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Abstract
This thesis is an extensive study which concentrates on the shareholders’ equity rights 
in joint stock companies under the Company Law of the State of Kuwait No. 15/1960. 
At the same time the thesis looks at the companies law of other counties, mainly at the 
UK Companies Act. The aim of examining foreign company laws is so that these 
might be used to improve company law in Kuwait. The main purpose of this thesis is to 
define the rights and role of shareholders. The thesis also attempts to identify the 
position, role and powers of the body of shareholders in joint stock companies by 
dedicating a chapter focusing on the topic of company theory. This study is divided 
into a number of chapters. The first chapter is an introductory chapter which 
concentrates on the legal system and the kinds of companies in Kuwait. The second 
chapter focuses on the theory of the company and nature of shareholders roles 
according to such a theory. The third chapter focuses on the definition of shares and 
shareholders in joint stock companies. The fourth chapter deals with shareholders 
financial rights. Chapter five is devoted to a discussion of shareholders’ right to 
knowledge of what took place and is going on in the company and the board’s duty to 
disclose all facts and details about the company’s affairs. The sixth chapter 
concentrates on the auditors’ role. The auditor acts on behalf of the shareholders to 
verify the credibility of the disclosed information and the validity and soundness of 
directors’ acts. Chapter seven is concerned with shareholders’ rights at the general 
meeting. Chapter eight deals with shareholders remedies. The thesis concludes with 
some proposals for reform of the Kuwait Company Law.
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Introduction
Companies in general have increasingly become a very important element in 
people’s lives. Every day most individuals deal with companies, often as buyers and 
consumers of a company’s product. There are many kinds of companies but the most 
important are joint stock companies (hereafter JSC). JSCs usually carry out major 
economic projects in all countries of the world. It is the type of company most able to 
consolidate capital. Many people choose to invest their money through the possession 
of a company’s shares, where their responsibility for the debts of the company does not 
extend beyond the nominal value of their shares.^
Hence, JSCs play a major role in the concentration of capital, which enables them 
to have an important role in economic, political and social life. Due to the importance 
of JSCs and their economic influence, it is very important for all countries to continue 
organising these companies by means of legislation, which will achieve the highest 
interests of the companies as well as those of the states.
A JSC is an artificial person; thus it has to be managed by a board of directors 
with the help of a number of employees. The board of directors carry out a 
management role in the interest of the company and they are subject to control and 
supervision of the shareholders in the General Meeting (hereafter GM) as well as the 
company auditors.^ The company’s GM is significant because it represents an
 ^ Al-melhem, Ahmed, Privatisation and Protection of Investors in Kuwait, ALQ, (1998) p. 191.
 ^ Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial ia w  o/Kî/wa?ï, T^edn, Kuwait: Author Publishing,
(1999), p. 368.
opportunity for shareholders’ opinions to be delivered to the board of directors/
However, one weakness of companies’ GMs is that many companies have given the 
boards of directors the chance to exercise wide powers in their companies. Moreover, 
they can exceed the powers stipulated for them by the law or under the Memorandum 
and Articles of Association.'^ This can have a detrimental result for companies, their 
shareholders and creditors. Sometimes, the GMs of JSCs come to resemble family 
meetings and pleasant places in which to authorise the directors’ actions during the last 
financial year. Such a GM is sometimes called “the absent parliament”.^
This thesis discusses shareholders’ rights in JSCs under the Kuwaiti Companies 
Law no. 15/1960 (hereafter KCL). The main purpose of this study is to examine the 
rights and role of shareholders in JSCs under the KCL. An attempt will also be made 
to answer a number of questions: What is a shareholder? What are the rights of 
shareholders? What role do shareholders play in JSCs? Do they actually and 
effectively carry out that role? If no, what obstacles prevent them fi'om doing so? Are 
they accorded all the rights which shareholders should possess in order to carry out 
their role effectively? What causes the perception that shareholder may not pay enough 
attention to the affairs of their companies or, in other words: Why might they not be 
sufficiently interested in participating in their companies? If shareholders are not given 
all or some of the rights, which enable them to exercise their powers in the company, is 
this due to defects in the KCL? Do flaws in the application of the Law by the Ministry
 ^ Gowers’ Principles o f Modern Company Law, Paul Davies ed, 6**^ edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Publishing, (1997), p. 583.
‘’Abou Zied, Radwan, Shareholding Companies in Public Sector, Cairo: Dar Al-fker Al-Arabi 
Publishing, (1983), p. 27.
 ^Ibid.
of Commerce and Industry (hereafter MCI) deprive shareholders of such rights, or do 
the shareholders themselves not care about their companies and fail to attend and vote 
at GMs. This is something that can results in a v^eakness of these GMs, which, along 
with shareholders ftmds, fall under the domination of the board’s directors.
The study is divided into eight chapters. Each chapter shall examine one of these 
rights although it should be borne in mind that each right is related to the one 
preceding it. The rights of the shareholders complement each other. Thus, such rights 
cannot be viewed in isolation. Arguably the principal feature is that each shareholder 
shall enjoy his financial rights in the company. These interests and rights require other 
rights to protect, maintain and ensure the increasing of these material rights (or the 
decreasing of them). After the financial right, is the shareholder's right to be 
acquainted with what goes on in the company, and commit the board to a duty to 
provide information through the reports issued annually (see chapter 5).
Such information regarding companies' conditions and status are useless if what 
is expressed in these reports, issued by the board through the company, does not have 
enough credibility, accuracy and detail to enable shareholders to perform their role 
correctly. They seek to monitor the board and protect their interest m the company 
based on information about the company's status and financial position. A shareholder 
who participates in the GM, based on incorrect information, is not expected to use his 
authority and rights in the meeting in the correct way. Nevertheless, the credibility 
required in the information provided cannot be proven or denied by most shareholders 
with their humble credentials. Therefore, it follows that the right succeeding the 
previous right for shareholders, is having an auditor to work for the benefit of the 
shareholders and produce a report that explains to shareholders the accuracy and 
credibility of the information provided by the board.
After focusing on the shareholders' rights and the presence of auditors, the role 
of shareholders' rights in all kinds of GM will then be discussed. When a shareholder is 
acquainted with his financial rights and the company's status through practicing his 
right in reading the reports, knowing what goes on in the company and making sure 
whether this information is correct or not, through the auditor's report, then comes the 
turn of studying and knowing shareholders' rights in the GM of the company. As will 
be seen in this study, the GM has the highest authority in the company and is the 
appropriate place for shareholders to protect their rights and to hold the board 
answerable. The decisions made by shareholders are of no use unless they are fully 
informed by an accurate understanding of the company's position.
Another extremely relevant issue is that of shareholders' remedies. Each one 
share in the Kuwaiti law entitles one vote in the GM -  the device that makes the 
decisions committing the board and shareholders. Those who possess a majority of 
votes, in reality, possess the authority for making decisions, and those in the majority 
are required to use that authority to achieve the companies' and shareholders' interests. 
However, this is not always the case, as the majority can sometimes be under the 
influence of the board. Such a situation could lead to problems and negation of the 
minority's rights. The question that is to be posed is: What are the rights of 
shareholders’ minority pursuant to the Kuwaiti law? These are important rights, not 
only for the protection of interests and rights for this minority, but also because one or 
a few of the shareholders may adopt an action or procedure for the company's 
protection, especially if the majority in the GM of the company is under the board’s 
control.
The question that imposed itself in this research is: Does the board in this kind of 
company have any relation with the subject of shareholders' rights? In other words, is
it necessary to discuss the subject of the board, and the role it shall play in the 
company, even though the study focuses on shareholders' equity. In response to this 
question the first observation is that, there is a direct, basic and inseparable relation 
between the board and the subject of shareholders' rights. All the authorities and 
powers given to the board could hinder the effectiveness of the rights granted to the 
shareholders by the company law. In any JSCs, there are two main bodies; these are 
the board and shareholders and they work through the GM. Thus, when discussing the 
subject of shareholders' equity, we shall discuss the subject of the board will also be 
discussed and the role it plays regarding shareholders’ rights (see 2.5).
The Kuwaiti Stock Exchange Market (hereafter KSEM) crash in 1982 provides 
clear evidence about the damage that occurred to the national economy of the State 
and to shareholders and their investments in the JSCs. The consequences of this crash 
were partly a result of the directors of many JSCs working outside of the law. The 
Kuwait Cabinet inspected the affairs of about 39 of the companies involved in the 
crash. It discovered that the problem occurred mainly because of the illegal actions of 
the directors of these companies. Its report provided, for example, that some directors 
of these companies had contracts with the companies without the permission of the 
GM as provided in the KCL in Article 151. The directorship of some directors was 
invalid because they had not deposited the qualification shares as provides in Article 
139 of the KCL. The boards of directors of some companies had increased their 
capital of the companies without any respect to the legal procedure mentioned in the 
KCL.^ Many directors had taken personal loans from the national banks by
 ^ Such as Kahema Real Estate company, the report provided that this company increased its capital 
without respecting the legal persuaders that must be followed in the case according the KCL.
guaranteeing their companies’ capitals/ Some accountancy firms colluded with the
boards of directors to submit inaccurate reports on their financial position, and some 
auditors presented false statements and balance sheets that showed profits where there 
were not any/ In addition, some of the boards of directors paid dividends of 15 or 20
per cent by drawing fi'om the capital of the company/ The report also provided that
the transactions of some companies had been carried out in the name of the presidents 
of the boards of directors personally and not in the name of their companies. After all 
these breaches of law and the contracts of the companies and rules of ethics by the 
directors of companies, the maximum punishment would be a mere penalty of KD 200 
(£400) as provided m Article 184 of the KCL (see chapter 8).
Therefore, as will be seen in this study, among the rights supposedly enjoyed by 
shareholders, is the expectation that board members acquire a certain extent of 
efficiency, that the board shall work to achieve the highest interest of the company, 
shareholders, and all those who have an interest therein, and the board shall also 
explore any private interests of its members in the company. Shareholders are also 
entitled to establish an explicit legal rule that holds the board members accountable for 
their delinquency (see chapter 8). If board members are not qualified to perform the 
duties of the company's management, or are not trustworthy enough to keep the 
company’s capital, the only subsequent result is the loss for aU those who have an
’ One of the chairmen of Kuwaiti companies took personal loan from the company without getting
permission from the GM and without telling the board’s members or the auditor of the company, for 
more information see Alanba’a Newspaper, Kuwait: 16/11/1992.
® Abdrheem, Ali and Aljumah, Haider, The Accountancy Policy and the Crash of Souq AL-Manakh,
60 Journal o f Gulf Studies and the Aribain Island (1989) p. 23,
 ^ For more information see the report of the committee that established by the Kuwaiti Cabinet on
13/03/1983 by Cabinet resolution no. 10 meeting 11/1983 to inspect the affairs of number of 
companies; also see Darwiche, Fida, the G idf Stock Exchange Crash the Rise and Fall o f  the Souq 
AL-Manakh, London: Croom Helm Publishing, (1986), p. 90; AL-hayyan, Abdullah M., Company
interest in the company, and shareholders shall be the first. The relation between the 
main organs in the company (the board and shareholders) is strong. Hence, any study 
on shareholders' equity shall directly include the board and authorities possessed 
thereby in the company, as well as distribution of powers and duties between the board 
and the shareholders in the company.
The main objectives of this study are; first, to enumerate the rights of 
shareholders in the JSCs. Second, to point out the weakness of the KCL on the issue 
of shareholders’ rights. Third, to put forward certain recommendations to rectify these 
defects, in order to keep up with the current developments in company law world­
wide.
In Kuwait, there are a few studies concerning JSCs, all of which concentrate on 
the board of directors. Despite the importance of the topic of shareholders’ rights in 
these kinds of companies, there is not even one study in Kuwait about them. 
Therefore, the subject of shareholders’ rights has not received its due attention and 
examination. This study will, therefore, disclose the function of the regulations in 
company law, and aims to provide access to a range of different solutions to the 
problems related to shareholders’ rights.
This study cites most of the articles of KCL and explains them. It then tries to 
identify any problems or issues that arise. At the same time, it looks at the companies 
laws of other countries, mainly the UK’s Companies Acts. Reference is made to many 
sections of the UK CA 1985 and other Acts. The aim of examining foreign Company 
laws is so that these might be used to improve the Kuwait position in the case of
Directors ' in Kuwaiti Companies: An Evaluation for Existing Laws and Proposals fo r  Reform, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Aberystwyth University of Wales, (2000), p. 8.
shareholders’ rights and position. Therefore, in summary, this study will concentrate 
on the position and rights of shareholders under the KCL 15/1960 with reference to 
the UK Companies Act 1985.
One may ask, why focus on the UK to conduct this research or use it as a base 
for this study. In fact, there are many reasons:
(1) The relationship between the UK and State of Kuwait started a long time 
ago, with the Amir of Kuwait in 1899 and a treaty of protection with the UK. 
Therefore, there is a historical link between these two countries, and this might be 
useful in this research.
(2) The UK is one of the pioneer countries in the field of company law 
worldwide. Commercial companies, specifically JSCs, have been known for a very 
long time. Therefore, these kinds of companies have played a major role in the growth 
and development of this country. Furthermore, such a deep-rooted law has enabled it 
to be the main source of benefit for all other countries, especially developing countries.
(3) The legal forms of business organisation in use in both the UK and Kuwait 
are currently similar. These can be arranged into four major categories: Sole trader. 
Partnership, Companies and Public Companies. Therefore, the UK Companies 
Legislation can be taken as a model to improve the KCL.
(4) It is noted that many of the basic principles of the UK Companies Acts are 
not embodied in Statutes, as the common law influence is still strong at the present 
time. In other words, precedent is recognised as a source of law. Precedent is law 
created by an adjudicative body (courts). Therefore, there are two main sources of law 
in the UK. Hence, the legal system in the UK is flexible, sophisticated and can be 
developed easily without following long procedures. By contrast, in the Kuwaiti
system, precedent is not recognised as a source of law at aU, where the source of law is 
codes; that is, the rules are written and the task of the courts is to implement them. 
Thus, if there is a real need to amend the KCL, there are many procedures that must be 
respected, and that means the legal system in Kuwait is a rigid system that cannot be 
improved easily. The UK is a common law jurisdiction. This means that it has a 
different legal system from Kuwait which is civil law country. This differentiation 
between the two legal systems may enrich the study, and give new ideas to solve those 
legal problems in Kuwait’s company law.
(5) In the UK, there have been a whole series of Companies Acts. The principal 
UK statutes applying to company law are: the Companies Act 1985 and 1989, 
Insolvency Act 1986; Financial Services Act 1986; Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986; Business Names Acts 1985, Criminal Justice Act 1993.
(6) The UK is a member of the European Union (EU), and this membership leads 
to further development due to the influence of the European Community harmonisation 
programme.
(7) The UK, unlike Kuwait, is characterized with many publications and 
reference books in the field of companies and shareholders' equities. The DTI also has 
many reports and studies issued, in which all the concerned parties in the field of 
companies participate. No doubt, this access to information is deemed very important 
and useful for every researcher in this field to enrich their study. Examples include: (a) 
Shareholders, Remedies: A Consultative Document, DTI November 1998, URN 
98/994; (b) Hampel Committee, Final Report on Corporate Governance (Gee: 
London, July 1998); (c) Directors' Remuneration : A consultative Document, DTI 
July 1999, URN 99/923; (d) Greenbury Committee, Report on Directors' 
Remuneration (Gee: London, July 1995) and many more.
The researcher’s presence in the UK is considered as an opportunity that shall be 
exploited. However, this shall not eliminate acknowledgment of other laws, that shall 
be useful and enriching to this study.
This study is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is the introductory 
chapter. It is necessary in this chapter first to give an outline of the judicial system in 
the state of Kuwait, followed by an outline of the history of the Kuwaiti Commercial 
Companies Law and the types of companies thereunder. This provides a background 
for the discussion on shareholders’ rights.
In chapter II it is necessary before proceeding to the main chapters, to identify 
the role of shareholders in the JSCs. This helps in understanding their rights. There 
then follows a section which focuses on the theory of the company, in order to identify 
the nature of shareholders’ roles under such a theory and understand their position in 
these kind of companies. This chapter also deals with distinction of powers in the 
company between the company’s board and the shareholders through the annual GM. 
It defines the powers which shareholders have vis a vis the board and evaluates their 
effectiveness. This chapter has a special importance, as it will help us go into further 
detail. It will address important matters and answer many questions concerning JSCs 
and shareholders, such as the nature of the JSC: is it a contract or an institution? What 
is the position of the shareholders? what is their role in this type of company? Are they 
owners of the company or just providers of capital and eventually gain a profit? What 
is the distribution of power in the company? What are the shareholders’ actual powers? 
Finally, the powers which they should possess but which Kuwaiti laws fails to provide 
for will also he discussed, it will also be established whether these powers are activated
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by the shareholders themselves or iftheyjust exercise them to protect their rights in 
the company.
In chapter III, it is necessary to give a definition of shares and shareholders in 
JSCs, and know when a person becomes a shareholder and when he loses this status. 
Kinds and classes of shares and shareholders vrill be described in addition to the 
characteristics and advantages of shares which make them distinct ifom other stocks.
Chapter IV will deal with shareholders financial rights in JSCs or the rights they 
should exercise under the Kuwait Companies Law. These rights are: the right to 
dispose of their shares by selling or any other means by which ownership is transferred 
to other persons; priority in subscription to any new shares issued by the company; 
receiving dividends at the end of every financial year and liquidation or termination of 
the company.
Chapter V is devoted to a discussion of shareholders’ right to knowledge of the 
company and the board’s duty to disclose all facts and details about the company’s 
affairs. It will determine the information which shareholders may have access to before 
during or after the annual GM. The reports published by the company will also be 
discussed. These include directors and auditors’ reports, the account balance sheet and 
profit and loss statements. The importance of these reports, and their significance as 
far the shareholders (in particular) are concerned, will be highlighted. It is also 
determined whether these reports under the Kuwaiti laws are adequate and 
comprehensive enough for shareholders to rely upon in taking future decisions 
concerning their investment in the company. This of course, depends on the credibility 
and accuracy of the information.
The person who acts on behalf of the shareholders to verify the credibility of the 
disclosed information and the validity and soundness of directors’ acts is the auditor,
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In view of the importance of the role of auditors for shareholders, chapter VI is 
devoted to this matter, including the auditors’ appointment and powers and the 
significance of the report they issue at the end of each financial year. It wiU also 
discuss their independence, the subsequent reliability of their report and finally their 
removal and the need to regulate so that their independence is not compromised.
Chapter VII is concerned with shareholders rights at the GM and the importance 
of the GM as weU as the types and duties of GM. The discussion covers in detail 
shareholders’ rights at the annual GM, including the right to attend in person or by 
proxy, the right to discuss any matter on the agenda and ask questions and the right to 
vote.
Chapter VIII deals with shareholders’ right to file a lawsuit against the board 
because of errors committed by the directors. An account of the types of action that 
may be filed by a shareholder in his personal capacity or in the name of the company is 
given. A discussion of the board’s civil and criminal liability follows.
In the conclusion of the thesis, the most important point that appeared in this 
study will be discussed. Recommendations will also be made in relation to the 
shareholders’ rights in the JSCs.
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Chapter One
1. Introduction:
This introductory chapter first outlines the legal system, and the laws organizing 
companies in the State of Kuwait. The kinds of companies according to the KCL No. 
15/1960 will then be explored, especially JSCs. It will also be looking at company law 
in the UK, and briefly kinds of companies under the UK Companies Act 1985. 
Attention will also be given to legal problems in the KCL.
1.1 Legal System of the State of Kuwait
Kuwait existed in the eighteenth century when its necessary factors as a State 
were completed.^ Kuwait indirectly remained part of the Ottoman Empire^ until 1899
when the ruler of Kuwait signed a treaty with Great Britain. Kuwait then fell under 
British mandate until its independence on 19 June 1961.^
Islamic Law dominated all the Arab States for more than thirteen centuries 
(Shari’a) The first written law that applied to Kuwait in 1938 was the Judicial 
Provisions Magazine on Civil and Commercial dealings according to Islamic Law. The 
Magazine was the ofldcial law of the Ottoman Empire.^ In the middle of this century
 ^ Ministry of Information, Kuwait Facts and Figures^ edn, Kuwait: the Ministry Publication, p. 23.
 ^The Ottoman Empire is now the Republic of Turkey.
 ^ Abdul Rasoul, Abdul Reda, A Summary of the Legal and Judicial System in the State of Kuwait, 6 
A L Q {\9 9 \)^ . 267.
Islamic Law means all the rules and regulations that are laid down in the Qur’an (the words of God),
and the Sunnah which is formed, as generally agreed, by the deeds, utterance and unspoken approvals 
of the Prophet Mohammed.
^The Magazine judicial provisions was enacted in 1876 and divided into 16 sections.
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and due to oil production, Kuwait witnessed a very fast growth in its urban 
communities and, after it had completed its full independence on 19 July 1961, it 
adopted a constitutional system.^ Kuwait is a civil law country, and its system is based
on French and Egyptian models/ The majority of codes in Kuwait were inspired by the 
French system and consist of the work of Egyptian and Kuwaiti legal scholars. 
However, the Islamic Law still forms an essential part of the legal system.*
Anybody may ask, why this is study being conducted in a state with a different 
legal system than that of the State of Kuwait. It could have been conducted in France, 
as Kuwait is affected by its civil law system.
First, it should be noted that this study is not the first one of the kind conducted 
in the UK by Kuwaiti researchers, and shall not be the last. The reason behind that is 
the richness of the deep-rooted legal system. Second, The world especially after the 
foundation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has become a small village, which 
led to the large interpenetration in the commercial life among many states which have 
different legal systems, such as the State of Kuwait. In addition to the foregoing, each 
member in the organisation is obliged to develop its laws especially commercial laws in 
order to be more developmental and flexible, which is applied in Kuwait also, in its 
capacity of a member in the organisation. In the course of carrying out this 
development, it shall seek developed legal commercial systems, and the most flexible. 
As we shall explain in the next point, this is not done properly in the French legal 
system with which the State of Kuwait is affected upon the establishment of the same.
® The State of Kuwait as the Constitution of Kuwait provides in Art. 6: “The System of Government in 
Kuwait shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides in the people, the source of all powers. 
Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner specified in this Constitution”.
’ Gerald, John O., Legal Aspects o f Doing Business in Kuwait, 6 ALQ (1991) p. 321.
® The sources of law in Kuwait are three: Legislation, Custom, and Islamic Law.
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Third, As the State of Kuwait has been affected by the French legal system, which is 
being followed for many years, it is a rigid inflexible system, and suffers ffom many 
problems as proven in some of the studies. Hence, why shall the state affected with 
this system stay within its limits.
After taking a look at some of the researches presented by La Porta and others^ 
in the field of protecting shareholders and investors as they are comparative studies 
between different legal laws, such as the French and British and other 47 counties. 
Porta provided in the conclusion of his article that;
In this paper, we have examined law governing investor protection, the 
quality of enforcement of these laws, and ownership concentration in 49 
countries around the world. The analysis suggests three broad conclusions. 
First.. .countries whose legal rules originate in the common law tradition tend 
to protect investors considerably more than the countries whose law originate 
in the civil-law, and especially the French-civil-law, tradition. Second,... law 
enforcement is strong in common-law countries as well, whereas it is the 
weakest in the French-civil-law countries.
He provided also on the same article that, “companies in counties with poor 
investor protection have more concentrated ownership of their shares," and good
accounting standards and shareholders protection measures are associated with a lower 
concentration of ownership, indicating that concentration is indeed a response to poor 
investor protection’"^
Therefore, the states following the French system, are in fact less protective of 
shareholders and investors in general in JSCs, and also it has the weakest quality of law 
enforcement and weakest quality of accounting. In return, these studies have
 ^La Porta, Rafael and others, “Law and Finance”, 154(4) Jnl o f Politcal Economy (1998) p. 1113 
^°IW.,p.ll51 
1145 
1141.
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discovered that the states applying the common law system, e.g. UK, are more efficient 
and capable of protecting shareholders and investors. They are also successful in 
applying the commercial laws, and imposing the respect of these laws. As result of the 
aforementioned facts, markets at these states are more active and expanding than the 
stock mai'kets of the states following the French legal system. Why shall we in the 
small states affected by the French system remain locked within its borders, as they do 
not provide us with any addition to our legal commercial system. Hence, why not 
seeking to solve our problems in another state, such as UK, for the purpose of 
developing our laws and protecting companies’ shareholders through taking what is 
proper for application in our state. This is Kuwait’s orientation, as researchers in all 
science fields are sent to many developed countries -fi'om which among is UK- in order 
to contribute in building this state in all fields, of which among is the commercial legal 
field indeed.
1.2 Constitution of Kuwait
The permanent Constitution of Kuwait was issued on 11 November 1962, being 
laid down by a constituent assembly of 20 members elected by the nation." The 
Constitution is based on democratic principles and its basis includes the sovereignty of 
the state, public fi-eedom, and equality before the law."
The constitution of Kuwait is composed of 183 articles divided into five 
chapters; the State and the System of Government, The Basic Constituents of Kuwait 
Society, Public Rights and Duties, Powers, and General Provisions.
Ministry of Information, Supra note 1, p 44.
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1.3 Components of the System of Government
The system of government in Kuwait is based on a separation of powers. The 
legislative power is vested in the Amir (the head of the state)" and the National
Assembly; the executive powers are vested in the Amir, the Cabinet, its the ministers; 
judicial power is vested in the courts in the name of the Amir. The Constitution of 
Kuwait in Art. 50 provides that:
The system of government is based on the principle of separation of powers 
functioning in co-operation with each other in accordance with the provisions of the 
constitution. None of these powers may relinquish all or part of its competence specified 
in this constitution.
1.3.1 National Assembly
The National Assembly" is a unicameral house composed of fifty members who 
are elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot." The members are elected 
for a four-year term."
Members are free to express any views or opinions in the Assembly or its 
committees." Every member has the right to introduce bills,^  ^Any bfil passed by the
See Constitution of the State of Kuwait Articles 6,7 and 8.
The present Amir is His Highness Sheikh Jaber AL-Ahmad AL-Jaber AL-Sabah.
The first parliamentary election in Kuwait was held on 23 January 1963.
Constitution of the State of Kuwait Article 80.
Article 51 of constitution of Kuwait provides “legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the 
National Assembly in accordance with the constitution”.
Constitution of the State of Kuwait Article 110.
Ibid., Article 109.
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National Assembly will not become a law until ratified by the Amir/^ The Assembly is 
empowered with approving the state budget and its final accounts. The Assembly also 
oversees the government through different means, like submitting questions, requesting 
the tabling of any subject for discussion, questioning of ministers, and the setting up of 
committees of inquiry.^^
1.3.2 Government
The executive power consists of the Cabinet: Prime Minister and Ministers.^*
The Amir appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister; he also appoints and dismisses 
ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet has control 
over state institutions, and plans the government’s general policy and pursues its 
execution. While every minister is responsible for the affairs of his ministry, the Prime 
Minister and the ministers aie accountable to both the Amir and the National 
Assembly. '^^
1.3.3 The Judiciary
The judicial power is the third component of the system of government. The 
constitution of Kuwait stipulates that the judiciary is independent, and judges are not 
subject to any authority.The right of litigation to the courts is guaranteed to all.^ ^
Ibid., Article 79.
Ibid., Article 99.
Ibid., Article 123.
Ibid.
Constitution of the State Kuwait in Article 163 provides: “In administering justice judges shall not
be subject to any authority. No interference whatsoever shall be allowed with the conduct of justice. 
Law shall guarantee the independence o f the Judiciary and shall state the guarantees and provisions 
relating to judges and the eonditions of their irremovability”.
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Therefore, according to the legal system of the State of Kuwait, any law must be 
enacted by the National Assembly because producing bills is one of its duties. As will 
be proved later in this study later there is a real need for a new Company Law. 
Therefore, the National Assembly should implement its duty and present this new law.
1.4 History of Company Law in Kuwait:
In Kuwait, the company, as an entity, existed within a limited scope and in a 
form commensurate with the Kuwaiti’s economic life at that time, which was based on 
fishing, diving for pearls in the Arabian Gulf, and travelling to Africa and India for 
trade.^ ^
The Ottoman Empire ruled all states in the Arabian Gulf, directly or indirectly, 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the first half of the twentieth 
century.^* While Kuwait was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, it began, in 1938, 
to implement the articles of the Justice Magazine, it was then introduced in all Arabian 
Gulf countries.A s already stated, the Magazine was issued by the Ottoman Empire in 
1876. The Justice Magazine was the official law of the Ottoman Empire. All its
Law of Judiciary No. 19 of 1959.
Abou Zeid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative Law, T‘ edn, Dar Al-Kitab 
Al-Hadeeth Publishing, (1978), p. 10.
Mohammad, Al-Moqatei, Introducing Islamic Law in the Arab Gulf State: A Case Study of Kuwait, 
A ALQ  (1989) p. 139.
Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, 3®‘* edn., Kuwait: Author Publishing, 
(1999), p. 27.
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articles were taken from the Islamic Shari’a law/° The Magazine was comprised of 
1851 articles and 16 books. One of these was on companies.^ ^
The major development in Kuwait with respect to commercial life was the 
discovery of oil in the 1930s. Thus, economic and human resources increased, and the 
major corporations for oil exploitation were established in Kuwait at that time.^^
Proceeds from oil brought about new characteristics in the Kuwaiti economy. New 
plans for government machinery were drawn up, including the enactment of written 
legislation and reforms of the judicial system. In the early 1950s, the Kuwaiti joint 
stock companies began to be incorporated; e.g., the Kuwait National Bank ini952, the 
Kuwait National Cinema Company in 1954, the Kuwait Airways Corporation in 1954, 
and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company in 1955."
The KCL has been set in 1960, and was subjected to some amendments, which 
did not touch the basic points of defects therein, specifically to determined 
shareholders equities. After reading this law, we have discovered that it only includes 
234 legal articles, as this number of legal materials is very little and cannot cover all the 
firm’s affairs with aU its types. As for the legal articles which focus directly on 
shareholding companies, it does not exceed 115 articles and it surely cannot cover all
Ibid.
Ibid. In Islam there are three types of companies: the Proprietary Partnership (Sharikat Mulk);
Contractual Partnership (Sharikat Aqd) and the Allowance Company (Sharikat Ebahah). First, 
Proprietary Partnership is the joint ownership of property created expressly or by implication without 
its joint exploitation: for example the joint ownership of a house. Second is a contractual partnership. 
In this kind of company the joint ownership is not an element necessary for the establishment of the 
partnership. The emphasis is rather on the joint exploitation of capital and the joint participation in 
profits and losses. Third Company is the Allowance Company. This company includes everything 
permissible for people to make use of it together. For more information see Tamma, Supra note 25, p. 
28.
Ibid., p 37.The first foreign oil were company incorporated in 1934 by the US Gulf Oil Corporation, 
and the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.
Tamma, supra note 29, p. 35.
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the affairs of this type of large companies with the special importance among all kinds 
of companies. In consideration to the legal articles tackling shareholders rights, 
unfortunately they do not exceed three or four articles of this law. Hence, there is a 
grave defect in the law, which is clear before reading the substance thereof.
Why development shall be brought about now? As previously indicated that 
some attempts were carried out for the sake of development, yet, they were all 
defective, and had not any real additions. Specialised people in the area of company 
law demand the comprehensive development, but this demand was not met with 
attention up till now. Currently, this matter has become more persisting and the 
situation in the world has developed in a quickly. Kuwait as a small developing state, 
cannot catch with this progress, unless by modernising its laws and being aware of the 
laws and systems of other countries, such as the UK, to assist us in bringing about this 
development. This development in laws and systems is one of the demands of WTO, 
in which Kuwait has joined, leading to obliging it to develop its laws to be more 
flexible and modern.
Also, there is an orientation in the State of Kuwait to eliminate dependence on 
the public sector (governmental), and give the private sector the opportunity to play 
the role required therefrom. This matter cannot be achieved unless this sector is given 
this opportunity to perform the expected role. Accomplishing the same requires 
flexible laws, and non-intervene from the part of the state in all the commercial life 
affairs, so as this sector can attract capitals. Therefore, laws regulating the private 
sector shall be developed, of which among the companies’ law of course.
Regarding the form of development required in Kuwait, the JSCs and specifically 
shareholders rights, it shall be as follows: In fact, as will be explained in the second 
chapter- any company of which its contract is governed by its memorandum of
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association and companies’ law, as the company is not founded by a special pure 
contract, in the same time it is not a governmental establishment. Thus, any 
development in the commercial life and companies shall contain a company contract, 
meaning its memorandum of association or constitution, and the development of 
companies’ law as well. Also, We must indicate that there is many laws related to the 
same, for example, the stock market laws, as they are important and vital laws, which 
shall be taken in consideration upon any development, as we have explained in the fifth 
chapter. These laws are concerned with shareholders and investors in general.
KCL No. 15/1961 covers all types of companies which are recognised in Kuwait. 
Traditionally differentiation is made between people companies and capital companies. 
People companies are the companies where the personality of the associates is 
fimdamental. However, in capital companies, the personality of the associates is, in 
principle, irrelevant. Their capital is divided into shares which are to be freely 
transferable.
1.5 Lawful form of Companies under the KCL
A company is defined as a contract in which two or more persons undertake to 
participate in a financial project with a view to profit, each contributing money or 
services and dividing the profits or losses resulting from the project." The 
classification of companies within the KCL is based on French law adopted in Egypt
Kamal, Mustafa, Commercial Companies, Dar Al-jama Ai-jadeeda Publishing, (1998), p. 15.
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and other countries in the Middle East. All permitted types of companies enjoy 
independence and legal personality except joint ventures.^^
The forms of companies authorised in the State of Kuwait include General 
Partnership, Limited Partnership, Joint Venture, Closed Joint Stock Company, Limited 
Liability Company, and Joint Stock Company.
1,5.1 General Partnership
A general partnership is established between two or more persons under a certain 
title, to carry out some commercial activities. It is a company in which all members are 
personally, severally and jointly liable for the debts and obligations of the company."
Therefore, the creditors of such a company may execute against the personal assets of 
a partner only after serving notice of the claim against the partnership; in other words, 
this liability may extend to each partner’s personal wealth when the partnership fails to 
pay its debts.^  ^ However, the personal creditors of one of the partners may not
recover the sum owed from the capital of the partnership.
According to the Company Law of Kuwait, the memorandum of general 
partnership should contain the following/*
(1) The name of the company; (2) The headquarter of the company; (3) The 
object of the company; (4) The names of the members, one of them must be a 
Kuwaiti national; (5) The names of the managers of the company; (6) The 
capital of the company, the share of each member, and the proportion of
Article 2 of the KCL provides that “with the exception of Joint Ventures all companies shall be 
endowed with legal personality.”
Article 4 of the KCL.
Ibid., Article 22 provides that "The creditors o f a partnership are entitled to have recourse to the
partnership’s assets as well as to the personal assets of a partner who was, at the time of contracting, a 
member o f the partnership; all partners shall be jointly liable to the creditors of the partnership; 
however, execution may not be effected against the personal assets of a partner unless notice has been 
served on the partnership, which has failed to pay within the reasonable time limit fixed by the 
creditor.”
Article 5 of the KCL.
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Kuwaiti capital in the company capital shall be not less than 51 per cent; (7) 
The method of distribution of the profits and losses among the partners; (8) 
The duration of the company; (10) Any other specific thing which the 
members think should be included in the memorandum.
The name of the general partnership consists of the name/names of one or more 
partner followed by the phrase “and Co”*^ . The bankruptcy of the partnership means 
the personal bankruptcy of all partners.'^  ^In a general partnership company, a partner 
cannot transfer his interest in the company until he attains the approval of all partners 
in the partnership.'^^
As stipulated in the partnership’s memorandum, a partner may appoint one or 
more managers to manage the company. These managers may be chosen firom the 
partners themselves or fi'om the public. The manager may perform all normal acts of 
management in order to achieve the objects of the company.'^  ^However, managers and 
partners should not carry on any business that is similar to the business of the 
partnership unless they are authorised to do so by the partners."
A general partnership is dissolved when one of the general liquidation causes 
occurs, as mentioned in Article 24 of the KCL.'^ '^
^^Ibid., Article 7. 
Ibid., Article 11.
Article 12 of the KCL provides that “Unless the memorandum of association of the company
otherwise provides, no member of the company may transfer the property in his share thereof to a 
non-member except with the consent o f all the (other) members, and no transfer of his share by a 
Kuwait member in a company formed after the coming of this law into force, to a non-Kuwait, shall 
be valid, if  it shall cause the capital o f the Kuwaiti members (in that company) to fall below 51% of its 
capital. The formalities as to publicity, prescribed by the provisions of the Commercial Register Law, 
shall be complied with.
A member, however, may transfer to a third party the benefits and fi:uits o f his share of the company, 
but such a transfer shall have no effect except as between the parties to it.
Article 15 of the KCL.
Ibid., Article 20. 
Ibid., Article 24.
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1.5.2 Limited Partnership
This kind of organisation has three sorts of partners: limited partner(s), sleeping 
partner(s) and general partner(s). The limited partner enjoys limited liability. 
Therefore/^ he is liable for the debts and obligations of the company only to the extent
of his share in the capital of partnership, and he is banned from participating in the 
management of the company. However, the general partners who manage the 
company are personally and jointly liable for the debts and obligations of the company, 
and this liability may extend to personal property.
The memorandum of the limited partnership must indicate the name of the 
partnership as well as the names of the general and limited partners. One general 
partner at least must be of Kuwaiti nationality and ovm at least 51 per cent of the 
company capital.
If a limited partner participates in management he will then be in the same 
position as a general partner, and cannot then enjoy limited liability.Furthermore, a 
limited partner will lose the benefit of limited liability when his name appears in the 
name of the partnership.'^*
Ibid., Article 42.
Ibid.. Article 47.
Ibid., Article 46.
Ibid., Article 45 provides that “the name of the company shall include the name of its active
partners only, and where there is only one partner whose liability extends to all o f his property, his 
name shall be followed by the word(s) ‘and partners’.
A sleeping partner shall not allow his name to be included in the title of the company, otherwise he 
would be liable as a active partner towards a bona fide third party.
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In all other respects, such as management, winding up and liquidation, the limited 
partnership is governed by the same rules that apply to general partnership/^
1.5.3 Joint Venture
The KCL provides that the “joint venture is confined to the relationship between 
the partners and shall not be valid in regard to the third parties”."  The joint venture
agreement is entered into by two or more parties for the purpose of carrying limited 
operations, and need not be registered with the authorities and need not disclose their 
identity to the public.^  ^A joint venture exists just between the partners. Therefore, this
kind of association does not enjoy an independent legal personality,^^ and it may not
issue negotiable shares or debentures.^^
1.5.4 Limited Liability Company
A Limited Liability Company is formed by two or more persons, but not more 
than thirty persons, '^^each of which is liable only to the extent of his contribution to
capital. The minimum capital required to form this kind of company is KD 7,500 
(15,000 pounds); the capital is not represented by shares and must be fuUy paid up in
Ibid., Article 44 provides that “Subject to the provisions hereinafter stated, “limited partnership”
shall, as to its formation, management, winding up and liquidation, be regulated by the rules which 
govern ‘general partnership’ even as regarding its sleeping members.”
Ibid., Article 56 provides that “A joint venture is a commercial company formed (by and) between
two persons or more, but has no existence except as between its partners. It shall not be binding on a 
third party.”
Ibid., Article 57.
”  Ibid., Article 59.
Ibid., Article 62 provides that “A joint venture may neither issue negotiable shares nor debentures.” 
Ibid., Article 185.
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cash or in kind/^and at least 51 per cent of the capital must be owned by a Kuwaiti."
However, a participant’s share in a limited liability company may not be transferred to 
third parties except by the permission of the other members who have the right to 
refuse the transfer to the third party. In other words, any member who wants to sell his 
portion must tell the other members and wait one month. If nobody among the other 
members is interested, he has the right to sell his portion in the company to non- 
members.^^ A limited liability company cannot raise additional capital by public
subscription and issue negotiable shares or bonds." Also, it is prohibited from 
investing in banking, insurance or financial activities.^  ^The company’s name may be 
derived from its purpose or from the name of one or more of its members,^® and the 
name must be followed by the term “Limited”.
One or more managers manage a limited liability company,^^ and Articles of
Association should determine the power of the managers.^^ The manager may or may 
not be a member." The management of this company is similar to the management of 
the JSC regarding the liability of the directors,the shareholders and the third parties.
”  Ibid., Article 193. 
Ibid., Article 197. 
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 186. 
Ibid., Article 187. 
Ibid., Article 188. 
Ibid., Article 201. 
Ibid., Article 203. 
Ibid., Article 201.
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1.5.5 Closed Joint Stock Company
This kind of company, as a general rule, is subject to the rules governing JSCs. 
However, they have especial characteristics which make them different from open 
JSCs and other kinds of companies. The Closed Company must include not less than 
five shareholders who subscribe for its capital which is divided into shares. This 
company cannot resort to public subscription in order to cover its capital, but the 
intending founders of the company should take all of the shares of the company. 
Moreover, to establish this kind of companies there is no need to issue an Amiri decree 
like in a public JSC."
1.6 Joint Stock Company
A JSC is a company in which the capital is divided into equal and transferable 
shares and in which the shareholders are liable for company debts only to the extent of 
the nominal value of their shares.^^
1.6.1 Incorporation Procedure
The incorporation procedure of a JSC depends, according to the KCL, on 
whether a company is a public joint stock company or a private joint stock company. 
The difference between them is that, in a JSC the capital is offered to the public, 
whereas a private joint stock company’s entire share capital must be subscribed by the 
founders of the company."
Ibid., Article 204.
Ibid., Article 94.
Ibid., Article 63.
Ibid., Article 94.
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The company name must be obtained from its purpose and be followed by the 
term: “joint stock company”. A company can change its name but a resolution must be 
passed concerning this at its extraordinary general meeting, and this change should not 
affect its rights and obligations.^*
The founders of the company must be five or more.^  ^Kuwaiti legislature
does not give any definition of a founder, but it is generally recognised that a 
founder is any person who effectively takes part in the incorporation of a company 
with the intention of bearing any resulting responsibilities.^^ According to the 
KCL, the founders shall file an application in the government department 
concerned in the MCI in order to obtain a decree to incorporate the company.^’
The requests of incorporation go along with the Memorandum of Association and 
Articles of Association.
The governmental concerned department in the MCI shall make sure that the 
proposed company does not go against public policy or the rules of morality and is not 
in conflict with the provisions of laws of the country.Also, this department should
examine the feasibility study of the proposed company.^^ After issuing and publishing 
the decree of incorporation in the Official Gazette, the company becomes a legal 
person separate from its founders.
Ibid., Article 66.
Ibid., Article 70.
Tamma, supra note 29, p. 267; see also Mustafa, Kamal, Commercial Companies-. General 
Provisions on Companies, Cairo: Dar Al-jama Al-jadeeda Publishing, (1997), p 146.
Article 71 of the KCL.
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 72.
'^Ubid., Article 74.
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In the second stage of incorporation, the founders offer an invitation to the 
public to subscribe for shares in their company/^ The subscription operation shall 
remain open for a minimum period of ten days, and a maximum period of three 
months." The subscription normally takes place in one or more of the approved banks. 
To ensure the integrity of the founders, Kuwaiti legislature requires the founders to 
subscribe not less than 10 per cent of the total number of the company’s shares.^^
The third stage of incorporation starts when the subscription operation has been 
finished. The founder, within three months, must serve an announcement to the 
subscribers to attend the constituent meeting.^* In this meeting, a report concerning aU 
the operations of the incorporation should be presented by the founders of the 
company." Then, the shareholders in this meeting will elect the first board of directors
and the first auditors.*^
1.6.2 Share Capital
The capital of a public joint stock company must be at least KD 37,500 (150,000 
pounds).*^ The capital of the company is to be divided into nominal shares of equal
value. The value of the shares should be determined by the founders but should not
Ibid., Article 76.
Ibid., Article 77.
Ibid., Article 81,
Ibid., Article 88.
Ibid., Article 89.
Ibid., Article 90(1) provides that “the general constituent meeting shall elect the first board of 
directors and the first auditors, and proclaim that the incorporation of the company has become final.” 
Ibid., Article 98.
Ibid., Article 99.
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be less than 100 fils (20 pence) and not more than KD 75 (150 pounds).** The value
of the shares should be paid in cash in one single payment or in instalments, by paying 
20 per cent of the share value the first time; the remaining value should be paid within 
five years starting fi*om the date of the incorporation decree.*'  ^If the company has 
shares in kind (not in cash) it should be ascertained that assessment is correct and made 
sure that their value was not over-estimated.*^ The shares of the new JSC are not
negotiable before the publication of the first balance sheet after at least one complete 
financial year.*^
A Company may increase its capital by issuing new shares after the instalments 
on the first shares have been completely paid up.*  ^The new shares must be of the same
value as the shares already in existence.** A shareholder of the company has priority to
subscribe in the new shares equal with the number of shares he holds (see 4.2).*  ^After
issuing the resolution of an extraordinary GM, the company can also reduce its capital, 
if the capital that the company has is more than meets its requirements, when it has lost 
part of its capital and when it wants to reduce the capital to the amount really 
available.^®
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 102. 
Ibid., Article 105. 
Ibid., Article 106. 
Ibid., Article 110. 
Ibid.
Article 111.
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1.6.3 Membership of the Company
The promoters as well as the subscribers, who have subscribed to the company’s 
shares, are members of the company and they have equal rights and are subject to the 
same obligations/^ In other words, a person becomes a member when he subscribes to
the shares of the company and enters his name in the Shareholders’ Register^^. Any
person can think of becoming a member, except that the Company Law or the Articles 
Association imposes some restrictions (see 3.4.2).
According to KCL, every JSC incorporated in Kuwait will be of Kuwaiti 
nationality. All shareholders shall be Kuwaiti and the company’s headquarter should be 
in Kuwait.^* Therefore, foreign shareholding is inadmissible, unless there is a need for
investing foreign capital or experience.^"  ^ In this case, the approval of the concerned
government authorities must be given, and foreign shareholding should not exceed 49 
per cent of the capital, except for insurance companies and banks where the foreign 
shareholding does not exceed 40 per cent.^^
When a person’s name is entered in the register of the company, he becomes a 
member of that company, and he enjoys some rights. These include the right to share 
the profit," the right to share the company’s assets upon dissolution,^^ the right to
^°lbid., Article 112 provides that “A JSC may reduce its capital if: (a) it is in excess of its
requirements, (b) a loss occurs and the company deems (it advisable) to reduce the capital to the 
amount actually available. Such reduction shall be authorised by a resolution of the EGM.”
^fbid., Article 130.
Ibid., see also Morse, Geoffrey, Charlesworth & Morse Company Law, 15‘*' edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Publishing, (1995), p. 210.
Article. 68.
Ahmed, Al-Melhem, Privatisation and Protection of Investors in Kuwait, 13 ALQ (1998) p. 184. 
Ibid.
Article. 131(1) of the KCL.
^fbid.. Article. 131(2).
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obtain a printed “booklet” containing the balance sheet of the company/*and the right 
to supervise the board of directors and GM in accordance with the Articles of 
Association/^ A shareholder can also start actions against the directors, apply for the 
nullification of a resolution taken by the GM, and be in contact with the law, public 
policy. Memorandum or Articles of Association/®^ Furthermore, a shareholder has the
right to dispose of his shares and has priority to subscribe for new shares/®  ^However, 
a shareholder is subject to some legal obligations, such as paying instalments that are 
due and paying the interest in the case of a delay, compensating the company for 
expenses that it paid during the recovery of the instalments or doing anything that may 
cause harm to the company. Moreover, a shareholder should implement any resolution 
passed by the GM of the company."^
As will be seen later in this study, the articles in the KCL that concentrate on the 
rights of shareholders in the JSCs are limited. Therefore, shareholders of a JSC in 
Kuwait do not necessarily enjoy all of their rights and this affects their role in these 
kinds of companies.
1,6.4 Board of Directors
Every company acts through two main organs. These are the GM and the board 
of directors. Each organ has obligations to the company, and they have to work 
together to achieve the company’s aims. The board of directors consists of a group of
ib id , Article 131(3). 
Ibid, Article 131(4). 
^^Ubid, Article 131(5). 
Ibid, Article 131(6). 
Ibid., Article 132,
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shareholders, and their duty is to manage the company (see 2.5.1). The Memorandum 
of Association determines the appointment and the number of directors. One of the 
main problems which affects the interests of shareholders and other interested groups 
in the JSCs in Kuwait is that many members of the boards of the companies act outside 
of their powers and current legislation does not help to control them.^ '^ ®
A director, according to the KCL, should own one per cent of the company’s 
capital. However, it is sufficient also that a director own a number of shares with a 
nominal value of K.D 7500 (£15,000),^®'  ^unless the company’s Articles of Association
are otherwise provided for. The qualifying shares shall be deposited into an approved 
bank within one month from the date of his appointment. They are not negotiable until 
the membership term expires, and until approval of the balance sheet of the last 
financial year during which the member of the board carried out his work."^
Directors of a JSC are elected by the GM of shareholders by secret ballot and 
may be re-elected unless the Articles of Association provide otherwise."^ At the first 
meeting of the board of directors, the directors shall select a chairman and a vice- 
chairman."^
The directors should carry out aU duties of management of the company,"* the 
powers of the board should be mentioned in the Memorandum of Association."^ The
For more information see the report of the committee that established by the Kuwaiti Cabinet on
13/03/1983 by Cabinet resolution no. 10 meeting 11/1983 to inspect the affairs of number of 
companies; also see Alwatan Daily News Paper, Kuwait, 26.9.82.
Article 139 o f the KCL.
Ibid
Ibid , Article 141.
°^Ibid., Article 145.
Ibid. Article 146
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board of directors is responsible to the company, the shareholders and any third party 
and for all acts of their management, such as cheating, abuse of power, violation of the 
law, or the Articles of Association or any other fault in management (see 2.5.1).^^^
Furthermore, a director of a company should not have any personal interest in any 
contracts or transactions made with the company, unless these interests are authorised 
by the GM (see chapter 7).“ ^
The directors may receive remuneration for their work/^^ The Articles of 
Association of a company should determine the method of fixing the remuneration. 
The total of such remuneration should not be more than ten per cent of the net profit, 
after deduction of depreciation reserves and the distribution of not less than five per 
cent of the capital to the shareholders (see 5.3.4.3).“ ^
A director may be dismissed by resolution of a GM. The proposal of dismissal 
must be made by a number of shareholders who own not less than 25% of the shares 
subscriber.^
1.6.5 General Meeting
A GM is the highest authority in a JSC. The will of the shareholders of a 
company is normally expressed at the GM, when they vote for or against any 
resolution that is proposed, and the decision of the GM is a decision of the company. 
Every shareholder has a number of votes equal to the number of shares he or she holds
Ibid.
^^Ubid., Article 148. 
Ibid., Article 151. 
Ibid., Article 150. 
Ibid.
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and resolutions are passed by the absolute majority of the shares represented in the 
meeting (see chapter 7)/^^
The board of directors may convene a GM at any time but must meet at least 
once a year/^^ General notice of a meeting should be sent to all shareholders at least
one week before the date of the meeting, and published in two Arabic newspapers at 
least twice/
AGMs address all matters that are not reserved to the EGM (see 7.1.1),^^^such
as the directors’ report with regard to the activities and the financial situation of the 
company and the auditors’ report concerning the balance sheet of the company. It may 
also discuss and authorise the accounts and determine the dividends to be distributed 
to the shareholders of the company. It elects the directors and auditors of the 
company, discusses the proposals concerning the increasing of the company’s capital, 
the issue of debentures, borrowing, mortgages and guarantees.
There are some matters which the Kuwaiti legislature reserve for the EGM (see 
7.1.2).^^° These are, for example, the amendment of the Memorandum or the Articles 
of Association, the sale or disposal of a project carried out by the company, the 
dissolution of the company, amalgamation with another company and reduction of the 
company’s capital.
^Ubid., Article 152. 
Ibid., Article 156. 
Ibid., Article 154. 
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 157. 
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 158. 
Ibid.
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The EGM will not be valid to carry out its business without the presence of 
shareholders representing three-quarters of the company’s shares. Otherwise, notice 
for another meeting should be served, and this meeting will be valid if a total of half of 
the shares of the company is represented.^^^
GMs in the JSCs are the highest power in the company, therefore, the board of 
directors are subject to the control and supervision of these meetings. Also, the GM is 
a good place for shareholders to express their opinions to the board of directors. 
Unfortunately, as a result of the weak impact of these meetings, the shareholders lose 
their chance to hold the directors to account with the remit that the boards are given 
more power that what has been stipulated for them by the law and articles of 
association (See 7.4).
1.6.6 Accounts of the Company
A JSC must have at least one auditor. The GM of the shareholders has the
right to appoint him and determine his fees. The auditor’s job is to audit the company’s 
accounts, and he has the right of access to all the company’s books, register and 
document s .The  auditor has to attend the GM and produce his report,^^  ^which 
should be accurate otherwise he will be responsible, and every shareholder has the 
right to discuss and ask the auditor about any point in his report (see chapter 6)}^^
Ibid., Article 160. 
^^ I^bid., Article 161. 
^^ I^bid., Article 163.
Ibid., Article 164. 
^^ I^bid., Article 165,
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The existence of an auditor is one of the shareholders rights in the company. 
Auditors under the KCL unfortunately do not have enough power and are not 
sufficiently qualified to play their role (see 6.4)
1.6.7 Liquidation
The KCL stipulates the circumstances in which a company may be wound up. A 
JSC is liquidated when the company has achieved the objective for which it was 
established; with the expiry of a fixed period for which the company was established; at 
the declaration of the company’s bankruptcy; with the dissolution of the company 
according to the law; and when a judicial judgement is issued to wind up the 
company. Moreover, if the company has lost three-quarters of its capital, the board
of directors must convene an extraordinary GM to discuss either the liquidation of the 
company or the reduction of its capital. If the board of directors fails to convene this 
meeting, or a quorum is not present at the meeting, or the shareholders in the meeting 
refused to liquidate the company, the government department concerned and every 
shareholder may introduce legal proceedings to force liquidation (see 4.5).^^^
1.7 Company Law in the UK
Earlier to this time companies were created by Royal Charter (a special 
authorisation fi-om Crown) or by a special Act of Parliament.^^  ^ UK company law is 
mainly concerned with the creation and operation of registered companies, that is.
Article 170.
Ibid., Article 171.
G ower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law, Paul L. Davies (ed.), edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Publishing, (1997), pp. 18-35
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companies with separate legal personality created by the process of registering them 
with the registrar of companies under the Companies Act 1985. This facility of 
creating companies with limited liability simply by registration has been available in 
England since the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.
JSCs became common in the 16^ ‘^ century and were so-called because their 
members contributed merchandise or m o n e y . A t  first these companies were colonial
companies, created mainly to open up trade with new colonies, but by the late 17^  ^
century nearly all of the new companies were created for domestic enterprises. At this 
time, there was also considerable growth in the numbers of large partnerships which 
were using various legal devices to make them as much like the chartered and statutory 
companies as possible. In the beginning of 1 century there were many speculative 
flotations of different types of company and a stock market collapse. This reached a 
climax in 1720 when the share price of the South Sea Company collapsed; this event 
was known as the South Sea ‘Bubble’ because once it burst, there was nothing left of 
its assets.'^  ^ Legislation was then passed which was designed to prevent the large 
partnerships firom acting as though they were companies. Known as the Bubble Act, it 
was not repealed until 1825^^\ by which time it had been realised that it was
economically desirable to permit the easy creation of companies. It also soon became 
necessary to clarify the status of the many partnerships which had now begun to 
prosper. In England, legislation in 1844 permitted incorporation by registration for the 
first time and limited liability was made obtainable in 1855.^ ^^  These provisions were
^^°/6zU,p.20.
Ibid., p. 24. 
^^^Ibid., p. 33. 
Ibid., p. 40.
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then re-enacted in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856/ '^* In 1862 this and other
following legislation was consolidated in the Companies Act 1862/^^ Then, the
growth of company law followed a pattern which remains to the present day. In the 
years following a consolidating Act more reforms are established, either as a result of 
an inquiry into company law by an expert outside committee appointed by the 
government department responsible for companies, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) or, as is more common these days, as a result of policy decided by the 
DTI itself. The proposed reforms then become legislation and after many years of this 
process, another consolidating Act is passed. For a few years thereafter all the 
statutory material on company law is available m one consolidated Act. The latest of 
these is the 1985 consolidation.'^^
The present statutes governing companies are Companies Act 1985 and 1989, 
Insolvency Act 1986; Financial Services Act 1986; Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, Criminal Justice Act 1993. In the UK at the present time, there are three 
basic types of incorporated company - statutory, chartered and registered.
1.7.1 Chartered companies
Chartered companies are incorporated by the grant of a charter ftom the Crown. 
In previous centuries trading concerns were granted Royal Charters and some of these 
companies are still in existence at the present time, such as the Bank of England. 
Charters are used now to incorporate non-commercial bodies, universities and 
colleges.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid.
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There is no restriction on the number of members in this type of company, and 
unless otherwise stated, the members are not personally liable for the company’s 
contracts. The creditors’ remedy lies against the company.
1.7.2 Statutory companies
Statutory companies are formed by a special Act of Parliament. This method of 
company formation was frequently used in the past for the formation of public utilities 
such as railway, gas, canals, electricity and water companies. These companies often 
required special powers, such as compulsory purchase of land, and were usually 
granted a monopoly in a particular locality. As a result of nationalisation most 
statutory companies have been taken over by Public Boards, and by Corporations set 
up by Public Acts.
A statutory company must have a minimum of two members. A member whose 
shares are not fully paid up may be liable for the company’s debts ifthe company has 
insufficient assets to satisfy its creditors.
1.7.3 Registered companies
The term “registered company” means a company incorporated by registration 
under the companies Acts. The major Act is the Companies Act 1985. A registered 
company may or may not have a share capital, for although a share capital is essential 
for a trading company, it may not be required by other companies.
The Act provides for three basic types of registered company; company limited 
by guarantee, unlimited companies and companies limited by shares.
136 Ibid., p. 50.
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A company limited by guarantee is a registered company in which the Ability of 
member is limited to such amount as they respectively undertake to contribute to the 
assets of the company in the event of its being wound up/^’ The majority of companies 
limited by guarantee are formed to incorporate professional, trade and research 
associations, or clubs supported by annual subscriptions.
An unlimited company is defined as a company not having any limit on the 
liability of its members.'^® Therefore, every member is liable for the debts contracted by
the company while a member but the liability will only arise if the company is wound 
up and is unable to meet its debts. All unlimited companies are private companies.
A company limited by shares has the liability of its member limited by the 
memorandum to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held by them. No further 
liability attaches to the holder of a fully paid shares. Should the company become 
insolvent, he will not be required to contribute to the payment of its debts. The 
promoters of a company have to decide whether a company should be formed as a 
private or public company.
A public company is a limited company with a share capital which has a 
memorandum stating that it is a public company and which has been registered or re­
registered as such.'®® A company which is not a public company is a private company. 
There are three requirements for registration of a company as a public company;
(l)It must state it is a public company both in its memorandum and by its name, there 
must be a clause to that effect in the memorandum''"' and its name must end with
S. 1(2) (b) the UK CA1985.. 
Ibid., S. 1(2) (c)
Ibid., S. 1(3).
Ibid.
42
words “public limited company” (frequently abbreviated to ‘pie’)/'" A  private 
company uses the traditional ‘Limited’ or ‘Ltd’ at the end of its name/'*®
(2) The memorandum must be in the form specified in Table F of the Companies 
(Table A to F) Regulations 1985)/''®
(3) The company must ha ve an authorised capital figure (the amoimt of shares it may 
issue to the public) of at least the authorised minimum, currently 50,000 pound/''''
The ininiinum number of member for a public company is two but one will suffice for a 
private company'''® and a public company must have at least two directors whereas a 
private company need only have one/''^
A private company with only one member is known as a single member company. The 
fact that it only has one member must be recorded in the company’s register of 
members, but not on the public register.'''^ in general terms, the provisions of the Act
ai’e to apply to single member company in the same way as to other companies, with 
such modifications as are necessary there are, however, special provisions for meetings 
and resolutions of such companies.'"®
''" Ibid., S. 25 (1).
Ibid., S. 25(2).
'''® Ibid., S. 3.
''''' Ibid., Ss. 11 and 118, 
'''® Ibid., S. 1 (1) (3A). 
'''^  Ibid., S. 282.
'''’ S. 352A.
148 The Companies (senega! member private Limited Companies) Regulations 1992 (S.I. 1992 No. 
1699), Art. 2(1).
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1.8 Conclusion
In the State of Kuwait the source of law is codes enacted by Parliament. 
Therefore, the rules are written and the task of the courts is to implement them. 
Precedent is not recognised as a source of law at all. Consequently, if there is a real 
need to amend or develop any law there are many procedures that must be respected. 
In the UK legal system the precedent is recognised as a source of law. Precedent is a 
law created by an adjudicative body (courts). Therefore, there are two main sources of 
law in the UK. Hence, the legal system in the UK is flexible, sophisticated and can be 
developed easily without following long procedures. Because of this inflexibility of the 
legal system in Kuwait, the codes of the coimtry, including the laws that organised the 
commercial life such as the Companies Law, cannot be developed easily.
The JSC, as a legal person, acts through two main organs (See chapter 2); these 
organs are the shareholders and the board of directors. Some of the powers of the 
company are exercised by the shareholders and some are reserved for the board of 
directors. This distribution of power within the company now exists in every company 
law. However, in KCL this kind of distribution of power between these two main 
organs does not exist clearly. Also, the role of shareholders, as will be seen later in this 
research, is not sufficiently clear, and, because of this, shareholders do not enjoy most 
of their rights in JSCs. Hence, they do not play their primary role as one of the main 
organs in the company. The question that must therefore be answered here in this 
study, before discussing the rights of shareholders is; what is the position and role of 
shareholders in JSCs? Also, what are the reasons for the weak role of shareholders in 
Kuwaiti JSCs? (see chapter 2.)
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The main reason is believed to be that of the KCL itself. This law was enacted in 
1960, and, despite the many adjustments that have been made since 1960, this law is 
stÜl underdeveloped and lacking in sufficient detail. It fails to address many of the 
issues relating to shareholders’ position and rights in the JSCs. As a result, the role of 
shareholders is not clear. This situation gives the boai'd of directors the opportunity to 
act outside of the company law in order to achieve their personal interests.
Also, in Kuwait, we are in need of being acknowledged with concentrated 
ownership structures and how many companies’ shares do natural or institutional 
shareholders own, for the sake of being aware of their strengths, then determine the 
role required from the same. We also need to know how many shares owned by the 
JSC’s boards of directors, for the purpose of knowing their strength at holding the 
company’s GMs. Finally, this kind of study help to know the link between 
concentrated ownership structures and weak protection of minority shareholders.*"^^
This research will seek, first, to discuss the nature of the position of shareholders 
in JSCs in theory and law and after identifying the position of shareholders, will 
concentrate on the rights of shareholders (see chapter 2).
In fact, since my first year of carrying out this study, I have exerted several attempts to acquire the
information required from the companies and Ministry of Commerce, to be aware of the distribution 
and dissemination of companies’ shares in Kuwait among shareholders of different types, such as 
ordinary and institutional shareholders, and how many shares shall companies board members own in 
order to understand the concentrated ownership structures. Unfortunately, I have faced many 
difficulties, such as the confidentiality of this information for some companies, or receiving 
insufficient information fl*om the same, which we cannot depend on, in our way of seeking a reliable 
result. Therefore, I have deemed it suitable to give this matter the adequate time, by conducting it as 
an independent research in cooperation with a number of researches in the near future. This subject is 
one of the recommendations emerging from this study for other future researches.
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Chapter Two 
The Position of Shareholders in the JSC
2. Introduction
In trying to understand the position and role of shareholders in a company it is 
useful to take a look at the topic of company theories. There are two main theories 
regarding the nature of the company, and each theory places the shareholders in a 
different position in the company. This chapter attempts to establish the basic position 
of shareholders in order to identify their role and rights in the JSC. A number of 
questions concerning JSCs and shareholders wül be dealt with such as the nature of a 
company; is it a contract or an institution created by the state? What is the role and 
position of shareholders in both cases? Are shareholders the owners of the company 
or are they just providers of capital in order eventually to gain a profit? What is the 
distribution of power within the company? Who are the main players in the JSC? Who 
has the residual power in the company? What are the shareholders’ actual powers? 
The answers to these questions will assist in understanding the position of shareholders 
in JSCs and then the rights they should enjoy because of this position.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
There are several theories that relate to the concept of the company. Such 
theories also provide the foundation for identifying the role and position of 
shareholders in the JSCs. The rights and authorities possessed by shareholders may 
differ according to their position in the company. Some theories consider the company
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as a contract, and the shareholders as the company's owners. Other theories consider 
the company as an institution founded by the state, and shareholders are only funding 
the company, by providing the company's capital, thus entitling them to a number of 
rights. Therefore, the rights and powers of shareholders may differ according to each 
theory.
The two main theories are the contractual theory and the institutional theory. 
The contractual theory treats a company as a private contract between a group of 
people and the shareholders are the owners of the company. The institutional theory 
considers a company as an institution created by the State and shareholders are one of 
the interested groups in the company.
2.1.1 Contractual Theory
This theory is one of the oldest theories in explaining the nature of the company. 
The contractual theory is based on the notion that a company is incorporated by an 
agreement between a number of persons who agreed to create an association, with a 
view to sharing the possible profit,* and such an agreement is nothing but a private 
contract.^ Thus, a JSC is borne by the agreement of all shareholders; each shareholder, 
when he participates in this contract, is in fact giving funds and receiving some rights in 
exchange. Therefore, the corporate charter should be available simply upon 
compliance with certain generally applicable requirements that have been mentioned in 
the regulations.
' Abou Zeid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative Law, T' edn, Cairo: Dar Al- 
fker Al-rabi Publishing, (1978), p. 19.
 ^Jamal-adeen, Ali, Commercial Company, Cairo: Dar AL-nahdah Publishing, (1961), p. 15.
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The traditional meaning of this theory is that it treats a company as a private 
contract when the need arises to modify the contract of the company (a company 
contract is embodied in the Memorandum and Articles of Association)/ The contract is
subject to the general provisions of Civil Law. As with any private contract the law 
states that, all parties of any contract must give their consent on any modification 
related to their contract."* Therefore, when a JSC wants to increase or decrease the
capital of the company, issue bonds and increase shareholders’ liability or any other 
modification, the approval of all shareholders in the company is required for any such 
modification to take place. It is hard to imagine in the case of a JSC, whose 
shareholders may exceed tens of thousands, that the objection of one shareholder 
would be enough to defeat any attempt to modify the contract of the company. In this 
situation, it is not necessary to enact legal provisions to protect the minority in the 
company, because, the minority protection as such does not exist since the rule of 
unanimity is required to execute any change in the company’s contract (see chapter 8).
Due to this major defect in the traditional meaning of the contractual theory, 
French scholars sought to alleviate the intransigence of the meaning by allowing the 
inclusion in the Articles of Association of any JSC a clause empowering the GM to 
modify the Memorandum or Articles of Association by consent of the majority of 
shareholders.^ Thus, the Articles of Association of a company could be modified by
® See section 113 of the Civil Code in France which holds contracts to be unalterable except with the 
consent of all contracting parties.
'' Abid-Alfdal, Ahmad, Protection of minority of shareholders, 2 Journal o f Legal and Economic 
Research (1987) p. 201.
® Ibid., p. 202.
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the consent of the majority of shareholders and each shareholder should consent when 
entering the company to submit to the rule of the majority/
After this major modification to the traditional meaning of the contractual theory 
(the submission to the rule of the majority), Professor Thaller^ in 1893 put forward his
theory of the “basic rights of shareholders”, which states that the decision to modify 
the contract of a company is the right of the majority/ However, this right is subject
to the condition that it should not prejudice the basic rights of the shareholders. Thus, 
the authority of the majority is not absolute in a JSC.
This development emerged, in order to solve some of the negative aspects of the 
contract theory as it focuses on the fact that there are basic rights that cannot be 
touched by the majority in any case. At the beginning the law did not determine these 
rights, which led to leaving this determination to scholars of company law, which in 
turn led to a diversity of opinions regarding what is considered a basic right or not. 
But generally, one can say that basic rights of shareholder are/
(1) The right to receive the deed proving his rights in the company;
(2) The right to acquire profits;
(3) The right to dispose of his share at any time and by any means of 
disposition, and is also entitled to reject the increase of his commitments in the 
company.
(4) The right to remain in the company as a shareholder who presented a part 
of the company’s capital;
®Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, T^  edn, Kuwait: Dar Al-ktab 
Publishing, (1986), p. 80,
 ^Abid-Alfdal, supra note 4, p. 204.
* Ibid.
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(5) The right to participate in the company’s management;
(6) The right to hold a responsibility according to the capital paid by him;
(7) The right to have access to information that enable them to read specific 
documents, data and reports sent to him, or be put under his disposition at 
certain appointments and occasions;
(8) The right to attend and vote in the GMs;
(9) The right to demand abrogation or dissolution of the company, if there is a 
legal reason for that;
(10) The right to start an action in the name of the company to defend its 
interests or in his own name, to defend his own interests in the company.
Therefore, in contractual theory, a company is run by a series of private 
contracts; consequently, the role of the State should be limited. In other words, the 
State should not interfere with the j&eedom of private contracts, and also should not 
impose any restrictions on the principle of firee contracting. The role of law should be, 
for example, as a public service announcing a standard form of contract. To explain 
why the State has no role in the contract that establishes a company, we have to look 
at the classification of laws in civil law contracts. There are two main branches of law, 
public law and private law. Public law governs relations in which the State is a party, 
while private law governs the relations, duties and rights of private natural or artificial 
persons. Company law is part of private law because all of the parties of the company
Ibid.
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contracts are private, therefore, the contracts that establish a company are private and 
so, the role of the State should be iiiinimal/°
The nature of the relationship between the owners (shareholders) of the company 
and the directors is based on the agency’s nature. Thus, it is a relationship between 
principals and agents and these agents are required to execute some services on behalf 
of their principals. They have to carry out their duty in the best interest of their 
principals. Therefore, the right of shareholders in their company is supreme, and the 
company’s interests are, in fact, equated with the interests of the shareholders because 
they are the owners of the company.
2.1.2 Institutional Theory
Another group of company jurists asserts that the contractual theory has begun 
to retreat; they say that a company is not a contract but a legal institution. A company 
as a collective being would not find an explanation within the traditional rules of public 
law. It would have to be thought of as institutional."
The institutional theory started at the beginning of the last century in France. It 
considers a company to be an institution set up for a specific purpose, a legal 
institution whose statutes are drawn up by the legislature.*^ Hence, a company is a
creation of the State. The role of the individuals (shareholders) is limited to declaring 
their intention to join the company and subscribe according to the rules made by the
The major areas of public law are constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law and financial 
law. The major areas of private law are: civil law, commercial law, labour law and family law.
" Jean, Paillusseau, the Nature o f the Company, in Robert R. Drury and Peter G. Xuereb (eds), 
European Company Laws, (1991), p. 22.
" Mustafa, Kamal, Commercial Companies: General Provisions in Companies, Alexandria: Dar Al- 
jama Al-Jadeeda Publishing, (1997), p. 15.
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legislature.*^ Thus, the process of subscription is not a contract and those who sign
subscription papers do not sign a contract; the subscribers are actually asking to get a 
benefit or take advantage of a company created by the State.
As a rational result, shareholders are not the owners of the company, and the 
idea of delegating power fi-om the owners to the board of directors would disappear in 
this theory.*"* A JSC according to this theory is a company in which, for example, the
GM is unable to step on the board of directors’ powers. Therefore, it considers the 
board of directors, shareholders, auditors and employees of the company to be an 
organ of the collective being and, when they carry out their duties, they are, in fact, 
practising their own power as organs of the company.*  ^The source of these powers
and rights of the organs of the company, including shareholders, is the law. 
Consequently, there is no more delegation of power fi-om one group to another. This 
separation of power within the company, leads many company jurists who advocate 
this theory to assert that a JSC appears like a small parliamentary State.*  ^ In this State
citizens would be represented by shareholders, the executive power would be 
represented by the board of directors, and the legislative power by the GM. This State 
should be a democratic State; it should hold a GM every year to discuss its budget, 
hear the auditors’ opinion, hear the board of directors’ report, and discuss the 
company’s affairs." Therefore, shareholders like a citizen in a State have a number of
" Sami, Fawzi, The Explanation o f Commercial Law, Jordan: Maktabt Dar Al-Thgafah Publishing, 
(1997), p. 22.
" J W .,p . 23.
" Mustafa, snpra note 12, p. 51.
Sami, supra note 13, p. 23.
17 Ibid.
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rights in their company not because they are the owners but because they are one of 
the organs who enjoy these rights.
According to this theory the board of directors and the GM of a company are 
bound to exercise their powers, not as provided in the contractual theory in the interest 
of shareholders, but used solely in the interests of the company. Moreover, because 
the company is a creature of the State by its law, this law regulates all of the affairs of 
the company and shareholders, and other groups in a company must act according to 
the law. However, company law nowadays regulates certain aspects of the companies’ 
affairs and lays down rules of general guidance but still there are many affairs regulated 
by the companies through their board of directors and GMs.
It is clear from this theory that the institutional conception of the company tends 
to abandon the traditional principles of private law and substitute them with principles 
from public law.
One might ask, if the shareholders are one of the company’s organs, what are 
thefr rights in the company according to this theory? As provided above, according to 
this theory the company is a creature of the state and the company law controls it from 
the beginning thl the end. Therefore, the company law also decides the rights and 
powers of shareholders and the other organs as well.
2.2 The Nature of a JSC under the KCL
Kuwaiti legislature does not specify the nature of the company in a 
straightforward way. However, many scholars of law are agreed that a company, 
according to the KCL, is nothing but a contract.*** Article 78 of the KCL provides:
Tamma, supra note 6, p. 83.
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Subscriptions shall be in writing, giving the number of shares subscribed 
for and stating that the subscriber accepts the memorandum and articles 
of association of the company...
It is clear from this article that the operation of subscription according to the 
KCL is a contract between a company and its subscribers. In other words, the KCL 
considers the subscription operation as a contract between a company on the one side, 
and subscribers on the other. The subscription prospectus is considered as an offer 
from the company, and the subscription of the subscribers as an acceptance from 
them.*^
It should be stated that JSCs in Kuwait (or in any country) are established not 
just by one contract between the company and its shareholders or between the 
founders and the subscribers; JSCs actually consist of many contracts with 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, and consumers. All these groups have 
important roles in running their company and they have interests in the company, 
which should be protected. Among aU these contracts in JSCs one is given priority 
and has the main role in the process of establishing and running the JSCs. This 
contract is the contract between the company and the shareholders in the process of 
subscription. Because of the importance of this contract the shareholders have more 
rights and authority in the company than other interested groups.
A contract establishing a company has to comply with the general legal 
requirements common to all contracts. Accordingly, aU parties to any contract must 
give their consent freely and must have the required legal capacity.^ ** Also, the
" Ibid., p. 86.
See Article 147 o f Kuwaiti Civil Law No. 67/1980.
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objective of a company must be lawful and achievable/* Furthermore, the reasons for 
establishing a company must also be lawful/^
Moreover, as mentioned above, the contract of any company, especially a JSC, is 
different from others/^ Therefore, the contract establishing a company must meet 
certain requirements that apply specifically to it. First, a company should have at least 
two persons agreeing to participate in it.^ "* Second, each member should make a 
contribution to the company’s assets, in return for which he receives one or more 
shares in it; members may participate in a company by cash or in kind.^  ^ Sometimes
this may consist of a promise to work, e.g. a promise to manage the company’s 
business.^^ Third, all shareholders should have the intention of acting together on an
equal footing to achieve the company’s goals. Furthermore, the aim of a company 
must be to make gains that are to be shared between its shareholders. Finally, they 
must contribute to the losses incurred by the company.
When looking at law in some civil law countries we will find that there is no 
doubt that, in general, a company is a contract. For example, in France, a company is
^'Xamma, supra note 6, p. 272.
Ibid., p. 91.
Younes, AH, Commercial Companies, Egypt: Dar-Al-feker Al-Araby Publishing, (1991), p. 29.
See the KCL Articles No. 4, 42, 56, 70 and 185; this research focus on commercial companies
because, in general, there are two kinds of companies -  civil company and commercial. A 
commercial company is determined by its form and its objects. In other words, a company that has 
neither a commercial form nor commercial objects is a civil company.
See Art. 110 of Kuwaiti Commercial Law.
^Ubid.,p. 100 .
Ibid., V. 113.
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described as a contract between two or more persons, as Article 1832 of French Civil 
Law provides/^
Company is a contract between two or more persons agreeing to 
constitute a common stock with intent to sharing any profit arising 
therefi-om/^
This means that all the business associations are defined in Article 1832 of 
French Civil Law in terms of a contract/** Also, all Arabic countries directly or
indirectly describe a company as a contract. For example, Egyptian, Oman, and Saudi 
Company Laws describe a company as being a contract, and all of these countries 
agree on the definition. A company is a contractual agreement between two persons 
or more who undertake to work together in an enterprise with profit as the motive, 
each one of these persons contributes a share of the capital in the form of money or 
services, with a view to sharing any profits or losses resulting fi-om the enterprise.^*
At this point the following questions arise: Who organises the company 
shareholders through the GM and boar ds of directors by carrying out the contract of 
the company or the company law? What are the organisational techniques that must be 
used? Who is in charge of choosing these techniques, the parties to the contract or the 
law or both? In fact, company law gives the parties of the company contract a number
Article 19 of French Commercial Law 1966 that provides “A partnership is established by a
contract between the partners. However, a de facto Partnership may be found to exist whenever the 
following there basic features are present, i.e., contribution by the partners, sharing of profits and 
losses..”
See Church, Edgar, Lnw, London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited
Publishing, (1960), pp. 192-4.
Le Gall, Jean-Pierre & Morel, Paul, French Cotnpany Law, 2ed edn , Longman Publishing, (1992),
p. 1-3; see also Drury, R., The Relative Nature o f A Shareholder’s Right to Enforce the Company 
Contract, 45 CL.7(1986) p. 220.
For example, Saudi Company Law provides in the first article: “a company is defined as a contract
under which two or more persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, with each 
contributing a share in the form o f money or services, with a view to dividing any profits or losses as a
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of powers, and at the same time, gives the State a number of powers to enable it to 
play a major role in establishing and running the companies. Therefore, a company is 
not a pure private contract between private parties. This can be seen easily in the 
KCL. According to the KCL, the application of incorporation of the proposed 
company will be presented to the government department involved in the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. This department will ensure that the proposed company does 
not contravene public policy or the rules of morality and is not in conflict with the 
provisions of the laws of the country.^^ Also, this department will examine the
feasibility study of the proposed company, and it has the right to reject the proposed 
company.All  these requirements must be placed before the issuance of the Emir’s
Charter. The State still has to play a major role even after the issuance of the 
incorporation certificate. For example, the company shall submit an application to the 
ministry for capital reduction, capital increase, the amending of the objectives of the 
company; also, any modification for the Memorandum or Articles of Association 
cannot be implemented without the consent of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.^ "*
In summary, each theory places shareholders in a different position and as a 
result their rights and powers are different. The contractual theory treats them as the 
owner of the company. Therefore, the company should be managed iu their interest 
first, and as owners they enjoy a wide powers and rights within the company. The 
institutional theory treats the shareholders as an organ among a number of organs in
result o f such enterprise”; see first the article of Oman Company Law, and Art. no. 505 of Egyptian 
Civil Law.
Article 71 of the KCL.
®® Ibid., Article 73.
Ibid., Article 135.
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the company. Therefore, the company is not managed for their interest alone because 
they are the owners of the company. Shareholders also have a limited number of 
powers and rights as mentioned in the Company Law (see 2.4).
2.3 Nature of a Company and the Role of Shareholders in the UK
In the UK Companies Act of 1985 provisions (supplemented by case law) exist
which concern the nature of a company. The first section is S. 1(1) that provides:
Any two or more persons associated for a lawful purpose may, by 
subscribing their names to a memorandum of association and otherwise 
complying with the requirements of this Act in respect of registration 
form an incorporated company.
Also, one of the important sections in the CA of 1985 that wül help in analysing
the nature of the company in the UK is S. 14(1) that provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, 
when registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent 
as if they respectively had been signed and sealed by each member, and 
contained covenants on the part of each member to observe all the 
provisions of the memorandum and of the articles.
In these two provisions of the UK Companies Act of 1985, the legal relationship 
that exists between the members and the company is a contractual relationship as a 
result of the operation of subscription. The contract is embodied in the Memorandum 
and Articles of Association.^^ Thus, the normal legal analysis of the nature of a
collective entity is in terms of a contract. In Bratton Seymour Service Co. Ltd v 
Oxborough [1992] BCLC 693, Steyn LJ at p. 698 said:
35 Prentice, Graham N., The Enforcement of Outsider Rights, 1 Co. Law (1980) p. 179.
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The contract between a company and its members formed by the 
company’s articles derives its binding force not from a bargain struck 
between the parties but from the terms of the statute..
However, the contract formed by the Articles of Association is unique. It is not 
like others, for example, a sale contract. It does not force each party to carry out a 
particular list of obligations that must be fulfilled by the end of the contract. This 
contract provides the rules or methods controlling decision-making in the company. It is 
a contract that may be altered by a three-quarters majority of the members.^^ The
contract above mentioned of, and which is clear in the wording of s. 14 (1) of the UK CA 
1985, is a subscribing contract between the company and its shareholders. This contract 
is not the only contract which a company has; any company has five participants: 
shareholders, directors, managers, employees and creditors, and all play a significant role 
in either financing or executing the economic activities which the company undertakes. 
Each participant is tied to his company by a contract. Therefore, many real contracts lie 
behind the subscription contract that exists between a company and the shareholders. 
These contracts have a major role in establishing and running a company, such as, a 
contract between the company and its employees (suppliers of labour) or a company and 
suppliers of goods or services.
The discussion so far about the nature of the JSC agrees in many aspects with 
economic theory. Coase (1973) defines a firm as “An umbrella that enables private
See also Conservative & Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 552 at p. 525 Lawton LJ
said; “The bond of union between the members of an unincorporated association has to be 
contractual”.
The UK CA 1 9 8 5 ,8 .9  (1).
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individuals to contract with each other more efficiently by limiting the costs of the 
transactions between them.”^^
In his ai'ticle, Coase says that a company is created by private contracts, not by 
the State’s will, and the role of the State should be limited to the announcing of a 
standard form of contract or any other provisions that do not impose restrictions on 
the principle of free contracting/^
This theory treats the company as ‘a nexus of contracts’/^ These contracts 
create a web of contractual relationships between the company’s elements. The 
advocates of this theory regard a company as a basket of different suppliers of inputs,'  ^^
i.e. shai eholders provide equity capital, supervise and monitor the act of board of 
directors, board of directors manages the business of the company, employees provide 
labour, and creditors provide debt capital. All these input suppliers should act together 
to produce goods or services."^  ^These contracts determine the rights and obligations of
the various interested groups in the company.Also, this theory assumes that the 
directors of the company are agents of the company; thus, all input owners should 
surrender the use of their inputs to the agents."^ "^  According to this theory, shareholders 
are not the owners of the company, they are just one of the company’s input owners.
Coase, R., The Nature o f the Firm, 4 Economica, (1937) p. 386; see also Wright, Mark J.,
Corporate Governance and Directors’ Social Responsibilities: Responsible Inefficiency or 
Irresponsible, 17 B.LR  (1996) p. 174.
See Bratton, William W., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives fi-om
History, 41 Stanford Law Review  (1989) p. 1471.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin .Econ (1976) p. 310; see F. H. Easterbrook and D, R. Fischel, The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1991), p. 21.
'’‘Wright, supra note 38, p. 178.
Easterbrook, F., and Fischel, D., The Corporate Contract, 89 Cohim. L. Rev (1989) p. 1429.
'’^ Jensen, supra note 40, p. 310.
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and their rights should be determined by the set of contracts that created the 
company/^ They own the shares of the company. Consequently, their position in the
company is as the owners of the company’s shares, and the source of their powers and 
rights are the contract of the company (Articles of Association and Memorandum) and 
the company law.
2.4 The Nature of a Shareholder Position in the Company and the 
Basis of his Rights
Among all these input suppliers or interest groups or participants in a JSC the 
questions that this section will try to answer are; What is the nature of the 
shareholder’s position in a company? Are shareholders the owners of the company? If 
not, what they are? Do certain shareholders have more rights in their company more 
than others? What is the basis of these rights? Finally, what about the other groups 
that have interests in the company?*^
There is no doubt that a company, as an artificial person, “owns” itself. Thus, it 
is completely separated fi'om its shareholders.'^^ According to the KCL and after 
issuing and publishing the decree of incorporation in the Official Gazette, the company 
becomes a legal person separate from its founders and subscribers as is provided in 
Article 74 of the KCL. Also judicial decisions in the UK before the end of the 19^  ^
century made clear without doubt, that shareholders of a company under the Acts have
Cheung, Steven N., The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L.&Econ (1983) p. 3.
Millon, David, Theory of the Corporation, D .L J  (1990) p. 229.
Worthington, Sarah, Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement part 1, 22 Co. Law 
(2001) p. 258.
Ireland Paddy, Capitalism without the Capitalist: Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of 
the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 J.L.H {1996) p. 41.
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no legal interest in any part of the company’s assets, and the company is the only 
owner of all the property vested in it. As Lord Macnaghten in Salomon v. A Salomon 
& Co Ltd [1897] said “the company is at law a different person altogether from the 
subscribers to the m em o ra n d u m . . .T h e  shareholders’ part in any JSC is to put their
money in equities and not in anything else, such as bonds, because they believe the 
return of equities to be more attractive. Therefore, shareholders of a company are not 
joint owners of its property because the company is a separate person in law and 
property is held in the name of the company.'^  ^Moreover, the common definition of a 
share in the UK is that of Justice G. Farwell in the case of Boland’s Trustee v. Steel 
Brother & Co Ltd.^^ Mr. Justice Farwell said:
A share is an interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a 
sum of money for the purpose of liability in the first place and of 
interest in the second place but also consisting of a series of mutual 
covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance 
with s. 16 of the Companies Act 1862 (now CA 1985, S. 14). The 
contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original 
incidents of a share.
A share, according to the judge’s definition, means the shareholder’s interest in the 
company evaluated in an amount of money. Such interest makes the shareholder 
responsible for the debt of the company to the extent of his shares on the one hand, and a 
titleholder on the o t h e r .A  share is not an amount of money but an interest measured by 
a sum of money, based on the various rights contained in the memorandum -  including
[1897] AC 22.
See Ireland, Paddy, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 M .LR  (1999) p. 32; 
Mayson, Stephen W., Company Law, 15‘‘' edn, London, Blackstone Publishing, (1998), p. 175.
(1901) IC h 279 at p. 288.
See also Inland.Revenue Commissioners, v. Crossman [1937] A.C. 26, 66. In this case Lord
Russell described the share as “an interest being composed of rights and obligations which are defined 
by the Company Act and by the memorandum and articles of association of the company.”
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the title to an amount of money more or less than the share value. Therefore, the 
shareholder’s rights in his company are no longer seen as a result of his position as 
owner. The rights that the shareholder enjoys in the company are a result of the 
ownership of shares, and these rights are limited to the rights mentioned in the Company 
Act or in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company.
Moreover, s. 182 (1) of the UK CA provides that, “The shares or other interest of 
any member m a company; (a) are personal estate”. A share represents the interest of the 
shareholder in a company. Shares in a JSC could be treated as the property of the 
shaieholders, because they can do what they want with them, however, ownership of the 
shares is separate from ownership of the company.
If the shareholders are not the owners of their company, who are they? Why do we 
always try to give them a privileged position in the company? The answer is simple: 
shareholders are the providers of the company’s capital and residual risk-bearers,^^
therefore, they should enjoy a special position in their company. Many see the only
purpose of the company as enhancement of the shareholders’ investments. For example
Professor Berle in one of his articles said:
All powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived 
from statute or charter or both, are necessary and at all times 
exercisable only for the rateable benefit of all the shareholders as their 
interest appears. That, in consequence, the use of the power is subject
^^Grantham, Ross., The Doctrinal Basis Of The Rights of Company Shareholders, C .LJ (1998) pp. 
562-3.
Ibid.
See Worthington, supra not 46, p. 259; also G ower’ s Principles o f  Modern Company Law, Paul L.
Davies (ed.), 6“* edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell Publishing, (1997), p. 301; L. S. Sealy. Cases and 
Materials in Company Law, 5“' edn, London: Butterworth, (1992), p. 413; S. Mason, D. French and C. 
Ryan, Company Law, 17“’ edn., London: Blackstone Press, (2000), p. 178.
E.F Fama and M.C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ (1983) p. 301.
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to equitable limitation when the powers have been exercised to the 
detriment of such interest/^
A company’s directors are primarily accountable before their shareholders through 
the GM/^ and the duties imposed on directors under the Companies Act are to give
priority to the interests of the body of shareholders/^ Hence, many consider that the sole
pui'pose of the company is the making of money for its shareholders/^
Nevertheless, some legal scholars such as Professor E.M. Dodd do not see that 
making money should be a company’s sole aim/° They say that a company is not just 
shareholders and their directors, and that the company has responsibilities to the non- 
shaieholder groups and also to the community/^ In other words, the company is not
just a contract between the company and its shareholders; there are many real contracts 
between the company and other participants in the company, such as employees, 
creditors, suppliers, and others. They demand taking the interests of non-shareholders 
into account.^^ Thus, the interests of the company contain not only the interests of the
Adolf, Berle A., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv.L.Rev (1931) p. 1049.
”  Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury) para.3.4.
See Adolf, Berle A., For Whom Corporate Manager Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L  Rev (1932)
p. 1365; see also Proctor, Giles & Miles, Lilian, Cutting the Mustard: Stakeholders in the Boardroom? 
\9B .L .R ev  (1998) p. 172.
See for example. Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (the Hampel Report) para 1.16
provides “single overriding objective...is the preservation and the greatest possible enhancement over 
time of the shareholders investment”; see also Davies, supra not 54, p. 602.
“^See Dodd, E., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 Harv. L. Rev (1932) p. 1145.
“‘Millon, supra note 45, p. 236.
E. M. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 Harv.L.Rev (1932) p. 1148; see also
Coffee, John C., Shareholders Versus Manager: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev 
(1986) p. 84.
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shareholders but also the interests of the company’s non-shareholders, such as 
creditors^^ and employees/'^
The interests of non-shareholders in any JSC cannot be ignored; they play major 
roles in their companies, therefore, they are fully capable of protecting their interests in 
the company. However, this does not mean they are in the same position as 
shareholders. Shareholders bear the risk of venture failure; they are paid at the end, 
after creditors, employees, and others who have fixed claims, and shareholders in a 
JSC have the residual claim because they get what is left over.^  ^Consequently, many 
scholars, such as F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, describe the shareholders as “residual 
risk-beai'ers”:
We believe...that shareholders are residual claimants to the firm’s 
income. Bondholders have fixed claims, and employees generally 
negotiate compensation schedules in advance of performance. The 
gains and losses fi-om abnormally good or bad performance are the lot 
of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in the end.^^
Because of the special position of shareholders as “residual risk-bearers”, 
company legislation universally mentions them more than any other participants in 
company law, and gives them many rights that the others do not enjoy. For instance, 
the right to attend and vote in a GM, the right to file a case against the board of 
directors in some circumstances on behalf of their company,and the right to remove 
the board of directors fi-om their office by ordinary resolution.^ ** There are many other
SeeLonrhoLtd  v. Shell Petroleum Co. Let [1980] 1 WLR 627.
““ UK CA 1985, S. 309.
Cheffins, Brian R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
(1997), p. 54.
Easterbrook, F. & Fischel, D., Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ (1983) p. 403.
See Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461.
UK Company Act 1985, S.303.
65
matters for which the approval of shareholders in the GM is required. Consequently, 
according to the legal provisions, shareholders have real power over corporate affairs 
but their real involvement does not agree with the legal role that they have.
If there are many interested groups, and shareholders comprise one of these
groups, enjoying a special position in the company, should the law protect the interests
of those other than shareholders? In fact, there are many ways in which their interests
could protected. In respect of employees of JSCs, their interests could be protected by
statute. In the State of Kuwait, the Labour Law protects the rights of employees in the
private sector and here in the UK, S.309 (1) of the CA 1985 provides that:
Matters to which the directors are to have regard in the performance of 
their functions include the interests of the company’s employees... .
This means that the board of directors should keep in mind the interests of 
employees. So, if directors fail to take into account the employees’ interest they will 
be in breach of their fiduciary duties to the company.Also, there are usually many
provisions that arrange the position of creditors of the company and protect their
rights, for example Article 128 of the KCL provides that:
Representatives of the debenture holders may attend the GMs of the 
company; the company shall send to them the same notice of meetings 
which it sends to the shareholders; such representatives may take part in 
the deliberation but may not vote.
Furthermore, there are many provisions and cases demanding that the board of 
directors include the interests of the company’s creditors among their duties. Take for
However, in the UK, they are arguing that S.309 is “statutory provision without teeth”. Because this
section does not specify the interest o f the employees that must be protected, and it does not give the 
employees the right to sue the directors even if they prove that directors did not have regard to their 
interest; for more information see Villiers, Charlottee, Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985: Is it 
time for a reappraisal? Legal regulation o f  the employment relation (2000) p. 593.
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example, the case of Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum Co Lt^^. In this case Lord Diplock
explained that the board of directors of a company have to act in the best interest of
the company and said:
These are not exclusively those of its shareholders but may include 
those of its creditors.
Furthermore, every State should always have laws to protect anyone who has 
any kind of relation with a company, e,g., an Environment Law to protect the 
environment from pollution and a Consumer Law to protect customers of the 
company. Finally, according to the theories mentioned above, the relationship between 
the company and its non-shareholders is contractual; thus, their interests should be 
protected by these contracts that link them with their companies.
In the previous sections the position of shareholders in JCSs was identified in 
order to understand the powers and rights they enjoy in the companies. However, the 
shareholders are not the main players in the JSCs. There are also those who control 
the affairs of the companies. The next section of this chapter will concentrate on the 
distribution of powers between shareholders and directors.
2.5 Shareholders and the Board of Directors: Distribution of 
Powers
A company, as a creature of a commercial contract or the State or both, is an 
artificial person. It is an independent legal person, it owns its property, has rights and 
obligations, and it has a separate identity from its directors and shareholders. This 
legal person acts through two main organs. These organs are the shareholders in the
™ [1980] 1 WLR(HL) 627.
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GM and the board of directors. Each organ has obligations to the company, they have 
to work together to achieve the company’s aims. The board of directors’ duty is to 
manage the company. Shareholders in GMs have a number of duties toward the 
company. Greer L. J. provided in John Shaw & Son Ltd v. Shaw’^
A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its 
directors. Some of its powers may, according to its articles, be 
exercised by directors, certain other powers may be reserved for the 
shareholders in the GM. If powers of management are vested in the 
directors, they and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way 
in which the general body of shareholders can control the exercise of 
the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their 
articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re­
elect the directors of whose actions they disapprove they can remove 
the directors now by ordinary resolution according to CA 1985, s.303). 
They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by articles are vested 
in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the powers vested 
by the articles in the general body of shareholders.
However, legal tradition everywhere divided the powers in JSCs between the 
two main organs, the directors and the shareholders. Therefore, some powers are 
exercised by the board of directors and some powers may be reserved for the 
shareholders in the GM.
2.5.1 Board of Directors
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, there are two theories about the 
nature of JSCs in civil law countries. Each theory with its ideology on the nature of 
the relationship between the board of directors and shareholders has raised much 
controversy between law scholars. Supporters of the contractual theory have said that 
a company is a contract, created by agreement between a group of people. Thus, a 
company owes its existence to a contract between individuals. This theory treats
[1935] All E. R. 456 at 464; Powell-Smith, Vincent, The Law and Practice Relating to Company
68
directors of the company as agents of the company. The company, as a principal, 
determines the authorities of the agents.^^ Supporters of the institutional theory say 
that a company is a creature of the State, and that it has many organs. The board of 
directors is one of these organs. Thus, the board of directors is connected with the 
company by legal ligature, and directors of the company have their authorities or 
powers from the law of the State and have not formed a contract that created the 
company.^^
The KCL does not define a director, nor does it specify the nature of the role of 
a director in a company, is he an employee, agent or trustee? Furthermore, there are 
no special provisions that manage the relationship between the company and the board 
of directors. Therefore, we restored the provision of an agency in the Civil Law in 
order to explain this kind of relation; Civil Law treats this relation as a relationship 
between agent and principal. '^*
According to the KCL, directors need no special qualifications for office. In 
other words, anyone can be a director. There is no educational requirement. It could 
be argued that it is one of the shareholders’ rights and in the interest of the company 
that directors should comply with certain qualification requirements. It should not be 
agreed that if shareholders appoint unqualified or bad directors, they must take the 
consequences.
Directors, London: Butterworths, (1969), p. 102.
^^Al-Shemmari, Tanimah, The Boai'd o f Directors o f Joint Stock Company: Comparative Study
Bet\\>een Law of Kuwait and the Laws o f USA, T’ edn, (1987), p 102- 3; See also Radwan, supra note 
1, p. 451.
Ibid.
'^’Abou Zied, Radwan, Joint Stock Companies and Public Sector, Cairo: Dar Al-fker Ai-Arabi 
publishing, (1976), p. 41.
”  See Neville J. in Brazilian Rtibber Plantation and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch. 425 in this case it 
provided that “a director is, I think not bound to bring any qualifications to his office. He may
69
The directors are those who manage the company. They run the company for 
the benefit of the company as a whole, as Article 138 of the KCL.
The Kuwaiti legislature in above article decided that the powers of management 
are vested in the directors, and they alone can exercise these powers. In other words, 
the board of directors is responsible for carrying out the day-to-day business of their 
company and shareholders should not intervene in management affairs.
The KCL has defined the powers the board of directors have and the rights of 
shareholders. In article 146of the KCL Kuwaiti legislature gives the board of directors 
very wide powers for managing their company in order to achieve the company’s 
objectives. Therefore, the board of directors’ duty is all of the managerial functions, 
such as performing business of the company, deahng with the outsiders and suing in 
the name of the company.
However, Kuwaiti legislature has imposed four compulsory restrictions on the 
powers of the directors that must be respected, otherwise they will be Ultra Vires and 
responsible for what they have done. First, directors should work within the objectives 
of the company as determined in Memorandum and Articles of Association.^^
Therefore, the board of directors should carry out their duties within these objectives. 
In other words, the board of directors cannot engage in activities that were not 
expressed in the object clause of the company. Second, the board of directors should 
obey the provisions of Company Law that place restrictions on directors. For instance. 
Article 151 in the KCL says that any member of the board of directors, directly or 
indirectly, may not have any personal interest in any contract or transaction made with
undertake the management of a rubber company, in complete ignorance of everything connected with 
rubber without incurring responsibility for mistakes which may result from such ignorance.”
Radwan, supra note 1, p. 449.
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the company unless these interests are expressly authorised by a GM of the company/^
Third, the board of directors should do their duties within the powers given to them 
under the Memorandum and Articles of Association. Fourth, the board of directors 
has to obey the resolutions of the GM of shareholders. A GM can impose some 
restrictions upon the board’s powers.
In UK companies, the division of powers between the board of directors and the 
shareholders in a GM depends entirely on the constitution of the company (the 
Memorandum and the Articles of Association). Where some powers are vested in the 
board, the body of shareholders in the GM cannot interfere in the business of the board 
unless the board is working contrary to the provision of the Company Act or the 
constitution of the company.In addition to the constitution of the company. Article
70 of Table A’^  grants the board of directors the power of management of the company
and provides:
Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles 
and to any directions given by special resolution, the business of the 
company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise aU the 
powers of the company...
This provision provides that the board should manage the company, and it may 
exercise all the powers it has to execute its duties. However, the board should never 
act inconsistently with the provisions of the Companies Act and Articles of 
Association; also, it is subject to the directions given by special resolution. The affairs 
of the management of the company can be exercised only by the board of directors.
"  See also Articles 139, 140, and 162 of the KCL.
See John Shaw & Son Ltd  v. Shaw [1935] All E. R. 456 at 464; also see Scott v. Scott [1943] 1 All 
E. R. 582.
The Companies (Tables A-f) Regulations 1985 (which were made using powers in Sections 3 and 8
of the Companies Act 1985) specify forms of memorandum and forms of articles for the different 
categories of registered companies. Table A sets out articles for the commonest category of registered
71
The board, therefore, should always practice its powers entirely free from the 
interference of shareholders or the GM. Thus, m Automatic Self-Cleansing Filler 
Syndicate Co. v. Cuminghame,^^ the company’s Article of Association contained a
provision similar to Article 7, of Table A; it required any intervention by the GM of the 
company to be by extraordinary resolution. Nevertheless, during one of the GMs of 
the company, an ordinary resolution was passed ordering the board of directors to sell 
the company’s undertaking to a new company. The board refused to execute the 
resolution. The court held that the GM had no power to iuterfere with the board’s 
power of decision.®’
Directors are like trustees of the company’s property under their control. 
Therefore, they owe a duty of good faith to the com pany.A t the same time, directors
could be treated as agents of the company; they work on behalf of the company.
Hence, the acts of the board of directors become the acts of the company, and when 
they work within their authority they bind the company (see Northern Court Securities 
Ltd V Jackson and Steeple Ltd),^^ However, directors of registered companies are not
regarded as delegates of shareholders; shareholders cannot hold a meeting to tell the
company-a company (public or private) limited by shares.
[1906] 2 Ch 34.
Boyle & Birds' Company Law, 4“’ edn, in John Birds and Eilis Ferran and others (eds), Bristol:
Jordan publishing, (2000), p. 471.
Sealy, L., The Director as Trustee, C. L. J  (1967) pp. 86-7; However, we have to admit that
directors are not trustees in the frill technical meaning of trusteeship. For example, when directors 
manage their company they must take risks and the true nature of trust does not have something like 
this.
Cheffins, supt'a note 65, p. 45.
[1974] 2 All ER 625.
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board of directors what to do during management of company. A Buckley L J  
provided in Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v. Stanley
The directors are not servants to obey directions given by the 
shareholders as individuals; they are not agents appointed by and bound 
to serve their shareholders as their principals. They are persons who 
may by the regulations be entrusted with the control of the business, 
and if so entrusted, they can be dispossessed from that control only by 
the statutory majority which can alter the articles. Directors are not, I 
think, bound to comply with the directions even of all the corporators 
acting as individual.
However, the directors should always act in the best interests of the company as 
a “bona fide rule”. This rule can be seen in many cases.Therefore, they always have 
to ensure that any transaction that they undergo is for a proper purpose. In Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd, Re^^ “They (directors) must exercise their discretion bona fide in what
they consider — not what a court may consider — is in the interests of the company,
and not for any collateral purpose.” Therefore, directors will be at fault if they do not
act in the interests of the company or if they act for an improper aim.®’’
2.5.2 Shareholders
Shareholders in JSCs, through the medium of GMs, also have important powers 
in their company. The most significant powers retained by them at a GM in the KCL
[1908] 2 KB 89, CA, at pp. 105-6.
®“ See similarly in Regal (Hasting) v Gulliver [1942] 1 All B.R. 378, 387, Lord Russel said “Directors
of a limited company are the creatures of statute and occupy a position peculiar to themselves. In 
some respects they resemble trustees, in others they do not. In some respect they resemble agents, in 
others they do not”
®^ Alexander v. Automatic Telephone Co. [1900] 2 Ch 56.
®® [1942] 1 All E. R. 542 at 543.
See Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd  [1967] Ch 254; see also Worthington, Sarah, Corporate Governance: 
Remedying and Rarifying Directors’ Breaches, 116 L. Q. R (2000) p. 638.
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are: they have the right to elect the board of directors and auditors/^ they have the 
power to remove directors/* and they have the power to fix their remuneration if it is 
not fixed in the Article of Association/^
The KCL provides in Article 131 the rights of members of a JSC:
A member shall in particular have the following rights; (c) To take part 
in the management of the company business whether the same is in the 
GMs or in the board of directors, according to the Articles of 
Association... .
In this provision, the legislature states that shareholders have a role in the 
management of the company. However, the legislature does not explain how to “take 
part in the management” and how shareholders can play this role. The Kuwaiti 
legislature should in a direct way give the shareholders the right to inspect the books 
and records of their com pany.This contrasts for example, with the Company Law of 
Saudi Arabia, which gives the shareholders the right of access to the books of accounts 
and all pertinent documents of the company. '^*
The KCL provides in Article 148:
(1) The chairman of the board and the directors are liable to the 
company, to the shareholders and to third parties for all acts of cheating 
and misuse of powers as well as for any violation of the law or of the 
articles of association and for any fault in the management.
(2) A ballot by the GM discharging the directors of liability shall not bar 
the initiating of proceeding for liability.
Article 157(4) of the KCL.
Ibid., Article 152 provides “the GM may dismiss the chairman or any member of the board upon a
proposal being made by the absolute majority of the board or upon application signed by a number o f  
shareholders who hold not less than one-quarter of the capital subscribed for”
Ibid., Article 157(4).
’^‘Tamma, supra note 6, p. 468.
See Company Law of Saudi Arabia Article 108(5).
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According to this article directors whl be liable, i), if they have done any act 
contrary to the KCL or other law of the State; ii) if they exceed the powers and role 
granted to them in the Articles of Association, and iii) when they have committed any 
fault in the management of the company. Therefore, shareholders, according to this 
article, may file a liability lawsuit against the board of directors for cheating, breaking
the law, and bad management (see chapter 8). The GM, voting to release the board of
directors firom their liabilities, cannot prevent this right.
Besides this, Kuwaiti legislature has imposed conditions on the GM for the 
benefit of shareholders. These conditions are very important when the GM is under 
the control of the board of directors.
Furthermore, the KCL provides in Article 133:
(1) The shareholders’ GM may not: (a) Increase the financial charges of 
a shareholder nor increase the nominative value of a share; (b) Reduce 
the percentage of the net profits which must be distributed to the 
shareholder as determined by the company’s articles of association; (c) 
Impose new conditions other than those set forth in the articles of 
association, which relate to the competency of a shareholder to be 
present and vote at the GM (see chapter 7); (d) Restrict the right of a 
shareholder to institute proceedings against all or a number of the 
directors claiming damages according to the law; (see chapter 8)
(2) However, a deviation fi'om the above provision is permissible with 
the written consent of all the shareholders, or by a unanimous vote in 
which aU shareholders participate”
This article is one of the most important articles for the protection of 
shareholders. It is very clear fi-om this article that Kuwaiti legislature has intervened to 
protect the shareholders of the company. Also in this article, the Kuwaiti legislature 
has laid down a line that cannot be crossed in the company untU written permission is 
received fi-om all shareholders. This intervention from the legislature in the affairs of 
JSCs imposes these conditions on the authorities of GM because, arguably it is well
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known that GMs of many JSCs have become like family meetings -  cosy places to 
make the directors’ actions legal, instead of being the forum in which shareholders may 
practice their rights. Therefore, it is unacceptable according to the KCL for the GM to 
impose new conditions on shareholders other than the conditions that are usually 
mentioned under the Articles of Association. The GM may not add financial burdens 
or increase the nominal value of the shares, and it may not reduce the dividends that 
must be distributed as determined by the Articles of Association. Furthermore, the 
GM may not impose new conditions other than those mentioned in the Articles of 
Association relating to the competency of the shareholders to attend and vote in the 
GMs. In addition, it may not restrain the shareholders’ right to file a lawsuit against 
the directors for compensation for any damages they have suffered. At the end of that 
article, the legislator stipulates that these conditions may only be exceeded with the 
written consent of all the shareholders of the company or by the “unanimous” vote of 
all the shareholders.
In the UK, on the other hand, shareholders in the GM of the company are given a 
large number of powers, which cannot be exercised by the directors. These powers, 
reserved to the shareholders in a GM by the UK CA 1985, include: the right to alter 
the Memorandum^^ and Articles of Association,^^ to alter the share cap ita l,to  alter
the object of the com pany ,to  decide not to caU the uncalled share capital,^  ^to
The UK CA 1985 8 .307(1). 
9(1).
9 7 Ibid., S. 121. 
Ibid., S. 4. 
Ibid., S. 120.
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authorise substantial property transactions with d irec to rs /to  dismiss directors/*** and 
many others.
Consequently, in general, every JSC acts through two bodies. The first is the 
board of directors, and the second is the GM of shareholders. Each organ has 
exclusive powers, in theory at least, and legislature, legal committees and legal scholars 
of Company Law always try to balance the power between them. For example, this 
balance of power can be found in the Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury) in its definition of Corporate Governance 
in para 2.5:
Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are run. At 
the centre of the system is the board of directors whose actions are 
subject to law, regulations and the shareholders in a GM. The 
shareholders in turn are responsible for appointing the directors and the 
auditors and it is to them that the board reports on its stewardship at 
the Annual GM.***^
In fact, the way of controlling a company, and the balance of power between the 
board and shareholders to prevent directors fi-om enteriug into unauthorised 
transactions, exists only in theory or on paper -  the reality is very different. JSCs 
nowadays resemble a country on its day of independence, when it announces that it 
will be democratic. As is known, every democratic country has three powers, each 
separate fi-om the other, and each cannot interfere in business belonging to other
JW ., S. 320(1).
Ibid., S. 303.
In the same report see also para. 6.1 which provides “the formal relationship between the
shareholders and the board of directors is that the shareholders elect the directors, the directors report 
on their stewardship to the shareholders and the shareholders appoint the auditors to provide the 
external check on the directors’ financial statement. Thus the shareholders as owners of the company 
elect the directors to run the business on their behalf and hold them accountable for its progress”; see 
also Villiers, Charlotte and Boyle, George, Corporate Governance and Regulation, in Laura 
Macgregor, Tony Prosser and Charlotte Villiers (eds.)., Regulation and Market beyond 2000, 
Ashgate: Aldershot, (2000), p. 221-242.
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authorities. The country, when it established its associations, in reality, allows the 
government to play two different roles: the role of the executive authority (original 
role), and the role of the legislative authority. In many JSCs the same thing is 
happening. The boards of directors in many JSCs are effectively playing two roles -  
that of the GM and their original role. Therefore, the annual GMs of many companies 
become the place where the board of directors legality their work of the last year. 
Whilst, the role of the shareholders becomes merely that of putting money into the 
company (see chapter 7).
The question that must be asked is why the actual participation of shareholders in 
the company’s affairs does not match the powers they have in the company. There are 
many reasons for this indifference shown by the shareholders toward the company’s 
affairs. The most important are: First, the limited liability that the shareholders enjoy 
reinforces this indifference because each member knows that the most he may lose is 
what he has paid. Second, the huge sum of the company’s capital compared with the 
amount of money the shareholder is investing causes the shareholder not to attend 
because he does not expect his vote to have any influence. In addition, in large 
companies the shares are so widely dispersed that any group of shareholders will find it 
very hard to control what the directors do. Furthermore, the way for of a shareholder 
to get out of the company and terminate his membership at any time is by selling his 
shares. Finally, a large number of the shareholders are, in fact, speculators and they 
will sell their shares directly when the market value of their shares goes up. As a result 
of this indifference, the board of directors effectively enjoys powers far wider than the 
powers that directors are given by the legislature and the Articles of Association (see 
chapter 7).
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2.5.3 Residual Power
If every company has two main organs which of these two organs has the 
residual power? In fact, shareholders through the GM have the residual power in the 
company. This is because the GM is the superior power in the company. For example, 
the GM is generally regarded as having the power to act in place of the board of 
directors if for any reason the board cannot act, and is unable or unwilling to carry out 
their duties as a board of directors.Besides, when the board of directors act outside 
its authority, it needs a resolution from the GM of the shareholders in order to legalize 
the board’s actions.***'* Furthermore, the Articles of Association, which is one of the
sources of power to the board of directors and GM, can be altered by the shareholders 
in the GM.***^  Moreover, shareholders in the GM may, in limited circumstances start an
action on behalf of the company if the board of directors are unwilling or refuse to start 
it for any reason (see 8.1.2). Finally, the board of directors are appointed and dismissed 
by shareholders in the GM.***^  Therefore, the directors and the powers vested in them
are subject to the GM and its resolutions if it is within the law and the Articles of 
Association of the company.
In fact, these powers are just examples of a shareholder’s power in the company, 
and many powers will be discussed in the rest of the research to give a clear impression
See Foster v. Foster [1916] 1 Ch 532; Barron v. [1914] 1 Ch 895 in this late case, the
company had two directors who were given power to appoint additional director. The company’s 
business came to a stop because one of the directors refused to attend any board meeting at which the 
other director was present. Warrington J. said “If directors having certain powers are unable or 
unwilling to exercise them -  are in fact a non-existent body for the purpose -  there must be some 
power in the company to do itself that which under other circumstances would be otherwise done. 
The directors in the present case being unwilling to appoint additional directors under the power 
conferred on them by the article, in my opinion, the company in GM has power to make the 
appointment”; see also S. 384(3) of the UK CA.
See Bamfordv. Bmford [1970] Ch 212, [1969] 1 All ER 969.
See Article 158 (1) of the KCL.
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that shareholders, through the GM, are the residual power in the company. These 
powers need to be activated by shareholders if they want to act in their company as 
owners or at least as the main interested group. Unfortunately, most of the 
shareholders are uninterested in involve themselves in the affairs of the company, 
which gives the directors the right to play all of the roles in the company.***^
2.6 Conclusion
According to the KCL, it cannot assure that the Kuwaiti legislator has adopted one of 
these theories in eomplete. It may be notieed that the contract substance exists in this law. But 
this contract has a special nature as we have previously mentioned in this chapter. This law 
also gave the State represented in the MCI a significant role in establishing and monitoring the 
companies -especially JSCs. Therefore, arguably, it can be said that the Kuwaiti legislator has 
adopted a mixed system, and did not adopt one theory. Hence, the company is managed m the 
method specified in its memorandum of association, which means its constitution. This 
management shall be under the surveillance of shareholders and Ministry of Commerce, which 
play a remarkable role in monitoring these companies, in order to make sure that the board 
aims at accomplishing the declared objeetives of the company, and that shareholders’ and 
investors interests are maintained, and not violated. In course of the state’s performance of this 
role, it is in fact preserving the stability of its economy, str engthening the same and directing its 
wheel in the right direction.
If the companies need large authorities regarding managing the same, they shall 
be organising their constitution. This matter is required by the commercial life which 
shall be flexible and quick. In the same time, this important and vital sector cannot be 
left completely to these companies without a balanced surveillance which does not
See S. 292 of the UK CA 1985 and 152,157 of the KCL.
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affect the flexibility required in the commercial markets. Taking what has occurred in 
the United States as the best example, as the federal government has intervened when 
they found out that there is manipulation, corruption and illegal violations committed 
by executive managers and auditors in these companies (such as Worldom and Eron),
which led to large losses, and to negative results that affected the American economy. 
Thus, the state can intervene as happened in the largest economies in the world at all, 
which is the United States’, as state’s interference can be in the interest of shareholders 
and companies in general. Therefore, the State intervention is sometimes justified since 
intervention will ensure that resources are allocated to more highly valued uses, 
thereby increasing aggregate social welfare.***^
Both the above theories place shareholders in a different position. The 
contractual theory treats them as the owner of the company. Therefore, the company 
should be managed in their interest first, and as owners of the company they should 
enjoy a wide range of powers and rights. The institutional theory treats the 
shareholders as one of a number of organs in the company. Therefore, shareholders 
have a limited number of powers and rights that are mentioned in the Company Law. 
In fact, both assumptions about the position are rejected. The companies in all 
Companies Acts around the world are independent legal persons, and they ovm their 
assets, and shareholders are the owners of the company’s shares, and the ownership of 
shares endows them with a number of powers and rights. The source of these powers 
and rights are the constitutions of the companies and the Company Statutes.
This position has been given to the shareholders to create some sort of balance of
See Isle o f Wight Rly Co v Tahourdin (1883) 25 Ch D 324. 
Cheffins, supra note 65, p. 126.
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power between them and board of directors, as provided above. However, this alleged 
balance of power only exists theoretically. This is because the role and position of 
shareholders in the KCL is not sufficiently clear. Therefore, most of the shareholders 
do not get involved as required in the company’s affairs. If the role of shareholders as 
inspectors and monitors lessened or even ceased to exist, this could have a negative 
impact on the management of the company and damage the shareholders.
In the end of this chapter the body of shareholders is one of the main two organs 
in any JSC. The question that must be asked in the next chapter is how a person 
becomes a shareholder? If the answer is when he gets a share. Than what is the 
definition of a share? The next chapter whl focus on the definition of share and 
shareholder; how a person becomes a shareholder and how he loses this status and the 
kinds and classes of shares and shareholders.
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Chapter Three 
Definition of Share and Shareholder
3. Introduction
As discussed in chapter two, knowing the position of shareholders in the JSCs 
helps to identify their role and rights. Also, to identify the position of shareholders, it 
is relevant to study the matter of shareholders’ rights and to know that a person 
becomes a shareholder when he owns a share in a JSC. As a shareholder, he or she 
enjoys a number of rights. Also, a JSC may grant different rights with different classes 
of shares. The questions that should be asked here in this chapter are; what is the 
definition of a share and a shareholder? What are the characteristics of a share? What 
are the types of shares? How does a person become a shareholder, with a number of 
powers and rights? When does a person lose his position as a shareholder? The 
answers to all these questions will help to assess the matter of shareholders’ rights. 
Therefore, this chapter whl concentrate on the definitions of the share and 
shareholders.
This chapter is concerned with the shares and shareholders of a JSC. Before 
tackling the main issues of this research, it is important to examine a few things under 
KCL No. 15/1960. First will be the definition of a share, this wiU be followed by the 
characters of shares and types of shares. Next the definition of the shareholder will be 
given, i.e. the person who becomes a member of a JSC until his or her membership is 
terminated.
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3.1 Definition of a Share
There is no definition of a share in the KCL. The legislature of Kuwait has left 
this matter to scholars of company law who have given various definitions. A person 
becomes a shareholder when he or she owns a share, so what is a share? Answering 
this question will be helpful in understanding the definition and position of 
shareholders. The share capital of a JSC represents the total amount of contributions 
in cash or in kind made to the company in return for issues of its shares. A share is a 
shareholder’s portion of the company’s capital and is, in the meantime, the supporting 
document of the shareholder.* Also, a share is defined as a fi-action of the capital 
expressing the holder’s proportionate financial stake in the company. According to the 
above definitions, every shareholder owns a part of the company’s capital. 
Consequently, the shareholders of the company are the ovmer of the capital of the 
company. This result is not acceptable nowadays, because every company is in fact a 
separate legal person. Rather, a share represents a shareholder’s interest in a company 
and entitles him to enjoy certain rights, such as dividends and sharing the remaining 
assets of the company upon dissolution.^
In the UK, the common definition of a share is that of Justice G. Farwell in the 
case of Boland's Trustee V. Steel Brother c& Co L/<7(1901) 1 Ch279 at p. 288.^ A 
share, according to Justice Farwell, means the shareholder’s interest in the company 
evaluated in an amount of money. Such an interest makes the shareholder both
‘ Abu Zaid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in the Kuwaiti Law, edn , Cairo: Dar AL-Fker AL- 
Arbi Publishing, (1978), p. 403.
 ^ See Worthington, Sarah, Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement part 1, 22 Co
Law (2001) p. 258; Mahmoud, Al-Sharkawi, Commercial Companies in Egyptian Law,
Nhdah AL-Arbai Publishing (1986), p 167.
® Gower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law, Davies, Paul L (ed.), 6“' edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Publishing, (1997), p. 300.
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responsible on the one hand and a titleholder on the other. A share also implies a series 
of reciprocal undertakings made by all shareholders among themselves as contained in 
the company’s Articles of Association. A share is not an amount of money but an 
interest measured by a sum of money, based on the various rights contained in the 
Memorandum, including the title to an amount of money more or less than the share’s 
value. Therefore, shares are bundles of contractual and statutory rights which the 
shareholders have against the company. Pennington commented on the concept of 
share;
A concept of share in these terms is incomplete, because many of the 
important rights and obligations of a member of a registered company 
under the present law are conferred or imposed on him, not by the 
statutory contract, but directly by the Companies Act 1985, itself. 
Nevertheless, if account is taken of such statutory rights and obligations 
and they are aggregated with the members’ rights and obligations under 
the statutory contract, the whole complex of member’s right and 
obligations constitutes his shareholding. It follows, therefore, that 
because such right and obligations are the components of shares, and 
not distinct items of property or limitations imposed on a separate item 
of property (ie the funds paid to the company in consideration of the 
issue of shares), shares cannot themselves be subject to rules of law 
which invalidate certain dispositions of property, such as the rule 
against perpetuities. Dispositions of shares which already exist are, of 
course, subject to those rules of law, because shares are items of 
property, but the constituent contractual and statutory rights which 
together make up shares cannot be/
According to Pennington’s view, shares of a registered company are a species 
of intangible movable property, which comprise a collection of rights and obligations 
relating to an interest in a company of an economic and proprietary character, but not 
constituting a debt (see 2.4).^
Pennington, Robert, Can Shares in Companies be defined? 10 Co. Law (1989) p. 144. 
 ^Ibid.
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3*2 Share Features
If a share is an interest of a shareholder in the company evaluated in an amount 
of money, what are the features of the share? And what are the rights that may be 
given to the shareholders as a result of these features? A number of features will be 
discussed in this section. These include share transferability, the equal nominal value 
of shares in Kuwait, indivisibility of the share and limited liability.
3.2,1 Share Transferability
The transferability of shares is the most important feature that encourages many 
people to participate in this kind of company. Therefore, share transferability must 
neither be completely prohibited nor restricted except for consideration of higher 
economic interest on a temporary basis. The KCL pointed out very clearly this feature 
in Article 63 that provides “A JSC is formed by a number of persons who subscribe for 
negotiable shares”.
The shareholders have, by virtue of their ownership of shares, the right to 
transfer them. Therefore, a shareholder can do what he or she wishes with his or her 
shares such as sale, donation, will, or mortgage. Shares can be transferable on the 
Kuwaiti stock exchanges through stockbrokers only after they have been admitted to 
the official stock list (see 4.1).^
® The companies listed in the Kuwait Securities Market are divided into eight sectors which are: first,
the banks sector, second, the investment sector, third, the insurance sector, fourth, the real estate 
sector, fifth, the industrial sector, sixth, the services sector, seventh, the food sector, eighth, the non- 
Kuwaiti companies sector.
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3.2.2 Shares are of Equal Nominal Value
Shares of JSCs under the KCL are of equal nominal value. Shares of different 
nominal value may not be issued according to the KCL. This is stipulated in Article 99 
which provides “The capital of a company shall be divided into equal shares the 
nominal value of each of which is not less than 100 fils nor more than 75dinar”. 
Article 100 of the KCL provides also that “Shares shall be issued at their nominal value 
and may not be issued at lower value.”
The nominal value of the share is the amount of money that must be paid to the 
company to say that it is fully paid. There are two justifications for this article. First, 
according to the KCL, there is just one category of share (ordinary share); therefore, it 
is normal for the shares of companies to be of equal nominal value. Second, the 
Kuwaiti legislator appears to aspire to attaining equality of rights between shareholders 
(especially when all shareholders have one kind of share) with respect to the 
attendance at the company’s GMs and decision-making, distribution of profits among 
shareholders, and equality in bearing liabilities resulting fi-om shareholders’ 
possession.^ The equality among shareholders is also clear in other articles in the KCL
such as Article 156 that provides “Every shareholder shall have a number of votes
equal to the number of his shares” (see 7.3.5). Article 131of the KCL provides:
A member shall in particular have the following rights; (a) to receive the 
profits and interests, which are determined to be distributed to the 
shareholders; (b) to recover a share of all the company assets upon the 
liquidation of the company.
There should be a distinction between the share’s nominal, commercial, and 
actual value. The nominal value means the value paid for a share upon subscription, the
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value of which in Kuwait shall be a minimum of 100 fils (about 20 pence) and a 
maximum of KD 75 (£150) in accordance with Kuwait law/The commercial value
means the share’s value on the stock exchange market/ This value is determined by 
several factors including the company’s dividends, assets, the strength of its financial 
position, and its project success/® There are also external factors, which would
contribute to the determination of the share’s commercial or market value, namely 
local and international economic and political circumstances as well as the investor’s 
speculations/^ The actual value is the value of the company’s net assets upon
liquidation thereof and deduction or settlement of its debts. After the company’s 
dissolution, and liquidation and settlement of its debts, the actual value of a share of 
the company’s net assets can be determined.
3.2.3 Indivisibility of the Share
Share indivisibility means that a single share may be the joint property of several 
persons, for whatever reason such as donation and inheritance and wills. In this event, 
none of the joint owners exercises his proprietary right separately. For example, one 
of the joint owners cannot claim a separate instrument representing his individual right. 
The joint owners cannot each request payment of the dividends of part of the capital to 
which the share is entitled. In addition, they cannot all attend the GMs of the
 ^ Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, edn., Kuwait: Author Publishing,
(1999), p. 307; see also Mahmoud, Al-sharkawi, Commercial Companies in Egyptian Law, Cairo: Dar 
AL-Nahdah Publishing, (1986), p. 198.
® Article 99 of the KCL.
 ^Radwan, supra note 1, p. 406.
Ibid.,
Taama, supra note 7, p. 308.
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company/^ These persons should either select one of themselves or a third party to
represent them before the company while the rest of the partner(s) remain jointly 
responsible for the obligations resulting from ownership of their share/'^ A share is
indivisible as clearly stipulated in Article 99 of the KCL, which provides:
A share is indivisible: two or more persons may co-own a share where 
one person must represent them vis-à-vis the company: the co-owners 
(of the shares) shall be jointly liable on obligations derived from the said 
ownership.
Therefore, while a share can be owned by a number of persons, they cannot all
practice the rights of this ownership. Also, a person may not subscribe or be the
holder of part of a share of the company. The reason for a share’s indivisibility is to
facilitate the exercise of its right towards the company, especially voting rights at GMs,
as this right is indivisible.
The UK CA 1985 directly provides in s. 2(5) b “No subscriber of the
memorandum may take less than one share”.
This means that no one can subscribe for a part of a share; thus, a shareholder
shall not be a holder of a part of the share. Furthermore, Table A, Article 55 in the
UK provides for jointly held shares:
In the case of joint holders the vote of the senior who tenders a vote, 
whether in person or by proxy, shall be accepted to the exclusion of the 
votes of the other joint holder; and seniority shall be determined by the 
order in which the names of the holders stand in the register of the 
members.
Here, according to Article 55 mentioned above, shares may be allotted to two or 
more persons jointly, and will be registered in their names; the first named in the
Ihid.
Mustafa, Kamal, Commercial Companies, Cairo; Dar Al-jama Al-jadeeda Publishing, (1998), p. 
194.
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register is entitled to a share certificate, a dividend, and to a vote at the general 
meeting.
The Kuwait National Assembly (hereafter KNA) and the government put 
forward suggestions for amending the law, which is now under consideration by the 
Assembly’s Financial and Legislative Committee. This proposal suggests adding a new 
article to the KCL. This article, in line with current international trends, provides that 
JSCs listed in the Kuwait Stock Exchange (hereafter KSE) may split each share into a 
number of shares, subject to approval of the Exchange’s administration and provided 
that the company in question has distributed dividends for at least two successive 
years. The relevant resolution is passed by an EGM of the company in accordance 
with the regulation set by the MCI.’^
3.2.4 Limited Liability
One of the most important features of shares in JSCs is the limited liability of the 
owners. The limitation of shareholders’ liability in JSCs helps these kinds of companies 
to grow because people want this kind of limitation of liability. This feature shifts the 
risk of business failure fi*om the shareholders to the company itself Therefore, they 
prefer to invest their saving in shares of the JSC rather than other kinds of companies. 
Again, as Hicks provides^ ^
Indeed, if there were no limited liability, such investments would hardly 
be made at aU, except in the public sector. Thus it is not surprising that 
the building of railways was historically connected with the coming of 
limited liability.
'^^ Tamma, supra note 7, p. 309.
See the proposal Article 99
See Andrew, Hicks, Limited Liability: the Pros and Cons, in Tony Orhnial (ed.),
and the Corporation, London: Croom Helm Publishing, (1982), p. 12; see also Easterbrook, Frank H., 
and Fischel, Daniel, R., limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 the Uni. o f Chi. L. Rev (1985) p. 89.
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The basis of this feature is that the shareholders of the company take 
responsibility for the company’s debts if matters work out badly. The company is a 
separate legal entity and provides some measure of cover for the shareholder. For 
example, when a company enters into any contract, it enters in its capacity as a 
separate legal person and not on behalf of its shareholders.^^ Each shareholder shall be
responsible for the company’s losses to the extent of his own shares as provided in
Article 63 of the KCL:
A joint stock company is formed by a number of persons who subscribe 
for negotiable shares and those persons shall not be liable for the 
commitments of the company except to the extent of the face value of 
the shares subscribed for.
Therefore, when the shareholder pays the whole value of his subscribed shares, 
he shall not be liable for the company debts and shall have no rights except for those 
related to profits and the company assets upon liquidation thereof. The limited liability 
of shareholders in the JSC encourages people to invest their money in these kinds of 
company since they will not have to use their personal assets to pay their company’s 
debts. Therefore, to ensure limited liability, the Kuwaiti legislator provides that the 
general meeting of any company cannot make a resolution for increasing the 
shareholder’s liability. ^®
In the UK, the Companies Act of 1985 in S. 2(3) provides that the liability of 
shareholders must be limited, and this limited liability is one of the important rights of 
shareholders. Therefore, it cannot be increased under any kind of circumstances.^^ A
‘^Aubrey, Diamond L., Corporate Personality and Limited Liability, Tony Orhnial (ed,), London: 
Croom Helm Publishing, (1982), p. 31.
Article 133/l(a) o f the KCL provides that “The shareholders’ General Meeting may not (a) 
increase the financial charges of a shareholder nor increase the nominative value of a share.”
S. 2(3) of the UK CA 1985 provides “the memorandum of a company limited by shares or by 
guarantee must also state that the liability of its members is limited.”
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JSC is a separate legal entity providing some measure of protection for the 
shareholders^", and for any of the company’s obligations. The separate legal entity of a 
limited liability company was firmly incorporated by the House of Lords in one of the 
most important cases in the UK Salomon v A Salomon &Co Ltd\\^91}
Therefore, section 25(1) of the UK CA 1985 provides:
The name of a JSC must end with the words “public limited company”
or, if the memorandum state that the company’s registered office is to
be situated in Wales, those words or their equivalent in Welsh (“cwmni 
cyfyngedig cyhoeddus”); and those words or that equivalent may not be 
preceded by the word “limited” or its equivalent in Welsh 
(“cyfyngedig”).
They are required to mention the word “limited” at the end of its name, and 
they may also use the abbreviation ‘Ltd’ or the Welsh equivalent. S.33 of the UK CA 
provides a JSC commits a criminal offence if it gives the impression that it is a private
company when it is not.
3.3 Types of Shares
A JSC may grant different rights with different classes of shares.Therefore, the
rights of shareholders depend on the kind of shares they have. However, the question 
that must be asked is why do companies often have different kinds of shares? This can 
be justified in a number of ways. First, the ordinary shareholders usually have most 
voting power at GMs, and ordinary shareholders have the largest part of the profits in
Gower’s, supra note 3, p. 80.
In this case Lord Macnaghten said: The company is at law a different person altogether from the
subscribers to the memorandum, and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, the same persons are managers, and the same hands reeeive the 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the 
subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, exeept to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the act.
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times of prosperity/^ If new ordinary shares were issued to new shareholders or to
existing shareholders, the current balance of power within the company would be 
disturbed; therefore, existing shareholders may seek to ensure that the company raises 
its future capital by issuing preference, non-voting shares or debentures/"^ Second, a
company may issue different classes of shares to attract different types of investors. 
An investor may be interested, for example, in preference shares; if the company does 
not have this kind of share, the investor is not going to invest his money in its other 
shares. A third possible reason is that when a company wants to raise new capital and 
the current market price of its existing shares is less than nominal value, the sole 
practicable method of raising new capital is to issue a new class of share that has 
preferential rights/^
A share may be paid in cash or in kind. For cash shares only 20 per cent of the 
value of each is paid upon subscription and the rest is paid up within five years of the 
date of issue of the formation decree.^® Shares in kind (vendor’s shares) must be fiilly 
paid. Article 105 of the KCL provides:
A (share) company may (issue) shares otherwise than in cash: for 
money’s worth or for chooses in action; and the founders (of the 
company) shall apply to the President of the High Court for appointing 
an expert to check whether such consideration has been rightly valued. 
But the evaluation shall not be final until it is sanctioned by a majority in 
number of the shareholders holding two-thirds of the cash shares 
(remaining) after excluding the cash shares owned by the contributors -
Pennington, Robert. Company Law, edn., London: Butterworth Publishing, (1990), p. 205 .
J.H, Farrar & B.M. Hannigan., Farrar's Company Law, 4“^ edn, London: Butterworths Publishing, 
(1998), p. 229.
Pennington, supra note 22, p. 204.
Ibid., p. 202.
Article 102 of the KCL provides that “the value of the share shall be paid in cash, either in one sum
or by instalments; and the instalments payable on the application shall be (equivalent to) not less than 
20% of the value of the share. In all cases, however, the full value should be paid up within five years 
from the date of the (company’s) decree of incorporation.”
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who shall have no right to a vote in the sanctioning of the evaluation — 
of that consideration.
The KCL does not recognise shares in kind (such as land, equipment, etc.). 
However, a founder who desires to contribute in kind must apply to the President of 
the Competent Court to appoint an expert to verify accurate valuation and seek 
consent of at least two thirds of the shareholders. Once valuation of the vendor’s 
shares is verified their owner is given nominal shares of an equivalent value as provided 
in Aiticle 105 of the KCL. The KCL has established this system to ensure accuracy of 
valuation of shares in kind to protect shareholders. Because, founders usually offer 
shares in kind and would probably overestimate the value of their contribution in kind.
The main classes of share are ordinary shares, preference shares, deferred shares, 
and redeemable shares. However, the most common classes are ordinary and 
preference shares. These two classes are not terms of law; the rights and obligations 
affixing to ordinary and preference shares may alter fi*om company to company. 
Usually, the rights and obligations attached to the shares exist in the company’s 
Articles of Association, with the contract of allotment exactly specifying the shares and 
the rights and liabilities attached.
3.3.1 Ordinary Shares
Ordinary shares are sometimes called equities. If a company has just one class 
of shares they must be ordinary shares. The holders of ordinary shares are those who
Mayson, Stephen, French D. and Ryan, C., Company Law, 15'*' edn, London: Blackstone 
Publishing, (1998-99), p. 103.
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bear the biggest share of the company’s risks/^ Also, the voting powers in the general
meeting are vested in this kind of shares, (see 2.4 and 7.3.4.2)
The holders of ordinary shares have no fixed dividends as with preference shares, 
but ordinary shareholders get the residual profit of dividends after all preference 
dividends.^® In the winding up of a company, after payment of the company’s debts and 
before the ordinary capital is returned, the preference shareholders get the nominal 
value of their shares.^® The ordinary shareholders, after the winding up, may get
nothing because what is left after paying the company’s debts may not be enough to 
return the nominal value of their shares. However, they may often get the nominal 
value of their shares when there are surplus assets available after getting rid of all the 
company’s liabilities.
The most important feature of ordinary shares is that the voting powers in the 
ordinary general meeting or extraordinary general meeting are vested in the holders of 
ordinary shares. Therefore, the holders of this kind of share play the most important 
part in monitoring directors’ actions.
According to the KCL there is only one kind of share. Therefore, all 
shareholders have equal rights whether with respect to distribution of profits, division 
of the company’s assets after liquidation, or voting rights. The KCL provides in 
Article 130 that:
The promoters who have subscribed to the company’s Memorandum 
and Articles of Association, as well as subscribers who have subscribed 
for its shares, shall be deemed to be members of the company and shall
Yacoub, Sarkhuwa, Shares and Negotiation Thereof in the Companies Law, 
AL-Arabia publishing (1982), p. 107.
^Ubid., p.103.
Farrar, supra note 23, p. 229.
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have equal rights and be subject to the same obligations, with due 
observance of the provisions of the law.
In this article it is clear that the Kuwaiti legislature wanted to grant all 
shareholders of any JSC equal rights and enable them to be subject to the same 
obligations.^^ The reason for giving equal rights to shareholders is because, as said
above, according to the KCL there is only one kind of share. For this reason, the 
holders of these shares should enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same 
obligations.
Ordinary shares do not entitle their holders to any special rights. The holders 
of this kind of shares get their dividends after the holders of preference shares, who 
should receive their promised profits according to the Articles of Association of the 
company or the deal between them and the company. However, ordinary shareholders 
do not receive a particular amount of money as dividends every year. Their dividends 
are based on the company’s financial position and how much profit the company has 
made in the last financial year. If the company in the last year was in boom condition, 
the ordinary shareholders will obtain great profits. However, if the company has not 
realised any gains, they may receive nothing.^^ When the company goes into 
liquidation for any reason, the ordinary shareholders may share the remainder of the 
company’s assets after the debts of the company have been paid and after the return of 
the nominal value of preference shares to its owners.
Some legal scholars treat the owners of ordinary shares as owners of the 
company, because they provide the main part of the company’s capital. However,
Articles 131 and 132 of the KCL concentrate on the rights and obligations of shareholders. 
Gower's, supra note 3, p. 318.
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where there are preference shares, the rights of ordinary shareholders are second to 
those of preference shareholders.
3.3.2 Preference Shares
A preference share is one to which certain preferential rights are attached. In 
other words, these shares give their holders priority and certain privileges. These kind 
of shares are considered a guaranteed investment, particularly in case of the company’s 
expiry. Preference shares, according to the company’s Articles of Association, are 
usually refundable after fulfilment of the company’s debt and before the refunding of 
the ordinary capital.
Preference shares have two main advantages; in other words, they entitle their 
holders to two rights. First, the holder of these shares is entitled to annual fixed 
dividend (e.g. 5 percent preference share) when a dividend is declared, and these 
dividends shall be paid in priority to any dividends that may be paid to other members 
such as ordinary shareholders. The right to preferential dividends of these shares is 
cumulative, if no dividend is declared on the preference share in any year, the arrears of 
dividend are carried forward and must be paid before any dividend is paid on the 
ordinary shares. For example, if no dividend is declared on 5 percent preference shares 
in 1996, 1997 and 1998, they would be entitled in 1999 to arrears of 20 percent before 
the ordinary shareholders were paid any dividend. Second, on the winding up of the 
company, the holder of preference shares has priority over other shareholders. If we 
take a look at these two advantages of preference shares we can say that the position 
of the holder of these shares is like that of a creditor. Usually the holder of a
33 Stephen, supra note 27, p 100.
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preference share does not have voting rights at a general meeting. However, in some 
countries, such as Egypt, preference shares entitle their holder to more than one vote 
at the general meeting.
Many Arab legislators in countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon 
permit the issuing of preference shares.^ "^  However, the KCL has adopted a negative
attitude towards this type of share. Kuwaiti legislation does not contain any provision 
permitting or prohibiting issuance of such shares. This matter raises a question about 
the possibility of the issuance of preference shares in Kuwait. In fact, the Kuwaiti 
attitude in regard to preference shares is defective. Arguably, a company should not be 
bound to issue all its shares with the same rights; it should be able to confer different 
rights on different classes of shares, such as ordinary shares and preference shares.^^
The UK CA is a good example to follow. In the UK a company may produce
different classes of shares, such as the preference share with rights that seem more
profitable in order to attract contributions of capital. This attitude is very clear in
Table A Article 2 which provides:
Subject to the provisions of the Act and without prejudice to any rights 
attached to any existing shares, any shares may be issued with such 
rights or restrictions as the company may by ordinary resolution 
determine.
From this article it is clear that a company has been given the power to issue 
different classes of shares in order to attract contributions of capital.
Some Arabian countries do not allow the issuance of such type of shares. For example, UAE
Company Law in Art. 152 (2), and Jordan in Art. 100(c); however, other countries like Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt do allow the issuance of this type of shares; Article 103 of Saudi Company Law provides 
“...in  the absent of any or to convert common shares to preferred share of stock. Preferred shares may 
vest their holders with priority in receiving a certain dividend and/or in recovering their paid-in 
capital upon liquidation, or with any other benefit...”
For more information see Al-Malham, Ahmed, The Preferences Shares in the Company Law o f  
Kuwait and Comparative Laws, Kuwait: University of Kuwait Publishing, (2000), p. 79.
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This clear fahme in the KCL regarding this kind of share, has led the KNA to put 
forward suggestions for amending the law which is now under consideration by the 
assembly’s financial and legislative committee. One of the suggestions put forward by 
the KNA is adding a new provision to the KCL through which some of the company’s 
shares may be preference shares and entitle their owners to a portion of the company’s 
dividends before owners of ordinary shares. The suggested provision would give 
owners of preference shares priority in the company’s assets upon liquidation as well 
as the right to vote and stand for board membership. The suggested article highlights 
the need for equity of shares of the same type in the terms of rights and privileges. 
This suggested article is one of the most important provisions that needs to be adopted 
because it provides shareholders with many benefits, including capital increase as an 
incentive for investors and shareholders by issuing preference shares instead of seeking 
loans at such a high cost that the company may be unable to repay and the creditors 
may file an application for liquidation.
3,3.3 Redeemable Shares
An equity shai'e is one whose holder is not paid its nominal value for the duration 
of the company, a redeemable share is otherwise, without the need to wait until the 
company is dissolved or liquidated, as normally is the case. Article 114 of the KCL 
provides that:
A company may not buy its own shares without an authorisation to this 
effect fi-om the general assembly (the company in general meeting) and 
the purchase price shall be paid out of the voluntary reserve and the 
value of the shares (purchased) shall be paid in full. Shares so 
purchased shall be deemed extinguished.
The general rule is that a JSC may not return the nominal value of the shares to 
their holders until the company is dissolved or liquidated and its assets divided.
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However, a company may do so if it fears depreciation of its assets upon termination, 
and if it operates ships, vehicles, mines, quarries or a public utility under State 
concession, as all the company’s property vested in the State after the agreed period, 
such as the case in electricity, water and oil companies. Therefore, a JSC under the 
KCL may buy some of its shares and give redeemable shares to the holders of the 
shares.
Owners of these shares have the same rights as other shareholders that hold 
ordinary shares, including dividends and attendance and voting at the annual general 
meeting. However, they may not recover the nominal value of their shares upon the 
dissolution and liquidation of the company and division of its assets among the 
shareholders because they have already redeemed the nominal value of their shares.^^
For redemption of the company’s shares to be valid, the general meeting should 
approve that the value of the redeemable shares be paid ft'om the voluntary reserve. 
Also, the value should be paid in full. Moreover, the company should still be in 
existence. Finally, the company should destroy the redeemable shares and may not re­
offer or sell them.
3.3.4 Classification of Shares According to the Form They Take
There are two basic varieties of shares either of which may be issued by a JSC, 
and either of which, may, in most cases, be requested by the shareholders. They are 
the nominal shai'e and the beaier share.
Article 115 of the KCL provides that “The company shall grant to the holders of shares bought (by
the company) in accordance with the provision of the previous article “enjoyment shares”. Holders of 
enjoyment shares shall be entitled to all the rights to which holders of ordinary shares are entitled 
with the exception of the right to recover the nominal value of the share upon the liquidation of the 
company.
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A certificate for a share in nominal form contains the name of the shareholder. 
The share certificate is merely evidence of the title of the named holder. To be 
transferred to another person, special procedures must be respected and the name of 
the new holder must be entered in the shareholder’s register at the company.
Bearer shares are issued to no named person, they are recognised by their 
numbers and are considered moveable property, as the bearer is the owner and can be 
transferred simply by delivery. Therefore, shares of Kuwaiti JSCs must always be 
registered shares not bearer shares (they are not allowed to issue bearer shares).A s a
general rule Kuwaiti law does not allow non-Kuwaitis to subscribe for shares in JSCs. 
Thus, the issuing of bearer shares will allow non-Kuwaitis to be members of Kuwaiti 
companies.^® That can be see as a legislative shortcoming (see 3.4.2)
3.4 Definition of Shareholder
The word ‘shareholder’ means a subscriber to the Memorandum of the company
and every other person who agrees to become a shareholder by other means, as will be
discussed later in this chapter. In the KCL, Article 130 provides a clear definition of a
shareholder in a JSC; this article provides that:
The promoters who have subscribed to the company Memorandum and 
Article of Association, as well as subscribers who have subscribed for 
its shares, shall be deemed to be members of the company and shall 
have equal rights and be subject to the same obligations, with due 
observance of the provision of the law.
The KCL provides in Article 101 “The shares of a (share) company incorporated in Kuwait shall be
registered shares; and in companies to which authorisation is given to enlist non-Kuwaiti members, 
the shares of the Kuwaiti members shall be registered shares. But dividend coupons, the form of and 
the rules governing which shall be prescribed in the articles of association of the company, may be 
registered or bearer coupons.”
Tamma, supra note 7, p. 307.
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It is clear that a person becomes a shareholder, according to the KCL, when he
or she agrees to subscribe for a number of shares of the company and enters his or her
name in the shareholders’ register.
A person in the UK becomes a member of a JSC when he or she agrees to
become a member and enters his or her name in the company’s register. The definition
of the shareholder is clear in CA 1985, s. 22 which provides:
(1) The subscribers of a company’s memorandum are deemed to have 
agreed to become members of the company, and on its registration shall 
be entered as such in its register of members; (2) Every other person 
who agrees to become a member of a company, and whose name is 
entered in its register of members, is a member of the company.
According to the above, if a person’s name has been entered in the company’s 
register of shareholders it is not in itself enough to make that person a shareholder of 
the company. The person must have agreed to be a shareholder.
Usually a person becomes a shareholder in one of the following ways.
(1) By subscribing to the company’s memorandum;
(2) By applying to the company for an allotment of shares;
(3) By buying shares ft'om a former member; and
(4) By transmission of shares on the death or bankruptcy of a member.
3.4.1 Kinds of Shareholders
There are two kinds of shareholders; natural shareholders and institutional 
shareholders. Institutional shareholders are companies that invest their capital(s) in a 
wide variety of securities. Institutional shareholders in the UK hold about 70 per cent 
of all quoted securities. Therefore, they are treated with significant respect by the
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boards of directors of the companies in which they have invested. Examples include of 
major insurance companies, pension funds, banks and building societies.®^
In Kuwait there are a number of institutional shareholders but, unfortunately no 
study exists about institutional investors or shareholders in the Kuwaiti market. 
Therefore, we do not know the extent of the shareholders’ power in Kuwait. 
Moreover, institutional shareholders or investment funds in Kuwait are regulated by 
the Amiri Decree no. 31/1990, which provides how the establishment of investing 
funds and the trading of securities are regulated (see 7.4).""
3.4.2 Who May Become Shareholders?
Any natural or legal person can be a shareholder in a JSC. Therefore, a company 
may become a shareholder of another company if its constitution contains a provision 
that allows it to invest in shares of another company. However, a subsidiary company 
in the UK, as a general rule, may not hold shares in its holding company as provided in 
S. 23, unless; the subsidiary was a shareholder of its holding company before 1 July 
1948, or the subsidiary held the shares in a holding company before it became a 
subsidiary. In this case, the subsidiary company may continue to be a shareholder but 
it cannot vote at the meetings of its holding company.
See Helen, Short and Kevin, Keasey, Institutional Shareholder and Corporate Governance, in Kevin
Keasey and Mike Wright (eds). Corporate Governance Responsibilities, Risks and Reimineration, 
England; John Wiley & Sons Publishing, (1997), p. 23; see also also Stapledon, G. P., Institutional 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance, Oxford; Clarendon Press, (1996), p .19,
"" Article 6 of the Amiri Decree no. 31/1990 provides “Kuwaiti shareholding companies which part of
their responsibilities include investment on the behalf of others, may establish joint financial and real 
estate investment funds where Kuwaiti and other nationals have the right to participate in -  that is 
after obtaining the permission issued by the Minister of the Commerce and Industry and in 
compliance with the approval of the Central Bank of Kuwait where the permit clarifies the policy of 
investing in such capital.”
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Shares may be allotted to two or more persons jointly, and the shares will be 
registered in their names, the first person named in the register is entitled to practice 
the right of the shares. Therefore, he attends and votes and gets a dividend on behalf 
of the others.
Likewise, minors (persons under the age of 18) may become shareholders in 
Kuwait unless the articles of the company forbid them. However, the contract of the 
minors to take shares in the UK is avoided before or within a reasonable time of 
becoming eighteen."^
A bankrupt may be a shareholder of a company. A shareholder does not cease to 
be a shareholder in his company if he becomes bankrupt. As a shareholder he is 
entitled to attend and vote at GMs, but usually articles provide that notice of the 
meetings is to be sent to the trustee in bankruptcy."^
Furthermore, the ownership of the shares of a deceased shareholder is 
transmitted to his executors or administrators (personal representative). The company 
will recognise the rights of personal representatives on production by an administrator 
of letters of administration of an estate. A personal representative is entitled to 
transfer the shares, attend and vote in GMs and receive all dividends and all other 
rights of the deceased shareholder without being registered as a shareholder in the 
company."^
Hence, any person could become a member, except where the company law or 
the Articles of Association imposes some restrictions. The KCL provides a restriction 
on persons who are not Kuwaiti nationals. Article 68 provides:
Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds) Ltd  [1923] 2 Ch 452. 
Table A Article 38 of the UK CA 1985,
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Every joint stock company, which is incorporated in Kuwait, shall be of 
Kuwaiti nationality; all partners shall be Kuwaiti and the company’s 
head office shall be in Kuwait. However, as an exceptional measure, a 
number of persons who are not Kuwaiti nationals may be partners in a 
joint stock company if it is necessary to invest foreign capital or use 
foreign expertise, provided that the capital holdings of Kuwaitis shall 
not be less than 51 per cent (60 per cent in banking and insurance 
companies) and also provided a license to that effect is obtained from 
the government department concerned.
According to the KCL, every JSC, which is incorporated in Kuwait, will be of 
Kuwaiti nationality, all shareholders shall be Kuwaiti, and the company’s headquarters 
should be in the State of Kuwait. However, citizens of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) States are permitted to practice a number of commercial activities and one of 
these activities is owning shares in the Kuwaiti JSCs.""
Foreign shareholding, other than GCC citizens, is inadmissible in the JSCs unless 
there is a need for foreign investment or experience. In this case, the approval of the 
concerned government authorities must be given, and that part of foreign capital 
should not exceed 49 per cent of the capital of the company, except for insurance 
companies and banks, where the foreign shareholding does not exceed 40 per cent."^ ^
It appears at first sight that the Kuwaiti legislator is concerned with protecting 
national citizens from the competition of foreign investors. The Kuwaiti legislator also 
wants to have the control of the economy in Kuwaiti hands. Therefore, the KCL does 
not allow foreigners to practice commercial business without restrictions on ownership 
percentage.
S. 183 (3) of the UK CA 1985.
"" See Law Decree No. 33 for 1988, permitting the citizens of the GCC to own shares in Kuwaiti 
companies, Kuwait Al-Youm, 1774 edn.
"^See Article 23 (1) of the Kuwaiti Trade Law no. 68/1980 and article 68 of the KCL; see also Al- 
meihem, Ahmed., Privatisation and Protection o f Investors in Kuwait, 13 A .L Q  (1998) p. 184.
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Arguably Kuwait should open the door to investment in its companies to foreign 
fijnds and experience for the economy to grow. If the government is afraid of these 
foreign funds, it may impose reasonable restrictions on their investments. Also, it must 
be clear that the government cannot in the near future separate its economy from the 
rest of the world. The world through WTO Agreements has become a village with 
regard to the freedom of information available (whether via satellite dish or the 
Internet) and the freedom of transferring goods and services across international 
boundaries.
3.4.3 Register of Shareholders
Every company, and especially JSCs, should have a register of their shareholders.
This register is very important; it is an instrument that can be used to identify
shareholders and what their liability is. Article 134(1) of the KCL provides:
The company shall keep a Shareholders’ Register wherein shall be 
entered the names and addresses of the members, the number of shares 
held by each member, the amount paid in respect thereof, the date of 
registration of the member in the Register and the date and method of 
leaving the company. This register shall be kept at the registered office 
of the company and shall be open to inspection by the shareholders free 
of charge. It shall also be open to the inspection of any other person 
against a reasonable charge; and anyone concerned may apply for its 
correction if the name of a person is entered in or struck off it without 
justification.
This register should have the shareholders’ names and addresses, the number of 
shares held by each shareholder, the amount paid for their shares, the date they 
registered, and the date he or she stopped being a member. The place of the register is 
in the company, and it should be open for inspection to all shareholders.
The -same method is used in the UK; every company must keep a register of its 
members,"^ and a company with more than 50 members must keep an index of its 
members. The register and index must be open to inspection during business hours, 
free of charge to its members."^
3.4.4 Termination of Membership
A person ceases to be a shareholder when his name is legally removed from the 
register of the company. This can happen for the following reasons; when he transfers 
all of his shares to another person, when he forfeits or surrenders all of his shares,"® or
when his company sells all of his shares to enforce a lien."^  Also, the death of the
shareholder and winding up the company terminates his membership. The membership 
of a shareholder may also be terminated with a court order for the purchase of shares 
by a company,^" and finally, with the purchase of the shares of a dissident shareholder
in a take-over bid. '^
3.5 Conclusion
In the second chapter the theory of the company was discussed and provided that 
a company is not an absolute contract to make the shareholders alone the owners of 
the company. Also it is not an institution created by the State, and the process of
S.352 of the UK CA 1985.
Ibid., S. 354 and 356.
"® Ibid., S. 143 (3) (d) and Table A. Articles 18 and 19. 
Table A Article 9 of the UK CA 1985.
Ibid., see Ss. 5, 54, 459-461.
Ibid., S. 428.
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subscription is not a contract and those who sign subscription paper do not sign a 
contract. A company is arguably a mixture of both these theories and shareholders are 
not the owners of the company. They are the capital providers, residuals claimant and 
shares owners. This is the position of shareholders in the JSCs. A shareholder is any 
person who agrees to become a shareholder by having a share and their shares are their 
interests in the company.
A shareholder’s rights depend on the kinds of shares he or she has. Therefore, 
this chapter concentrated on the definition of share and shareholder. The KCL was 
criticised for not including any definition of a share. It is proposed that the KCL 
should begin with the definition of the shares of JSCs because a person does not 
become a shareholder unless he owns a share. The KCL is also defective for not 
mentioning the preference share despite its importance. A shareholder should always 
have the right to obtain any kind of shares he wishes to acquire. The legislator should 
not compel him to invest his saving in one kind of share. Moreover, the existence of 
preference shares is vital to JSCs because it attracts different kinds of investors to 
subscribe in its capital. This chapter also discussed an essential issue of the rights of 
shareholders. That is limited liability. Limited liability must always be clear and any 
condition or resolution that denies it must be null and void. However, it should be 
recognised that when a shareholder knows his responsibility for the debts of the 
company is limited to the extent of his investment in the company, he may give less 
attention to the affairs of the company. Unfortunately, this is one of the negative 
aspects of limited liability. Also, the transferability of shares as features and rights that 
encourage people to invest their saving in JSCs may mean that they give less attention 
to their companies because they can easily withdraw ft'om the company anytime by 
transferring their shares. This is quite true. But, it must be remembered that nowadays
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the individual shareholders in JSCs is, for example, the UK, control less that 30 per 
cent of the JSCS’ shares and institutional shareholders control more that 70 per cent/^ 
Therefore, even if liability is limited, the institutional shareholders should play a serious 
role in their companies otherwise they will incur damages or get less profits. 
Moreover, the institutional shareholders cannot easily withdraw firom their company 
because the huge numbers of shares cannot be sold within a short period of time. 
Therefore, if they want to protect their interest in the JSCs they must not stay away 
firom their company just because they have limited liability or the right of 
transferability. Also, communication between the company and the shareholders and 
between the shareholders themselves (individuals and institutional) should be 
encouraged by law and the contract of the company. This kind of communication 
should enable them to be highly interested in following up the company’s activities as 
they realise that their business fortune depends on its proper management. Therefore, 
they will be more hkely to attend the company’s general meetings on a regular basis 
and have a significant voting group (see 7.4).”
Having examined the nature of shareholders’ position and distribution of powers 
within the company in chapter 2, and the definition of share and shareholders in 
chapter 3, the first to be discussed in this study should be the financial right of 
shareholders. This right is the motivation and the main reason for a shareholder to 
invest in the JSCs ant it is the subject of the next chapter.
”  Helen, supra note 39, p. 23.
”  Farrar, supra note 23, p. 305; Whittington, G., Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial 
Reporting, 23 Accounting and Business Res (1993) P. 313.
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Chapter four 
Financial Rights of Shareholders
4. Introduction
As already discussed, shareholders are the main providers of the capital of their 
company and they are the residual risk-bearers. As a whole they are the main party in 
the company contract and one of the main two organs in the company along with the 
directors. This position gives them a numbers of rights. The first of the rights of 
shareholders to be dealt with in this chapter is financial rights.
However, it must be clear that making profit for the body of shareholders is not 
the only goal of the company. As mentioned in chapter two, a company is a web of 
contracts, and an aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or 
services.^ Therefore, every input provider has an interest and this interest should be
protected. Thus, a company is not just a tool to make profits for the body of 
shareholders. As Dodd described the business corporation as, ‘an economic institution 
which has social service as well as profit making
It is a fact that most people buy shares and become shareholders of JSCs in 
order to obtain a number of rights, including financial. It is also considered as an 
incentive for shareholders to participate in the company, and to be more keen on 
knowing their full rights, which enable them to be aware of the company’s position. 
However, shareholders cannot take advantage of these rights unless they give more
‘ Easterbrook, F. H., and Fischel D. R., the Corporate Contract, 89 Colmn. Law Rev (1989) p. 1416. 
 ^Dodd, E M., For whom are corporate Managers Trustees? 45 H. L. Rev (1932) p. 1148.
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attention to the affairs of their companies. For example, if a shareholder wants to 
exercise his right to dispose of his shares, he needs information to choose the right time 
of disposal in order to get more profit. Likewise, a shareholder needs to inspect and 
understand the company’s reports and attend the GM to make sure that he is going to 
get his full part of the dividends. This means that the financial rights should be a 
reason encouraging the shareholders to pay more attention to their company. On the 
other hand, somebody may say that the financial right may be a cause, and at the same 
time, it may push many shareholders away fi-om their company especially when a 
shareholder knows that he is a minor shareholder whose participation in the company’s 
capital represents a very tiny part of the company’s shares. In addition, a shareholder 
can easily withdraw fi*om the company by the disposal of his shares at any time, and his 
annual profit will not be affected whether or not he attends the GM. In this case it 
should be remembered that in the UK, for example, the individual shareholders control 
less than 30 percent of the JSCs shares, and institutional shareholders control more 
than 70 per cent. Therefore, the institutional shareholders cannot get rid of this huge 
amount of shares and withdraw Ifom the company as easily as individual shareholders. 
So, because of the power the institutional shareholders have in the JSCs, they have a 
duty to the company and other shareholders, and the law should enforce them to play 
their role. The financial rights should encourage them to participate in the company’s 
affairs.  ^ With regard to the individual shar eholders, if they want to have an effective 
role, they should communicate with each other (see 7.4).
Financial rights are important rights that must be protected by the company Act 
and the contract of the company. The proposed question to be answered in this
Winter, Ralph K,, On Protection the Ordinary Investor, 63 Washington Law Review  (1988) p. 892.
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chapter is: What are the financial rights which each shareholder shall enjoy? What are 
the means and obstacles facing practicing these rights? Does the Kuwaiti Law grant 
these rights to shareholders?
There are four major financial rights that every shareholder should have. These 
rights are: First, the transferability of shares is the most important financial right that all 
shareholders must have. This right is one of the reasons why many people choose to 
invest their money in shares instead of other things. Second, their financial right is the 
right of pre-emption. By this right a shareholder has the option to buy any newly 
created shares before an outsider is given the opportunity to do so. Third, a 
shareholder who joins a JSC should receive dividends at the end of every financial 
year. This is one of the rights mentioned in any company contract, stating that the 
profits are to be distributed at the end of every financial year. Finally, in addition to 
the above rights, the shareholder’s application of assets on winding-up is also one of 
the financial rights that every shareholder must enjoy. A shareholder may redeem the 
nominal value of his shares fi*om the balance remaining after settlement of the 
company’s debts. If there is an additional surplus afl:er the liquidation, shareholders 
may apportion the same as provided under law and the Articles of Association. These 
are the rights that will be discussed under the KCL in this chapter.
4.1 Shareholder Right to Transfer Shares
The transferability of shares is one of the most important features that 
encourage many people to participate in JSCs as it means that they can transfer their 
shares whenever they want, This right is a personal right because a share is the
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property of a shareholder like the right of transfer is the right of propeity/
Therefore, share transferability must neither be completely prohibited nor restricted, 
except for considerations of higher economic interest on a temporary basis. And 
shareholders should always have the right to transfer shares at any time they wish. 
The KCL pointed out this right very clearly in Article 63 that provides “A joint 
stock company is formed by a number of persons who subscribe for negotiable 
shares.”
The shareholders have, by virtue of their ownership of shares, the right to 
transfer them. Therefore, a shareholder can do what he or she wishes with his or 
her shares such as sale, donation, will, or mortgage. Shares can be transferable on 
the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange through stockbrokers only after they have been 
admitted to the ofiBcial stock list.  ^ However, the KCL imposes a number of 
restrictions on this right, as we will see later in this chapter.
In the UK, shares of any member of a company are personal property^ and they
are transferable in the manner provided by the law and the company’s Articles of
Association. The UK CA 1985 provides in section 182(I)(b):
The shares or other interest of any member in a company; (b) are 
transferable in manner provided by company’s articles, but subject to 
the stock transfer Act 1963 (which enables securities of certain 
descriptions to be transferred by a simplified process) and to 
regulations made under section 207 of the Company Act 1989.
Bastin, Nigel A., The Enforcement of a Member’s Rights, J. B. L (1971) p. 22.
 ^ The companies listed in the Kuwait Securities Market are divided up into eight sectors which are:
first, the banks sector, second, the investment sector, third, the insurance sector, fourth, the real estate 
sector, fifth, the industrial sector, sixth, the services sector, seventh, the food sector, eighth, the non- 
Kuwaiti companies sector.
 ^ In Moffatt V. Farquhar (1878) Ch.D. 591 the right to transfer was considered a right of property and 
could therefore be protected by individual suit.
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The transferee becomes a member of the company when he agrees to become a 
member and allows his name to be put on the register of members/ The essential 
position on share transfer, defined in Smith, Knight & Co, Weston's Case Re (1868) 
4 Ch App 20, is that shareholders have a prima facie right to transfer their shai'es/
Therefore, a share is negotiable, i.e. it may be commercially assigned in accordance 
with simplified procedures facilitating the quick transfer thereof from one owner to 
another without being subject to the approval of other shareholders. If a share is a 
bearer share, it can be disposed of through delivery. If it were a nominal share, it 
would be disposed of through registration in the company register.^
4.1.1 Regulations of the Transferability of Shares
As previously mentioned, one of the main features of shares is their 
transferability by commercial means. In principle, owners of shares may dispose of 
them in any way, e.g sale, pledge, gift, will. It would be said that the transferability of 
shares is one of the main advantages that drive many persons to invest their saving in 
these kinds of companies; therefore, the company law cannot deny this right. To be 
valid, trading in shares m Kuwait must meet the following conditions.
4.1.1.1 Obtaining a permit from the proper government authority
Article One of Decree Law 31/1990 stipulates that no Kuwaiti or non-Kuwaiti 
JSCs shares or bonuses may be offered without licence fi'om the MCI. Under
'S e e th e  UK CA 1985 S. 22(2).
® J.H, Farrar and B.M. Haiinigan, Farrar’s Company Law, 4‘*' edn, London: Butterworths Publishing, 
(1998), p. 239.
^Alshammiri, Tamma, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, 1st edn., Kuwait: Dar Alktab 
Publishing, (1999), p. 307.
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Article 4 of the same law, the consent of the Central Bank of Kuwait is necessary 
before the said licence is granted, in respect of the companies which are subject to 
supervision and control of the Central Bank. These are normally banks, insurance 
companies and financial investment companies. The Ministry is the authority 
concerned with the licensing the trading of shares in the State of Kuwait and, before 
granting such licensing, consent of the Central Bank of Kuwait must be obtained in 
respect of the company under its control.
The administrative authority in charge of the day-to-day supervision and 
monitoring of trading in shares is the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), represented by 
the Stocks’ Committee. The Stock’s Committee consists of eleven members headed 
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The KSE registers the JSCs licensed to 
offer their shares, for changing hands in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations. Additionally, the KSE (represented by its Stocks’ Committee) has the 
power to transact by/° First, laying down regulations of dealing in shares on the 
premises and monitoring their application. Second, taking the necessary action in 
case of dubious transactions. Third, temporarily suspend trading on the stock 
exchange or in the shares of a particular company or companies upon the occurrence 
of exceptional circumstances which threaten the smooth running of business.
In accordance with the views of Al-Shamairi, it is suggested that a new power be 
added to the KSE’s, administration for the sake of uniformity in administrative 
authority. As previously mentioned, trading in shares is subject to a licence from the 
appropriate government authority. This power that is granted to this government
Article 5 of the Decree organising the KSE.
" Ibid,, articles 4, 6 and 8. And see article 11 of the KSE By-Laws.
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authority, should be granted to the KSE’s administration, rather than the Ministry of 
Commerce or the Central Bank. That would eliminate the clash of powers which 
interrupts dealing and consequently causes shareholders to suffer damage to their 
interests. As the Stock Exchange is a corporate body, independent of government
agencies, as stipulated by Article 1 of the Decree, nothing bars the Stock Exchange 
from having the power to authorise companies to trade their shares or bonds.
4,1.1.2 Trading of shares in a Licensed Stock Exchange Market
The KSE in accordance with Article 324 of the Commerce Law no. 68/1980, 
states that no stock exchange may be established without a licence from the Ministry 
concerned, normally at the MCI. Trading in approved shares must take place in the 
trading hall of the market, except in cases of inheritance, will and the cases authorised 
by a special committee. All shares traded on the stock exchange must be entered into 
its records, upon transfer of ownership of these shares from buyer to the seller, in 
accordance with Article 31 of the by-law of the KSE. Trading must take place during 
the business hours specified by the KSE’s administration and must be in the presence 
of controllers from the exchange. The administrators of the market also collect details 
of the shares allowed to be traded on the market and makes them available for all 
traders.
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 334.
Ibid., p. 334.
See articles 31 to 36 of the by-law of the KSE.
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4.1.1.3 Trading should be carried out by a licensed stockbroker
For trading to be legally valid, it must be conducted by a stockbroker whose 
name is on a list published by the Exchange’s Stocks’ Committee/^ The broker does
not act as agent of either party (buyer or seller). He is a neutral element whose duty it 
is to bring the positions of the other two parties closer. If the transaction is completed 
he is paid a charge or fees by the party concerned. The Kuwaiti legislator established
this condition for the sake of proper organization in dealing in stocks and for the 
protection of dealers from fraud. Fraud is likely to occur if a buyer and seller ai e left 
alone without a third party.
The stock exchange manager gives every company whose shares have been 
traded on the exchange a detailed statement of these transactions and the parties 
concerned upon completion of entry in the exchange’s records. The company in 
question must enter these transactions in its records upon notice thereof, in order to 
effect transfer of ownership of the shares sold from seller to buyer.
As the above discussion shows, the regulations of transferability of shares in 
Kuwait, unlike those of other countries, do not allow shares to be traded outside the 
KSE, unless in certain exceptional cases set forth above. In other countries, such as 
the UK, trading may take place on or out of the Stock Exchange Market directly 
between buyer and seller without a middleman, in order to facilitate the process of 
disposal of the stocks. Kuwait laws, however, are designed to control the trading 
process of shares and prevent any fraud. As far as the nominal shares are concerned, a 
shai'eholder who wants to sell his shares out of the market must have this transaction
Article 328 of the Kuwaiti trade Law No. 68/1980 provides that “Transactions for Exchange Market
shall not be validly concluded unless if  conducted through brokers whose names are listed in a list 
issued by the Exchange Market Committee.”
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completed by the relevant company’s employee, in the presence of both parties and 
subject to approval of the Exchange.
4.1.2 Disposal of Non Paid-up Shares
Is it permissible to sell the shares that are not paid-up? If a shareholder has paid 
only 40 per cent of the share value and is still required to pay the balance (when 
called), may he sell such shares? If yes, who is responsible to pay the remainder of the 
value; the transferer or transferee?
The KCL, unfortunately, has not regulated this matter in the same way that other 
Arab and non-Arab company laws do.’^  However, it is customary in Kuwait that to
deem such a disposal valid, the buyer and new owner of the shares not paid-up
becomes liable to the company to pay the unpaid instalments.^^ This is logical for two
reasons: First, he has bought shares lower in value than those fully paid-up. Second, 
he is entitled to receive dividends in respect of these shares if the sale is completed and 
entered in the company’s registered office before the end of the financial.
4.1.3 Restrictions on the Right of Transferability
The right of the transferability of shares, according to the KCL, is subject to 
some temporary restrictions under Articles 106, 109, 139 and 140(2) of the KCL. 
When the shareholders, founders or directors breach the restrictions that are
Ibid., Article 306.
See for example implementation regulations o f Egyptian Company Law 159/1981 article 142. 
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 361.
A1 Kalyoubi, Sameha, Commercial Companies, Egypt: Dar Alnadah Publishing, (1993), p. 274.
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mentioned in the articles above, their actions will be null and void/^ There follows an 
examination of restrictions and their effect on the right of the transferability of shares.
4.1.3.1 First Restriction
The first restriction is imposed on the transferability of shareholders’ shares as 
provided in Art 106 of KCL:
(1) Shares and provisional certificates may not be disposed of until the 
company has issued its first balance sheet for at least 12 months; any 
disposal prior to that shall be deemed to be null and void...
(2) Disposal is permissible after the issue of the aforementioned balance 
sheet where the assignee must be a Kuwaiti national if the shares or 
their provisional certificates are owned by a Kuwaiti national.
In this article the legislature of Kuwait does not allow action to be taken on the 
shares of a new company until it has published its first balance sheet. Therefore, it is 
prohibited before the issuing of the first balance sheet, to transfer by commercial 
means such as transcription, delivery or endorsement, promises of shares. The 
Kuwaiti legislature assumes that, if the transferability of shares were to be permitted 
as soon as the company has been registered in the Ministry of Commerce Register, 
many individuals would utilise the companies’ incorporation by selling their shares 
directly with the aim of immediate wealth.^' This practice could result in the
Article 184 of KCL provides “Notwithstanding any heavier punishment provided for any other law,
any person who violates the provision of Articles 85, 106, 109, the last paragraph of Article 77 and 
the last paragraph of Article 10, shall be punished with a fine not less that 10 Dinars (£20) nor more 
than 200 Dinars (£400); the court may decree the impounding of the shares which were the subject of 
the violation; any interested person may claim damage, (if appropriate) ftom the defaulter” that means 
any shareholder or member o f directors who breaches the restrictions mentioned at Arts. 85, 106, 109 
will be punished with a penalty of 10 KD (Kuwaiti Dinar) minimum and 200 maximum. The court 
may rule for confiscation o f the breach subject shares. As you see here, the punishment is a fine 
which not less than 10 KD and not exceeding 200 KD. This is a very light punishment and it is not 
appropriate to act as a good deterrent.
Alshammari, Taama, Kuwait Companies law, 1st edn, Kuwait: Dar Alktab publishing, (1987) p 
348,
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intensification of a speculative spirit between negotiators of the shares of newly 
founded companies, without deliberation or knowledge of the company’s financial 
position. Such a position would be known only after the company’s issuance of its 
first balance sheet, which is often at least 12 months after the company’s 
incorporation.^^ A company’s balance sheet is usually supplemented by a profit and
loss account which summarises the earnings and expenditures of the company during 
the last year. Therefore, the Kuwaiti legislators restricted the transferability of newly 
incorporated companies’ shares for a minimum period of 12 months. Consequently, 
after the issuance of its first balance sheet and the obtaining of a license from the 
securities committee, a company may offer its shares for negotiation on the stock 
exchange market.
4.1.3.2 Second Restriction
The second restriction is imposed on founders’ shares. The founders of a JSC, 
according to the KCL, cannot transfer their shares to others for three years from the 
date of the company’s incorporation. Also, Kuwaiti legislature enforced them to 
subscribe not less than 10 percent of the total number of the company’s shares.This
restriction that is imposed on the founders’ shares is found in Article 109 of the KCL 
that provides:
The promoters may not dispose of their shares within three years 
from the date of the legal incorporation of the company. Any 
disposal effected otherwise than aforesaid shall be null and void.
Any interested person may adduce such nullification and the court 
shall, of its own accord, so determine.
Ibid., p. 348 
Article 81 of the KCL.
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A founder is one who undertakes to form a company. The incorporation of 
any new company cannot be achieved without the activities of the founders. 
According to the KCL, founders may not dispose of their shares for a minimum 
period of three years from the company’s incorporation date. The Kuwaiti 
legislature considers it necessary to enforce founders of a company to stay in that 
company for at least three years. This is because the legislator believes that the 
most important years for any new company are the first three years, and the most 
important people in a new company are its founders. "^  ^They are the holders of the
company’s incorporation idea, and in the absence of this restriction, the founders 
could dispose of their shares a short time after the incorporation of the company, 
thus opening the door for the incorporation of worthless companies or formal 
companies that exist only on paper, causing the speculation of shares to achieve 
rapid wealth. This could be achieved by the company founders, with noisy 
advertising pushing the public into subscribing in company shares on the 
company’s incorporation or by fraudulent practices or techniques, encouraging 
negotiators to buy the shares of the new company including those of the founders. 
Following this, the founders could leave the company, allowing the purchasers 
and the company shareholders alone to bear its losses.^^
In fact it could be argued that Kuwait’s legislature is justified in imposing 
restrictions on the transferability of the founders’ shares, because there have been 
many cases in Kuwait where founders disposed of their shares at the beginning of
Tamma, supra note 9, p 349.
The Kuwait Cabinet after the Kuwait Stock Exchange crash and after examining the affairs of at
least 39 of the companies involved in this crash discovered that the problem happened due to many 
reasons. One of these reasons was that the founders of many JSCs had sold their shares before the end
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the company’s life, thus affecting the company’s reputation. However, three years 
could be considered too long a time. Most other Arabian countries impose less 
than three years on the transferability of the founders’ shares.^  ^ One yeai' is
probably enough to see the financial position of the company after the publishing 
of its first balance sheet; also, the founders of any JSC are shareholders and they 
should enjoy the same rights as other shareholders.
4.1.3.3 Third Restriction
The third restriction is imposed on the board of directors who cannot
transfer their qualffying shares. This restriction is mentioned in Article 139 of
KCL that provides:
He (director) shall be the holder of a number of shares constituting not 
less than one per cent of the company capital; however, it is sufficient for a 
director to hold a number of shares, the nominal value of which is equal 
to7500 KD (about 15,000 pound) The said number of shares shall be 
allocated as a security for the management and shall, within one month of 
the date of the appointment of the director, be deposited in an accredited 
bank, where it shall remain deposited and unnegotiable until the director’s 
term of office has expired and the balance sheet of the last financial yeai* of 
his directorship is approved; if a dhector fails to produce such a security, 
his directorship shall be nullified.
This article stipulates that the board director of any JSC should hold a number of 
shares not less than one percent of the company’s capital. However, it is sufficient that 
a director owns a number of shares with a nominal value of KD 7500, unless the
of the three years the companies had been established. See the report of the committee that 
established by the Kuwait Cabinet on 13/3/1983 by Cabinet Decree no. 10/1983,
According to Article 45(1) o f company law of Egypt the founders of a JSC cannot dispose of their
shares for a minimum period of two years from the company’s incorporation date; the restriction 
according to the company law of UAE in Article 173 just two years; in Jordan also two years Article 
103.
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company’s Articles of Association states otherwise. At the appointment the qualifying 
shares shall be deposited into an approved bank. If the board member does not provide 
the qualifying shares within one month from the date of his election as a director, his 
membership will be deemed invalid. They are not transferable until the membership 
term expire and until his approval of the balance sheet of the last financial year (during 
which the member carried out his work). The main objective in imposing this 
restriction is to ensure good management and loyalty from the board of directors 
towards the company.^^ Moreover, these shares will be held as a guarantee against the
possible liabilities of directors if they work beyond their authority and cause damage to 
the company.
In the UK, when the Articles of Association imposed qualification shares on 
directors, they were to hold these shares as provided in s. 293(1) of the UK C A 
1985.^* Qualification shares are not obligatory according to the UK CA but, when the
Articles of Association impose this restriction on the directors, they have to submit to 
it. The qualification shares must also be held in the director’s name.^^
4.1.3.4 Fourth Restriction
The fourth restriction, according to the KCL, is the restriction imposed on 
directors to stop them from using the inside information to achieve personal interest; 
Article 140 (2) provides
"  A1 Kalyoubi, supra note 16, p 285; see also Abou Zeid, Radwaii, Commercial Companies in Kuwait
Comparative Law, 1st edn, Cairo: Dar Al-fker Al-Arabi Publishing (1978), p. 421.
S. 291(1) of the UK CA provides that “it is the duty of every director who is by the company’s
articles required to hold a specified share qualification, and who is not already qualified, to obtain his 
qualification within 2 months after his appointment, or such shorter time as may be fixed by the 
articles”
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A director, even when representing a legal entity, may not take 
advantage of any information obtained by reason of his office, in 
order to obtain a benefit for himself or another, nor may he sell or 
purchase the shares of a company so long as he is a director of 
such company
Clearly this article concentrates on insider dealing. In general, insider dealing 
involves buying and selling a company’s shares on the advice of specific information 
that effects the share price/^ This article stipulates that the board director may not, 
even if he is a representative of a corporate person, use the information which became 
known to him as a result of his office for obtaining benefits for himself or any third 
party. Furthermore, he may not sell or purchase shares of the company of which he is 
a board member for the duration of his membership. As the board of directors is 
knowledgeable and familiar with the company’s financial position, it knows whether 
the company is realising profits or losses and knows the possibility of future price 
movements.Shareholders, on the other hand, know nothing about the company’s 
position, except after the board’s publishing of information at the fiscal year end.^^
The Kuwaiti legislator also aimed at preventing the abuse of unpublished inside 
information relating to a company for the purpose of gaining an unjust benefit in 
transactions including those of company shares.
The KCL is trying, by the article above, to prevent directors that are in a 
fiduciary relationship with their companies fi'om making profits fi*om insider dealing. 
This would lead to the following question: Who is the insider according to the KCL?
Morse, Geoffrey, Charles worth & Morse Company Law, 15“' edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Publishing, (1995), p 317.
Brazier, Gill, Insider Dealing: Law and Regulations, London: Cavendish Limited Publishing,
(1996), p. 76; see also Hannigan, B r e n d a , 2®“ edn., London: Longman Publishing,
(1994), pp. 2-5.
Tamma, supra note 9, p 353.
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According to the KCL, The directors are the only insiders. This mean that, other 
people such as shadow directors or managers of the company who have a fiduciary 
relation with the company and know inside information are not in question. Also, in 
order to protect their financial interests in the company any person is entitled to be 
included in the constraint stated in article 140(2) in addition to board members if he is 
entitled to have access to unpublished information concerning the company. That 
enables this person to make a profit when exploiting this information on shareholders’ 
and the company’s account, through selling or buying the company’s shares. The 
persons that shall be subject to constraint stated in the article are the company 
employers, the financial auditors, the shadow directors and the relatives of board 
members.
Also, the article was issued in general terms, and does not mention the nature or 
type of information that is considered as inside information.^^ The infonnation that is
considered as insider information shall be clearly defined. Thus its exploitation shall be 
prohibited for achieving personal interests and harming the company’s interests or 
those who have common interests with the company. Any legal material shall always 
be characterised with clarity and specification, in order to be implemented accurately. 
Unfortunately, this accuracy does not exist in the aforementioned article.
Moreover, the KCL does not consider a guarantee period for non-abuse of 
unpublished information following the end of directorship. The article mentioned
Radwan, snpra note 27, p 421.
The Company Law of the UAE No. 8 of 1989 which explained in Article 322(7) provides that
“without prejudice to any more severe penalty specified by other law the punishment of imprisonment 
for a period of not less than three months and not exceeding two years and a fine of not less than ten 
thousand dirhams and not exceeding one hundred thousand dirhams or one of those to penalties shall 
be imposed upon; (7) each manager or member of a board of directors or member of supervisory board 
or advisor or expert or auditor or this assistant or employee and each person entrusted with the
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above does not provide any solution to the problem of insider dealing. Also, under the 
KCL: What is the penalty for committing this crime? This issue must be detailed by 
new articles added to the KCL and other company laws can be taken as examples to 
follow, such as the UK CA.
Insider dealing in the UK has received the important attention it deserves. The 
UK first made insider dealing a specific criminal offence in 1980, and re-enacted the 
provisions with minor amendments in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985. This was then replaced by the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA). According to 
this latest Act there are three main offences as provided in s. 52 of CJA
(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing 
if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities 
that are price-affected securities in relation to the information.
(2) An individual who has information as inside is also guilty of insider dealing 
if - (a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether 
or not that other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the 
information, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing 
would take place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or (b) 
he discloses the information, otherwise than in the report performance of 
the functions of his employment, office or profession, to another person.
(3)The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in 
question occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary.
In this section it is noticeable that while there is only one offence of insider 
dealing, it can be committed in three ways; (1) by dealing in securities, the price of 
which will be affected by inside information; (2) by encouraging another person so to 
deal; and (3) by disclosing the inside information to another person.
The CJA clearly determines the information considered to be inside information. 
Inside information according to the UK CA must; (a) relate to particular securities or
inspection of a company who divulge the company’s secrets he obtains in the course of his work or
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to a particular company or its business; (b) be specific or precise; (c) not have been 
made public; and (d) be such that if it were made public it would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the price or value of any securities/'^ In the UK, a person can have
inside information; (1) by being a director, employee, or shareholder of the company 
which issued the shares or debentures in question; (2) by having access to the 
information by virtue of his employment, oflSce or profession; or (3) by the direct or 
indii ect source of the information being a person within (1) or (2)/^
The penalty for insider dealing m the UK is a maximum of seven years 
imprisonment and/or a fine of unlimited amount. The transactions entered into in 
breach of the prohibitions on insider dealing are valid, despite contravention of the Act. 
Proceedings can only be instituted by or with the consent of the Secretary of State or 
the Dii’ector of Public Prosecutions.^^
The KCL should have asked the directors to disclose all the transactions carried
out by them with respect to the company’s securities (see chapter 5), as in the UK CA
1985 that provides in s. 317;
It is the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, whether 
directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with 
the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the 
directors of the company.
make use of such secrets for his personal again on that of other parties.”
S. 56 of the UK CJA 1993.
The individual concerned must in each o f the three offences mentioned in S. 52 of the CJA have
information as an insider where; (a) the information is inside information; (b) the individual has that 
information from an inside source; (c) the individual knows that he has inside information from an 
inside. See S. 57 o f the UK CJA.
Ibid. S. 61. An individual could avoid liability if  he proves that (a) he did not expect that the
dealing would result in a profit attributable to the fact that the information in question was price 
sensitive in relation to the securities; or (b) he had reasonable grounds for believing that the 
information had been disclosed widely; or he would have done what he did, even if  he had not had the 
information. See S. 53 of the UK CJA.
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Therefore, the board of directors should disclose and keep the company informed 
of all dealings and transactions carried out by them with respect to its securities. The 
law prevents any person from dealing with the company’s securities if such dealing is 
made upon information given from inside the company. When one of the directors has 
an interest within his company, he is normally not allowed to vote at meetings of the 
board of directors in respect of the contract he has interests with the company.
In the UK, shares of a JSC are freely transferable unless the company’s articles
of association impose restrictions on the transferability of its shares. In the case
mentioned above, the Judge stated:
The directors of a company have no discretionary power, 
independently of power expressly given to them by the articles of 
association to refuse to register a transfer which has been bona fide 
made.
Therefore, the board of directors may be given the power to refuse a transfer of 
shares without giving any reason for their refrisal, but they should act in good faith 
and in the best interest of the company/^ This kind of provision that gives the board
of directors this kind of power usually exists in Articles of Association of small family 
companies, where the directors may not wish the shares to go into the hands of those 
who are not close family members. However, listed companies are not generally 
allowed to have transfer restrictions in their articles except in respect of partly paid 
shares and shares in certain communications and broadcasting companies.^^
The Articles of Association of many large JSCs usually contain provisions that 
a shareholder who wishes to transfer his shares to a person who is not already a
Table A, Arts 94 and 95 of the UK CA.
Farrar, supra note 8, p. 240.
Admissions of Securities to Listing, S. 9, Ch 1, para 1.2; see also Re Stockton Malleable Iron Co
(1875) 2 C h D  101.
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member, shall fast offer them to the other shareholders. Only when the other 
shareholders do not wish to buy the shares, can the shareholder who wants to sell his 
share transfer them to a proposed transferee; this is known as a right of pre- 
emption.'^ ®
4.2 Shareholders Right of Pre-emption
The Right of Pre-emption, is the right given to shareholder of a company to have 
the option to buy any newly created shares before any outsider is given the opportunity 
to buy those shares. A shareholder should be able to protect his proportion of the total 
equity by having the chance to subscribe for any new shares. The question that may be 
asked is; why should a shareholder have the right of pre-emption? There are a number 
of factors that highlight the importance of this right for shareholders. First, if a 
shareholder does not buy from the newly created shares a number that is proportionate 
to his existing holding shares, his influence in the company will be reduced because he 
now has control over a smaller number of votes. Thus, the board of directors, usually 
in the absence of the pre-emption right, uses the method of issuing new shares that 
carry voting rights to change the balance of voting power in the company.Therefore,
the pre-emption rights should exist to allow shareholders the opportunity to maintain 
their voting power before and after the allocation of shares. By this right the 
shareholders can balance the powers within the company and not lose their influence in
Griffin, Stephen, Company Law Fundamental Principles, London: Pitman Publishing (1994), p.
98.
Alkali, Aziz, the Commercial Companies Under Jordan Law, Pcmmwn:T>2LV k\X\i2i(\?iüiPVih\\ûi{r\g,
(1995), p. 400.
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the GM/^ Second, when a JSC issues a large number of new shares, these will
probably affect the existing market price of the company’s shares (the old and new 
shares). These shares of the company will be treated in the market at a price normally 
somewhere between the issue price and the previous market price. Thus, the market 
price of the existing shares will go down whilst, at the same time, the value of the new 
shares will go above the offer price. In this case, when the existing shareholders 
acquire the relevant proportion of the new shares, they will be compensated by the 
increase in the value of the new shares above the offer price. Otherwise, the existing 
shareholders will be the losers of the decision of issuing new shares, and the new 
shareholders (outsiders) will be the winners because they entered the company too 
cheaply.
The KCL requiies that any JSC wishing to raise new capital to comply with the
shareholders’ right of pre-emption as provided in Article 131(6) of the KCL
A member shall in particular have the following rights; (Q to dispose of 
the shares held by him, and to have a priority right to subscribe for new 
shares, according to the provision of the law.
This article of the KCL contains an important provision designed to ensure that 
shareholders have the right of pre-emption over any new issue of shares. Therefore, 
any JSC proposing to issue new shares must first offer them to existing shareholders. 
It is not obligatory for all shareholders to accept or refuse the offer; it is acceptable for 
some shareholders to accept the offer and other to refuse it. Also, a shareholder need 
not accept all the shares offered to him. So, if he only wishes to accept part of the
Grier, Nicholas, UK Company Law, London: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, (1998), p. 161; in
Pierey v. S. Mills & Co. Ltd  [1920] 1 Ch. 77, 88 Patterson J. submitted that “Directors are not entitled 
to use their power of issuing shares mainly for the purpose of maintaining their control or the control 
of the company, or mainly for the purpose o f defeating the wishes o f the existing majority of 
shareholders.”
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offer, he must of course intimate to the company that he will be making a partial
acceptance. The shares that are not taken up by the existing shareholders will then be
offered to outsiders. Moreover, the KCL in Article 111 gives more details about
practising this right when it provides that:
Every shareholder shall have the right to subscribe for a number of the 
new shares proportionate with the number of shares he already holds, in 
priority.
Shareholders shall be allowed a period of not less than fifteen days from 
the date of publication of the offer made to them for exercising this 
priority.
A company may contain its articles of association a provision that give a 
shareholder the right to surrender from his priority in advance and also 
may put any restrictions on this right.
It is clear this article guarantees the pre-emption right provided in Article 131 
and added that every shareholder has a priority right of subscribing for a number of the 
new shares commensurate with the number of shares already held by him. Also, the 
later article provided a time limit. Therefore, any shareholder interested must exercise 
his priority rights within fifteen days from the date of publication of the offer made to 
the shai'eholders.'^^
The problem in the above article, is in the last part of it. The Kuwaiti legislator 
gives JSCs the right to impose any restrictions on the right of pre-emption. As a 
result, the board of directors, who usually control the company and its GMs, can limit 
or prohibit this right. Directors can do this by passing a resolution which deprives 
shareholders from this right.'^^  In other words, the KCL confers indirectly on the
The question that may arises here is, does a shareholder who wishes to transfer his shares to a
person who is not already a shareholder have an obligation to offer these shares to other shareholders 
first? The answer according to the KCL is no, because the pre-emption right according to the two 
articles mentioned above about the shareholders right of pre-emption to have the option to buy any 
newly created shares before any outsider is given the opportunity to buy those new shares.
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 458.
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directors to issue new shares to outsiders or their friends without regard to right of 
pre-emption or with qualification of this right. Furthermore, this defective article does 
not demand the directors, as fiduciaries, when they place restrictions on the pre­
emption right to exercise this power bona fide in what they consider to be the best 
interests of the company and not for any collateral purpose. The KCL has granted 
shareholders in the JSCs the right of subscription in the new shares. However, 
granting this right is not adequate, as the same article that granted this right has 
granted the board the authority to impose constrains on its practice especially if the 
board is dominating the GM of the company, which is considered as a point of 
criticism of Kuwaiti law. Therefore, the legislator shall always be accurate when 
mentioning the rights of shareholders, as it shall not add legal paragraphs or articles 
that are contradicting this right. The Kuwaiti legislator shall consider the UK CA 
1985, as it is more accurate and detailed regarding treating this right.
In the UK, in order to ensure that the existing shareholders are not prejudice by 
the issue of newly created shares, s. 89 requires that the new shares must first be 
offered to existing shareholders. They can acquire a proportion of the new shares that 
corresponds to the proportion of shares they already hold in the company. For 
example, if a shareholder owns 10 per cent of the company’s shares, he must be 
offered 10 per cent of any newly created shares. The terms of the offer to existing 
shareholders must also be the same as or more favourable than the terms offered to 
outsiders.'^  ^ The existing shaieholders have 21 days in which to accept or refuse the
offer.'^^  However, a JSC in the UK may vary or exclude s. 89 of the UK CA from all
89(1) of the UK CA. 
JW ., S. 90 (6).
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its allotments, if its directors have a general authority to issue shares under s. 80, by a 
provision to that effect in its articles or by passing a special resolution/^
What are the consequences of failure to communicate the offer to the existing 
shareholders? In fact, none of the KCL articles deal with this problem. This means 
that shareholders, according to the KCL, can do nothing when they are deprived from 
practising the right of pre-emption. In the UK, for example, if the directors fail to 
make the pre-emption offer to existing shareholders, the existing shareholders may 
demand compensation for any loss, cost or expenses they may have incurred as a result 
of being deprived of the opportunity to acquire the newly created shares. However, 
any harmed shareholder must make his claim for compensation within two years of the 
allotment or his claim will be time-bai'red.'^^
4.3 Shareholder’s Right to Dividends
One of the main reasons why a shareholder joins a JSC is to receive dividends. It 
is one of the rights which is mentioned in all companies’ Articles of Association, that 
the profits be distributed at the end of each financial year. Also, commercial 
companies are formed to earn profits for the shareholders out of which dividends can 
be paid.'*^  However, in spite of the significance of this right to the shareholders and
their expectations to be paid the maximum dividend, companies use their profits to 
meet their financial requirements and consolidate their financial positions. Moreover,
S. 95.
S. 92 of the UK CA 1985. In the UK, the procedure of issuing new shares must be strictly adhered
to. In Re thundercrest Ltd, [1994] BCG 857, in this case the allotment of 5000 shares to two 
shareholders was cancelled by order of the Court as the letter of provisional allotment did no allow at 
least 21 days for acceptance, and the letter had not been property served on the other shareholders of 
the company.
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shareholder’s entitlement to dividends at the end of each financial year is thus affected 
by the fact that companies retain a portion of their earnings directly or indirectly and 
shareholders cannot therefore insist on being paid these earnings in full at the end of 
each financial year/°
4.3.1 The Nature of Dividends’ Right
A dividend is the share received by a shareholder of the company’s profits legally
available for dividend and divided among the shareholders. As previously mentioned, a
shareholder’s eligibility to receive dividends is his basic right and it is one of the main
reasons that make a shareholder join a JSC. Other rights, such as the right to know
what is going on in his company, the right of discussion with the board of directors,
and his right to vote are established to enable him to be entitled to be offered
dividends. Consequently, the KCL, when determining the shareholders’ rights in a JSC
in Article 131(1) mentions this right as the first right every shareholder must enjoy.
This article provides that
A member (of a share company) shall in particular enjoy the following 
right: (1) to receive (a rateable share of) the profits and benefits it shall 
be decided to distribute to the shareholders.
And to insure this right the KCL provides in Article 133(2) that
The shareholders’ GM may not: (2) reduce the percentage of net profits 
specified in the articles of the company to be distributable to the 
shareholders.
Mayson, Stephen, French D. and Ryan, C., Company Law, 15th edn, London: Blackstone 
Publishing. (1998-99), p. 302.
“^Radwan, supra note 27, p. 478; To make matters worse, it is taken for granted nowadays that any
company’s GM may, at its discretion, decide not to distribute the profit for any year in flill and retain 
a portion thereof to create reserves, and this situation continues for many successive years.
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Accordingly, the dividend is certainly one of the basic rights of the shareholders 
in the JSCs and it cannot be reduced or stopped when the company made profit in the 
last financial year. The profit realised may only be dividends when it becomes a net 
profit and following the approval of the company’s balance sheet for the relevant 
financial year. Hence the date of entitlement of dividends, if any, is fixed. The 
company’s Articles of Association often fix the date of dividend payment, otherwise it 
is fixed by the GM, which is the company’s highest authority.^’
It may be asked, what is the definition of net profits according to the KCL? The 
KCL has mentioned the net profits in a number of articles but unfortunately none of 
them provide a clear definition of it.^  ^ This definition is very important; in order to
know what is can be accounted as part of the net profit and what is not. Also, by 
means of this description shareholders can calculate approximately how much dividend 
they will get this year.^^
4.3.2 When is a Shareholder Entitled to Dividends?
Some argue that a shareholder becomes entitled to dividend the moment he is 
aware of the net profit earned in the previous year. This entitlement is established even 
before the GM approves the company’s balance sheet and financial statements for the 
relevant year, as the role of the GM is secondary in this respect. In other words, a 
shareholder’s entitlement to dividends arises the moment the profit is established.
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 456,
See articles 166, 167 and 168 of the KCL.
The Egyptian Company law no. 159/1981 provides clear definition of net profits when it provides in
Article 40(1) that “the net profits are those realised from operations exercised by the company after 
deduction of all expenses needed for their realisation, and after accounting for all consumptions and 
allocations, which the accountancy rules impose and putting them aside before proceeding on any 
distribution in whatever way”; see Alkali, supra note 41, p. 427. '
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However, that argument is disputed by the fact that the balance sheet presented to the 
GM is only suggested rather than final and the GM may, at its discretion, approve the 
same and make amendments thereto. The GM may also decide to retain the profit 
made in the previous year and transfer the same to reserves to provide for the 
company’s financial commitments.
Other commercial law jurists say that a shareholder claims his share of the profit 
the moment the balance sheet is approved and a dividend is fixed by the GMs, in 
accordance with the general rules which distinguish between the establishment of a 
right and the time it is due.^ '* In other words, prior to the GM’s resolution, the entire
shareholders are collective creditors of the company with the amount of profit that the 
company must pay if it has made real profit. The GM’s resolution to distribute profit 
establishes a shareholder’s right thereto as it determines the dividend and makes it 
payable and allows the shareholder to seize it, thus becoming a creditor of the 
company claiming actual distribution of the profit.^^
Each shareholder shall be entitled to a dividend immediately upon the passing of 
the GM’s resolution to distribute such a dividend. Unfortunately, the KCL allows the 
company’s board to fix a date for payment of the dividends at its discretion. As a 
result of this shortcoming, the board of directors in Kuwaiti JSCs can delay the 
distribution of dividends for some time to execute the decision of GM. This attitude 
should be taken by the Kuwaiti legislator in order to prevent any attempt by directors 
to delay the distribution of dividends to the shareholders. A good example to follow in 
this issue is in Egyptian Company Laws. Such provides that each shareholder shall be
Mustafa, Kamal, Commercial Companies: General Provisions in Companies, CûiroiDar A\-iama
Al-jadeeda Publishing, (1997), p. 316. See also Radwan, Payez N., Commercial Companies, 
Almansoora: Maktabat Aljla’a Aljadeeda, (1994), p. 583.
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entitled to a dividend immediately upon the passing of the GM’s resolution to 
distribute such a dividend/^ The board of directors shall implement the GM’s
resolution to distribute dividends within one month/^
In the UK, dividends are paid in the manner laid down in the Articles of 
Association. Table A, Article 102, provides that the company may declare a final 
dividend by ordinary resolution at the annual GM and this dividend should not exceed 
the amount recommended by the board of directors.^^ Then shareholders pass an
ordinary resolution to approve the level of dividend or reduce it.^  ^The announcement
of a dividend by the company creates a debt due to its shareholders. If the dividend is 
stated to be payable at some future date, a shareholder will not be able to enforce the 
payment until the actual date for payment arrives. Dividends can only be paid in cash, 
unless there are words allowing payment by the issue of shares or debentures.From
Ibid., p. 2 \7 .
^^Article 44 (1) o f Egyptian Company Law no 159/1981 provides that “both the shareholder and
workers will deserve, each his part in the profit, immediately upon issue of the decision of the general 
assembly for distribution.”
^ I^hid., Article 44 (2) provides that “the administrative board should proceed to the execution of the
decision o f the general assembly for distribution of profits to shareholders and workers, within one 
month at most from the date of issue of the decision.”
S. 234 (1) of the UK CA 1985 requires the directors of a company to state in their report, which
they must prepare for each financial year and present it to the GM, their recommendations on 
dividend.
Article 102 of Table A 1985 provides that “... the company may by ordinary resolution declare
dividends in accordance with respective rights of the members, but no dividend shall exceed the 
amount recommended by the directors”; see also Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582,
Table A, art 5 authorises the payment o f dividends in kind; in Potel v Inland Revenue
Commissioners [1971] 2 All ER 504 Brightman J, summarised the entitlement of shareholders to 
dividends in the following terms; (a) If a final dividend is declared, a date when such dividend shall 
be paid can also be specified; (b) If a final dividend is declared by a company without any stipulation 
as to the date of payment, the declaration of the dividend creates an immediate debt; (c) If a final 
dividend is declared and is expressed to be payable at a future date a shareholder has no right to 
enforce payment until the date for payment arrives.; (d) In the case of an interim dividend which the 
board has resolved to pay, it is open to the board at any time before payment to review the decision 
and resolve not to pay the dividend. The resolution to pay an interim dividend does not create an 
immediate debt; (e) If directors resolve to pay an interim dividend they can, at or after the time of 
such resolution, decide that the dividend should be paid at some stipulated future date. If a time for
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the time that a dividend is payable to shareholders, it is a debt owed by the company to 
the shareholders/^ Therefore, a dividend is a debt due to the shareholders only as soon 
as it has been declared. In a case of liquidation it is a deferred debt, and shareholders 
will only obtain their outstanding dividends once preferential and ordinary creditors 
have been paid.^^
A company may issue different classes of shares and grant different rights with 
different classes of shares, either by the Memorandum or articles or by other ways.^^
Therefore, in the case of dividends, if a company has different classes of shares such 
as ordinary and preference shares, the shareholders of the class that has priority 
(preference shares) are entitled to a preferential dividend before any dividend is paid 
to the shareholders who hold ordinary shares. If there are two or more classes of 
preference shares, the shareholders of the class that has priority (senior preference 
shares) are similarly entitled to their preferential dividend before any dividend is paid 
in respect of the junior class for the same financial year.
According to the KCL, there is one kind of share. Therefore, all shareholders 
have equal rights either with respect to distribution of profits, division of the 
company’s assets afl;er liquidation, or voting rights (see 3.3.1).^ "^
The dividends’ beneficiary must be one person, assumed to be the shareholder or 
his agent or proxy. If the share is jointly owned, the holders must elect one fi*om
payment is so prescribed, a shareholder has no enforceable right to demand payment prior to the 
stipulated date.
Mayson, supra note 49, p. 302; see also Alkali, supra note 41, p. 427.
S. 74 (2) (f) of the Insolvency Act 1986; see also Re Compania de Electricidad de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires [1980] 1 Ch 146.
Pennington, Robert. Company Law. 6‘'' edn, London: Butterworth Publishing, (1990), p. 205.
The KCL provides in Article 130 that: “The promoters who have subscribed to the company’s 
Memorandum and Articles o f Association, as well as subscribers who have subscribed for its shares.
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among their number to receive the dividends. Another point to note is, shares that 
have not been paid up upon subscription receive a rate of dividends proportionate to 
the normal value of the shares paid. This provision is not covered by the KCL but is 
required by equity. This is a shortcoming in the KCL which leads to the possibility of 
manipulation on the part on the board (see chapter 3).
4.3.3 Determination of Distributable Profits
The first aim of any commercial company is to make a financial profit and 
distribute most of it to its shareholders. However, this aim is not continually achieved 
as the company’s economic enterprise may face difficulties and suffer losses in bad 
years. On the other hand, it may realise profits in good years. Accordingly, profits 
mean the amount of money a company adds to its financial assets or accounts. The 
company laws always seek to ensure that a dividend paid to the shareholders by the 
company is not, in whole or in part, a return of capital they have contributed to make 
profits to be distributed among them.
The issue of specifying the profits that shall be distributed to shareholders is 
extremely significant. Before specifying the profit that shall be distributed, this process 
requires exploration of information regarding the company’s financial position in which 
shows accurately the profits achieved by the company in the previous fiscal yeai*, as 
well as the percentage transferred to the company’s reserve. This issue is related to 
shareholders right to know the company’s status and to read all the reports regarding 
this issue this will be examined further in the next chapter.
shall be deemed to be members of the company and shall have equal rights and be subject to the same 
obligations, with due observance of the provisions of the law.”
139
The annual GM is the body authorised to announce dividends. However, it has 
no absolute authority in this regard. It is limited and governed by the provisions of 
company law concerning maintaining the capital intact and observing the draft balance 
sheet presented by the board as well as the company’s in terests.T he GM, as the
highest authority in the company, may make some amendments to the draft balance 
sheet, however, it may not decide to distribute unreal or false dividends. It is also 
obligated to deduct a certain amount and transfer the same to statutory reserves.
The GM cannot distribute dividends before it determines distributable profits. If 
such profits do exist distribution can only be made after deduction of the losses. That 
the capital may have incurred, and of the amounts transferred to the legal reserve. The 
GM must also add profits carried forward fi*om the previous financial year to the yeai" 
ending before carrying out the suggested distribution.
In accordance with the KCL there are two restrictions that must be respected 
before any distribution of dividends. First, the KCL provides that a percentage of the 
total profits must be debited, and this amount must be specified by Articles of 
Association of the company or by the board of directors. This amount should be set 
aside every year for depreciation and for offsetting devaluation of the company’s 
assets. Such deductions shall be applied to the purchase or repair of the necessary 
material, machinery and installations and this money may not be distributed to the 
shareholders.^^
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 480.
Article 166 of the KCL provides that “A percentage of the gross profits, to be specified in the articles
of the company of fixed by its board of directors, shall be set aside each year for writing off the assets 
of the company or making provision for the depreciation in their value. This money shall be used for 
purchasing or repairing the machines and constructions needed; it may not be distributed to the 
shareholders.”
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Furthermore, it is taken for granted that the company’s capital must remain intact 
and may not be reduced or distributed to the shareholders as it represents the minimum 
amount for securing the rights of the company’s creditors/^ Accordingly, distributable
profits must be limited to the extent that they do not affect the capital. But if the 
company suffers losses and these are deducted fi’om the capital, no profits may be 
distributed in the next financial year unless the capital is replenished. It is a general 
rule that whenever there are previous losses, there are no distributable profits.^^
Second, the GM may only distribute dividends after deduction of the percentage
specified by law to create a legal reserve. This reserve is recognised to ensure the
ability to settle debts. It also has a precautionary function in that it prevents the
distribution of exaggerated dividends with no consideration of the consequences.
There are two kinds of reserves mentioned in the KCL. It provides that 10 per cent of
the net profit of a JSC shall be retained as a provision for the legal (compulsory)
reserve as Article 167.1 of the KCL provides that
Unless the articles of the company provide for a greater percentage, ten 
per cent of the gross profit shall be set aside each year to the 
compulsory reserves.
Therefore, according to the above article, a company’s Articles of Association 
may provide for a higher percentage than ten per cent, and if the Articles of 
Association do not have anything determining the compulsory reserves, these reserves 
must be ten per cent of the whole profits made in the last financial year. However, it 
must be reasonable, taking into consideration the company’s and shareholders’ 
interests. The profits as a whole may not be transferred to the reserve, thus denying
Ferran, Eilis, Company Law and Corporate Fzwawce, F‘end., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
(1999), p. 410.
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shareholders the essential right to receive annual dividends if the company’s earnings 
are such that cover the compulsory reserve and provide available dividends/^
The GM of a JSC may only distribute the compulsory reserve to the shareholders 
in one case, namely to ensure a dividend of up to 5 per cent in the years during which 
the company’s profits do not allow that rate. Therefore, assuming that a company does 
not have distributable profits, as determined according to the legal provisions, it is 
automatically obligated to distribute up to 5 per cent as dividends to the shareholders, 
and these dividends should be taken fi'om the compulsory reserves as provided in 
Article 167(2) of the KCL.™
The GM may suspend deduction fi'om the net profits for the compulsory reserve 
if such a reserve exceeds half its capital. It may also use the excess in the manner and 
for the purposes it considers desirable and beneficial to itself and to its shareholders.^^
Another type of a reserve mentioned in the KCL is the voluntary reserve. This is 
governed by Article 168 of the KCL under which the GM may, at the recommendation 
of the board of directors, decide each year to retain a portion of the net profits to the 
account of a voluntary reserve. This reserve will be used for purposes decided by the 
GM. To be valid, the GM’s resolution must be reasonable and in the interests of the 
company and its shareholders. If it is designed to be adversary to the minority
See Hassiii, Almasry, Investment Companies, Cairo: Dar Al-Nahdah Publishing, (1981), p. 238,
The purpose of retaining a higher rate as a reserve must not be only to damage the interests of the 
minority shareholders.
The compulsory reserve may not be distributed to the shareholders, but it may be used to permit
distribution to the shareholders as dividends up to 5 per cent in years in which the profits of the 
company do not admit of distributing this percentage.
Article 167(3) of the KCL.
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shareholders it will be subject to challenge and they may file a legal action demanding 
invalidation thereof/^
The determination of distributable profits in the UK CA is more explicit than in 
the KCL. The basic rule in the UK is that a company must not make a distribution 
except out of profits available for the purpose.^^ The statutory rules restricting 
distributions apply to every description of distribution of a company’s assets to its 
shareholders, whether in cash or otherwise, (except distributions by a number of ways 
mentioned in s. 263(2) of the UK CA 1995).^ "^  The profits available for distribution in
the UK are defined as the company’s accumulated realised profits, so far as not 
previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less its accumulated realised losses, 
so far as not previously written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital duly 
made.^ ^
Moreover, there are two restrictions imposed on a JSC making a distribution
provides in s. 264(1) that states
A company may only make a distribution at any time (a) if at that time, 
the amount of its net assets is not less than the aggregate of its called- 
up share capital and undistributable reserves, and (b) if, and to the 
extent that, the distributions does not reduce the amount of those assets 
to less than that aggregate.
Ibid., Article 168 provides that the GM, on proposal submitted by the board of directors, may each 
year pass a resolution to set aside a proportion of the net profits to a voluntary reserve.
S. 263(1) of the UK CA 1985.
Ibid., S. 263(2) provides that “in this part. Distribution means every description of distribution of a
company’s assets to its members, whether in cash or otherwise, except distribution by way of (a) an 
issue of shares as fully or partly paid bonus shares, (b) the redemption or purchase of any of the 
company’s own shares out o f capital (including the proceeds of any fresh issue of shares) or out of  
unrealised profits in accordance with Chapter VII of Part V, (c) the reduction of shares capital by 
extinguishing or reducing the liability of any of the members on any of the company’s shares in 
respect of share capital not paid up, or by paying off paid up share capital, and (d) a distribution of 
assets to members of the company on its winding up.
Ibid., S. 263(3).
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This means in practice that before any distribution is made, first, the net assets 
must be greater than the total of the called-up share capital and the undistributable 
reserves. Second, the proposed distribution must not make the net assets amount to 
less than the total of the called-up share capital and the undistributable reserves.
It is common for JSCs’ Articles of Association in the UK to provide that the 
boards of directors may transfer part of their profits to reserves before recommending 
a dividend despite the fact that the present UK CA does not have any provision 
demanding directors to create reserves.
Therefore, in the UK, dividends are payable only out of profits, and to pay a 
dividend out of capital would be to return capital to shareholders in breach of the 
above principle. Capital can be reduced only according to strict requirements set out 
in the CA. Consequently, the UK CA sets out detailed provisions to ensure that only 
profits available for distribution as dividend are so utilised.
4.3.4 The Effect of Reserves of the Company on the Dividends’ Right
Reserves are taken fi'om the net profits of the companies. They refer to those 
amounts retained from the company’s net profit in any financial year as a provision 
against losses or foreseen or unforeseen expenses in the future and other purposes. A 
reserve may not be created unless the company realises profits.
The distribution of dividends is not conditional on the company’s making profit 
during the financial year. It may have fi'ee reserves which may be distributed in the
The companies Act 1948 Table A, art 117, contained such a power.
Mustafa, supra note 51, p. 310.
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form of dividends in the years in which no profits are realised/^ This could lead to a
question about which reserves are disposable. The GM cannot distribute all reserve 
funds to the shareholders as some reserves are complementary to the capital. Its 
function is only to insure against the risks that the company may face in the future and 
to ensure the established rights of the company’s creditors. These kinds of reserves are 
not distributable.^^
It is worth noting that the GM’s right to dispose of the reserve must be based on 
legal or agreement grounds. Law provides that the GM may distribute the reserves it 
is allowed under law or the Articles of Association to dispose of in part or as a whole. 
The reserves may only be used for their intended purposes, unless the GM decides 
otherwise.^*’
As provided above, if the company realises no profits in any year and an amount 
of money is deducted fi'om the reserves to distribute to the shareholders as dividends, 
the source of these funds must be disclosed in order not to give a false impression of 
the company’s financial position or cheat the shareholders and others by implying that 
it made real profit in the previous financial year while profits were taken from the 
reserves.Failure to disclose the source of such profits entails that the GM’s
resolution to distribute the same becomes null and void. Also, the company’s board of 
directors should be held legally responsible, as such an act leads the company’s 
customers and shareholders to misunderstand the real financial position of the
Younes, Ali, Coîtimercîaî Companies, Egypt: Dar-Al-feker Al-Araby Publisher, (1991), p. 185. 
^^Mahmoud, Alsharkawi, Commercial Companies in Egyptian Law, Cairo: Dar Alnahdah Publishing 
(1986), p. 238.
Alkalyoubi, supra note 19, p. 525.
Hassni, AL-Jondi, The Criminal Law o f  Business Transactions, Cairo: [no publishing] (1989), p. 
247.
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company. The KCL should compel the board of directors to disclose that the company 
did not make any profits in the last financial year and that the reserves might be used to 
pay dividends.
To sum up, the obligation to disclose the deductions from the reserves is an 
essential guarantee of shareholder’s rights and supports the principle of balance sheet 
accuracy and credibility, that helps reflect the real financial position of the company. 
Additionally, it threatens to reveal the consequences of the board’s wrong policies and 
mismanagement of the company’s funds, and therefore, makes the directors act more 
carefully and responsibly, urging them to realise profits rather than being negligent. 
Disclosure also consolidates a shareholder’s authority and control over the company’s 
activities. In spite of the importance of this issue, the KCL fails to provide for such 
guarantees, the result of which is that shareholders are more passive at the GM. It also 
undermines their financial rights as well as creditor’s guarantees of the reserves.
The question that may be asked is: Is there a conflict between the company’s 
interest and shareholder’s interest in using the annual profits? On the one hand, the 
company’s interest always requires retaining some of the dividends, transferring to the 
reserves, and using them in new investments to enhance the economic capability of the 
enterprise. Shareholders, on the other hand, desire to share the maximum rate of 
dividends. The two interests must be aligned and balanced in order not to make one 
prosperous at the expense of the other. But, if some of the profits go to the company 
and its reserves, do shareholders benefit fi'om the profits that are retained by the 
company rather than paid out as a cash dividend? Arguably there are no conflict of 
interests between the shareholders and their companies, and also the body of 
shareholders benefit indirectly fi'om the profits that are retained by the company for a 
number of reasons. First, self-financing has an advantage in that it puts a portion of the
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dividend at the company’s disposal to use in new investments, projects or facilities 
without seeking assistance Ifom others (e.g. bank loans) who may take too close an 
interest in the company’s affairs and play the role of shadow directors.Self-financing 
then plays a key role in formulating companies financial policies and is highly regarded 
by boards.^^ It is worth noting that company laws usually encourage the creation of
reserves such as compulsoiy and voluntary reserves in order to ensure companies’ 
independence and security in the face of conditions in the business environment and 
their ability to meet its financial needs dealing with unpredictable circumstances in the 
next financial year. This, of course, is extremely important for the shareholders and 
creditors of the company. However, the excessive application of self-financing has a 
negative impact on shareholder’s financial rights and could lead to depriving them of 
the dividends that would be wholly devoted to the company’s growth and expansion. 
This is unacceptable. This is also the case when a company pays out only a proportion 
of the profits as a cash dividend, while retaining the remainder. As a result, 
shareholders receive part of their returns in the form of dividends and part as a capital 
gain, and it is true that some shareholders prefer capital gains to dividend income. 
This is because the price of their shares will appreciate by the amount of the retained 
profits divided by the number of shares outstanding.*^ Furthermore, a company adopts 
a self-financing policy when it needs additional funds, and that helps it remain
The bank may act as shadow director of a company when the company is managed in accordance
with the bank’s recommendations. See Bhattacharyya, G., Shadow Directors and Wrongful Trading 
revisited, 16 Co Law (1995) p. 313.
83 Some jurists dismiss the policy of self-financing on the grounds that the main purpose of forming 
the company is to share profits as stated in Article 1832 of the French Civil Law.
Ferran, supra note 67, p. 408; see Xuereb, Peter G., The right o f shareholders, Oxford: Blackwell 
Scientific Publications Ltd, (1989), p. 48.
Xuereb, supra note 84, p. 48.
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independent and enhance its economic capability without suffering any burdens. But if 
it receives loans or facilities from banks, it must repay the principal amount and 
interest, as well as foreign exchange differentials in certain cases. Sometimes it is 
forced to substitute debts to shares and is thus placed at the mercy of the lender. 
Similarly, a company may follow a capital increase policy by issuing new shares, which 
can results in a number of significant and even serious consequences. The capital 
increase through issuing new shares can reduce the prospects of making higher profit 
in the future due to increasing the number of shareholders. It also undermines the old 
shareholder’s authority and control in favour of the new shareholders and threatens the 
board’s stability.
4,3.5 The Criminal Distribution of Fictitious Profits
The purpose of a company is usually to make financial gains to distribute to its 
shar eholders, and the gains depend on the success of the company’s performance.*^ 
The real distributable profits in the form of dividends are the result of commercial or 
industrial transactions and the remainder of the profit for the financial year after 
deducting all necessary commitments, depreciation and reserves. Profit which differs 
from that sense is considered untrue or false and so too are the dividends, which are 
contrary to law and the Articles of Association and represents a criminal act. This is 
considered a criminal act because such dividends are in fact deducted from the capital 
and thus reduce it,*^  which damages the rights of the company’s creditors as the capital
Alsharkawi, supra note 79, p. 239. 
Tamma, supra note 9, p. 480,
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is general security for repayment/* Also, fictitious dividends will hardly effect the 
creditors of the company. At the same time, because shareholders and other interested 
groups in the company are not directly involved in the company business affairs, the 
fictitious dividends give them a false impression of the company’s financial position. It 
deceives shareholders and attracts the public into subscribing for the company’s shares. 
It may drive many banks and financial institutions to advance loans and open credit 
accounts. However, the deception is soon uncovered and the company appears unable 
to meet its commitments.*^ Hence, the rights of others become at stake and
shareholders’ lose rights. Eventually the company may go bankrupt and collapse.^^
Finally, dividend and earning announcements effect the share prices on the stock 
exchange, and if the dividends that are announced were fictitious and the company did 
not make this profit last year, as a result, the investors in the market would make 
inappropriate decision.
Due to the detrimental effects of this action on the company and its shareholders,
many company laws encounter such activity by clear and direct provisions which treat
this action as a criminal offence. For example, the Egyptian Company Law in Article
162/4 provides that
Without prejudice to severer penalties enacted by other laws, any one of 
the following personalities will be liable to a penalty of imprisonment 
during a period not less than two years, and to a fine not less than L.E. 
2000 and not more than L.E. 10000 which the infractor should 
personally support, or by one of these two penalties:
Kanam, AL-Kanam M., The Protection of Public Saving in JSCs, Cairo: Dar AL-Nahdah 
Publishing, (1988), p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72
Farrar, supra note 8, p. 410,
Almousavtri, Hishmah, Price Reaction Surrounding Dividend Announcement: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Kuv/ait stock Exchange, 66 Jouîmal o f the Gulf and Arabian Island Studies (1992) 
p, 178.
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(5) Any member of a board of administration who distributes profits or 
interests contrarily to the provisions of this law or the statutes of the 
company, and any controller who sanctions such as distribution/^
The Egyptian Company Law in this article is trying to prevent the board of 
directors fi’om distributing profits to shareholders in a way that contravenes the 
company law or Articles of Association, and compel them to distribute dividends when 
the company made profit fi’om its business transactions in the last financial year. 
Otherwise, the distribution of fictitious dividends will affect the stability of the 
company and the rights of shareholders and creditors. In addition to the Egyptian 
Company Law, many Arabian countries such as the UAE company law in Article 
322/4, Bahi'ain company law in Article 391/5, Saudi company law in Article 229/5^*
and Omani company law provide a comprehensive description of this crime in Ar ticle
170/4; this article provides that
Upon being found guilty, the following persons shall be punished by 
imprisonment fi’om three days to three years or a fine of ten to five 
hundred Rials omani, or both:
Every person who knowingly participates in the distribution of fictitious 
profits of a commercial company on the basis of a fraudulent balance 
sheet, or without having a balance sheet, or on the basis of a fi'audulent 
inventory or profit and loss statement.
Unfortunately, the KCL does not address this issue. This is a legislative 
shortcoming which needs to be rectified to eliminate its adverse effects on the company
^^Also Article 43 of Egyptian company law provides that “No distribution of profit allowed if  it
culminates in disabling the company from confronting its cash liabilities in due time.
Creditors of the company may demand from the competent court the invalidation of any decision 
issued in contravention to the provisions of the preceding clause. The member of the Administrative 
Board who approved the distribution will be jointly responsible in front of the creditors, within limit 
of the amount of the profits the distribution of which has been prevented.
Recourse may also be had on the shareholders who know that the distribution was effected in 
contravention of this article within limit o f the profits they obtained.”
Article 229/5 of Saudi company law provides that “without prejudice to the requirements of the
provisions of the Islamic Shari’ah, the following offenders shall be liable to imprisonment for a period 
of not less than three months and not more than one year, and/or to a fine of not less than five
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and its shareholders and creditors. Therefore, an article should be added to the KCL 
and this suggested article should regulate that a penalty is imposed in the event of 
fictitious dividends. This penalty should be designed to strike a balance between the 
illegal act and the punishment.The penalties under the current KCL are too lenient 
and do not match the gross mistakes which make the company and its shareholders 
suffer. Also, the Kuwaiti legislator should follow the approach adopted by the 
Egyptian legislator who specified the persons who may be prosecuted for involvement 
in this crime, namely board members and auditors who are in office at the time of 
fictitious dividends distribution.^^
With regard to the crime of distributing fictitious profits there are a number of 
elements to say that this crime has been committed. First, this crime may have 
occurred in the absence of stocktaking or by using default stocktaking. As stated in 
chapter five, the board must carry out a stocktaking and prepare a balance sheet 
together with a profit and loss account, as well as a report about the company’s 
activities during the year and its financial position at the end of the year. To 
substantiate the occurrence of the crime of fictitious profits, no stocktaking or a false 
one was carried out showing the company’s assets in excess of its liabilities and that it 
has earned distributable profits. Second, the crime is not established unless dividends 
are declared and put at the disposal of the shareholders even if they have not actually 
received them. The crime is committed when the GM, under the recommendation of a 
director, issues a resolution declaring the dividends to be distributed to the
thousand not more than twenty thousand Saudi Riyals: (5) Any manager or director who receives or 
distributes among the members or third parties fictitious (unearned) profits.”
Kanam, supra note 88, p. 90.
^^See Article 162.5 Egyptian Company Law no. 159/1981.
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shareholders/*’ A third element is the existence of fictitious profits. These refer to the
dividends distributed to the shareholders despite the fact that the company has not 
made such profits or if they exceed the real profits earned. As the company has not 
gained profits fi’om certain activities or operations, dividends are only deducted fi'om 
the capital. These are deemed to be false dividends and a violation of the principle of 
maintaining the capital intact to secure the rights of creditors. The final element is bad 
faith or intent on the part of a board of directors. This element is the immaterial 
(moral) element of this crime. Bad faith refers to knowledge that the dividends are 
false regardless of the board’s motive to commit such a crime.^^
After committing this crime the question is; Can a company recover the 
dividends distributed to shareholders once they are discovered to be false? Once again, 
the Kuwaiti legislator fell short of addressing this matter, a position that should be 
criticised, as such distribution is deemed illegal gain. Some jurists, however, argue that 
shareholders are obligated to return these dividends to the company whether or not 
they are aware that they are false. This attitude corresponds with the Kuwaiti Civil 
Law which provides that any person who receives a payment in trust which is not due 
to him shall return the same as it is illicit profit earning.
Others maintain that shareholders with bad faith should be singled out and 
required to return the dividends.Their argument is based on the assumption that a
Kanam, supra note 88, p. 94; Abdel hanieed, AL-Shwarbi, Financial and commercial Crimes, 
Alxsindra: Dar AL-Matboat AL-Jameah Publishing, (1986), p. 332.
Younes, siipra note 78, p. 527. See also Kanam, Supra not 85, p. 100.
Younes, supra note 78, p. 131.
This is the attitude of Egyptian company law in article 43(3) of it and Lebanon company law in
article 108 of it; for more information see Sami, Fawzi, The Commercial Companies "Public and 
Private Provisions", Jordan: Maktabt Dar Al-Thgafah Publisher, (1999), p. 523; Mustafa, supra note 
54, p. 318.
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shareholder can only exercise control on the management of a company by reading the 
balance sheet, profit and loss statement and board report. If these documents are 
falsified or if they contain misrepresentations, a shareholder may be unable to detect 
that. It is then fair and just that he retains the dividend, even if it were false, so long as 
he does so in good faith. This is harmonised with the attitude of the UK CA that
provides any shareholder who receives a distribution which he knows, or has 
reasonable grounds to believe, has been paid in breach of ss. 263 to 281 of the 
Company Act, must return that amount to the company^^  ^ and he will be liable to
account to the company as a constructive trustee. However, a shareholder who
receives an improper dividend, even if he does not know or has no grounds to believe 
that dividend is improper, may, under the UK CA, be liable if there is a clause in the 
Articles of Association of the company indicating this, or if he has at some stage signed 
a contract indicating that he would repay any improper dividend irrespective of the 
underlying circumstances.^*^*
4.4 Shareholder’s application of assets on a Winding-up
It is generally acknowledged that a shareholder may not claim the value of his 
shares during the life of the company. If he wants to leave the company, he must 
assign his shares to other persons who thus become new shareholders. However, upon
Younes, supra not 78, p. 131.
Section 277(1) of the UK CA 1985 provides that “where a distribution, or part of one, made by a
company to one of its members is made in contravention of this part and, at the time of the 
distribution, he knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that it is so made, he is liable to repay 
it (or that part of I, as the case may be) to the company or (in the case of a distribution made otherwise 
than in cash) to pay the company a sum equal to the value of the distribution (or part) at that time.” 
See Precision Dippings Ltd  v Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd [1985] 3 WLR 812.
’“^ S. 277(2) of UK CA 1985.
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the termination of the company, after dissolution and liquidation of the company and 
statement of its debts, a shareholder may redeem the nominal value of his shares from 
the balance remaining, if any. If there is a surplus after the liquidation, shareholders 
may apportion the same as provided under law and the Articles of Association.
The KCL has provided the circumstances which lead to the lapse of a company. 
A JSC is liquidated when the company has achieved the objective for which it was 
established; with the expiry of a fixed period for which the company was established; at 
the declaration of the company’s bankruptcy; with the dissolution of the company 
according to the law; and when a judicial judgement is issued to wind up the 
company. Moreover, if the company has lost three-quarters of its capital, the board
of directors must convene an EGM to discuss either the liquidation of the company or 
the reducing of its capital. If the board of directors fails to convene this meeting, or a 
quorum is not presented at the meeting, or the shareholders in the meeting refused to 
liquidate the company, the government department concerned and every shareholder 
may introduce legal proceedings to force liquidation.^ *^ *
4.4.1 Settlement of Debts
If the company is solvent, the liquidator, before settling the company’s debts, 
first pays the cost, charges and expenses properly incurred in the winding up, and this 
includes the remuneration of a liquidator. After that, he should settle the matured 
debts and reserve for the non-matured debts and disputed debts should be set aside. ^ *^^
Article 170 of the KCL. 
Ibid., article 171.
106Ibid., Article 40(1) of the KCL provides that “the property of the company (which remains) after
settlement of the rights of the creditors and deduction of the sums required to meet debts which have 
not fallen due and debts which are in disputes shall be divided among all its shareholders.”
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4.4.2 Return to the Shareholders the Value of their Shares in the Capital
The general rule is that a shareholder has claim to the company’s common funds 
as soon as the closing accounts are approved, liquidation concluded and debts settled. 
In the KCL provisions to the effect that the liquidator shall return to the shareholders 
the value of their shares in the company’s capital are met. As provided above, such 
refund occurs only when all company’s liabilities are settled. The company’s assets are 
distributed in the manner set forth in the Memorandum or Articles of Association, in 
the absence of which Article 40.2 of the KCL a p p l i e s . I t  provides that each
shareholder shall be entitled to a share equivalent to his share in the capital, and the 
balance remaining, if any, shall be divided among the shareholders pro rata to the share 
of each in the profits. If the company’s net balance fails to cover such shares, this 
means that the company has incurred losses and the loss is shared by all shareholders at 
the agreed rate.
A shareholder’s claim to a company’s assets varies in extent depending on the 
Articles of Association and whether these articles allow greater and smaller equities (or 
preference equities) than ordinary shares in terras of the remaining profits and/or 
capital. The KCL has settled this matter. In accordance with Article 176 that 
provides:
On completion of the liquidation activities, the Liquidators shall prepare 
the final balance setting down the share of each shareholder of the 
company assets.
Article 40/2 provides that “each member shall be entitle to a portion equivalent to his share of
the capital as stated in the memorandum of association, and the surplus, if  any, shall be divided 
among the members in proportion to their shares of the profits. On the other hand, should the net 
(pro-ceeds) of the company’s property be insufficient to meet the members’ shares, the loss shall be
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Therefore, the company’s liquidators are those responsible for determining the 
share of each shareholder in the assets. Distribution of the company’s assets in Kuwait 
is easy since the company law allows the issuing of one kind of share, namely ordinary 
shares, and, accordingly, there is no preference for shares to others.
If the net assets of the company are insufficient to cover the full value of the 
shareholders’ shares in the company’s capital, then the deficit shall be apportioned 
among the shareholders in the proportion provided for the division of losses.
If any rights or claims are discovered following the company’s liquidation, any 
shareholder may file a legal action against the debtor claiming such rights in the name 
of the company and all shareholders. Shareholders have such a right when the 
liquidation process has been completed and the liquidator no longer represents the 
company or shareholders and hence is not authorised to claim settlement of the debts 
in the name of the company. Shareholders alone are the aggrieved party, as they have 
been paid an equity less than that in the liquidated company.
4.4.3 Distribution of the Remaining Assets
Once the company’s liabilities are settled and the value of contributions to the 
capital has been refunded to the shareholders, the remaining assets, if any, shall be 
distributed among the shareholders. The KCL does not provide much detail about this 
distribution except that stipulated in the Articles of Association: Otherwise, the
apportioned among the members in accordance with the ratio agreed (to be applied) in apportioning 
the loss.”
Ibid.,
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remaining assets shall be distributed among the shareholders in proportion to their 
interest in the company’s capital/
4,5 Conclusion
Persons buy shares and become shareholders of JSCs in order to obtain a number 
of rights. The first rights one may think of are the financial rights. These rights are 
considered as an encouragement for shareholders to participate in the company, and to 
be more keen on knowing most of the company’s affairs, which enable them to be 
aware of the company’s financial position. However, as asserted at the beginning of 
this chapter, making profits for the body of shareholders is not the only aim of the 
company. Any JSC is, in fact, a web of contracts. Thus, it has a number of interested 
groups, and every group has its own interests. But, because the study is about the 
rights of shareholders it concentrates on their rights alone. Also, as provided in the 
Chapter Two, this study disagree with the supporters of the contractual theory who 
treat the shareholders as owners of the company, and the company must be managed in 
their interest alone because any company nowadays is a separate legal person. As 
provided previously a company is not purely a private contract between private people. 
In addition, as well as a board of directors and shareholders, there are other interested 
groups in any JSC. Sometimes it is not an institution created by the State alone 
without any major participation firom private parties. It is a kind of combination 
between both theories (see chapter 2).
However, shareholders have in the company a particular special position in their 
company because; they are the owners of the company shares, they first bear the risk of
109 Ibid.,
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venture failure and they are paid at the end, after all other interested groups in the 
company. In other words, they are residual risk-bearers. Therefore, they enjoy a 
number of powers and rights that other interested groups do not have. These include, 
amongst others, financial rights and attending and voting in the GMs.
This chapter started with the right of shareholders to transfer their shares at any 
time or in any way. It was emphasised that this is one of the basic rights that 
shareholders cannot be deprived of. If for some reason, the company law imposes 
some restrictions on the rights of shareholders to dispose of their shares, these 
restrictions must be designed in the interest of the company and its shareholders. The 
legislator must not over-impose his restrictions to the extent of depriving shareholders 
of this right. Unfortunately, the KCL has gone too far in imposing restrictions on this 
right. Investors show interest in these JSCs for the privilege that shareholders enjoy 
and which enable them to discard their shares expeditiously and whenever they need to 
do so.
Also reviewed was the right of existing shareholders to subscribe in new shares 
offered during the company’s existence. These new shares should be offered first to the 
shareholders of the company and not to the public to preserve the existing balance of 
power in the companies. The KCL, Article 131/6 has given this right candidly to 
shareholders. But, unfortunately, the KCL in another article has given the boards of 
directors of the companies the privilege to impose restrictions on this r i g h t . I t  must
be clear in the company law and in the contract of the company that shareholders must 
not be deprived of this right unless they voluntarily relinquish it.
Regarding the annual profit, the KCL is criticised for not having a clear definition
n o Ibid., Article 111.
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of the word annual dividends despite its importance. With respect to determining 
dividends due dates, it is provided that the annual dividends become the right of the 
shareholder as soon as it is declared in the resolution issued by the GM of the 
company. However, the KCL is found to be at fault when giving the board the 
authority to determine the date for the distribution of the annual dividends. This means 
that distribution of profit can be delayed for sometime. Profits should be distributed as 
soon as they are advertised and boards should have no authority on this matter.
The discussion in this chapter also involved the issue of reserves, the means of 
creating reserves and the importance of preserving reserves as a means of maintaining 
the company’s independence; especially avoiding banks with the need to finance 
projects. It criticised the KCL for allowing JSCs to pay annual dividends to 
shareholders from these reserves without obligating companies to inform their 
shareholders directly of the sources of their profits.
This chapter highlighted the fact that there is no clear mention by the KCL of the 
crime of distributing false dividends. This is a fault that needs rectifying. The lack of a 
clear article in the KCL that incriminates the alleged dividends has made many boards 
distribute profits fi'om the capital without them knowing that they are alleged profits.
Finally, a company as a legal entity owns its own assets, but at the time of 
dissolving the ownership these assets are transferred to the shareholders and they 
become the ovmers of the assets. These assets are not to be distributed among 
shareholders unless or until all debts are settled. Each shareholder receives a 
percentage of the assets related to the shares he is holding as compared to the 
companies’ capital.
When a shareholder invests his savings in a JSC, he knows or should well know 
his financial rights, as these rights are the motivation and main reason why he invested
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in this kind of company. However, does every shareholder know the other rights that 
are granted to him in his capacity as a shareholder? These rights when exercised should 
help him effectively to maintain his rights in the company, especially his financial rights. 
Among these rights is the shareholder’s right to know what goes on in the company 
tlj^ough reading any information they deem important. This is the focus of the next 
pkapter.
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Chapter Five 
The Right of Disclosure of Information
5. Introduction
Shareholders of JSCs, as many commercial law jurists argue, are the interested 
parties, since they are the owners of the company’s shares and as such are affected by 
the developments that take place during its lifetime. The acts of companies always, 
therefore, provide that the highest authority should be in the hands of the shareholders’ 
GM.  ^ The GM expresses the will of the corporate body and is thus authorised to pass
resolutions related to the company’s activities and its future and to appoint and remove 
the board of directors; it also has many other powers (see 2.4 and chapter 7). 
However, ah these powers would be useless without a good system of disclosure.
Disclosure of information means the right of the shareholders and other 
interested groups in the company to receive or have access to the information related 
to different aspects of the company’s business. This enables the shareholders etc., to 
evaluate the board of directors’ performance^ and to exercise effective control over
their activities^ by attending the GM, sharing in discussions, and voting on resolutions
equipped with knowledge of the matters under consideration.'^ In addition, a
shareholder cannot take advantage of his financial rights unless he has sufficient
 ^ Shearman, Ian, Shackleton on the Law and Practice o f Meetings, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
publishing, (1997), p. 115.
 ^ Meier-Schatz, Christian J., Objectives of Financial Disclosure Regulation, 8 Journal o f  Comparative 
Business and Capital Market Law (1986) p. 231.
 ^ See Caparo Industries pic  v. Dickman (1990) 1 All ER 568.
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information about the financial position of his company. For example, if a shareholder 
wants to exercise his right of disposal of his shares, he needs information to choose the 
right time of disposal to get more profit. Likewise, shareholders need to inspect and 
understand the company’s reports and attend the GM to make sure that his savings in 
safe hands.
Therefore, disclosure should help shareholders to make more intelligent voting 
decisions.^ An advantage of disclosure is provided by Meier-Schatz
The studies also indicate that more effective disclosure rules would 
have made the execution of the fraudulent schemes very difficult, if not 
impossible. In addition, practical experience seems to suggest that 
some fraudulent conduct simply does not get off the ground because of 
the existence of a mandatory disclosure process. Both empirical results 
and experience support the thesis that the financial disclosure regulation 
of new securities issues can reduce although not prevent fraudulent 
practices detrimental to small investors.^
In this chapter the right of JSCs shareholders to have access to information 
concerning the company’s affairs will be discussed. In other words, to have the right 
to know what is going on in their company, and to what extent companies are required 
under the KCL to provide such disclosure of information.^ This is an issue of
paramount importance to the shareholders and the company alike. There are many 
questions that this chapter will try to answer, such as; do the shareholders, according 
to the KCL, have the right to know the company’s affairs? Does the board of dfrectors
Mustafa, Ahmed, Protection of Minority Shareholders in JSCs, 6 Journal o f Legal Studies (1991) p. 
229.
 ^Meier-Schatz, supra note 2, p. 227.
 ^Ibid., p. 221.
’ Not only shareholders but many groups will use the information that must be disclosed by JSCs-
bankers, debenture holders and possible debenture holders, employees, customers, suppliers and 
potential suppliers, etc, Benjamin, James and Stanga, Keith, Differences in Disclosure Needs of 
Major Users of Financial Statements, 7 Accounting and Business Res (1977) p. 187.
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have a responsibility to deliver the information about the company’s business? What 
documents and reports are put at the shareholder’s disposal and for how long?
The right that is the subject of this chapter, is one of the most important rights 
considered in the study, as it is directly related to the other rights for shareholders. 
Through this right, attending GMs can be useful, and the votes of shareholders can 
also be used effectively for the interests of the company and its shareholders (see
7.3.1). By disclosure of information, shareholders can learn whether the company is 
suffering from problems because of the board or a third party, which gives 
shareholders the right to demand the adoption of judicial procedures from the board in 
order to protect the company's interests (see 8.1.2). Should this not happen, 
shareholders can take the initiative to defend the company's interests through filing a 
suit for the company. This chapter therefore studies a specially significant subject, as 
without it, many of these rights are of little use. Thus, all the information and data 
revealed from the company's reports shall be correct and compatible to reality, and this 
is what shall be assured or denied by the auditors of the company's accounts (see 
chapter 6). In return, this ensures the role played by the auditors of the company's 
accounts to in relation the company's interests, which indicates that auditors in all 
companies shall enjoy wide authorities. They should also be independent and far from 
any effect imposed by the board, and this is considered as an important right for 
shareholders (see 6.1).
This chapter will first discuss how far the company’s board of directors is 
obligated to disclose the information to the shareholders and to what extent it fulfils 
such an obligation without request from the shareholder. It will then specify the 
possible sources of disclosure obligations under the KCL. Finally, the shareholder’s
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right to use the services of an expert to help in understanding the financial position of 
the company if he does not possess sufficient technical knowledge will be dealt with.
5.1 The Board of Directors’ Obligation of Disclosure to 
Shareholders
Chapter Two of this study tried to establish the nature of the relationship 
between directors and shareholders. Having discussed the nature of this relation it is 
possible, at least in theory to discover the obligations that every organ owes the other 
in a JSC. Chapter two provided that there are two main theories. The nature of the 
relationship between shareholders (the owners of the company, as many scholars 
argue) and the board of directors according to contractual theory is based on the 
agency’s nature.^ Thus, it is a relation between principals and agents. Agents aie 
required to execute certain services on behalf of their principals; their duty should lie in 
the best interest of their principals.^ As a normal result of this relation, the
shareholders as principles always have the right to know what is going on in their 
company; and the directors as agents always have a duty to inform the shareholders 
about the company’s business affairs.’^  However, there is the possibility that the agents
controlling the company may direct the company in their own interests rather than in 
the interests of the principals. In this situation, and to protect the interests of the 
shareholders, there should be a clear disclosure of obligations on the people who
® Jensen, Micheal and Meckling, William, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. o f  Fin. Econ (1976) p. 308.
® Ibid.
Al-Shemmari, Tammah, The Board o f  Directors o f Joint Stock Company: Comparative Study 
Between Law o f Kuwait and the Laws o f  USA, T‘ edn, Kuwait: Institution of Kuwait Publishing,
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control the company/^ On the other hand, the nature of the relationship according to
the institutional theory is different. The shareholders and directors are organs among 
other organs. Their relationship is controlled by the law of the State. Therefore, the 
law determines the rights and authorities of all organs, as well as determining what 
should be disclosed to the shareholders by the directors. Arguably the obligations of 
disclosure come from both, the contract of the company (Memorandum and Articles of 
Association) and the Company Law.
Furthermore, in JSCs, as explained previously in the chapter 2, there is a clear 
distinction of powers either between shareholders through the GM and the board of 
directors who control the company or between power and ownership. Therefore, there 
are two main organs in any JSC; first, the board of directors and, second, the body of 
shareholders through the GM. Each organ has specific duties and rights. Company 
acts, in every business, give each organ powers to carry out its duties. The KCL 
provides that the powers of management are vested in the directors; they alone can 
exercise these powers. In Article 146, the KCL give the board of directors extensive
powers to managing their company in order to achieve the company’s objectives. 
Here it is noticed that the legislation specified the duties of the board of directors and 
the power they need to carry out these duties. On the other hand, the body of 
shareholders through the GM hold important powers in their company. The most
(1987), pp. 102-3; see also, Abou Zeid, Rnùwan, Cotnmercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative 
Law, T‘ edn, Cairo: Dar AI-Kitab Al-Hadeeth Publishing (1978), p. 451.
The relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors is a relation between 
principles and agents. See chapter two of this research.
Article 138 of the KCL provides that “The company shall be managed by a board of directors whose 
composition and terms o f office shall be stated in the Articles of Association...”.
Ibid., Article 146 provides that “the board of directors may exercise all such managerial functions 
as are consistent with its objects, and this power of the board shall be subject to no limitation except
165
significant powers retained by the board at a GM, according to the KCL, are: that they 
have the right to elect the board of directors and auditors;they  can remove 
directors;^^and they can fix their remuneration if this is not fixed in the Articles of 
Association/^ Many rights make the directors accountable to the shareholders (see 
2.5.2).
One of the aims of Companies Laws is to create a kind of balance between the 
main organs in every company. However, this balance does not exist until the 
shareholders have full knowledge of their company. Moreover, the shareholder’s right 
to know the company’s conditions and situation is closely related to his right to vote at 
the GM. Therefore, it cannot be imagined that shareholders could be asked to vote on 
matters of which they know nothing. Shareholders cannot make a good choice in the 
election of board of directors if they know nothing about the candidates. Also, it is not 
acceptable to ask shareholders to vote on the proposal of a resolution without giving 
them full information about its objectives. In addition, shareholders cannot be 
commanded to accept their par t of the annual dividends until all information on the 
company’s accounts is disclosed to them (see 4.3).^^
To enable shareholders to exercise their right of control and supervision over the 
company’s activities, they should be given some rights related to managing the
such as may be provided for by law, the articles of the company, or the resolution of its general 
assembly...”.
Ibid., Article 157(4).
Ibid., Article 152 provides “the GM may dismiss the chairman or any member of the board upon a
proposal being made by the absolute majority of the board or upon application signed by a number of 
shareholders who hold not less than one-quarter of the capital subscribed for”.
^Ubid., knioXt 157(4).
'’E.F. F am a and M.C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. Xaw Æ (1983) P. 
301.
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company, such as access to information and the right to attend and vote at the GM/^
To this end, many countries give shareholders of a JSC the right to control and 
monitor the activities of their board of directors and access to information about the 
financial situation of their company.
Under the KCL, the board of directors has an obligation to put some documents 
and reports at the shareholder’s disposa/^ to prove that accounting records have been
kept properly, and to show what has happened to the shareholders’ wealth. However, 
the KCL omitted to give the shareholders some rights relating to disclosure of 
information, which is important in order for them to practice their role in their 
company, this will be discussed later in this chapter. This does not mean that the KCL 
does not give shareholders access to information; it gives them some rights and fails to 
give others, and is unclear in some instances.
Therefore, the KCL should be amended or articles should be added to enable 
shareholders to have more access to the company’s books and records and give them 
enough time to identify the company’s position.^® Also, a look at the disclosure system
in the UK would be useful to the legislators in Kuwait. In the UK CA 1985, the 
shareholders of companies and other interested groups are provided with great
'®Bartlett, Susan and Chandler Roy, The Corporate Report and the Private Shareholders: Lee and 
Tweedie Twenty Years On, 29 British Accounting Rev (1997) p. 247.
See Articles 131, 134, 154 and 179 of the KCL.
Such as French Company Law promulgated on 24 July 1966, where it is provided that shareholders
have the right to know and specify the documents which the shareholders may have access to and the 
manner in which they exercise such a right in good time prior to the GM, see Article 162 of the 
French Company Law. The Egyptian legislator did the same in Article 66 of the Company Law No, 
159 of 1981. Moreover, Article 66 of Egyptian Company Law provides that “the executive regulation 
indicates what should be brought to the knowledge o f shareholders, before the meeting of the general 
assembly, of data concerning the allocations and salaries of the chairman and members of the board of 
administration and all advantages or other allowances the obtained and the operations in which any of 
them is interested, in discord with the interest o f the company, and any other data relating to 
subventions or expenses of propaganda.”
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opportunities to obtain a great deal of information about the companies’ affairs/^ The
disclosure of obligations according to the UK CA obligate JSCs to provide their 
shareholders with complete financial information that will enable them to take 
decisions with full knowledge of the facts/^
The directors’ obligation is to run the company. Therefore, they are invested 
with full power to perform this task.^  ^ At the same time, they have an obligation to
prove that they are running the company in the interest of the owners of the company 
or for the corporate body. To prove this, they must disclose all information related to 
the company’s affairs as proof. In the UK, therefore, every shareholder entitled to 
receive notice of GM of a company must be sent a copy of the directors’ report. 
Every shareholder also has the right to demand copies of accounts and reports at any 
time during the year and without any charge.^  ^If a shareholder’s demand is not met
within seven days, the board of directors and every officer in the company is guilty of
an offence as provides in Section 239:
(1) Any member of a company. ..is entitled to be furnished, on demand 
and without charge, with a copy of the company’s last annual account 
and directors’ report and a copy of the auditors’ report on those 
accounts.
(3) If a demand under this section is not complied with within seven 
days, the company and every officer of it who is in default is guilty of an
Until one of the company law scholars argues whether we need all this huge disclosure here in the
UK, see Seally, Lennard, The Disclosure Philosophy and Company Law Reform, 2 Co Law (1981) p. 
53.
See Villiers, Charlotte, Disclosure and Corporate Governance, in UKNCCL(ed.), UK Law fo r  the
Millenium, London: UKNCCL Publishing, (1998), p 151; see also as examples see Sections 10, 19, 
226, 227, 231, 232, 234, 235, 238, 709 and 711 the UK CA 1985.
Table A Article 70 of the UK CA 1985.
^U bid.,^, 238.
Ibid., S.239 provides “any member of a company and any holder of a company’s debentures is
entitled to be furnished, on demand and without charge, with a copy o f the company’s last annual 
accounts and directors’ report and a copy of the auditors’ report on those accounts.”
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offence and liable to a fine and, for continued contravention, to a daily 
default fine.
This can be seen clearly in the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects
of Corporate Governance (Cadbury) 1992 where para. 16 provides:
Boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders and both have 
to play their part in making that accountability effective. Boards of 
directors need to do so through the quality of the information which 
they provide to shareholders, and shareholders through their willingness 
to exercise their responsibility as owners.
At the end of this section, it could be agreed that there are two main bodies in 
every JSC and the disclosure of information is seen as the only way for communication 
between these two bodies.^  ^ Therefore, the directors should carry out their duties in
the interest of the company and disclose everything necessary about the company’s 
business. On the other hand, shareholders receiving this information and documents 
should understand them and then exercise their right to monitor the directors’ actions.
Consequently, shareholders should have the right at any time to inspect the 
annual accounts and directors’ reports presented to GMs. They are entitled to be 
given relevant information in advance of any GM, which will enable them to take 
decisions with full knowledge of the facts. Moreover, this disclosure may prevent any 
activities by the board of directors that are seem to be in conflict with the interest of 
the shareholders or the company.However, to what extent should such disclosure be 
offered to shareholders?
Bartlett, supra note 18, p. 246. 
Villiers, supra note 22, p. 150.
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5.2 Sources of Disclosure Obligations to the Shareholders
Disclosure obligations may be imposed in Kuwait by two different sources. The 
first and main source is the KCL No 15/1961, fi*om which come most of the disclosure 
obligations. The second source provides the laws and bylaws that organise the KSEM. 
These laws are imposed on any JSC wishing to be listed in the KSEM.^^ Another
source of disclosure of information that exists is the information disclosed voluntarily 
by companies. However, it could be said that this is not one which should be relied 
upon in making any investment decision. Usually the purpose of information disclosed 
in this way is to promote the image of the company or that of the board of directors.
It is worth mentioning that the company law is the main source, which obliges 
the companies to reveal the information required in their reports. This law is applied 
on all companies whether it is registered in the stock market or not. Thus it is more 
comprehensive, and require special attention to the articles of this law, so that it 
becomes more detailed and specific, which shall be revealed. In the same time, this 
does not deny the special importance of the bourse laws or the KSEM Laws, which 
require revealing some of the information such as issuing quarterly or half annually 
reports on the companies registered in the market. These laws may be another source 
for information of which shareholders and investors may benefit from in the market. 
Then, the role of these laws whether company law or likewise is an integral role, as 
each one is completing what is lacking in the other, which is generally aiming at 
accomplishing shareholders and investors interests.
In comparison to other countries Kuwait has very few disclosure sources-though 
should be more. In the UK, for example, besides the disclosure obligations imposed by
Decree published on 14**' of August 1983 and law No. 2 of 1999,
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the UK CA 1985 there are many sources of disclosure obligations. For instance listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange Market (hereafter LSEM) have to submit 
to various extra disclosure obligations contained in the Listing Rules of the LSEM.^^
Furthermore, a number of reports issued by Cadbury^ \  Greenbury^^ and HampeP^
committees have disclosure obligations. Other obligations may be imposed by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Take-over Panel and the Accounting Standards 
Board.^ '^
5.3 What should be disclosed to Shareholders?
This section determines the documents and information that shareholders by 
statutory means are entitled to have access to before GMs at any time during the year, 
according to the KCL. This section will justify the importance of these documents or 
information to shareholders in exercising their role in the company and raises negative 
aspects of depriving shareholders from seeing or getting hold of these documents and 
information.
5.3.1 Shareholder’s Register (Register of Members)
Every JSC must hold a register of its shareholders. This register should contain 
information about the shareholders of the company, such as their names and addresses,
Villiers, supra note 22, p. 157.
Ibid., pp. 155-6; Pendlebury, Maurice and Groves, Roger, edn, London:
Routledge Publishing, (1994), pp. 6-9.
Cadbury Committee, Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee: London, July 
1992).
Greenbury Committee, Report on Directors’ Remuneration (Gee: London, July 1995).
Hampel Committee, Final Report on Corporate Governance (Gee; London, July 1998),
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how many shares held by each, the date which each person became a shareholder, and 
the date which each person ceased to be a shareholder as provides in Article 134 of 
KCL. All shareholders must have access to the register at the company’s head office 
and any other person may have such access upon the payment of a reasonable fee.
Due to the importance of the shareholders’ register, the UK CA 1985 mentions it 
in many sections of the Company Act so as to have an effective register in the JSCs. In 
the UK every company with more than 50 shareholders must keep a register of its 
shareholders, and the register must be open to inspection during business hours free of 
charge, to shareholders.^^ The register of the company states the name, address, date 
of registration, date of cessation of being a shareholder, and where the company has a 
share capital, the extent of the shareholding and the amount paid up on each share.^’
Anyone can inspect the index of shareholders at any time provided the register is 
not closed.^ ® If a person wishes to obtain a copy of the register with addresses he can
do so, but the company has 10 days from the day from the day of the request.^*’ Also in
the UK, if the register is inaccurate in any respect, it is possible to apply to the court to 
rectify the inaccuracy under S.359 (1). The court has wide powers to assert the right 
of an applicant to have his name entered in the register or have names deleted from the
®‘*Pendlebury, supra note 30, pp. 6-9.
Article 134 of the KCL provides that “A (share) company shall keep a register of (its) shareholders
in which it shall record the names, addresses and date registration of its members, the number of 
shares owned by each of them and the sum paid up on every share, and the date and manner of 
disassociation o f disassociated members. This register shall be kept at the registered office of the 
company and shall be open to inspection by the members free of charge. It shall also be open to the 
inspection o f any other person against a reasonable charge; and anyone concerned may apply for its 
correction if  the name of a person is entered in or struck off it without justification.”
See S. 352, 354 and 356 of the UK CA 1985.
S.352.
Ibid., S .356(l).
Ibid., S. 356(3).
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register/® The court is also given powers, where inspection is refused or copies of the 
register are not supplied, to order an immediate inspection or direct copies required to 
be given to the person requesting them/*
The right to know shareholders’ names and other information, such as shares 
held by each shareholder prior to a GM, has many benefits as it gives shareholders the 
opportunity to communicate with one another, identify their attitudes and co-ordinate 
matters which will be discussed at the GM. Such communication and co-ordination 
helps shareholders challenge the domination of the board members over the GMs (see
7.3.2).'^  ^ The question that should be asked under the KCL is, if the inspection required
by a shareholder or an investor is refused or if a copy of the names of shareholders or 
any other information required is not sent, what can shareholders do to enforce the 
registry to do its duty? What are the penalties that may be imposed on the company 
and every officer in default? Unfortunately, there are no answers to these questions in 
the KCL. Therefore, to have an effective registry the legislators in Kuwait should take 
the UK CA an as example to follow.
5.3.2 The GM Notice and Agenda
A GM cannot be held unless proper notice of it has been given to every 
shareholder entitled. A notice must contain important information such as the date, 
time, and location of the meeting. It must also contain an agenda of the meeting
Ibid., S. 359(2).
Ibid., S. 356(5) and (6) of the UK CA 1985 provides that “if  an Inspection required under this
seetion is refltsed, or if  a copy so required is not sent within the proper period, the company and every 
officer of it who is in default is liable in respect of each offence to a fine. (6) in the case of such 
refusal or default, the court may by order compel an immediate inspection of the register and index, or 
direct that the copies required be sent to the persons requiring them.”
Younes, Ali, Commercial Companies, Egypt: Dar-AI-Feker Al-Araby Publishing (1991), p. 286.
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stating clearly the nature of the business to be transacted and the draft resolutions
proposed by the board of directors or shareholders. From the documents and
information about the matters to be considered and discussed at the GM, the
shareholder may be able to take appropriate decisions.
The agenda is usually sent out in good time with the notice announcing the 
meeting so as to enable shareholders to look into the agenda, study it, and form an 
opinion and appropriate decision on the matters to be discussed.'*^
In fact, the KCL is not perfectly clear as far as informing shareholders prior to 
the GM is concerned/'^ Article 154/1 of the KCL provides that:
Notices of meeting shall be sent by registered mail to all the 
shareholders and shall contain a clear summary of the agenda at least 
one week before the date of the meeting.
Thus, the agenda of the GM must be sent to all shareholders and must contain a 
clear outline of the agenda. On the wording of this article -  what is the meaning of 
“outline or clear summary” of the agenda that should be sent to all shareholders? Is an 
outline of the agenda sufficient? That means the summarised notice or the agenda 
under the KCL does not contain the draft of proposal resolutions. Arguably the 
agenda of the meeting should contain the proposed draft resolutions that the board of 
directors wants to approve following discussion thereof, in order that the shareholders 
may attend the meeting fully acquainted with what is to be discussed. Therefore, just 
an outline is not enough, and the KCL provides full details of what should be in the 
notice as in the UK CA 1985.
Abou Zeid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative Law, T* edn, Cairo; Dar Al- 
Fker Al-Arabi Publiher, (1978), p, 462.
Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, 3'^ '* edn, Kuwait: Author Publishing 
(1999), p. 460.
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The UK CA provides that no less than 21 days’ notice must be given for an 
annual GM or for a meeting to pass a special resolution. At least 14 days’ notice is 
required for any other meeting.'*  ^ The notice of the meeting in the UK should have 
much information, giving shareholders a sufficient indication of the matters to be 
discussed.'^  ^If the true nature of the meeting is not disclosed, such as transactions to be
passed, the meeting will be invalid.'*’ The notice should disclose any benefit the the 
dir ectors will obtain as a result of the passing of any resolution."^ ® The directors should 
give shareholders an explanation or additional information to understand the 
implication of any proposed transaction."*^ ^
5.3.3 The Company’s Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account 
The balance sheet is a sign of the financial situation of affairs of the company at 
the last financial year. It shows the net assets of the company and how they are 
f inanced.The profit and loss account, on the other hand, summarises the outcome of
the company’s activities during the last financial year.^* Because of the importance of
S. 269 of the UK CA 1985.
See Table A, Article 38 o f the UK CA.
See Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Co Ltd  [1915] 1 Ch 503, In this case the directors
had from 1907 to 1914 received fees from a subsidiary company. At a later date they were advised that 
payment of the fees should have been approved by the shareholders. They called a meeting to approve 
their remuneration and to alter the articles to allow directors to receive payment for serving on the 
boards of subsidiary companies. The notice merely stated that directors’ fees would be a small 
percentage of the subsidiary’s profits, and did not state that the subsidiary had made very large profits, 
or that the total amount of directors’ fees was in the region of 45 000 pounds. It was held that the 
resolution approving the payment of these was invalid, as proper disclosure had not been made to the 
shareholders.
■*® S. 426 of the UK CA.
Ibid, S.376 (1) (b); The notice according to the UK CA should sometimes have certain resolutions 
to be set out in full see S. 378.
Pendlebury, supra note 30, p. 52.
I b i d . , p . 2 \ .
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the balance sheet and the profit and loss account, each shareholder should have the 
right to have a copy of the company’s balance sheet and accounts to identify the 
company’s financial position.
According to the KCL, each shareholder shall have the right to obtain a copy of
the book containing a balance sheet and a profit and loss account for the previous
financial year. Article 131/4 of the KCL provides that:
A member (of a share company) shall in particular enjoy the following 
rights; (4) to obtain a printed booklet containing the balance sheet for 
the ending accounting period, the profit and loss account.
Article 25 of implementing regulations of Law No. 15 of 1960 pertaining to KCL 
provides:
A copy of the balance sheet, the final accounts and the auditors’ report 
shall be sent to the control department at least two weeks prior to the 
GM; the balance sheet shall be prepared in accordance with the 
specimen forma attached hereto.
Therefore, accounts of the company should be prepared in accordance with the 
model provided of the pro forma attached to the implementing regulations of the 
KCL.^  ^ However, the provisions mentioned above suffer fi-om some shortcomings.
Fii'st, KCL does not specify the period within which the shareholder shall have access 
to the balance sheet, say 15 days prior to the GM, as is the case in many countries
which is a serious lack.^  ^ Article 154 of the KCL, that mentions the procedures of
sending the agenda of the GM, has nothing about sending the balance sheet and the 
profit and loss account. Second, the KCL does not have any article that compels the 
directors to give any information about the post-balance sheet and its effect on the
’^See Appendix C that attached to implementing regulations of Law No. 15 of 1960 pertaining to 
KCL.
See, for example, Article 89 of the Saudi Company Law where it gives the right to have a copy of 
the balance sheet of the company 15 days before the date of a GM.
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financial position of the company. Third, there is nothing in the KCL about disclosure 
of information of the bonus shares distributed to a number of shareholders and the 
procedures that follow the distribution of this kind of share. Therefore, the Kuwait 
legislator should compel the Kuwaiti JSCs to keep accounting records, which are 
sufficient to show and explain the company’s transactions. Finally, the KCL requires 
the board of directors to put the balance sheet for the previous financial year at the 
disposal of the shareholders. This could be viewed as in sufficient because in order for 
the shareholders to follow the soundness of the company’s financial position, he needs 
to identify the company’s balance sheet and profit and loss accounts for a number of 
previous y e a r s . I n  France, each shareholder has the right to receive a brief statement 
of the financial situation about the company at the end of its last financial year together 
with the financial statements of that company for each of its last five financial years.^^
In the UK, a copy of the company’s annual accounts along with a copy of the 
directors’ report for the financial year and the auditors’ report on the accounts, must 
be sent to every shareholder at least 21 days before the date of the meeting.^ ® The
company must always supply a copy of the full accounts and related documents to any 
shareholder wishing to receive them.^’
The balance sheet and the profit and loss account must give ‘a true and fair view’ 
of the company’s financial position. They must also comply with detailed requirements
In Egypt shareholders of JSCs have the right to see the balance sheets and the reports of auditors for
three years, for more information see, Sameha, A1 Kalyoubi, Commercial Companies. Egypt: Dar 
Alnadah Publishing, (1993), p. 511.
Le Gall, Jean-Pierre & Morel, Paul, French Company Law, 2®** edn, London: Longman Publishing,
(1992), p. 161.
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S. 238 of the UK CA 1985. 
Ibid., S. 251.
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of Schedule 4/® The advantage of such a schedule is that the companies have to 
prepare their balance sheet and profit and loss account in accordance with specified 
formats and the contents of the balance sheet and profit and loss account is already 
determined by law. In particular, the accounting records must contain as provided in 
S. 221 of the UK CA;
(1) Entries fi*om day to day of all money received and expended by the company 
and the matters in respect of which the receipt and expenditure take place;
(2) A record of all the company’s assets and liabilities;
In the case of a company dealing in goods; (a) Statements of stock held by the 
company at the end of each financial year; (b) Statements of stocktaking; (c) 
Statements of all goods purchased and sold and buyers and sellers of these 
goods.
5.3.4 Statutory Disclosure Obligation Regarding the Board of Directors
The business of the company is executed by the board of directors who are 
obliged to act in the interests of the company. Directors have complete power to carry 
out their duties. To ensure that directors are working in the interests of the company 
and not in their personal interests, there should be a disclosure obligation imposed on 
them to produce information about themselves in order to infonn the shareholders 
about the people controlling their company. Directors should also have to present a 
report on the company’s business affairs. Finally, shareholders have the right to know 
how much the directors receive every financial year fi*om the company, such as 
remuneration, benefits or bonus.
58 See S. 226(3) of the UK CA.
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5.3.4.1 Shareholders’ Right to Know Who Manage and Control the
Company
Article 16/2 of the implementing regulations of the KCL provides that the 
company shall prepare a detailed list, certified by the board of director, giving the 
names and capacities of the company manager, the chairman and directors of the said 
board. The original draft of this list shall be sent to the control department of 
companies, and any changes to the list during the year should also be reported to the 
MCI. Article 93 of the KCL requires the board to publish, within two months of the 
approval of the GM, the company’s balance sheet and financial statements of the 
previous year, and a list of the board members’ and auditors’ names.
Information about the current directors, the shadow director, managers and 
secretary is very important for shareholders in identifying who controls their company 
and what their qualifications and experience are it can help them determine whether 
directors meet the conditions for board membership and elect the directors they deem 
appropriate. Articles 140/1 of KCL that provide:
No person even though representing a legal entity, may be a director of 
more than three joint stock companies which have their head offices in 
Kuwait, neither may he be a delegated director or board chairman for 
more than a joint company which has its office in Kuwait.
The KCL gives shareholders the right to know whom the current directors and 
managers of their company are. However, information about the directors and 
managers should include more than names, as these are easy to find. In other words.
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biographies of directors’ and managers are required, so that the shareholders know the 
history, qualifications and experience, including previous directorship of each director. 
In the absence of such information it is likely that an inappropriate director is elected; 
this is neither in the interest of the company nor the shareholders.®®
Therefore, an article should be added to KCL which should impose a duty on 
directors, managers, secretaries and candidates who want to become directors, to 
disclose any information that may help the shareholders learn about who is controlling 
the company or wants to be appointed as a diiector.^^
The situation, according to the UK CA 1985, is totally different. Every company 
in the UK must maintain a register of directors and secretaries; it must be open to 
inspection to shareholders without a fee and to the public on payment of a prescribed 
fee. Here the shareholders and the public can obtain different kinds information about 
directors or shadow directors and secretaries of the company. The register must state
names and any fonner names, their date of birth,usual residential address, nationality.
Article 93 of the KCL provides that “the directors shall, within two months from the date on which
the GM approves the accounts, publish in the Official Gazette the balance sheet of the expired 
financial year and a list stating the names of the directors and the auditors”.
®® Unfortunately, the KCL do not have any article that concentrate on the qualifications that every
directors or manager must has. This shortcoming must be fixed to protect the interests o f shareholders 
and other interested groups in every company by prohibiting unsuitable directors from being 
concerned in management of JSCs see Hicks, Andrew, Director Disqualification; can it Deliver? J.B.L 
(2001) p. 433.
In Egypt, Article 87 of the Egyptian Company Law no, 159/1981 provides “every company should
dress annually a detailed list approved by its board chairman and the delegated member, with the 
name of its president and members of the board and their qualities and nationalities”; also Article 
221/1 of implementing regulations of Egyptian Company Law no. 159/1981.
See S. 288 of UK CA 1985.
This is because directors of the JSCs in the UK need approval fi-om the shareholders if  they are to 
remain in office over the age o f 70; see S. 293 of the UK CA 1985.
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business occupation, obligation relevant to former directorship relating to the previous 
five yeai’s,^ '^  and a copy of each director’s contract of service/^
5.3.4.2 Board of Directors* Report
The directors’ report is extremely important to the shareholders as it contains
information on the company’s business, management and financial position. All
company laws, therefore, provide that every JSC should present these two reports.
For example, Article 131 of the KCL provides that;
A shareholder (of a share company) shall in particular enjoy the 
following rights: (4) to obtain a printed booklet containing.. .the report 
of directors.
According to this article, each shareholder shall obtain a copy of the directors’ 
report. However, this article has a defect with regard to specifying an important point, 
namely the minimum period before the GM within which the shareholder must receive 
this report. According to the KCL, each shareholder should be sent a copy, but the 
question is how long before the GM should the report be sent? This is a very 
important point since most shareholders are ordinary who may not find it easy to 
understand the figures and statistics in the report. Therefore, they need to have the 
report some time before the GM. The KCL should thus have a specified minimum 
period, say 15 days. In the UK, every shareholder has the right to receive a copy of a 
company’s annual accounts, together with copies of the directors’ report and auditors’ 
report, at least 21 days before the date of the meeting.^^
®'* Ibid., S. 289.
318.
238.
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Regarding the contents of the report, it shall include information such as net 
proceeds and payments and a detailed description of the method in which the board 
proposes that the dividends of the year be distributed. Article 157/1 of the KCL 
provides that:
(1) The reading of the directors’ report on the activities of the company 
and its financial situation during the year; the report shall give sufficient 
explanations of items of income and expenditure and a detailed proposal 
of the method and date of distributing the net profits of the year;
According to this article, the directors’ report must contain details of the 
company’s activities and its financial situation during the last financial year. The report 
should also provide the date and level of the dividends recommended by the board of 
directors.
The information that should be disclosed by the directors’ report, according to 
the KCL is not sufficient. The directors’ report should be imposed to contain more 
information than that mentioned in Article 157. The directors of the JSCs should not 
be left entirely free to choose exactly what information is to be disclosed to the 
shareholders and the public. Despite the importance of this report, the KCL, 
unfortunately, has only this small provision explaining what should be mentioned in it. 
The dfrectors’ report is one of the most important reports issued by JSCs. Therefore, a 
company law and Articles of Association must always give it the attention it deserves. 
In addition, the directors’ remuneration should always be linked to the performance, 
and this link will encourage them to enhance their performance in the company.®’ Thus,
the KCL should contain a mandatory schedule of the report that the directors must 
comply with when they write their report, as is the situation in the UK CA.
®’ This is one of the main criticizes to the directors remuneration policy in the UK, see Directors’ 
Remuneration: A consultative Document, DTI July 1999, para 5.7.
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Shareholders also have the right to be aware of the deals concluded between the
company and the members of the board of directors. This attitude is adopted by the
KCL when it provides in Article 151 that:
The chairman and member of the board of directors may not have any 
direct or indirect interest in contracts and deals with the company or on 
its behalf without the authorisation of the GM.
From this, it is very clear that the board of directors may not have any interest 
directly or indirectly in the agreements or deals concluded with the company or on its 
behalf without permission from the shareholders in the GM.^ ® The purpose of this
provision is to protect the company and shareholders from any abuse that may result 
from the board of directors pursuing personal gains. Hence, these deals should be 
under the control of the shareholders in the GM.^  ^However, arguably this rule should
be applied to shadow directors and higher employees of the company, and the deals 
concluded between the company and any director, shadow director or employee, 
should be mentioned in the directors’ report upon permission from the GM. 
Furthermore, the directors’ report should contain information about employment, such 
as the number of employees in the company and their total remuneration, qualifications 
and any other relevant information.
In the UK, the directors’ report must include a great deal of information that the 
KCL does not compel directors to mention. For instance, the report should have
details about the board of directors^^ and their interest in the shares and debentures of
®® Also Article 19 of pro forma of articles of association of a JSC (similar to Table A in the UK AC)
provides that “a director may not...have a direct or indirect interest in contracts or transactions which 
are concluded with or for the company, nor shall he have an interest which conflicts with the interest 
of the company, save when the same is specifically authorised by the GM”.
Tamma, supra note 44, p. Commercial Companies: General Provisions in
Companies, Dar Al-jama Al-jadeeda Publishing, (1997), p 271.
See S. 234(2) of the UK CA 1985.
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the company/* The report should also have clear information about the business
activities and development of the last financial year/^ the likely future business
development, and the level of the dividends recommended to shareholders/^
Moreover, the report should have information on the employees of the company/"* The
UK legislator can then draw a clear picture of the directors’ report and specify in a 
direct way what should be in the report.
Besides this, the UK CA imposes a duty on any director with a direct or indirect 
interest in contracts or a proposed contract to disclose such an interest. This duty is 
also imposed also on the shadow director as applied on directors, thus he too has to 
disclose all the interests he has in the company.
5.3.4.3 Shareholders’ Knowledge of Directors’ Remuneration and Benefits
As a company is an artificial person, it cannot carry out any of its tasks and must 
act through a number of natural persons. The amount of directors’ remuneration is 
usually fixed in the directors’ service contracts or in the Articles of Association. 
Shareholders have the right to be awai’e of the directors’ remuneration and fi'inge 
benefits so as to be able to detect any malpractice in this respect and ensure that 
directors are only paid the amount to which they are entitled under company law or the 
Articles of Association. Also, the disclosure of directors’ remuneration is of
’* Ibid., Sch 7, 2A.
76W., S. 234(l)(a).
Ibid., S. 234(l)(b).
For more information see the UK CA1985, Sch 4, para 56, Sch 7, para 3-5, para 7(a)(b)(c), para 
8(9) and para 12.
'’U b id ,  S. 317.
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fundamental importance to strengthening accountability and encouraging enhanced 
performance.
Unfortunately, the KCL as always, does not give this issue enough attention:
thus, the door is opened for the directors in many JSCs to take advantage of this lack
and get remuneration they do not deserve. Article 150 of the KCL provides:
The Articles of Association shall specify the manner of determining the 
remuneration of the chairman and members of the board of directors. 
The total of those remuneration’s may not exceed 10 per cent of the net 
profit after all deductions of depreciation and the amount (set aside to) 
reserves, and distributing to the shareholders as dividends (the 
equivalent of) 5% of the capital or such other percentage as may be 
provided for in the articles whichever is greater.
Also Article 157/4 of the KCL provides:
The following matters shall be included in the agenda of the AGM:
(4) The election and determination of the fees of the directors and 
auditors payable to them during the coming year, if it is not fixed in the 
articles of association of the company.
The board’s chairman and directors’ remuneration shall be determined by the 
company’s Articles of Association, and if it not determined by these, the remuneration 
of directors should be presented to the GM to be determined. However, in all cases, 
such remuneration shall not exceed a maximum of ten per cent of the net distributable 
profit of the company after deducting depreciation, the reserves and distribution of 
dividends to the shareholders of not less than five per cent of the company’s share 
capital.
According to the KCL, it is cleai* that the remuneration of directors should not 
exceed ten per cent of the net distributable profits of the company and each
Article 27 Implementing Regulations of KCL No. 15 of 1960 provides “Notwithstanding the
provision of the law of commercial companies, the ordinary GM shall determine the remuneration of 
the directors; the board of directors shall determine remuneration of the delegated directors and the 
salary of the managing director.”
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shareholder has the right to know the amount the directors receive as remuneration. 
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti legislator overlooked the other amounts that directors may 
receive during the financial year which the shareholders have no idea, such as 
expenses, attendance fees, travel fees, benefits in kind, consultancy fees, and shares in 
the net distributable profits of the company. The total of these amounts may exceed 
the directors’ remuneration. The KCL does not impose any duty on the board of 
directors to present a detailed statement of remuneration and benefits received.
As this is an important issue, the Kuwaiti legislator should impose a disclosure
obligation on the directors to provide a statement or schedules at the end of each
financial year. This schedule should disclose to the shareholders all the benefits the
director have gained during the last financial year. It is hoped that the Kuwaiti
legislator will adopt the attitude of the Saudi Companies Law on this issue, which
provides in Article 74/3:
The board of dii'ectors’ report to the regular GM must include a 
comprehensive statement of all the amounts received by directors 
during the financial year in the way of emoluments, share in the profit, 
attendance fees, expenses, and other benefits, as well as of all the 
amounts received by the directors in their capacity as officers or 
executives of the company, or in consideration of technical, 
administrative, or advisory services.
This kind of report would certainly help shareholders in the GM detect any 
wrongdoing or misuse of the company’s funds, as it is inconceivable that directors 
would exaggerate their remuneration when they are obligated by law to present such a 
statement to the shareholders.
”  Alshammiri, supra note 10, p. 196.
Article 151 of the Yemeni Company Law compels the board of directors of any JSC to present an 
annual statement to the shareholders 15 days prior to the GM.
186
Directors’ remuneration in the UK may be determined by a company’s Articles 
of Association. In this event the court will not make its own determination of 
remuneration.^^ Table A, Article 82, provides:
The directors shall be entitled to such remuneration as the company 
may by ordinary resolution determine and, unless the resolution 
provides otherwise, the remuneration shall be deemed to accrue ftom 
day to day.
This means that the directors’ remuneration may be determined at the GM by 
ordinary resolution. However, it must be mentioned that the UK CA 1985 does not 
require the accounts of the company to disclose the remuneration of a director by 
name, it only requires that a company reveal in the annual accounts the total amount of 
the directors’ remuneration, fees and other benefits.
The Greenbury Committee declared a Code of Best Practice concerning the 
directors’ remuneration.^^ This Code is annexed to the Listing Rules of the LSEM.
However, its listing companies have to declare whether or not they have submitted to 
Section A of the Code.^  ^In addition, they have to issue a report of the remuneration 
committee and this report has to provide the amount of each different specified 
component in the remuneration package of every director.In the UK CA there are
also a number of provisions on disclosure of diiectors’ interests in shares and 
debentures. A director must disclose to the company any interest, or changes in
See Guinness pic  v. Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663; Re Richmond Gate Property Co. Ltd [1965] \ 
WLR 336.
®°See S. 232(1) and Sch. 6, part I; Ramsay, Ian M, Directors and Officers’ Remuneration: The Role of
the Law, JBL (1993) p. 355; Hampel Committee Report, para 2.12, provides that “the company’s 
annual report should contain a statement o f remuneration policy and details of the remuneration of 
each director.”
Greenbury Committee, Report on D irectors’ Remuneration (Gee; London, July 1995).
See Listing Rules 12.43 (w); section A is concerns the establishment and operation of committees of 
remuneration.
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interest, he or his spouse or dependent children have in shares and debentures of the 
company.®'* The particulars must be supplied to the company and shareholders within 5 
days of the event which gave rise to the disclosure obligation or the director’s 
knowledge of it. The company must maintain a register of directors’ interests and, in 
the case of a JSC, the notification must be passed to the Stock Exchange before the 
end of the day following the date which the company receives the information. The 
Exchange may publish the information it receives. Criminal sanctions are imposed for 
non-compliance.®^
In addition to statutory legislation, the Listing Rules of the London Stock 
Exchange apply to securities transactions by directors of the companies, listed on the 
Stock Exchange. In chapter 16 of the Listing Rules, companies are required to notify 
the Exchange of information they receive pursuant to part X of CA 1985.®*^  Thus,
every shareholder of one of the listed companies can easily, at the end of the financial 
year of his company, know how much benefit every director has received firom the 
company.®’
®® Ibid., 12.43 ( X ) .
®'* Not just directors are obligated to disclose their Interest In shares of the company. Part VI of the
CA 1985 sets out the law on the disclosure of Interests In shares. The law applies to all JSCs. Section 
198 and related provision require persons with interests In shares to disclose these to the company, 
within two days, when they reach or fall below specified disclosure thresholds. For most types of  
Interests the starting threshold Is 3% of the company’s shares and disclosure must be made at each 
percentage point thereafter. Section 212 and related provisions empower companies to Issue notices 
requiring those believed to have an Interest In their shares to provide certain information. See 
Proposals for Reform o f part VI of the Companies Act 1985, Consultative Document, DTI, April 
1995.
®^ Sections 324 -  329 and Schedule 13 of the UK CA.
®® See Disclosure of Directors’ Shareholders: Proposal for an Order Under the Deregulation and 
contracting out Act 1994, DTI, Consultative Document, August 1996.
®’ The current disclosure requirement In the UK have been subject to criticism. As provided In one of
consultative documents published by the DTI 1999 “the main criticism are, 1- requiring disclosure In 
excessive detail, with the result that the essential features are often obscured; 2- falling to provide 
Information which clearly shows the link between pay and performance, even In respect of long term
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5.3.4.4 Documents and Information that must be delivered to the MCI
In every country there is a governmental department, usually at the MCI, and 
this department has the right to exercise control over JSCs to ensure that the 
provisions of the law and Articles of Association have been respected, as provided in 
Article 178/1:
The government department concerned may exercise control over a 
joint stock company to insure that the provision of the law and the 
Articles of Association have been observed.
Therefore, to enable this department to carry out its duties and have effective 
control over the JSCs’ affairs, there should be full disclosure from these companies to 
this department. It might be asked what is information and documents that should be 
delivered and kept in the government department concerned of MCI according to the 
KCL.
In fact the information and documents that must be delivered to the government 
department concerned is a general things, such as Memorandum and Articles of 
Association,®* a list showing the names of the chairman, other directors and the 
managers of the company,®  ^ a copy of the balance sheet, the final accounts, and the
incentive schemes.” See Directors’ Remuneration, Consultative Document, DTI: July 1999, pp. 21-22, 
also Villiers, Charlotte, Disclosure Obligations in Company Law: Bringing Communication Theory 
into the Fold, Journal o f Corporate Law Studies (2002) p. 181.
See Article 71 of the KCL.
Ibid., Articles 145 and 153; Implementing Regulations of KCL No. 15 of 1960 provides in Article
15 that “the control department for companies (in the Ministry of Commercial and Industry) shall 
keep an alphabetical register wherein shall be entered the names of the chairman and directors of the 
board of directors and delegated directors of Joint stock companies showing against each name the 
names of companies in which they hold such positions”.
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auditors’ report.^^ Also, every JSC in Kuwait has, at the department concerned in the 
Ministry of Commerce, the names, addresses and qualifications of the auditors.^^
Shareholders are allowed access to the company’s records and documents at this 
department. In other words, anybody (shareholder or non-shareholder) may have right 
of access to the information and documents relating to any JSC, and may obtain a copy 
of the originals of such information and documents.^^As provided in Article 179 of the 
KCL:
Any interested person may have access to all information available at, 
and documents kept with, the government department concerned which 
pertain to the company; he may also obtain a true copy of the originals
thereof against payment of a fee, to be filed by the government
depaitment concerned.
The information that is located in this department is basic information and 
shareholders do not need to go to the department concerned at the MCI to obtain it 
either because of the low value of these documents and information or because they
may be obtained elsewhere. Therefore, this situation must be changed and more
important information on the Kuwaiti JSCs must be sent to this department so that it 
becomes one of the main sources of information to the shareholders and public. The 
UK Companies Act is a very good example to follow. According to the UK CA 1985, 
much information must be sent to the registrar and kept at Companies House for
“^Article 25 of Implementing Regulations of the KCL no. 15 of 1960.
^^Ibid., Article 24.
Also Article 31 of Implementing Regulations of the KCL provides “(1) any interested person may
have access to the information and document relating to any joint stock company which are in the 
custody of the control department for companies against payment of a fee o f 10 rupees for each 
quarter-of-an-hour or fraction thereof. (2) any interested person may obtain a true copy of the 
originals of such information and documents against payment of a fee of 10 rupees per page or part 
thereof’.
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inspection by the pubiic.^  ^This includes the address of the company’s registered office, 
its Memorandum and Articles of Association, '^^its issued share capital, names of 
directors and secretary of the company a copy of the company’s annual accounts and 
reports, and much more information.^^ A company must notify the registrar within 14
days of any change in its directors or its secretary,^^
5.4 Obligation of Disclosure Imposed by Kuwaiti Stock Exchange 
Market
In addition to the duties of disclosure laid down in the KCL, the regulations that 
organise the KSEM impose more disclosure obligations on public com panies.The
regulations of the KSEM give shareholders and investors, in general, a good 
opportunity to get more information on the business affairs of the public companies 
listed on the market.^ ®
Every JSC seeking a listing on the stock market must produce comprehensive 
and accurate disclosure of its business affairs. Therefore, every JSC registered in the 
KSEM has to submit all the information and statements that the management of the 
market may demand and this should be accurate and match the real situation of these
**®Gower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law, Paul L, Davies (ed), 6^ *' edn, London; Sweet & 
Maxwell Publishing, (1997), p. 506.
*"*See S. 10(1) of the UK CA 1985.
^Hbid., S. 10(2).
Ibid., S. 288(2)
See the decree organising the KSEM published on 14* of August 1983 that organising the KSEM 
and the law no. 2/1999.
The companies listed in the KSEM are divided into eight sectors: the banks sector, the investment
sector, the insurance sector, the real estate sector, the industrial sector, the services sector, the food 
sector, the non-Kuwaiti companies sector.
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companies.Also, all the records and registries of shareholders should be under the 
observation of the management of the market which has the right to properly make 
sure, that the information is right and accu ra te .E v ery  JSC has to disclose aU the 
information and resolutions that may affect the prices of their stocks to the 
management of the market.Furtherm ore, Law No 2 of 1999 adds a new obligation 
of disclosure, though this time on every shareholder in one of the companies listed on 
the Kuwaiti market. Every shareholder who has a number of shares equal to five per 
cent or more of the company capital has to, by official methods, inform the board of 
directors of the company. The company then has to transfer this information to the 
management of the market. This information should be kept in a registry in the 
market and any person concerned may inspect the information and documents kept in 
this registry^ after making an application to the management explaining the reasons 
for his request. At this stage, the management of the market has the right to accept
or reject this request without giving any reason for so doing. Law no. 2/1999 has one 
main defect; this law gives the management of the market the right to agree or reftise 
to disclose any information it has. Therefore, this law will not achieve its full aims 
until the information that has been disclosed to the market by public companies, 
publishes directly to the shareholders and investors in the exchange market.
See Article 14 internal bylaw of the KSEM.
Ibid., Article 15.
Ibid., Article 17.
Article 1 of the law no. 2/1999 and Article 2 of resolution no. 5/1999 of KSEM Committee.
Article 3 of the law no. 2/1999 
Article 6 of resolution no. 5/1999 of KSEM Committee.
Many investors complained because there is no transparency in the market and they are saying that 
some of the members of the committee of the market are not working neutrality. They are asking the
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After pointing out to the information sources for shareholders, mentioned the 
rights admitted by the Kuwaiti legislator, and criticised the KCL regarding many 
deficiencies, in which is it characterised by inadequacy and weakness, we shall pose the 
following significant question: in case of the complete and ftiU exposure of all the 
required information, how can shareholders benefit from this exposure and expression? 
We shall first point out that each shareholder has a limited number of shares that grant 
him a number of votes, and that it is impossible that any shareholder has a remarkable 
individual role in the company’s GM. Therefore, this role can be efifective after being 
acquainted with the company’s status, as there must be co-operation between 
shareholders. This co-operation shall lead to the co-ordination among shareholders in 
the GM, which in turn shall lead to granting them supreme authority in the assembly. 
All the aforementioned facts shall result in opposing correct surveillance on the works 
of the board. Hence, the statement of the names and addresses of shareholders, as well 
as the shares they possess, is an important matter for helping shareholders to 
communicate. It also assists in eliminating the reason that may be behind the 
carelessness of many shareholders regarding attending the meeting of the GM. This 
subject shall be examined when we study shareholders rights in the GM are discussed 
(see 7.3.2).
5.5 Shareholder’s Right to Use the Service of an Expert
One of the possible reasons put forward to explain the lack of usefulness of the 
annual reports of the company is that reports are too difficult to understand. 
Therefore, a shareholder’s right to use the services of an expert is important in the
ministry of commerce to fix the situation. For more information see Economic Editor, Deviation 
some of market eommittee’s members, Al-rai Al-aam newspaper, 8 April 2000.
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event that he or she does not fully understand the annual reports, certain items in the 
company’s balance sheet or board resolutions, or draft resolutions at the GM. Many 
studies note that private shareholders face difficulties in reading and understanding 
parts of annual reports. This may be due to the fact that the information presented
to the shareholders is inadequate or needs technical expertise, which most shareholders 
lack. The shareholder, therefore, finds himself needing to resort to a person with the 
necessary technical expertise.^^^
The KCL does not provide that shareholders have the right to resort to an expert 
on looking into the company’s documents. This is a legislative defect, which must be 
addressed in order to give the shareholders the greatest amount of protection. As 
experience has shown the weakness of control of the GM and the domination of the 
board of directors over the company’s affairs — in addition to the measures they take at 
the GM to ensure that no decision is taken to remove them from office or file a lawsuit 
against them. Also, the majority prevail at the GM and the interests of the minority are 
neglected. Moreover, auditors are likely to be influenced by the board members and 
hide their mistakes.
The Kuwaiti legislator should give shareholders the provision to approach 
experts, when they exercise their right of access to the company’s books and records. 
The expert must be a lawyer or an accountant, which is logical, as information is often
Chandler, supra note 18, p 248; see Anderson, Ray H., and Epstein Marc J.,//ie o /
Corporate Annual Reports to shareholders in Australia, New Zealand, and United States: An 
Interenational Comparison, London: JAI Press INC, (1996), p. 17.
Abou Zied, Radwan, Shareholding Companies in Public Sector, Egypt: Dar Ai-fker Al-Arabi
publishing, (1983), p 271; Mahmoud, Al sharkawi, Commercial Companies in Egyptian Law, Egypt: 
Dar AL-Nahdah AL-Aribia publishing (1986), p. 231.
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of a legal or accounting nature/^® It is worth noting that in all events an expert may 
only have the same degree of access to the company’s books and records as the 
shareholder himself.
5.6 Conclusion
Clearly, shareholders have a number of responsibilities in their company that can 
not be carried out by others such as creditors, employees or even directors of the 
company. They have these responsibilities because of then position in JSCs. In 
chapter two it was established that the body of shareholders are not the owners of the 
company as provided in the contractual theory because a company as a separate legal 
person owns its assets. In addition, shareholders are not simply one of a number of 
organs within the company as provided in institutional theory. This is because a 
company is not a private contract or an institution created by the State. It is 
somewhere between these two theories (see chapter 2).
However, the body of shareholders is an appropriate body to carry out a number 
of rights and responsibilities because of their special position in the company. They are 
the main providers of the company’s capital. They the owners of the company shares 
and, furthermore, they first bear the risk of venture failure because they are paid after 
all other interested groups in the company. In other words, they are residual risk- 
bearers with more potentially to lose. Due to then position in the company, the 
powers within any JSC distribute between two main organs. The body of shareholders 
is one of them. Shareholders appoint and dismiss directors and auditors. They 
monitor the performance of the board of directors through reports of the company and
108 See for example the Implementing Regulations of the Egyptian Company Law no. 159/1981
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by attending and voting in GMs. Hence, any of these obligations can not be carried out 
without a good system of disclosure and a clear transparency.
Shareholders cannot carry out their rights without disclosure of information. In 
fact, shareholders may assist in increasing the company’s turnover when they have 
information about their company’s business. Finally, disclosure is an effective method 
of reducing the attempts of directors to run the company in their own personal 
interests.
Unfortunately, the system of disclosure in the KCL is insufficient in ensuring that 
shareholders receive the true picture of the company’s situation. Shareholders will not 
play their vital role if they are not granted a clear right to be informed of all company’s 
documents and reports. Therefore, this matter should be reviewed and clarification 
should be transparent in the KCL.
Consequently, there is no doubt that the disclosure of information is an essential 
right of shareholders and other interested groups. Therefore, the KCL must specify 
the content of these reports to ensure that all the information needed by the 
shareholders or investors is included. However, what is the credibility and quality of 
this disclosure, especially if the infonnation is prepared by the board of directors of the 
company? How do shareholders know the disclosed infonnation is full and accurate 
information? This is the duty of the auditors of the company and it is the focus of the 
next chapter.
Article 301/1 that provided expressly the shareholder’s right to use the service of an expert.
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Chapter Six
The Auditors and Their Duties toward Shareholders 
6. Introduction
The separation of ownership and control may create conflict of interests between 
directors who control the company and the body of shareholders who own the 
company (see 2.4 and 2.5). Shareholders, through the GM, have the right to control 
and supervise the activities of the board to make sure that the directors are working in 
the interest of the company and not in their personal interests. In practice, few 
individual shareholders attend GMs (see 7.2.3). There are many circumstances that 
may prevent shareholders from carrying out their rights in their company, such as the 
large number of shareholders and their indifference to the affairs of the company. In 
addition, many lack the necessary expertise and so their control over the GM is 
insufficient.
Therefore, Company Acts always seek to provide the shareholders with 
instruments to help them monitor the performance of the directors. These include 
obliging companies to keep proper accounting records, preparing a profit and loss 
account and balance sheet and requiring directors to hold a GM annually to discuss 
these accounts before shai eholders. Copies of all of these documents and accounts 
must be sent to the relevant governmental department in the MCI.
However, as these accounts are prepared by directors and managers in the 
company, they are essentially reporting on their own performance. Thus, they may be 
tempted to disclose incorrect or incomplete information in their reports to reflect 
favourably on the management of the company’s affairs. Here, there is a clear conflict
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of interest between the directors who fix the financial reports, concerning their 
performance in the last financial year, and shareholders and investors who use these 
reports to ensure that directors are working to maximise their welfare. Every party has 
its own interest; directors want to design the report in such away that reflects the high 
value of performance, whilst shareholders want the reports to represent the real 
financial situation of the company.
Therefore, shareholders and other users of the company’s reports expect auditors 
to enter into company business affairs to exercise observation over the board and 
management of the company and to take an active part in improving the quality and 
extent of financial disclosure. The auditor is expected to be concerned with the 
possibilities of both fi-aud and illegal behaviour by management. Shareholders also 
want this report to be accurate in order to help them to decide whether to leave their 
holding of shares as it is, increase it, sell out, or, in some circumstances, use their 
voting right in such a way as to protect the shareholders’ interests. In summary, the 
users of financial reports want the auditors to provide reasonable assurance that 
directors have fulfilled their responsibilities and be truthful in the company’s reports.
It can be seen that there is a potential conflict of interest between the organisers 
and users of the reports. At the same time, shareholders cannot individually undertake 
to monitor the activities of directors to ensure the accuracy of the financial reports. In 
other words, shareholders do not know if directors wiU behave with the resources of 
the company in their personal interest or in the interest of the company. Therefore, it 
is prudent to appoint an independent auditor to report on the activities of the directors.
There must be a person or persons working on behalf of the shareholders to 
audit the company’s accounts and ensure the quality of the information contained in
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these accounts and statements/ These persons should be professional and have the
right of access to the accounts and records of the company. They should submit a 
report to the shareholders at the GM stating whether in their opinion the financial 
statements presented by the directors give a true and fair view of the company’s 
performance and situation.^ In other words, the duties of the auditor are to examine the
company’s financial accounts, which have been prepared by the board of directors. 
This report of auditors may be used as evidence to support the accuracy of information 
contained in the financial reports.® However, it could also be seen as a certificate that 
guarantees the correctness of the company’s reports or an instrument that adds to the 
credibility of the company’s accounts."^
An important question that may be asked here is, do as the existence of the 
auditors sufficiently protect the shareholders? Without doubt, auditors do protect the 
interests of shareholders and other interested groups in any company. Their report is 
one of the most important documents that every shareholder and investor should start 
with in order to understand the real financial and non-financial position of the 
company. They confirm the quality of the information that is disclosed by directors in 
the reports of the company. Furthermore, the existence of an auditor is useful for 
creating a balance of power between the two main organs in any JSC (see 2.5) because 
the auditors monitor the reports of directors in the interest of the body of shareholders.
’ Dunn, John, Auditing Theory and Practice, Great Britain: Prentice Hall Publishing, (1991), p. 6; see
also Sherer, Michael and Stuart Turley, Current Issues in Auditing, 3* edn, London: Paul Chapman 
Publishing, (1997), p. 6.
’ Paula, F. Clive and Attwood, Frank A,, Auditing Principles and Practice, London: Pitman 
Publishing, (1976), p. 6.
® Shere, Michael and Kent, David, Auditing and Accountability, London: Pitman Publishing, (1983), 
pp. 8-9.
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As will be seen later in this study (see Chapter 7), shareholders, through the GM, have 
the power they need to establish whether the directors are working in the interest of 
the company. Unfortunately, most of the shareholders in the JSCs are not active in 
their companies. They are not using the power they have in and out of the GM to 
monitor the work of the directors. This absence makes the role of auditors even more 
important to maintain the balance of powers within the company. But that does not 
mean the auditors of the company drive the shareholders to distance themselves from 
their company as the role of auditors is totally different to the role of the shareholders 
in the company.
However, if the auditors are not independent from the control of directors, and 
the legislator does not provide the powers they need to perform their duties in the 
company law they will not carry out their duties sufficiently to protect the 
shareholders. In effect, their report will be worthless.
Auditors, according to the KCL, are agents of shareholders. Therefore, auditors 
should always keep the interest of the body of shareholders at the forefront of their
mind/ In fact, auditors are playing a role that should be played by shareholders.
However, due to lack of experience, qualifications, time, and the huge number of 
shareholders, there should an auditor to perform this role on behalf of shareholders. 
This person is a practised accountant who inspects the company accounts in order to 
give his or her opinion as to the reliability of those accounts.
This chapter will cast some light on the role of auditors in the JSCs under the 
KCL, and their relationship with the body of shareholders. It begins with the
G. W. Beck, The Role of the Auditor in the Modern Society: an empirical, Accounting and Business
Research, (1973), p. 118; see also Lee, T.A., the Nature of Auditing and its Objectives, 81 
Accountancy (1970) pp. 292-6.
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importance of the auditors’ role in the JSCs in relation to the body of shareholders, 
followed by a discussion on the appointment and removal of auditors, the procedures 
that must be followed to appoint or remove the auditors. In addition, the chapter 
focus on the duties of the auditors toward the company and the body of shareholders, 
and the powers they have to execute their duties, the auditors’ report and the authority 
of auditors.
6.1 For Whom are the Auditors Preparing their Report?
There is no doubt that the auditing professional sees the shareholders as the main 
interest group.^ Auditors, as professional people, represent the body of shareholders in
examining the books and accounts of the company and submit a report at the end of 
their task to add more credibility to financial accounts of the company. This is clear in 
the KCL when Article 165 considers auditors as agents of shareholders. In almost all 
Companies Laws looked at so far, the body of shareholders (in theory at least) have 
the right to appoint auditors, fix their remuneration and remove them from office. 
Consequently, there is a contractual relationship between the principals (the body of 
shareholders) who has the authority to appoint the auditors and auditors (agents). An 
auditor has a contractual responsibility toward the shareholders.^ The main statutory
duty imposed on auditors is to report to the shareholders independently on the 
information provided by directors. However, shareholders are not the only user of this 
report. The auditor report is important to anyone who has or who wants to have 
interest in the company.
® Article 165 of the KCL no. 15/1960.
 ^Beck, supra note 4, pp. 117-22,
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Because of the importance of the role of auditors in the interest of shareholders 
and to have this kind of clear and clean auditing, shareholders must play the main role 
in many cases such as, the appointment and removal of auditors, qualifications, 
independence, freedom of access to the company books and accounts at any time, to 
determine the contents of their report and their relationship with shareholders. These 
issue will be discussed in the rest of this chapter.
6.2 Appointment of Auditors
As stated above, many things can influence the independence of the auditors. 
One is the issue of their appointment. The first auditors are appointed at the general 
constituent meeting® at the end of the subscription process for the public. This
appointment is made by an absolute majority resolution of the shares represented.^
Subsequent appointments are made by annual GMs according to Article 161 of KCL 
that provides:
The company shall have one or more legal accountants who shall be 
appointed and his/their fees determined by the GM to audit the accounts 
of the company; he/they shall audit the accounts of the company during 
the financial year for which appointed. Exemption from the above 
provision, any JSC registered in the KSEM shall have at least two legal 
accountants from different accounting offices.
’ Hopkins, Leon, The Auditor Report, London: Butter worths Publishing, (1984), p. 97.
® The first meeting after the end of the process of incorporation of the company contribution.
® Article 90 of the KCL provide that “The general constituent assembly shall elect the first board of
directors and the first auditors, and proclaim that the incorporation of the company has become final.” 
The general constituent assembly’s resolutions shall pass by an absolute majority of the shares 
represented, in accordance with the provisions of Article 156.
In Kuwait, the auditor’s relationship with the company is governed by the provisions of
Commercial Companies Law and Decree Law 5 o f 1981 concerning the auditing profession.
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Every JSC must appoint one or more auditor to audit the accounts of JSCs. 
However, JSCs registered in the KSEM must have at least two auditors and each must 
be from different accounting companies.
Shareholders at the GM have the power to appoint the auditors and fix their fees 
for the financial year in question. However, the questions that may be raised in 
practice are: Who recommends the candidates to work as auditors? Who in practice, 
determines the remuneration of auditors? Unfortunately, the auditor’s appointment 
and fees ai e determined upon the recommendations of the board of directors. In other 
words, directors, as a result of the weakness of the body of shareholders in the GM 
(see 7.4) indirectly appoint the auditors and fix their remuneration. This makes the 
auditors’ (the agents of the shareholders) relationship with the board closer than that 
with the shareholders at the GM.^’ In this situation, we cannot expect an auditor to be 
independent if his or her appointment and fees are under control of directors. This 
serious shortcoming may affect the auditor’s action as an agent of the shareholders^® to
monitor the account presented by the board of directors. It is inconceivable that the
auditor will perform his duties efficiently, because continuing his job may be seen as
dependent on the board’s satisfaction. Therefore, the Egyptian legislator, to make sure
that the board of directors is not involved in the process of appointing auditors
provides in Article 103/3 of the Company Law no. 159/1981 that:
It is not allowed to vest the board of directors with the 
nomination of the auditor or fixing his remuneration without 
deciding a maxim.
Tamma, Alshammiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, 3 edn, Kuwait: Author Publishing, 
(1999), p. 473.
Sherer, supra note 1, p. 19.
See Article 165 of the KCL.
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If the board of directors have the main role in appointing the auditors, they can 
easily mislead the shareholders by publishing information about its accounts, which are 
incorrect or incomplete, and they will be in a position to prevent the auditor from 
disclosing the real situation to the shareholders and the pub lic /In  this situation, the
aim of the process of auditing will be not achieved. It can also be said that, in such 
circumstances, auditors cannot be independent as they may not be able to resist the 
influence of the directors.
It is proposed that this defect would be corrected by the following, the board of 
directors should not be vested with the appointment of the auditor and the fixing of 
their remuneration. Directors must not be involved with the appointment of the 
auditor because of the conflict of interest that exists between directors (who are in 
charge of controlling the resources of the company and reporting to the shareholders 
about the business affairs of the company) and the auditors (who are in charge of 
evaluating the activities of the directors). Auditors should not see the board of 
directors as their employers.*  ^ Second, as Dr Tamma provided, a committee should be
formed from among the shareholders to select the auditor and fix his fees and put 
forward a recommendation to this effect to the GM. This may ensure the auditor’s 
independence from the board of directors.
There is another important defect that should be taken care of to protect the 
interest of shareholders that is, the auditors of the JSCs according to the KCL should
O’Sullivan, Noel, Auditors’ Liability: Its Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 23 Accounting 
and Business Res (1993) pp. 415-6.
Anderson, Ray H., and Epstein, Marc J., The usefulness o f corporate Annual Reports to
shareholders in Australia, New Zealand and the United States: An International Comparison, 
London: .TAI Press INC Publishing, (1996), p. 19.
Tamma, supra note 11, p. 437; Sameha, A1 Kalyoubi, Commercial Companies. Egypt: Dar Alnadah
Publishing, (1993), p 489.
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be re-appointed or replaced every financial year. This means that, if the auditor of a 
company wants to work again for a new financial year, they have to seek the 
satisfaction of directors who, in practice, control the appointment of auditors. 
Auditors can get the approval of directors by issuing a report that agrees with the 
accounts of the company disclosed by the directors. This situation gives the board of 
directors the opportunity to challenge the auditors’ independence by threatening to 
replace them at the end of their term if they try to disclose information contrary the 
information disclosed already in the company’s account. To maintain the 
independence of auditors, it is suggested that auditors should be appointed for a period 
of more than one financial year, say two or three years, in order to stop the directors 
fi'om intimidating auditors at the end of every financial year. French Company Law 
provides that auditors should be appointed for a term of six fiscal years. Their term 
shall expire after the ordinary general shareholders’ meeting that acts on the financial 
statements for the sixth fiscal year.^  ^ In this way directors cannot put pressure on
auditors every year to acquiesce on accounting matters or risk losing their jobs.
6.3 Removal and Resignation of Auditors
The removal of auditors fi'om their office is also a sensitive issue that may have 
an impact on their independence. Auditors will have real independence only if they can 
be protected fi'om unjust removal fi'om office. Therefore, removal of an auditor fi'om 
his office before the termination of the fited term is an important matter that must be 
regulated carefully by law.
See Article 224 (1) of French Company Law.
See Farmer, T.A., Rittenberg, L.E., and Trompeter, G., M., Investigation of the Impact of 
Economic and Organisational Factors on Auditor Independence, Auditing, (1987) pp. 1-14.
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It is must be clear in the company who has the power to remove auditors and 
what procedures must be followed to remove them. Therefore, every company law 
should contain a number of articles, which aim to guarantee that directors cannot 
weaken the auditors’ independence by threatening to remove them from the office of 
auditing. The removal should be based on a reasonable justification provided to 
shareholders at the GM. Otherwise, auditors may lose their independence this gives 
the directors the opportunity to intimidate them with removal if they try to disclose the 
truth about the company’s business affairs to the shaieholders. It is possible that an 
auditor, who expresses doubts about the information and figures that the directors 
have published, is more likely to be replaced or removed.
Unfortunately, the KCL does not have any ai’ticles regulating the removal of 
auditors from their office before the termination ofhis or her term.^° Because of the
lack of legal provision that controlling this issue in the KCL. As a general rule in civil 
law, the body that has the authority to appoint the agents has the authority to dismiss 
them. Therefore, an auditor could be removed by shareholders at the GM. According 
to the KCL, only the EGM may remove the auditor. They cannot be removed by the 
ordinary GM because at the ordinary GM, the term of the auditor is already finished. 
If the shareholders in the GM do not want him to work as the auditor again, they will 
not name him as an auditor of the company for the next financial year.^^
The Kuwaiti legislator would be wise to follow the approach adopted by the UK 
CA. In the UK, there are a number of provisions which determine that the board of
Simon, Elliot B., Can the Auditor be Truly Independent? (1980) p. 106: see aiso C.
W, Chow, Chee W., The Demand for External Auditing: Size, Debt and Ownership Influences, 57 
Accounting Rev (1982) p. 272.
Shaheen, Abraham 0 ., The Independence Aspects of External Auditor in JSC, 74 o///?e
Gulf and Arabian Island Studies (1986) p. 69.
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directors cannot weaken the auditor’s independence by threatening to replace him or 
her from office. Thus, the removal of the auditor is left in the hands of the 
shareholders by ordinary resolution.Due to the importance of the matter in the UK, a
special notice must be given of such a resolution.^® The company must also send a
copy of the notice to the auditor whom they want removed. Furthermore, the auditor
has the right to make a written representation, which must be sent to every shareholder 
of the company. If the written representation is received by the shareholders too late, 
the auditor may read his representation at the GM.^ ®
Another essential matter is that, after the removal or resignation of auditors, does 
the KCL impose any obligation on the ex-auditor to communicate with the new 
auditors or shareholders? Or are obligated to deposit a statement to the shareholders 
setting out any relevant circumstances they believe should be disclosed? This 
communication is important for the new auditor and shareholders. With this 
communication, the ex-auditor discloses to the new auditor and shareholders in an 
official way the circumstances that he or she believes important to be passed to the 
new auditor. In fact, in the KCL there is not even one article that deals with the matter 
of removing an auditor. Therefore, the ex-auditor does not have any obligation to pass 
information to the new auditor or to shareholders.
In the UK, the auditor who ceases for any reason to hold the office of auditor, 
must deposit at the company’s registered office a statement of any related
Ibid.
S. 391(1) of the UK CA 1985 provides that “A company may by ordinary resolution at any time 
remove an auditor from office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between it and him”.
Ibid, S. 391A (1).
^Ubid., S. 391A (2).
Ibid., S. 391A (3), (4) and (5).
207
circumstances which the ex-auditor believes should be passed to the attention of
shareholders and creditors. Therefore, Section 394(1) of the UK CA provides that:
Where an auditor ceases for any reason to hold office, he shall deposit 
at the company’s registered office a statement of any circumstances 
connected with his ceasing to hold office which he considers should be 
brought to the attention of the members or creditors of the company or, 
if he considers that there are no such circumstances, a statement that 
there are none.
Also, if an auditor resigns, he must provide the company with a statement of any 
circumstances, connected with his ceasing to hold office, of which he thinks 
shareholders must be aware. Even if there are no such circumstances he must still 
deposit a statement at the company’s registered office stating there are no such 
circumstances. If the auditor believes there are circumstances that should be brought 
to the attention of the shareholders or creditors, he should prepare a statement to that 
effect and, can, if necessary, demand a meeting to be called by the dfrectors, at which 
he can clarify to the shareholders his reasons for resigning.^  ^Also, under the UK CA
The auditor, can insist that the company circulate his statement to the shareholders.”
Moreover, he may still speak at the next GM^ ® on any matter which concerns him in his
position as a former auditor of the company.”
The KCL also fails to address another important issue -  what happens when an 
auditor becomes ineligible to carry out the audit because of lack of independence? 
What is the obligation imposed on the auditor in this situation? In the UK for instance, 
an auditor has to vacate his office as soon as he becomes ineligible for lack of
Ibid., S. 392 (2).
”  Ibid., S.392A (3).
”  Ibid., S.390.
”  Ibid., S. 392A (8).
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independence;®  ^ otherwise, he or she will be punished.®  ^Therefore, for the benefit of
shareholders and other interested groups in a JSC, there should be, in the company 
law, a clear obligation that demands auditors to vacate their office when they lose their 
independence. Also, if the auditor is found to be ineligible to carry out the audit, 
despite having done it already, the Secretary of State can insist on a second 
independent audit.”
6,4 Eligibility and Qualifications of Auditors
Article 161, mentioned above, provides that the auditor shall be a legal 
accountant. That capacity applies to the accountants licensed by the MCI to practice 
auditing and whose names are listed in the relevant register.®®
The ministry license is only granted upon meeting a number of conditions, such
as:
(1)An auditor must be a natural person (i.e. a human being), a license may not be 
granted to companies or anybody corporate;
(2) He must hold a Bachelor of accountancy fi'om Kuwait University or any other 
accredited university and must be a member of a recognised accounting 
association;
(3) He must have experience after graduation ranging fi'om at least seven years for 
auditors of banks, insurance and financial companies and up to five years for 
auditors of other institutions;
”  Ibid., See S. 28. 
Ibid., S. 28(5).
32 Ibid., S. 29(1) CA 1989.
”  Article 1 of Law 5 of 1981 concerning practice of auditing.
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(4)He must be a Kuwaiti national, legally competent and not less than 25 years of age;
(5)He should have good reputation and standing, not have been detained in a crime 
involving integrity and not subject to a disciplinary action for violation of the ethics 
of the profession unless he has been rehabilitated and after the lapse of three years 
following the final disciplinary action;
(6) He should pass the examination qualifying him to practice auditing;
(7) He must swear an oath that he shall perform his duties with honesty and integrity, 
observe the principles of the profession, not to hide the truth fi'om the parties 
concerned, and not disclose any information about his clients or any other 
confidential information. '^^
It is not necessary under the KCL, for auditors to be eligible for appointment as a 
company or for an auditor to be a member of a recognised supervisory body. That is a 
legislation shortcoming that needs to be rectified. The supervisory bodies are applying 
rules that must be obeyed to continue membership, and they have extensive ethical and 
other guidelines that every member is expected to follow, otherwise he or she may be 
barred from membership.
Under the UK CA 1989, for example. Sections 24-54 are extensive regulations 
that have been set down for the qualification of auditors.^  ^ A person is eligible for 
appointment as a company auditor only if he or she is a member of a recognised
Ibid., Article 2.
The Companies Act 1989 implemented the Eighth EC Company Law Directive (Directive
84/253/EEC.) on the qualifications and training of auditors. The stated proposes of the Act provides in 
S.24 (1) “the main purposes of this Part are to secure that only persons who are properly supervised 
and appropriately qualified are appointed company auditors, and that audits by persons so appointed 
are carried out properly and with integrity and with a proper degree of independence.”
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supervisoiy body, and he is eligible for appointment under the rules of that body/^
Section 25(1) of CA 1989 provides that:
A person is eligible for appointment as a company auditor only if he -
(1) Is a member of a recognised supervisory body, and
(2) Is eligible for the appointment under the rules of the body.^’
In the UK, if someone acts as an auditor, or tries to obtain the position of auditor 
when, in reality, he is not appropriately qualified nor on the appropriate register of 
auditors required to be kept under the CA 1989 s. 35 he commits a criminal offence.^ ®
Furthermore, the Kuwaiti legislator, to ensure the independence of auditors,
provides that a person is barred fi'om holding the office of auditor of a company in
some occasions as provided at Article 162 of the KCL:
An auditor may not, when auditor of the company, at the same time 
participate in the incorporation, be a director of, or carry out on a 
permanent basis any technical, administrative or consultative duties in 
the company.
It is not permissible to combine the duty of auditor and participate in the 
foundation of the company and membership of its board of directors, or work 
permanently in any technical, administrative or consultant duties in the company, even 
in the capacity of a consultant or advisor. Also, a person(s) is barred fi'om working as 
an auditor of a company where he is already an employee or if he is a blood relative 
within four generations of either a founder, director and manager of a company or he.^ ^
The Supervisory bodies in the UK are the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales,
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland, 
and the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants.
”  See sections 3 land 32 o f the CA 1989.
S. 41(2) UK CA 1989.
39 See also Articles 18, 19 and 20 of Law 5 of 1981 concerning practice of auditing.
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6.5 Duties of the Auditor and the Contents of their Report
The auditor’s principle duty is to form a report on the company’s annual 
accounts for the company’s shareholders. In this report he must determine, whether or 
not the statements prepared by the board of directors give a true and fair view of the 
real financial situation of the company. However, many users of audit reports do not 
entirely understand the extent and purpose of the auditors’ duties.'^  ^They also assume
that the auditor’s duty is to guarantee the correctness of the financial accounts of the 
company, make sure that no fi-auds had been prepared by directors and officials of the 
company, and ensure that the board of directors had performed all of theii'duties.'^^
This is what users of the report expect fi'om the auditor’s report. Therefore, any 
misunderstandmg of the auditors’ role in the company may cause an ‘expectation gap’ 
between shareholders and other users of auditors, and their understanding of what to 
receive fi'om the auditors.'^^
As stated by Mrs. Purificacion Grajal Martin in a paper presented about the role
of the statutory auditor in one of the European Commission conferences:
First of all, the user of financial statements should be advised that the 
auditor of the accounts is not responsible for detecting each and every 
possible case of fi'aud that may arise in the company he is examining. In 
other words, the criteria of materiality and rationality must also be 
taken into account here as well. Given this, we can classify fraud under 
two headings: one, fi'aud which may be described as “tangible fraud” 
which has an effect on the financial statements and which the auditor 
needs to ensure is properly treated in the financial information. Two, 
“intangible fi'aud” which should be notified to the competent authority 
by the auditor and which, where appropriate, the directors are 
responsible for disclosing in the financial statements. The auditor’s
T. A. Lee, the Nature of Auditing and its Objectives, 81 Accountancy (1970) pp. 292-6.40
Beck, supra note 4, pp 117-22. 
Sherer, supra not 1, p. 9.
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report should only mention the existence of cases of tangible fraud 
which significantly affect the financial statements being audited/^
Section 235 of the UK CA 1985 and Article 164 of the KCL as well, do not 
mention auditors having a duty to detect fraud. Both laws provide that the auditor’s 
responsibility is to give an opinion, not a guarantee. Nor is he to detect all frauds, 
enors or irregularities that may exist in the company accounts.' '^  ^ Although, the
auditors do not have an obligation to detect fraud, they do have to exercise reasonable 
skill and care. If an auditor fails to detect a fraud that influences the truth and fairness 
of the financial reports, he could probably be held liable for negligence.'^  ^The duty of 
auditors was considered by Lopes LJ who stated in the Kingston Cotton Mill Co
46case:
It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to 
perform that skill, care, and caution which a reasonably competent, 
careful, and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care, 
and caution must depend on the particular circumstances of each case. 
An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach 
his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is 
something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound. He is 
justified in believing tried servants of the company in whom confidence 
is placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, 
and to rely upon their representation, provided he takes reasonable care. 
If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to
European Commission, Act of the Conference on the Role, the Position and the liability of the
Statutory Auditor within the European Union, 5 and 6 December 1996, p. 72.
Pound, G. D., and Courtis, John K., the Auditor’s Liability: A Myth? 10 Accounting and Business
Res (1980) p. 300; Dunn, supra note 1, p. 40; Lord Denning, in Fomenta (sterling Area) v. Selsdon 
Fountain Pen Co. [1958] 1 All ER 11, p. 245, observed that: “An auditor is not to be confused to the 
mechanics o f checking vouchers and making arithmetical computation. He is not to be written off as 
a professional adder-upper and subtractor. His vital task is to take care to see that errors are not 
made, be they errors o f computation, or errors o f commission or downright untruths. To perform this 
task properly, he must come to it with an inquiring mind -  not suspicious of dishonesty, I agree -  but 
suspecting that someone may have made a mistake somewhere and that a check must be made to 
ensure that there has been none.”
Sherer, supra note 1, p. 15; See also Re London and General Bank (No 2) [1895] 2 Ch 673 at 682-
3.
[1896] 2 Ch 279 at pp. 288-9.
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the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound 
to be reasonably cautious and careful.
.. .(an auditor) does not guarantee the discovery of all fraud.'^^
Thus, the duty of the auditors is to perform the statutory requirements of the 
company act. They must act honestly, and with reasonable care and skill. It is clear 
that auditors, when they carry out their duties, must pay due attention to the possibility 
of frauds and of errors but within reasonable bounds.
The statutory duty on the auditor under the KCL is to report to the shareholders
of the company on the company’s accounts. The auditor must attend the GM and has
to read his report to the GM. This report should consist of all the data prescribed by
the law in Article 164 which provides that:
The auditor shall be present at the GM to give his opinion on that which 
relates to his assignment and particularly on the company’s balance 
sheet; he shall read out his report on the GM; his report shall cover the 
following particulars:
(1)Whether the auditor has obtained the information which he 
considered necessary for the satisfactory performance of his duties;
(2) Whether the balance sheet and the profit and loss account are in 
agreement with the real state of affairs and whether they contain all that 
is required by law and the articles of the company to incorporate in and 
give an honest and clear view of the true financial standing of the 
company; (3) Whether proper books of account have been kept by the 
company; (4)Whether the stock taking has been duly conducted; (5) 
Whether the information contained in the report of the board of 
directors is in agreement with the books of the company; (6) According 
to the information available to him, whether or not any violations to the 
provisions of the Articles of Association or the law have been 
committed during the financial year such as will effect the company’s 
activities or financial situation and whether or not the violations (if any) 
still persist.
The auditor has to present a report to the GM. In this report he has to answer all 
the questions provided in Article 164. First, he has to determine whether or not he has
In Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568 “it was held that the purpose of an audit
is to fulfil the statutory requirement of Company Act with a view to circulating the accounts to 
shareholders and laying the accounts before the GM. A duty of care is owed to the shareholders as a
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obtained the information needed to carry out his duties. Then, he has to determine 
whether the information disclosed by the board of directors in the directors’ report, the 
balance sheet and profit and loss account is correct and accurate, and whether or not 
an inventory has been prepared in accordance with the established procedure. Finally, 
the auditor has to state any violations of the Articles of Association or Company Law 
that occurred during the fiscal year which may have had an adverse effect on the 
business of the company or its financial standing (and if so whether they are 
continuing).
According to the KCL, it is not possible to determine whether an auditor is under 
any obligation to clearly disclose information that the board of directors failed to 
disclose to the shareholders. Examples include some aspects of the remuneration of 
directors, expenditures, or certain transactions between the company and its directors 
or officers. Under the UK CA, auditors are under an obligation to disclose in their 
report any information about directors’ earnings, pensions, compensation or loans, 
which might not be shown in the accounts prepared by the management.'^* Therefore,
it is proposed that auditors should mention in their report any information that 
directors intentionally or unintentionally fail to disclose.
The auditors’ report in the UK is more comprehensive than the auditors’ report 
under the KCL. The UK CA requires auditors to disclose to the shareholders any 
details which directors fail to disclose. The auditors’ report must state whether, in 
their opinion, the accounts of the company have been suitably prepared in accordance
body, not to individual shareholders or to members of the public who rely on the accounts in deciding 
whether to purchase a company’s shares”
S. 237(4) and Sell 6 of the UK CA 1985.
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with the UK CA 1985 and give a true and fair view/^ They also must consider whether
or not the information mentioned in the directors’ report agrees with the annual 
accounts and, if they believe it does not agree, they must state that fact in their 
report/^ Furthermore, auditors may carry out any investigations that enable them to
form an opinion on whether proper accounting records have been kept and whether the 
accounts of the financial year agree with those accounting records. They have to state 
in their report any doubts they have on these matters.^^
6.6 Authority of Auditors
Auditors play an essential role in any JSC on behalf of shareholders. Thus, they
should always have wide powers that may help them to carry out their duties. The
Kuwaiti legislator gives some powers to the auditors that may help them to carry out
their duties. Therefore, Article 163 of KCL provides:
(1) The auditor is entitled at all time to have access to all the books, 
registers and documents of the company and to call for any particulars 
. which he deems necessary; he may also verify the assets and liabilities of 
the company. (2) If he is unable to exercise the foregoing powers, the 
auditor shall prepare a written report setting down such facts which 
shall be submitted to the directors and referred to the GM.
Ibid., S. 235(2) of the UK CA 1985 provides “the auditors’ report shall state whether in the
auditors’ opinion the annual accounts have been properly prepared in accordance with this Act, and in 
particular whether a true and fair view is given -  (a) in the case of an individual balance sheet, o f the 
state of affairs o f the company as at the end of the financial year, (b) in the case of an individual profit 
and loss account, of the profit or loss of the company for the financial year, (c) in the case of group 
accounts, of the state of affairs as at the end of the financial year, and the profit or loss for the 
financial year, o f the undertaking including in the consolidation as a whole, so far as concerns 
members of the company.”
Ibid., S. 235(3) the auditors shall consider whether the information given in the directors’ report for
the financial year for which the annual accounts are prepared is consistent with those accounts; and if 
they are of opinion that it is not they shall state that fact in their report.
Ibid., S. 237(2).
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To have an accurate and comprehensive report, auditors should have the right 
and power to request and receive all relevant information that they believe is necessary 
to carry out their duties. Therefore, at all times, auditors usually have the authority to 
examine all the books, registers, and documents of the company and request 
information and explanations which he believes fundamental to the completion of his 
duties. The board of directors has to facilitate the auditor’s m issio n .In  case the 
auditors are unable to exercise their stated duties, this should be asserted in a written 
report which they have to submit to the board of directors, and the GM.
The auditors’ duty is to make a judgement on whether the accounts of the 
company are fair and true, and they make this judgement upon the information 
disclosed by directors. So, if they do not have the authority at all times to have access 
to the books and documents of the company, request any information they believe is 
important and can carry out any investigation, their judgement will be incorrect 
because of lack of information. Therefore, it would be argued that auditors, as agents 
of shareholders, should have more powers and unrestricted access to all of the 
company’s books of accounts, records and other documents. The board of directors of 
any JSC should always, under legal obligation, send a copy of all documents relating to 
the company’s affairs to the auditors’ office. They should be invited to attend the 
meeting of the board of directors in order to be aware of the general policy of the 
company that is usually drawn up by the board of directors.^* Auditors should also
Tamma, supra note 11, p 476; Mustafa, Kamal, Commercial Companies: General Provisions in 
Companies, Dar Al- jama Al-jadeeda Publishing, (1997), p 284.
”  See Article 270/1 of implementing regulations of Egyptian Company Law no. 159/1981; Sameha, 
supra note 16, p. 495.
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have the right to request a GM if they think that it is necessary, and if the board of 
directors failed to call it/'^
Under the KCL, an auditor does not have the right to convene the GM when he 
believes it is necessary to be held. A good example to follow is in the company law of 
Saudi Arabia Article 131. According to this article, if the board of directors fail to 
provide the auditor with the required assistance, the auditor may then invoke the 
authority vested in his office to convene a GM of the shareholders of the company in 
order to investigate his allegations.^^ However, despite its importance, the auditors 
under the KCL do not have the right to attend the meeting of the board of directors.
6.7 Shareholder’s Right to Discuss the Auditor’s Report
If the existence of an independent auditor is one of the shareholders’ rights in the 
JSCs and they are agents of shareholders, shareholders should have the right to discuss 
and ask the auditors about their report in order to understand it. The Kuwaiti 
legislator has given shareholders the right to discuss the auditor’s report and require an 
explanation of the information contained therein, as provided by Article 165 of the 
KCL:
As agent of the shareholders, the auditor shall be accountable for the 
truth of the information contained in his report, and any shareholder 
may, during the meeting of the general assembly, call him to account 
and demand explanation of the contents of his report.
In France, if  the board of directors fail to call a GM at the request of the auditors, they may call the
meeting themselves and set on its agenda; see Le Gall, J., Trenc/j 2'’‘'edn., London:
Longman publishing, (1992), p. 155.
Article 131(2) of the Saudi Company Law provides that “the chairman of the board of directors
must enable the auditor to perform his duty as specified in the preceding paragraph. If the auditor 
encounters any difficulty in this respect, he shall state that fact in a report to be submitted to the board 
of directors. If the board fails to facilitate his task, the auditor must call a regular GM to look into the 
matter.”
218
The auditor then, as agent of shareholders, is required to answer shareholder’s 
queries and explain any ambiguous data. He is responsible for communicating the 
information gained about the company to the shareholders accurately and honestly. 
The shareholder has the interest and the right to discuss the auditor’s report and he, 
therefore, must not be denied such rights.
Auditors are personally responsible for their failure to perform the obligations 
imposed on them. They are also jointly and severally liable for the breaches of duty 
when the consequential loss suffered by the company would not have happened if their 
duties had been carried properly. According to the KCL, auditors are considered as 
agents of all shareholders as provided by Article 165 and, as such, assume contractual 
responsibility to the company and its shareholders. If the auditor commits a criminal 
act, such as infidelity, fraudorforgery or hides any violation of the provisions of law 
of the company’s Memorandum or Articles of Association which might have an 
adverse effect on the company’s financial position or business, he shall be punished 
under the provisions of the Kuwaiti Criminal Law No. 16/1960.^^ Auditors are also
subject to further penalties if they are in breach of the provisions of Law 5 of 1981 or 
the principles or ethics of the profession, or if they commit gross negligence or a 
dishonest act. In the event of the occurrence of any of these acts of default, he shall be 
punished by notice (warning), suspended for up to three years or have his name struck 
off the auditors’ list. In the latter event, he is allowed to resume practice after the 
lapse of five years.^*
Sameha, supra note 16, p. 495.
See Articles. 231-236, 240 and 257 of Kuwaiti Criminal Law No. 16/1960.
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6.8 The Extent of the Auditors Responsibility
As for the question concerning the responsibility of companies auditors, if they 
are responsible for all what is mentioned in their reports before the company and its 
shareholders only, or if they shall bear the responsibility also towards all those who 
utilize these reports (even if he is from outside this company) especially if utilizing the 
information mentioned in the reports leads to harming who relied on the infonnation 
mentioned therein, as it may be inaccurate or incorrect.
First, Auditors shall legally abide towards the company -as this is very clear in all 
companies laws. Any prejudice to this obligation shall lead to giving the company as 
well as its shareholders the entitlement to sue the auditors and claim compensation 
therefrom, in case of any shortcoming from their side regarding performing their duties 
stated according to companies’ law. Therefore, the statutory provisions do establish a 
relationship between auditors and the company (and shareholders and debenture- 
holders). However, the statutory provisions do not establish such a relationship with 
everybody who has a right to be supplied with copies of the auditors’ report.
Second, auditors have a contractual obligation. Auditors in all companies are 
appointed in order to conduct auditing tasks for the company, by virtue of a contract 
made between the company represented in the GM and those auditors. If these 
auditors fail to perfonn their duties according to the contract, the other party -the 
company- shall be entitled to sue them and claim compensation for the damages 
resulting from the prejudice to the clauses of contract.
If there is a legal and contractual obligation on the part of auditors towards the
Articles 23 and 26 of Law No. 5/1981 concerning practice of auditing.
G ower’s Principles o f  Modern Company Law. Davies, Paul L (ed.), 6‘'’ edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Publishing, (1997), p. 552.
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company, while they do not have any legal or contractual obligation towards third 
party, if any person outside the company utilises the auditors’ reports in order to 
conduct any work, and this led to harming the utilises, auditors have no responsibility 
towards the same. This matter is very clear in the Kuwaiti law, wliich states that 
auditors are company’s agents for shareholders to ensure or deny the credibility of 
board’s reports, and present reports regarding tins matter to the GM formed of 
shareholders. So is the case in the UK, there are a lot of cases which mentioned the 
cause of auditors’ responsibility, as they have emphasised on the necessity of not 
allowing the opportunity for anybody to use auditors’ reports for the purpose of 
demanding compensation and make up damages resulting therefrom. For example, in 
Caparo Industries pic v Dickmanf'^ In this case Caparo was an existing shareholder of
fidelity pic. Fidelity’s 1984 accounts showed profits significantly lower than expected 
and led to a significant fall in been circulated to shareholders, Caparo purchased more 
shares and eventually mounted a successful take-over bid for fidelity. Caparo then 
concluded that its new acquisition was in fact worthless and that the accounts which 
had been certified by the auditor had been grossly inaccurate. Caparo sought redress 
against the auditors, alleging negligence and arguing that the auditors owed it a duty of 
care in both its capacities- that of existing shareholder and as potential bidder for 
Fidelity. The Court of Appeal held by a majority that there was a distinction between 
the position of the existing shareholder who purchased additional shares in reliance on 
negligently prepared accounts, to whom the auditors owed a duty, and that of non­
shareholder potential investors, to whom they did not. The house of lords rejected this 
distinction and held that the auditors did not owe a duty of care to persons who relied
[1989] 1 QB 653
2 2 1
on the accounts in deciding to purchase shares, irrespective of whether they were 
existing shareholders or not. Mere foreseeability of the fact that a tliird party such as 
Caparo might rely on the accounts to launch a take-over bid for fidelity was not 
enough to make the auditors liable for negligence.'^^
In the end it must be clear- that an auditor will not be liable if, given a duty of care, he is 
not in breach of it. Auditors are not likely to be in breach of duty if he follows auditing 
standards and guidelines, statements of Standard Accounting Practice and Financial 
Reporting Standards devised and issued by the profession. If he does that, he will at 
least have the advantage of the judgment of McNair J in Bolam v Frien Hospital 
Management Committee. H e  said in connection with doctors: ‘A doctor is not guilty
of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art... .merely because there is 
a body of opinion who would take a contrary view’. This statement is of course equally 
applicable to other professions including that of accountant and auditors.
6.9 Conclusion
The powers within every JSC are distributed between two main organs; the 
shareholders and the board of directors. As provided the chapter five, the role of 
shareholders in their company can not be carried out without a good system of 
disclosure. However, directors and managers of the company prepare the disclosed 
information in the company’s reports. Therefore, the disclosure of information alone is 
not enough because the directors write the reports about their performance. Hence,
Gower’s, supra note 59, p. 552, 
[1957] 2 All 118
2 2 2
there should be another body with the responsibility to assure the quality of the 
disclosed information.
The existence of auditors is shown to be useful to the body of shareholders. 
They are agents of shareholders as provided in the KCL, their report is a source of 
significant information that every shareholder and investor should start with in order to 
understand the real financial and non-financial position of the company. The existence 
of auditors is useful to create a balance of power between the two main organs in any 
JSCs.
Auditors should always know they are agents of shar eholders. Therefore, they 
should give priority to the interests of the body of shareholders first. However, the 
role of auditors cannot be complete without the existence of several factors. First, the 
essential factor for auditors to carry out their role is that they should always be 
independent fi'om the boar d of directors. Second, auditors should possess the proper 
academic credentials and specialities necessary to enable them to carry out their duties. 
Third, auditors should be given all the powers they need to carry out their duties.
The rights that come after these rights that are discussed in the above chapters, 
are shareholders' rights in the company's GM, as this is the place where shareholders 
practice many of the rights and make decisions based on the aforementioned rights. 
The next chapter, focuses on shareholders rights in the GM. However, shareholders 
cannot take advantage of their rights in the GM until they know their position in the 
company, financial rights, the company's status through practicing his right in knowing 
and reading the company's reports, and is sure of the correctness of these information 
through the auditors in the company.
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Chapter Seven 
The Rights of Shareholders in GMs
7. Introduction
As discussed in Chapter Two, there are two main organs in any JSC and the 
division of powers between these two organs depends entirely on the Company Act 
and the Constitution or the contract of the company (the Memorandum and the 
Articles of Association). Where some powers are vested in the board, the body of 
shareholders in the GM cannot interfere in the business of the board unless the board is 
working contrary to the provision of the Company Act or the Constitution of the 
company (see 2.5).^
Consequently, in general, every JSC acts through two bodies. The first is the 
board of directors and the second is the GM of shareholders. Each organ has exclusive 
powers, in theory at least, and legislature and legal scholars of company law always try 
to balance the power between them. This balance of powers can be found in any 
modern Company Law and a clear example of this balance can be found in the Report 
of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury) in its 
definition of Corporate Governance in para. 2.5:
 ^ See John Shaw & Son Ltd v. Shaw [1935] All E. R. 456 at 464, Greer LJ. provided in this case that
“A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers may, 
according to its articles, be exercised by directors, certain other powers may be reserved for the 
shareholders in the GM. If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can 
exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body of shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their articles, or, if  
opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors o f whose actions they 
disapprove they can remove the directors now by ordinary resolution according to CA 1985, s. 303, 
They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by articles are vested in the directors any more than
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Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are run. At
the centre of the system is the board of directors whose actions are
subject to law, regulations and the shareholders in a GM. The 
shareholders in turn are responsible for appointing the directors and the 
auditors and it is to them that the board reports on its stewardship at 
the AGM.^
It is clear from the foregoing that each organ in a JSC has an obligation and 
power to fulfil its duty. The relationship between the board of directors and GM is 
contractual, based on company laws and the constitutions of the companies. One 
might ask about the purposes of GMs of the JSCs. GMs have a monitoring role and 
they are responsible for ensuring that the board of directors and managers are carrying 
out their duties in the right way i.e. in the interest of the companies and in accordance 
with the Articles of Associations and company law.
A GM is a place in which the board should account for their control of the
company. It is the place where a number of resolutions are passed that justify the
actions of directors in the last financial year. At the GM, the directors are obliged to 
pass on to the shareholders information about important events concerning on the 
company at present and in the future.^ Therefore, in accordance with power division in
the company, the GM is the high authority therein, as its power surpasses the board's 
authority.
However, in order to obtain the desired profits from their company shareholders 
must fiilfil their role as owners of the company’s shares and take advantage of the
the directors can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders”; see also 
Scott V. Scott [1943] 1 All E. R. 582,
 ^ In the same report see also paragraph. 6.1 which provides “the formal relationship between the
shareholders and the board o f directors is that the shareholders elect the directors, the directors report 
on their stewardship to the shareholders and the shareholders appoint the auditors to provide the 
external check on the directors’ financial statement. Thus the shareholders as owners of the company 
elect the directors to run the business on their behalf and hold them accountable for its progress”.
^See Butcher, Donald B., Reform of the GM, in Saleem Sheikh and Willliam Rees (eds.), Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, Great Britain: Cavendish Publishing Limited, (1995) pp. 221-
225
rights in company law or the articles of association conferred on them to protect their 
interests. They should know what is going on in their company, struggle to obtain all 
of the information about the company affairs, take a deep look at all the reports of the 
company, attend all GMs of their company and discuss with the directors all the issues 
that they think are not clear. Finally, they should cast their vote in a wise way 
according to the information they have to establish their interest.
A JSC must hold a GM once every calendar year to approve the annual accounts 
and the directors’ report. A GM is very important because company law requires that 
a number of decisions in the running of a company be taken by shareholders at the 
GM.'  ^ Moreover, the will of the shareholders of a company is normally expressed at the
GM when they may vote for or against any resolution that is proposed. If the 
appropriate majority is obtained for a resolution, the will of the majority of the 
shareholders usually prevails and binds every shareholder. In this way the majority of 
shareholders are entitled to exercise the company’s powers and control its operations. 
They are able to make some changes to the company, such as dismissing or replacing 
the board of directors or auditors, capital structure may be changed, and a company 
may alter its Articles of Association or the company’s objects. GMs also provide the 
opportunity for a shareholder to ask questions and demand justifications about the 
directors’ performance and fiiture strategies.
This chapter considers the rights of shareholders at the GM whether at an 
ordinary or extraordinary meeting. As a result of owning a share, shareholders enjoy a
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A number of powers are returned by the statute to the shareholders at the GM. For example, the
most significant powers retained by them at a GM according to the KCL are: they have the right to 
elect the board of directors and auditors; the power to remove directors; the power to fix their 
remuneration if  it is not fixed in the Article of Association; the power to issue shares; shareholders 
approval is required of any purchase of the company’s own shares. See Articles 152,157(4),
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numbers of rights at the GM. These include the shareholder’s right to be invited to 
attend the GM. The right of attending the meeting is one of the most important rights 
every shareholder must practice. A shareholder that cannot attend the meeting in 
person should have the right to send a proxy to represent him. By the right of 
attending, shareholders can practice other rights, such as shareholders’ right to discuss 
and vote in the GM. However, before determining and discussing the rights of 
shareholders in GMs, it is necessary to introduce such matters as the concept of GMs, 
kinds of GMs, invalidation of GMs and its resolution and the needs of GMs.
7.1 Kinds of General Meetings
The GM is composed of all shareholders of a company, whatever their number or 
the number of shares held by them, and regardless of the type of share. The GM 
convenes regularly and as the need arises. Kuwaiti legislators have laid down 
regulations which govern the holding of these meetings, including the parties who have 
the right to call the meeting, formalities of the notice calling the meeting, agenda, 
quorum etc. A GM may be an ordinary or extraordinary. There may also be special 
meetings of shareholders of a particular class when a company has different kinds of 
shares. The distinction between ordinary and an extraordinary lie within the affairs 
each may deal with, and different quorums and majorities are required to pass 
resolutions at them.
The GM derives its powers from law and the company’s Articles of Association. 
It has the authority to pass any resolution subject to the substantive and procedural 
rule by law and under the company’s Articles of Association. The majority should also
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exercise their power in good faith and in the best interests of the company and 
shareholders alike.
The powers of the GM are determined in light of its functions of control and 
supervision of the company’s management and election of board members as well as 
the appointment of auditors.^
The powers are relatively straightforward. However, they are confined to 
control over the board of directors and do not question appropriateness of board 
resolutions. In other words, the GM may not interfere directly in the powers of the 
board or put forward recommendations or directions. Furthermore, these powers are 
bound by legal provisions and by the company’s Articles of Association. The GM is 
not authorised to consider amending the articles or increasing or reducing the capital, 
as these powers are among the exclusive powers of the EGM. The powers of the GM 
must also be guided by the interests of the company and shareholders without being
beneficial to one particular group at the expense of another, and its resolutions must be
clear of any arbitrariness and/or fraud otherwise they will be invalidated.
It is worth mentioning that under Article 133 of the KCL there are a number of
restrictions on the GM that must be complied with to protect the shareholders of the
company. This article provides that:
The shareholders’ GM may not: (1) increase a shareholder’s financial 
liability or the nominal value of the share; (2) reduce the percentage of 
net profits specified in the articles of the company to be distributable to 
the shareholders; (3) impose fresh conditions in addition to those set 
out in the articles (of the company) in connection with the shareholder’s 
qualification for voting at and attending the GM; (4) restrict the 
shareholder’s right to bring an action for damages, in accordance with 
law, against all or some of the members of the board of directors in 
respect of such damage as he may sustain. These provisions may.
The powers of the GM are set fourth expressly in Article 157 and 158 of the KCL.
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however, be overridden by the shareholders’ agreement in writing or 
unanimous vote.
Therefore, a GM, whether ordinary or extraordinary, may not increase a 
shareholder’s financial obligations or the nominal value of the shares held by them 
because each shareholder in this kind of company shall always be responsible for the 
company’s losses to the extent of his own shares. Furthermore, GMs cannot reduce 
the dividends distributed to the shareholders as specified by the company’s Articles of 
Association; cannot impose new terms and conditions regarding eligibility to attend 
and vote at the GM other than those set forth in the articles; or restrict a shareholder’s 
right to file lawsuits against all or some board members claiming compensation for any 
damage he has suffered. None of the above rights may be prejudiced unless agreed in 
writing by all shareholders or by unanimous voting, which is not feasible, particularly in 
JSCs that comprise a large number of shareholders.
The KCL does not require the directors to give notice of a resolution which the 
requisitionists intend to move at the next GM. The Kuwaiti legislator will find a good 
example to follow in the UK CA 1985. In the UK, shareholders who hold 5 per cent 
of the total voting rights or not less than 100 shareholders holding shares on which 
there has been paid an average sum per shareholder of not less than £100, may compel 
a company to give notice of a resolution to be moved at a meeting to shareholders.'^
They may also require the company, on giving one week’s notice, to circulate to 
shareholders a statement not exceeding 1,000 words with respect to any resolution or 
business to be dealt with at any GM.’ It can be said that when such provisions exist in 
any company law, they will enable shareholders who are opposed to a course of action
 ^ S 376 of the UK CA 1985.
^Ibid.
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or plan to be submitted at the meeting, to pass round their objections to the other 
shareholders before the meeting. Thus, to protect the shareholders’ right, they should 
have the right to require the directors to give them notice of any resolution the 
directors intend to move at the next GM. Also in the UK, no shareholder can be 
bound by an alteration to the articles made after he became a shareholder to the extent 
that the alteration demand him to take or subscribe for more shares than the number 
held by him at the date on which the alteration is made, or in any way increase his 
liability as of that date to contribute to the company’s share capital or otherwise to pay 
money to the company.® Therefore, in the UK the financial obligations of the
shareholders cannot be increased without their individual consent. S. 16 of the UK CA 
1985 is clearly intended to protect shareholders fi'om having their financial obligations 
to the company compulsorily increased.
7.1.1 Annual General Meeting
Each year the company should hold an AGM. Article 154 of the KCL provides
that:
(1) The shareholders’ general assembly shall hold a meeting at least 
once in each year, at the time and place specified in the articles of the 
company. The board of directors, however, may call a meeting of the 
assembly whenever it thinks fit, and shall do so whenever requested by 
a number of shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of the capital.
® Ibid., S. 16 provides “(1) a member of a company is not bound by any alteration made in the
memorandum or articles after the date on which he became a member, if  and so far as the alteration 
(a) requires him to take or subscribe for more shares than the number held by him at the date on 
which the alteration is made; or (b) in any way increase his liability as at that date to contribute to the 
company's share capital or otherwise to pay money to the company.
(2) subsection (1) operate notwithstanding anything in the memorandum or articles; but it does not 
apply in a case where the member agrees in writing, either before or after alteration is made, to be 
bound by the alteration.”
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It is clear from the foregoing that the AGM shall be held at least once each year 
at the time and place designated by the company’s Articles of Association. It is a duty 
of the directors to convene GMs and they do so at their discretion when they see fit, 
except when the law expressly imposes a duty on them to call a meeting. The board of 
directors shall call the meeting, often following the end of the company’s financial 
year.^ The AGM may also be called whenever the board deems necessary. The board
also has to call the meeting if requested to do so by holders of at least ten per cent of 
the company’s capital. Shareholders can exercise this right if the board fails to call the 
meeting. The proper government authority of Ministry of Commerce may also call a 
GM to consider any illegal acts committed by the board and which may damage the 
interests of the company and the shareholders or the national economy.
The notice of the GM must be sent by registered mail to all shareholders. 
Moreover, the notice must be published in two daily Arabic newspapers twice and the 
second publication must be one week after the first. The notice must contain a clear 
outline of the items on the meeting agenda. The agenda is important because it draws 
attention to the matters under consideration so that the shareholder is well prepared for 
the meeting. It also prepares directors to look beforehand into the matters raised for 
voting at the meeting (see 5.3.2).“
The body authorised to draw up the agenda is the board of directors. However, 
a meeting, as stated above, can be held at the request of the shareholders who should
 ^ The financial year usually start in January and end in December. Article 45 of Appendix B Pro 
Forma Memorandum o f Association of a Joint Stock Company of the KCL No. 15/1960.
See Article 178 of the KCL.
11Ibid., Article 154 (2) of the KCL “(2) The notice of the meeting shall contain a clear summary o f the
agenda of the meeting and must be sent in two ways. First, the notice of the meeting shall be sent to 
all the shareholders by registered mail at least one week before the date of the meeting. Second, the 
notice shall be published in two daily Arabic newspapers two times and the second publication must
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have the right to draw up the agenda of the meeting. Unfortunately, the above article 
does not give a clear picture of this right. It is suggested, therefore, that the agenda of 
any meeting should always be worked out by the bodies calling the GM. Thus, if the 
meeting held is at the request of the shareholders, auditors or the Ministry of 
Commerce they each shall have the right to decide what should be on the agenda.
The KCL specifies the items on the agenda of the AGM at Article 157.^ ^
According to this article, the AGM must discuss the following matters: First, it should 
hear the report of the board of directors on the business of the company and its 
financial standing during the year. Second, it should hear the report of the auditors on 
the balance sheet of the company and the accounts submitted by the board of directors. 
It should then consider and sanction the accounts and declare a dividend. Following 
this, they should elect the members of the board of directors, the auditors and fix their 
remuneration for the coming year, if it is not fixed in the Articles of Association. 
Furthermore, the meeting may discuss proposals for increasing the capital, issuing new 
shares, borrowing, mortgaging and providing guarantees and deciding sums and any 
other proposal the board of directors may enter on the agenda. A proposal may also 
be submitted during the meeting of the GM by a number of shareholders holding not 
less than one-tenth of the total number of shares.
be one week after the first.”
Article 157 provides “the following matters shall be included in the agenda of the annual GM:
(a) the reading of the directors’ report on the activities of the company and its financial situation 
during the year; the report shall give sufficient explanations of items of income and expenditure and a 
detailed proposal o f the method and date of distributing the net profits of the year; (b) the reading of 
the auditors’ report on the balance sheet and the account submitted by the directors; (c) the 
examination and approval o f the accounts and determination of the distributable profits; (d) the 
election and determination o f the fees o f the directors and auditors payable to them during the coming 
year, save when the same is stated in the Articles of Association; (e) the deliberation on and passing of 
resolutions on proposals made for the increase of the capital, the issue of debentures, borrowing, 
pledging and the issue of securities; (f) the deliberation on and passing of a resolution in respect of 
any other proposal placed on the agenda by the directors; such proposal may be made during the GM 
by a number of the shareholders who hold not less than one-tenth of the number of shares.”
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Only the matters listed on the agenda may be considered. However, the GM 
may consider a matter proposed by the board or holders of at least ten per cent of the 
company’s capital. This is likely to deny shareholders who do not constitute the 
minimum number required, the opportunity to discuss any matter that may be 
extremely important.
The shareholder who wants to attend the GM must enter his name on a special 
register at the company’s registered office at least 24 hours prior to the meeting. The 
entry shall show the shareholder’s name the number of shares owned or represented. 
He will be given a card or a shp authorising him to attend and showing the number of 
votes he is entitled as principle or proxy.
In accordance with the KCL, for a GM to be valid, holders of more than half the 
capital must be present. If the meeting lacks such a quorum it must be adjourned to 
another day and the second such meeting shall be valid regardless of the number of 
members present. In other words, the second meeting shall be valid even if attended 
by only one member. This provision seems the best available solution to the problem
of non-attendance at the GMs (see 7.3.1). However, it also reveals a drawback in the 
relationship between the board and the shareholders. The quorum is formed on the 
basis of the number of shares making up the company’s capital and, as previously 
mentioned, attendance may be in person or by proxy.
The GM is presided over by the chairman of the board of directors or his deputy 
or any person authorised by the board. “ As already stated each shareholder has a
“  See Article 34 of Appendix B Pro Forma Memorandum of Association of a Joint Stock Company of 
the KCL No. 15/1960.
Article 155.
“ Article 155 of the KCL provides ‘the meeting o f the GM assembly shall be presided by the chairman 
or deputy chairman of the board o f directors or by the person appointed by the board o f directors to be
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number of votes equivalent to the number of shares he holds, whatever that number 
may be (see 7.2.5).
In accordance with the provisions of Article 156, GM resolutions are passed by 
absolute majority. If the number of shares represented at the meeting is 100,000, for 
example, for a resolution to be passed it must be approved by shareholders 
representing more than 50,000 shares.
7.1.2 Extraordinary General Meeting
Any GM of a company other than the AGM is called an EGM. The law usually 
gives power to the directors to call an EGM at any time they think fit. Shareholders 
holding not less than 25 per cent of the company’s shares can at any time compel the 
directors to call, or requisition, an extraordinary meeting, and the directors must 
arrange the meeting within one month fi'om the date of receiving the request. “
Twenty-five per cent could be considered high. Therefore, it is proposed that this 
should be less. Most other jurisdictions give shareholders, if they hold not less that 10 
per cent, the right to insist on holding an EGM.“ For example, in the UK shareholders 
holding not less than 10 per cent of the paid up capital carrying voting rights may at 
any time compel the directors to call an EGM.“
chairman of that meeting...’
“ As provided in Article 159 of the KCL: An extraordinary meeting of the company may be called (by
the board of directors, either) at the instance of the board or on application in writing made to the 
board by shareholders holding not less than one fourth of the shares o f the company.
In the latter case the board shall call the meeting within one month from the date of receiving the 
application.
“ According to Article 70(1) of Company Law of Egypt no. 159/1981 the board of directors must call 
such a meeting if required by shareholders holding at least 10 per cent of the issued capital.
“  See s. 368 o f the UK CA 1985. For more information see Pennington, Robert R., Company Law, 7‘*' 
ed., London: Butterworths Publishing, (1995), p. 827.
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Also, in Kuwait, the board must convene such a meeting if the company has 
suffered losses which amount to three-quarters of its capital/^ This means that losing
less than three-quarters of the company’s capital (for example, one-half) is not enough 
to call an EGM under the KCL. It can be said that losing half of the shareholders’ 
capital is enough to compel the board to call the meeting, as in accordance with the 
UK AC 1985. In the UK, a JSC must convene an EGM if there is a serious loss of 
capital. That is, if the net assets are half or less of the company’s called up share 
capital The directors must call a meeting to consider what measures should be taken 
to deal with the situation,^®
The EGM is another side to the shareholder’s right to share in managing the 
company. Extremely important decisions are taken involving amendments to the 
company’s memorandum or Articles of Association, capital increase or reduction, 
liquidation or the merger of the company. In view of the serious nature of the 
resolutions passed by this meeting, it is subject to regulations different from those 
governing the AGM in terms of conditions of convening and the manner of voting.
In accordance with Article 160 of the KCL it provides that:
The quorum of an extraordinary meeting of the general assembly shall 
be shareholders representing three-fourths of the shares of the 
company. If this quorum is not present, notice shall be given of a 
second meeting. The quorum of the second meeting shall be 
shareholders representing more than half the shares. 
Resolutions (of the general extraordinary meeting) shall pass by a 
majority of more than half the shares of the company.
Article 171(1) of the KCL provides “if  the company loses three-quarters of its capital, the directors
shall convene an EGM to decide whether the situation necessitate the premature winding-up of the 
company, the reduction of the capital or the adoption o f any other proper measure”.
^°S. 142 of the UK CA 1985. Also Article 69 o f Company Law o f Egypt no. 159/198 Iprovides that 
the
directors of a JSC should call the EGM if  the losses of the company reach half the issued capital.
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In this context, an EGM will be valid if attended by shareholders representing at 
least three-quarters of the company’s shares. If the meeting lacks such a quorum, it 
must be adjourned to another day and the second such meeting shall be valid if 
attended by shareholders representing more than half the shares. Resolutions are 
passed by a majority; over half the total number of the company’s shares, not half of 
represented shares. Such a large majority required by the KCL to render the EGM 
valid is commensurate with the seriousness of the matters that it is authorised to 
consider.
It is worth pointing out that the serious error the Kuwaiti legislators have 
committed in Article 160 is inappropriate and illogical. The EGMs’ resolutions passed 
by a majority exceeding half the company’s shares can only be applicable to the first 
meeting at which three quarters of the shares are represented. As previously 
mentioned, if the meeting lacks such a quorum, a second meeting is called which shall 
be valid if half the shares are represented. This necessarily entails that for the meeting 
to be valid, the second meeting’s resolutions must be passed unanimously or almost 
unanimously, as resolutions under Article 160 are passed by majority agreement 
exceeding half the company’s shares. This is illogical and in some instances 
impossible. How can the entire quorum of the second meeting be a condition for the 
validity of the meeting? Therefore, it is recommended that the said Article be amended 
and set a different majority at the second meeting.
Article 158 of the KCL sets the powers of the EGM:
No resolution on (any of) the following matters may be passed except 
by the general assembly in extraordinary meetings. (I) Altering the 
memorandum of association of the company or its articles; (2) selling or 
otherwise disposing of the entire under-taking of the company; (3) 
dissolving the company or amalgamating it with another company or 
body (of person); (4) reducing the capital of the company.
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It is clear in this article that Kuwaiti legislators decided that these issues might be 
the reason to call an EGM. Therefore, under the KCL, the EGM may be called for 
four reasons. First, only the EGM is entitled to alter of the Memorandum or Articles 
of Association of the company. Second, if there is a desire to or otherwise disposing 
of the entire undertaking of the company, only the EGM is entitled to do this. In 
addition, dissolving the company or amalgamating it with another company must be 
done through the EGM. Finally, any proposal to reduce the capital of the company 
must be presented in the EGM.
7.2 Invalidation of the GMs and their Resolutions
As the above discussion shows, every JSC must hold ordinary or extraordinary 
sessions and pass appropriate resolutions on matters under consideration. However, 
this must be done in compliance with the substantive and procedural regulations by law 
or under the company’s Articles of Association in order to render the meeting and 
resolutions valid.^  ^ The KCL does not specify where the GM or its resolutions are
invalid. However, any meeting held without notice thereof to the shareholders or in 
contravention of the procedures and provisions of law is invalid. The resolution 
affecting shareholder’s basic rights set forth in Articles 131 and 133 is also invalid, and 
so is the resolution passed by means of ffaud or misrepresentation to the GM.
Any shareholder who objected to a resolution or a result of fraud or 
misrepresentation has approved a resolution, or absent may apply to a court of law 
demanding invalidation of the meeting and any resolution passed by it. This is because
^^Abou Zeid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative Law  ^ edn., Cairo: Dar Al-
fker Al-Arabi Publishing, (1978), p. 486-9; Tamma, PAûidLmmin, Commercial Companies Law o f  
Kuwait, P* edn., Kuwait: Author Publishing, (1999), p. 99.
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the GM was held in contravention of law and the company’s Articles of Association. 
However, a shareholder may demand invalidating the resolution only if the meeting 
itself was valid (see chapter 8).^ ^
As for the minority shareholder’s right to object to the resolutions of the EGM, 
Article 136 of the KCL establishes that right if the objections constitute at least 15 per 
cent of the company’s capital and provided they have voted against the resolutions in 
question at the meeting and proved that these prejudice of their rights/^ The objections
must be submitted to the court within 30 days of issue of the meeting resolution, and 
the court may uphold, modify, overrule or defer implementation of the resolution 
pending an appropriate settlement of the dispute by buying the objectors’ shares or in 
any other appropriate manner (see 8.2).^ '*
7.3 A Shareholder’s Right at the GMs
It must be stated first that the rights of shareholders in the GMs, such as the right 
of attendance, discussion and voting are not useful if the shareholder does not practice 
his other rights. He should be acquainted with his financial rights, and knew the 
company's status and reports. If not he should make sure about the correctness of 
what is discovered through communication with the company’s auditors. The
Article 133 of the KCL.
^^Ibid., Article 136 provides ‘within thirty days from the date on which a resolution is passed in
accordance with the preceding article, (any) number o f the shareholders who did not consent to that 
resolution, holding shares to a total value of not less than 15% of the subscribed capital, may, if  the 
resolution is to their detriment, make opposition to it before the court.
The court may confirm, qualify or cancel the resolution, or (order) postponement of its carrying out 
until a suitable arrangement for purchasing the shares o f the dissenting member -  provided that no 
expense whatsoever towards such purchase shall be charged to the company -  or any other suitable 
settlement is made.’
Ibid.,
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shareholder who is not aware of his rights or the company's status, will not be useful 
when attending the meetings. On the contrary he can be harmful to it.
Every shareholder of a JSC enjoys a number of rights at GMs, and these 
fundamental rights have been given to shareholders to perform duties, as the owners of 
the main interested group in the JSCs, towards their companies. Hence, following 
sections will concentrate and determine these rights.
7.3.1 Shareholder’s Right to Attend the GM
The shareholder’s right to attend the GM is associated with his capacity as a 
shareholder of a JSC and must not be denied.^  ^ Therefore, as a general rule every
shareholder may attend regardless of the number of the shares he owns.^ ® However, 
this differs from other laws that specify a minimum number of shares as a condition for 
attending the GM.” Accordingly, a number of countries deny some shareholders the
right to attend because they do not hold the required minimum number of shares.^^
The shareholder enjoys the right to attend even if a part of the value of his shares 
is due to the company, in other words, even if he has not paid up his shares.^  ^ That is
because his capacity as a shareholder of the company is not conditional on payment of 
the unpaid amount of the shares he subscribed for and if the shareholder is a body
^^Akthem, AI-Koli, Commercial Law o f Lebanon, Beirut: Dar Alnahda Publishing, (1980), p. 257. 
This right is established in Kuwait by Article 154 of the KCL and in the UK by Article 38 of Table
A and S. 370(2) that provides ‘notice of the meeting of a company shall be served on every member 
of it in the manner in which notices are required to be served by Table A .’
Younes, All, Commercial Companies, Egypt: Dar-Al-feker Al-Araby Publisher, (1991), p. 358.
See for example the Saudi law Article 83 that provides “the articles o f association of the company
shall specify the (classes of) shareholders entitled to attend GMs. Nevertheless, every shareholder 
who holds twenty shares shall have the right to attend, even if  the articles of association of the 
company provides otherwise.”
Younes, supra note 27, p. 356.
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corporate, it delegates a natural person to represent it. If the shares are jointly held by
a group of persons they must choose from among their number to exercise the rights
derived from such a holding, including the right to attend the GM.^°
It is known that a shareholder may mortgage the shares he holds but in this case,
who has the right to attend; the creditor or the debtor (shareholder)? Article 108 of the
KCL provides that:
The property of a (share) company may not be attached for the 
satisfaction of debts owing from one of (its) shareholders but the shares 
of that shareholder and the dividends thereon may, and in such a case an 
entry of the attachment, based on a notice from the authority concerned 
and not to be removed without a notice from that authority, shall be 
endorsed against the registration of the shares in the shares register of 
the company.
It is clear in this article that the matter of attendance at the GM, according to the 
KCL, is an established right associated with the owner of the mortgaged shares. 
Accordingly, the creditor may not exercise the right of the debtor (shareholder) to 
attend and vote at the GM.^^
Through attending GMs, shareholders can exercise the powers they have been 
given by the law and the Articles of Associations. Unfortunately, most of the 
shareholders are uninterested in participating in GMs. This situation might drive one 
to ask; why are they uninterested in participating in their companies? There are in fact, 
a number of justifications for the absence of shareholders from GMs.
7.3,2 The Reasons for Shareholders’ Absenteeism from GMs
It is established that shareholders often intend to practice their rights by
See Article 99 of the KCL; Mahmoud, Al Sharkawi, Commercial Companies in Egyptian Law, 
Cairo: Dar Al-nahdah Publishing, (1986), p. 119.
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attending GMs. During these meetings shareholders presumably enter into discussions 
about the various topics on the agendas and personally vote for the draft resolutions 
proposed by the board of directors. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the 
attendance of shareholders as owners or the main interested group in a JSC, they are 
often unable or unwilling to attend.
In order to identify reasons for shareholders’ absenteeism firom GMs, it is 
essential to look at the motivations that urged them to invest their funds, whether 
permanently or temporarily. When a permanent investor buys long-term shares he is 
looking for an annual income with a share of the dividends distributed by the company 
to its shareholders. He also expects an increase in his invested capital, matching the 
rise in the value of shares. On the other hand, when the temporary or short-term 
investor buys shares in a company he expects to benefit from the rise in their value due 
to price fluctuations. His profit margins are achieved by re-selling such shares.”
Based on the above, it is noted that there are two categories of shareholders; 
permanent and temporary. The psychological conditions of both categories are very 
different. Temporary shareholders are in fact speculators and they will sell their shares 
as soon as the market value of their shares goes up, therefore, they have their own 
reasons to be absent from the GMs. What are the reasons that prevent permanent 
shareholders firom attending the GMs of their companies?
”  Abdalah, Foaid, Management o f JSC, Beirut: Dar Am Al-Ktab Publishing (1996), pp. 158-9; 
Younes, supra note 27, p. 363.
32 Abou Zeid, supra note 21, p. 404.
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7.3.2.1 The Large Number of Shareholders
The large number of shareholders who share the stakes of the company’s capital 
constitutes the first material reason for absence. In such a situation, it is difficult to 
gather the shareholders in one place for a GM. For example, in very large companies 
there may be tens of thousands of shareholders. Also, when so many are entitled to 
attend and vote, none of the shareholders expects his vote to decide the matter, and 
none of them think his voice can be heard among this huge number of shareholders. 
As a result, most shareholders do not have the appropriate motivation to study the 
company’s affairs and vote intelligently.”
7.3.2.2 Geographic Spread of Shareholders
The geographic spread of shareholders over such vast areas hampers their 
participation in the GMs. These often take place in the capital where the majority of 
companies’ headquarters are located.” It is, therefore, more difficult for those who
reside in remoter areas to attend the meetings. Those who live closer have much easier 
access (bus ticket or taxi fere).”
7.3.2.3 Shareholders are too Busy
In order for shareholders to attend the meetings, they need more than invitation
”  See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev (1981) p. 1170-1.
”  The DTI Report in the Annual General Meeting and Shareholder communications (Consultative
Document) (October 1999) para 19 provides that “for JSC, at least those whose shares are listed on a 
stock exchange, the GM fails for quite different reasons to provide the reality of democratic 
accountability and control. There are many thousands -  sometimes hundreds o f thousands or even 
millions -  of individual shareholders of such companies; they live in all part of the UK, and many live 
abroad. It is quite impracticable for more than a small minority of them to attend a GM on a working 
weekday at a single location in the UK”.
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cards or newspaper advertisements. It is too difficult, if not impossible, for those 
shareholders who have regular jobs to have the time to attend such meetings, especially 
when they have shares in several different companies.
It is also established that in order for shareholders to be able to lead discussions 
during the GMs, they need to access sufficient, in-depth information on the company. 
In fact, this can be accomplished only if the company provides them with the relevant 
documentation and reports. Again, shareholders need to call at the company’s 
premises to collect copies of these materials prior to the GMs. This could be costly 
and time-consuming. Accordingly, shareholders are unable to attend GMs on a regular 
basis. Only those who have no other job (normally seniors, retired persons, or 
unemployed people) are able to do so.
7.3.2.4 Limited Liability of Shareholders
All shareholders know that their responsibility for the debts of their company is 
limited to the extent of the nominal value of their shares.”  Therefore, when a
shareholder pays the whole value of his subscribed shares, he will not be liable for the 
company’s debts. This limited liability is one of the reasons preventing shareholders 
from attending GMs (see 3.2.4).” Limited liability decreases the need for shareholders 
to monitor the directors of their companies because the financial consequences of the
”  Abdalah, supra note 31, p. 269.
See Article 63 of the KCL; John, Hicks, Limited Liability the pros and Cons, in Orhnial, Tony (ed).
Limited Liability and The Corporation, London: Croom Helm Publishing, (1982), p. 30, see also 
David Goddard, Corporate Personality-Limited Recourse and its Limits, in Ross Grantham and 
Charles Rickett (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 20“’ Century, Oxford: Hart Publishing, (1998), p. 
23.
^According to Article 133/l(a) of the KCL the GM of a company cannot issue a resolution that may 
increase the shareholders’ liability.
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companies’ failure are limited.”
7.3.2.5 Simultaneous Meetings by Most of the Companies
One of reasons that may cause absenteeism is that the majority of companies 
hold their GMs at the same time of year. Shareholders can be invited to attend GMs 
on the same date, and, sometimes, at the same hour. In such an event, a shareholder 
has to select the meeting that deserves more care. In Kuwait, AGMs of all JSCs are 
usually held in December or January, because the financial year of any JSC starts on 
the first day of January and ends on 31^ of December.”
7.3.2.6 Shareholders’ Psychology
There is a close causative relationship between the shareholder’s interest in the 
company and the amount of his stake. For instance, if a shareholder maintains a 20 per 
cent or more stake of a company’s share capital, it is natural to see him think about the 
company with the mentality of a major stakeholder. He will be highly interested in 
following up the company’s activities as he realises that his business fortune depends 
on its proper management. Therefore, he will naturally attend the company’s GMs on 
a regular basis.''® On the other hand, a minor shareholder whose participation iu the 
company’s capital represents a small part of his fiinds will have less interest in the
”  Ian M Ramsay, Models of Corporate Regulation: the Mandatory/Enabling Debate, in Ross
Grantham and Charles Rickett (eds.). Corporate Personality in the Century, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, (1998), p. 251.
” As provided in Article 45 of Appendix B Pro Forma Memorandum of Association of a Joint Stock
Company of the KCL No. 15/1960 ‘the financial year of the company shall start on the first day of 
January and expire on the 3 L* day of December o f every year, exception being made o f the company’s 
first financial year, which shall commence from the date of the declaration o f the legal incorporation 
o f the company and expire on the 3F* day of December o f the following year’.
J.H. Farrar & B.M. Hannigan, F arrar’s Company Law. 4“’ edn., London: Butterworths Publishing,
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management’s work and he will attend the GMs less regularly.'" Hence, most of the
individual shareholders who are absent from GMs do not come because they believe 
the number of votes they have is not enough to have a significant role in the matters of 
the meeting.
V.3.2.7 The Shareholders’ Failure to Follow-up the GMs
As the shareholders feel ineffective, they fail to attend GMs on a regular basis. 
Most companies invite their shareholders to attend the GMs during morning hours. If 
reports and documentation are read, there will not be sufficient time to discuss the 
details. In this context, notes made by the chairman and members of the board for 
answering the questions are briefly provided. Taking confidentiality as a pretext, they 
often refrain from giving any other notes than those exhibited in the reports. This 
causes participation by shareholders in the discussions to be of no use. Moreover, 
board members and auditors are not obliged to answer all questions during the GM’s 
discussions. In many cases, the directors prevent shareholders from practising their 
rights in obtaining sufficient information about the company on confidentiality grounds.
Nevertheless, confidentiality must not be left to the mood of the board members 
and should not constitute an illusive risk. If confidentiality necessitates respecting the 
company’s interests it must not give a permanent pretext for the board to conceal 
information.
(1998), p. 305.
'"Abdalah, supra note 31, p. 275.
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7.3.2.S Most of the Shareholders Lack Technical Experience
The shareholders’ failure to participate in the GMs may be interpreted more 
comprehensively. Most individual shareholders lack financial and managerial 
experience.'*  ^ As ordinary shareholders, they are unable to comprehend the complicated
financial reports issued by the directors.” Henceforth, their votes have a weak effect
on the resolutions adopted by the GMs (see 5.5).
7.3.3 The Right of Attending the GM by Proxy
A proxy is a person appointed by a shareholder of a company to represent the 
shareholder’s voting interests at a GM. If a shareholder is unable to attend the GM in 
person for some reason, they have the right to authorise others to attend on their 
behalf. The purpose behind this is to give shareholders the opportunity to share in 
managing and controlling the company’s business by proxy. The KCL article 155 
provides that; “A shareholder may appoint another person to attend the meeting as his 
proxy.” This means any shareholder who is entitled to attend and vote at a GM of the 
company is entitled to appoint another person, whether a shareholder or not, as his 
proxy.
Despite the importance and sensitivity of the issue, the KCL only has this 
provision in regard to proxy. This leads to the view that the legal rules relating proxy 
at the KCL are not sufficiently detailed, as for example in the UK CA 1985. In the 
UK, a shareholder has the right to attend the GM by proxy as provided in the
Lee T. A., and Tweedie D. P., Shareholder Use and Understanding o f Financial Information,
London: Garland Publishing, (1990), p. 27; see also Al-Sharkawi, supra note 30, p. 231.
Bartlett, Susan and Chandler Roy, The Corporate Report and the Private Shareholders: Lee and
Tweedie Twenty Years on, British Accounting Rev 29 (1997) p. 248; see also, Abou Zied, Radwan, 
Shareholding Companies in Public Sector, Egypt: Dar Al-fker Al-Arabi publisher, (1983), p. 271,
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sufficiently detailed S. 272. According to this section, any shareholder entitled to 
attend and vote at a company meeting may appoint another person, whether a 
shareholder or not, to attend and vote as his proxy.” Every notice calling a meeting
must state this right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy.” The Articles of Association 
cannot require the instrument appointment of a proxy to be deposited with the 
company more than 48 hours before the meeting or adjourned meeting.”  A proxy is 
appointed by an instrument in writing, in accordance with the Articles of Association 
of a company.” A proxy has no right to speak at the meeting except to require or join 
in requiring a poll, and he can only vote on a poll.”  To prevent directors from 
selecting only shareholders who would grant them proxies of support, S. 372(6) 
provides that an invitation to appoint a proxy must be sent to all shareholders. In the 
UK, there are two kinds of proxies in use; ordinary proxy -  appointing a person to 
vote as he thinks fit at the meeting; and a special proxy -  directing the proxy before the 
meeting to vote for or against a particular resolution.'*®
”  See S. 272(1) of UK CA 1985.
S. 272(3).
^fbid., S. 272(5).
Article 60 Table A, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations UK 1985.
See S. 372(2); Table A in the UK does not permit proxies to vote on a show of hands: see Article
59. In a private company, in the UK, proxies have the same rights as the shareholder who appoints 
them to speak and vote as provides in S. 372(1) o f the UK CA 1985. Also it is worth mentioning that 
one of the recommendation provided by the DTI Report on the Annual General Meeting and 
Shareholder communications (Consultative Document) (October 1999) para 50 states that the 
statutory right to speak be extended to proxies attending GMs of JSC.
Article 61; the Listing Roles in the UK require that a proxy form must enable the shareholder
(the appointer) to specify how the proxy is to vote on each issue other than procedural issues. See Para 
13.28(b) of the Listing Roles.
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Article 155 of the KCL does not lay down regulations governing attendance by 
p ro x y H e n ce ,  a shareholder who holds a small number of shares may act as a proxy
of a large number of shareholders and, in turn, direct their votes in his own personal 
interest and thus ignore the interests of the company and those of the other 
shareholders. Failure of the law to impose regulations on that process may encourage 
major shareholders to obtain the largest possible number of proxies legally or illegally 
(something which helps them dominate the GM). This is the case in some companies 
in Kuwait where major shareholders are used to buying the votes of small shareholders 
by buying the notices to the GM to give the act a legal shape, thus describing it as an 
agreement for attendance by proxy. Therefore, the Kuwaiti legislator should impose 
some limitations on those shareholders that want to attend the GM by proxy, such as 
Company Law of the Republican of Yemen. The Yemeni Company Law eliminated 
this defect by imposing a limitation to the proxy related to the number of votes ~ any 
one proxy may not exceed 5 per cent of the company’s capital.
Moreover, according to the general wording of Article 155 of KCL, any member 
of the board of directors of the company can attend the meeting as a proxy of a 
shareholder. GMs are the right place for shareholders to practice their power and an 
opportunity to monitor the board of directors. Therefore, a director should not be 
allowed to attend as a proxy for a shareholder.^^ In this context, the result is
acknowledgement that the acts of the board in the previous year were legitimate and
”  There are two conditions for proxy in Egypt, first, the proxy must be confirmed in writing. Second,
the proxy must be another shareholder; see Article 208 of implementing regulations of Egyptian 
Company Law no. 159/1981,
^'See Article 158/3 o f Yemeni Company Law.
Sami, Fawzi, The Commercial Companies ‘Titblic and Private Provisions, Iovàm:MdkXdi)a\.'02iii:
Al-Thgafah Publishing, (1999), p 490; Younes, supra note 27, p. 358; Sameha A1 Kalyoubi, 
Commercial Companies. Egypt: Dar Alnadah Publishing, (1993), p. 359.
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valid without any question. The Egyptian Company Law averted this error by
providing that a shareholder may not authorise a director to act on his behalf at a
GM.^  ^ Thus, the KCL should expressly prohibit the directors from acting as a proxy of
a shareholder at the GM
In summary, it is suggested that new rules relating to the representation of 
shareholders at GMs by proxies should be added and made more stringent in order to 
prevent abuses that frequently occur in practice. It should no longer be possible to 
appoint a proxy for an indefinite number of GMs. Therefore, each appointment of a 
proxy is valid only for the specific meeting for which the appointment is made. Also, a 
proxy should not represent more than a limited number of shares, for example, they 
should not exceed say 5 per cent of the company’s capital. Otherwise, one shareholder 
may be represented as a proxy for the majority of shareholders, thus enabling him to 
control the GM. Likewise, directors of the company should not be allowed to attend 
the GM as a proxy of a shareholder.”
7.3.4 Shareholder’s Right to Discuss at the GM
Chapter five concentrated on the right of shareholders to obtain aU the
information they need to know about the development and present condition of the 
company’s affairs in order to be able to exercise their rights to discuss and vote 
properly (see 5.3). It stated that at many times the reports sent to shareholders are not 
clear enough. Therefore, shareholders need to have the right to discuss and ask 
question and directors should have to answer to clarify any vagueness. Accordingly,
”  See Article 59.2 o f The Egyptian Company Law provides “no shareholder other than members of
the administrative board is allowed to charge any member of the administrative board to replace him 
in the attendance of GM,”
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issues scheduled in the agenda of a GM should be open to discussion to all company’s 
shareholders, and the shareholders should have the right to direct questions regarding 
the agenda of the meeting, both to the directors and auditors. Directors and auditors 
will be required to provide satisfactory answers to the questions put to them by their 
shareholders. However, questions must be answered in such a way so as not to 
jeopardise the company’s interest. If a shareholder feels that an unsatisfactory answer 
has been given to one or more of his questions, he should have the right to appeal 
against it at the meeting.” This is one of the basic rights which every shareholder must
enjoy during the GM. Accordingly, any provision in the Articles of Association of the 
company that attempts to limit or deprive the shareholders of this right, shall be 
considered null and void.”
The KCL is not clear on this important issue. There is no article in the KCL 
about this basic right. The Kuwaiti legislator should follow the Saudi Company Law 
when eliminating this defect. It provides, in Article 94, that issues scheduled in the 
agenda of a GM should be open to discussion to all shareholders. Also, shareholders 
should have the right to direct questions regarding the agenda, both to the company’s 
directors, and its auditors. Due to the importance of this right, the Saudi legislator 
stated in the same article that, any provisions in the Articles of Association of the 
company that attempt to deprive a shareholder of this right will be considered null and
”  Abou Zied, supra note 21, p. 224. 
”  Younes, supra note 27, p. 370.
”  Sameha, supra note 52, p. 378.
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void/^ Egyptian Company Law also clearly mentions this right when it provides in 
Article 72/1:
Every shareholders who attends the meeting of the general assembly has 
the right of discussing the questions included in the agenda of the 
meeting, and calling the members of the administrative board, and the 
auditors of accounts to answer on questions relating to them. He may 
also present any question before the meeting of the general assembly, at 
the time fixed by the regulation. Any provision depriving the 
shareholder fi'om exercise of this right will be invalid.
In the UK also, it is customary, before putting a resolution to shareholders for 
approval, that directors invite shareholders to ask if they have questions and the 
chairman should answer their questions. This right came fi'om common law. It is not a 
demand of the Company Act.” Therefore, to have a good corporate governance and
balance of powers between directors and shareholders, new articles should be added to 
the KCL under which shareholders are expressly and directly given the right to discuss 
and address any questions to the GM.
Another thing that may facilitate the process of discussion and questions at a GM 
is that if one of the shareholders has his questions ready a few days prior to the 
meeting he should send them to the board of directors so they can answer them m the 
meeting.Moreover,  it is necessary to require board directors and auditors to answer 
all shareholders’ questions and provide satisfactory answers, otherwise, shareholders
”  Article 94 of Saudi Company Law provides that “every stockholder shall have the right to discuss
the matters listed in the agenda o f a meeting, and to address questions to the directors and auditor in 
respect thereof. Any provision in the company’s bylaws depriving a stockholder of this right shall be 
considered null and void. The directors or the auditor shall answer stockholders’ questions to such an 
extent as would not jeopardise the company’s interests. If a stockholder feels that the answer to a 
question put by him is unsatisfactory, he may appeal to the meeting, whose decision shall be final in 
this respect.”
Smerdon, Richard, A Practical Guide To Corporate Governance, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Publishing, (1998), p. 155.
”  For example, five days under the Yemeni Company Law to allow the board or auditor to produce 
replies see Article 163/2 of Yemeni Company Law.
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should have the right to appeal against the board of directors or the auditors at the 
GM.
Ho’wever, if a huge number of shareholders attend a GM this may restrict the 
right of each shareholder to get a chance to ask questions. Accordingly, some 
jurisdictions should be included such as in the company law ofFrance whereby any 
shareholder may submit an unlimited number of written questions to the board of 
directors prior to the GM. Such questions must relate to the agenda, and the directors 
are required to answer these questions verbally at the meeting.^°
7.3.5 Shareholder’s Right to Vote at the GM
When the shareholders and directors finish their discussion on one of the matters 
that is presented to the meeting, they reach the stage of taking a decision by voting. 
The voting of shareholders in the GM is a right and a tool for shareholders, and 
considered as a proof of the special position shareholders exclusively enjoy (see 2.4). 
The shareholders' votes are a tool and an effective weapon as decisions cannot be made 
without these voices. Usage of this tool cannot be usefiil for the company or 
shareholders, unless the shareholders are fully aware of their other rights and practice 
these rights in order to stay close to the company and be aware of what goes on 
therein.
Therefore, voting is a basic right of a shareholder, which may not be denied 
under the company’s Article of Association, or even by a resolution of an AGM or 
EGM. The voting rights, as practised by shareholders during GMs, are closely related 
to the company’s existence. It is the basic motivator of its business. As the quorum is
Article 162 o f French Company Law no. 66-357 o f July 24, 1966.
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competed, upon providing the shareholders 'with sufficient information on the matters 
presented to the GM, and upon deliberation of each topic of the agenda, such matters 
are subjected to voting in order to adopt the relevant resolutions. Therefore, votes are 
used in important corporate decisions such as electing directors or auditors, 
authorising the accounts of the company, major asset sales, mergers, and authorisation 
of new shares issues. That means that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
depends on the efficiency of the voting process.
In general, every individual at a meeting has one vote and this is exercised by a 
show of hands. Each voter can be counted only once no matter how many shares he 
has. However, a company may allow shareholders to have a number of votes equal to 
the number of shares held -  this is called vote on a poll.®* The Kuwaiti legislator has
dedicated this right of the shareholder as provided in Article 156 of the KCL:
Every shareholder shall have a number of votes equal to the number of 
shares he holds and resolutions shah be passed by the absolute majority 
of the shares represented.
It is stipulated that each shareholder shah hold a number of votes equal to the 
number of shares owned by him. Therefore, the KCL recognises one method of voting 
(voting on a poU) when it provided, in the above article, that every shareholder has a 
number of votes equal to the number of shares he holds.
With regard to multiple voting shares in many countries, JSC shares, which are 
equal in nominal value, qualify their owner to enjoy equal rights. However, some 
countries, which have different kinds of shares such as ordinary shares and preference 
shares, give their holder a priority in receiving dividends during the life of the company
61 Article 54, Table A, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations UK 1985.
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and/or priority in distributing the company’s assets in the event of liquidation (4.5).^^
Holders of preference shares may also be given extra votes at a GM, and these are 
called “multiple voting shares”.^  ^ Whatever the reasons for issuing preference multiple 
voting shares, they are in fact misused and breach the rule of equality of shareholders. 
This is because they are granted to certain shareholders with the aim of dominating the 
company’s business by accumulating a majority in the hands of a few shareholders. 
With this in mind, many countries prohibit issuing multiple voting shares.^ "^
According to the KCL, JSCs may issue one kind of share. That share is an 
ordinary share and each shareholder has a number of votes equal to the number of his 
shares (see 3,3.1). In this context, JSCs in Kuwait cannot issue multiple voting 
shares.^  ^ In the UK, the law does not ban multiple voting rights. Therefore, it is
entirely legal for companies to issue a class of share with multiple voting right.^  ^In
Bushell V. FaW '’ the articles of the company provide that in the event of a resolution
being proposed at a GM for the removal of a director, each share held by that director 
should carry three votes. It was held that such voting rights were valid. On other 
hand, JSCs in the UK may have shareholders that have no rights to vote at GMs. 
However, non-voting shares are strongly disapproved of by the Stock Exchange of 
London.
Sameha, supra note 52, p. 249 
Sharkawi, supra note 30, p. 171.
See Article 156 of the KCL.
66 See Rights and Issues Investment Trust Ltd  v. Stylo Shoes Ltd [1965] Ch 250. 
[1970] 1 A U E R 53.
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7.3.5.1 By Whom is the Vote Exercisable?
Creditors and employees do not have a right to vote in GMs. The general rule is 
that every person whose name appears on the register of shareholders of the company 
is a member of the company and may vote accordingly (see .3.3).^  ^ The KCL is clear
on this issue when it provided in Article 156 “every shareholder” meaning only 
shareholders who have the right to vote. Therefore, a company’s Articles of 
Association cannot give a non-shareholder a right to vote at the GM other than as a 
proxy or representative of a corporate body. The UK CA 1985 clearly contemplate 
that only shareholders and their proxies or representative are entitled to vote.^^
The questions that may be asked here are: it is possible for a share to be owned 
by a person who suffers from a mental disorder? And shares be charged as security for 
loans? Shares may also be owned jointly by two or more persons, or artificial persons 
may own them. Furthermore, a shareholder may be bankrupt. The question here is 
who is entitled to attend and vote at the GM in such circumstances? If the holder of the 
shares is incapable of managing his affairs by reason of mental disorder, he may attend 
and vote by his curator or other person authorised on his behalf appointed by a 
competent court. If the shareholder is a body corporate, it delegates a natural person 
to attend and vote at the GM. If the shares are jointly held by a group of persons they 
must choose from among their number to exercise the rights derived from such a 
holding, including the right to attend and vote at the GM. Finally, as far as the 
company is concerned, it is the registered owner alone who is entitled to attend and
See Articles 130 and 134 of the KCL and S. 352 and 361 of the UK CA 1985.
In the UK CA 1985 the definition of extraordinary and special resolutions refers only to the votes of
shareholders; see S. 378.
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vote at the company meeting/® even if shares are charged by a shareholder in favour of 
his creditor. Alternatively shares may be held in trust, that is, the legal ownership may 
be vested in one person who is obliged to hold the shares for the benefit of another.^^
7.3.5.2 Why do Shareholders Alone Have Voting Rights?
In Kuwait as in many countries, shareholders alone have voting rights at GMs. 
One might ask why shareholders alone have this right? To answer this it may be useful 
to start with the importance of voting at GM. It is first necessary to understand that 
the right to vote is the right to make all decisions at the GM. All kinds of resolutions 
of the GM are issued by the votes of shareholders. Shareholders, for instance, may 
elect directors and give them the discretionary powers they need over the management 
of the company and/or they may dismiss them. The board of directors has to get 
agreement fi’om the voters at the GM to increase or decrease the capital of the 
company, to change the company’s objections, to distribute annual dividends, to 
appoint auditors. Therefore, votes are the instrument that must be used to make the 
resolutions of the GM, and this instrument should be under the control of the owners 
of the company or the main interested group in a JSC. In both cases, the group that 
has the power of voting at the GM is the shareholders (see 2.4).
®^ Article 108 of the KCL provides “The property of a (share) company may not be attached for the
satisfaction o f debts owing from one of (its) shares but the shares o f that shareholder and the 
dividends thereon may, and in such a case an entry of the attachment, based on a notice from the 
authority concerned and not be removed without a notice from that authority, shall be endorsed 
against the registration of the shares in the shares register of the company.
The execution creditor and the mortgage shall be bound by all the resolution o f the general assembly 
equally with the shareholder whose shares are charged or mortgaged but neither of them shall be 
entitled to the rights of membership o f the company.”
Younes, supra note 27, p. 363; see also Taha, Mustafa, Com/nercw/iaw, Buiret: AL-Dar Al- 
Jamaah publishing, (1982), p. 368.
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To answer the question provided above, a number of different explanations can 
be put forward. First, shareholders, as many scholars believe, are owners of the 
company and the voting right is seen as a result or aspect of this ownership.’^
Therefore, the right to vote is the method which shareholders exercise to monitor and 
have control over the board of directors who are managing their money. Second, there 
are those who reject treating shareholders as owners of a company and treat them as 
one of the interested groups in any JSC (see 2.4). They say that shareholders should 
enjoy the voting right at the GMs because they are the residual claimants to the 
company’s income.Therefore,  shareholders as the residual claimants, have the
appropriate motivation to make discretionary decisions. "^^  Thus, shareholders also, by 
this explanation, have a motivation to monitor the board of directors and company law 
gives them the power to do so by vesting in them the power to vote on many matters 
at GMs.
They enjoy this right because they are the providers of the company’s capital and 
the residual risk-bearers. Therefore, they should enjoy a special position in their 
company, as discussed in Chapter two.” Voting rights exist because someone must
have residual power to act where the aims of the company are not complete. The right 
is usually attached to the shareholders as the residual claimants to a company’s income. 
They receive most of the marginal gains and suffer most of the marginal costs. Hence,
”  Ferran, Eilis, Company Law and Corporate end., Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(1999), p. 245; see the Cadbury Committee Report states at para 6.1.
Easterbrook, F. & Fischel, D., The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law, London: Harvard 
University Press, (1991), pp. 67-72.
^^Ibid, p. 68; Ferran, supra note 72, p. 246.
”  E.F. Fama and M.C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 7 la w  c& Aeon (1983) p. 
301.
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it is felt that they are the appropriate group to exercise voting rights/® This has already 
been discussed in Chapter Two.
7.3.5.3 Voting Agreement
Shareholders may enter into agreements that determine the manner in which they 
exercise their votes. The question arises whether a shareholder is allowed under the 
KCL to enter into an agreement with his co-shareholder(s) for exercising the right to 
vote in a specific way or to abstain fi'om voting. This kind of agreement forms a bloc 
between a number of shareholders enabling them to carry more weight at GMs. The 
KCL, as in many cases, is silent on this matter. It is therefore, left to the courts to 
decide in each particular case whether an agreement should be upheld.” However, as
said earlier in this chapter, that the right to vote is a right of property and, therefore, 
voting agreements are a valid exercise of property rights and are enforceable in the 
courts, if they do not breach the law and the Articles of Association of the company.^*
Voting agreements are probably invalid if they; first, provide for a financial benefit to a 
shareholder for voting as directed; second, purport to oblige shareholders to cast their 
vote in a certain way as directors or always follow the directions of the company; third, 
purport to fetter the company’s power to alter its articles.
”  Easterbrook, F. & Fischel, D., Voting in Corporate Law, J.L & Econ, (1983) p. 403.
Sameha, supra note 52, p. 362; see also Maeijer, J., A Modern European Company Law System:
Commentary on the 1976 Dutch Legislation, Rotterdam: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International 
Publishing, (1978), p. 107.
See Greenwell v. Porter [1902] 1 Ch 530.
”  Farrar, supra note 40, p. 137.
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7.3.S.4 The Voting right and Conflict of Interest
A director of a company is in a fiduciary position and, therefore, he is subject to 
a number of restrictions to prevent a conflict of interest (see 2.5.1). However, the 
position of a shareholder in a JSC is different. Shareholders of a company are not in a 
fiduciary position. Therefore, in general, they can vote at the GM in any way they 
think fit to achieve their interests. In the UK, there are many cases that agree with this 
right. In Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd Lord Maugham said: “The 
shareholder’s vote is a right of property, and prima facie may be exercised by a 
shareholder as he thinks fit in his own interest.’’^ ^
Many cases in the UK are placing a shareholder’s rights in a company as 
property rights on the basis of a shareholder’s status which itself arises fi'om 
membership of the company (see 2.5.2). Therefore, ownership of a share gives the 
shareholder a number of rights of property; one of these rights is the right to vote at 
the GM. This right can be practised in any way the shareholder thinks fit,^  ^ even if he
has a personal interest in the resolution.®  ^ This principle was regarded as firmly 
incorporated by the Privy Council in Burland v Earle^  ^where Lord Daver held that it 
was a principle of law that
®® [1937] AC 707; In Pewt/er V Aî/jZ/mg/ow (1897) 6 ChD 70. Jessel MR held: Pender is a member of
the company, and whether he votes with the majority or with the minority he is entitled to have his 
vote recorded, an individual right in respect o f which he has a right to sue. That has nothing to do 
with the question like that raised in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 and that line of cases; also in 
Northern Counties Securities Ltd  v Fackson and Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133 at 1144 Walton J. 
said "when a shareholder is voting for or against a particular resolution he is voting as a person owing 
no fiduciary duty to the company and who is exercising his own right of property to vote as he thinks 
fit. The fact that the result o f the voting at the meeting wili bind the company cannot affect the 
position that, in voting, he is voting simply in exercise o f his own property right.”
®* Jaffey, Peter, Contractual Obligations of the Company in GM, 16 Legal Stttdies (1996) p. 31.
®^ Younes, supra note 27, p. 364; see also Jamal-adeen, All, C o / n / n e r d a / C a i r o :  Dar AI- 
Nahdah Publishing, (1961), p. 375.
®® [1902] AC 83.
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Unless otherwise provided by the regulations of the company, a 
shareholder is not debarred from voting or using his voting power to 
carry a resolution by the circumstance of his having a particular interest 
in the subject matter of the vote.
The Privy Council cited with approval North-west Transportation Co Ltdv  
Beattf"' where Sir Richard Baggallay had held that
Unless some provision to the contrary ,and every shareholder has a
perfect right to vote upon any such question, although he may have a
personal interest in the subject-matter opposed to, or different from, the 
general or particular interests of the company....
However, the freedom of shareholders to use their votes at the GM are 
subjected to some restrictions. First, when shareholders cast their votes at the GM 
they must always act bona fide for the benefit of the company, otherwise the resolution 
of the shareholders would be invalid.^^
The KCL provides in article 132/3 that ‘A member shall, in particular, be subject 
to the following obligations: (3) to abstain from any act intended to prejudice the 
company.’ It is clear from the above article that a shareholder is demanded with good 
intentions toward the company. In other words, when a shareholder’s act prejudices 
the company, he, in fact, does not act bona fide. Thus, the power of voting that the
shareholders enjoy in GMs must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law,
but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole and to protect the interests 
of other shareholders.^^ Secondly, a shareholder may not vote in certain cases
[1887] I2App Cas 589.
Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd  [1976] 2 All ER 268; also see Esttnanco ( Kilner House) L td v.
Greater London Council [1982] 1 All ER 194. In this later case Sir Rebert Megarry VC said "no right 
of a shareholder to vote in his own selfish interests or to ignore the interests of the company entitle 
him with impunity to injure his voteless fellow shareholders by depriving the company of a cause of 
action and by stultifymg the purpose for which the company was formed."
Abid-Alfdal, Ahmad, Protection of minority of shareholders, 2 Journal o f  Legal and Economic
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specified by law. For example, a shareholder should not have the right to vote on a 
resolution ratifying a contract entered into by the company in which he has a personal 
interest.
A question may be raised about the shareholder’s eligibility to vote at the GM on 
matters in which he has a direct interest. In other words, the question is, whether the 
shareholder may vote in his own immediate personal interest or whether the right to 
vote is really a power to be exercised solely in the higher interests of the body of the 
shareholders as a whole? A shareholder may not vote in certain cases specified by law, 
whereby he has a personal interest in the adoption of a certain resolution, for example, 
a deal between one of the shareholders and the company. In this case we have to say 
that shareholders are not a fiduciary for the company. As a result, shareholders, in 
general, have the right to use their rights to vote at the GM in any way they believe is 
appropriate for them to protect the interest of the company and the rest of 
shareholders. This issue must be controlled by statute.
Unfortunately, KCL does not organise this issue except in one case, namely by 
allowing the shareholder with a contribution in kind to vote on the resolution 
concerning the valuation of his contribution at the constituent meeting.** In other
cases, a shareholder is allowed to vote even if he has an interest in the resolution 
subject to voting except when the Articles of Association of a company provides that a
Research (1987) p. 151.
*’ For example Article 103 o f French Company Law no. 66-537 of July 24, 1966 provides “(4) the
interested party may not take part in the vote and his shares are not counted in calculating the quorum 
and the majority.”
** See Article 105 of the KCL that provides “A (share) company may (issue) shares otherwise than in
cash: for money’s worth or for choices in action; and the founders (of the company) shall apply to the 
President of the High Court for appointing an expert to check whether such consideration has been 
rightly valued. But the evaluation shall not be final until it is sanctioned by a majority in number of 
the shareholders holding two-thirds o f the cash shares (remaining) after excluding the cash shares 
owned by the contributors -  who shall have no right to a vote in the sanctioning of the evaluation -  of
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shareholders may not participate in voting if the shareholder has a personal interest in
the resolution. As provided in Article 33(2) of Pro Forma Memorandum of
Association of a Joint Stock Company, Appendix A:
A member may not participate in the voting on his own behalf or that of 
his principal, if the matters in respect of which the voting is required, 
relate to a personal benefit to him or to a dispute between him and the 
company.
However, despite the innocence of the wording of this article it has to be said 
that Appendix A is not mandatory in JSCs. It is just a proposal of Articles of 
Association issued by the MCI, therefore, JSCs have a choice whether to follow it or 
not.®^  In order to avoid an abuse of the right to vote by major shareholders the KCL
should have expressly prevented a shareholder fi-om voting if he has an interest to 
acquire personal gains fi'om the matter under consideration. Taking into account that 
under the KCL there is no limit to the number of votes a shareholder may have either 
in person or by proxy. Therefore, the above article of the KCL must be a mandatory 
article to which all shareholders must comply. And, as previously mentioned, 
shareholders alone have the voting power because they are the driving force behind 
making the right decisions for the future of their company. Therefore, they should not 
use this power against the interest of the company to achieve a personal interest.
Directors are, in fact, shareholders in the company they manage. Therefore, the 
above principle should be applied to them as well. They should be prevented fi'om 
casting their votes as shareholders at GMs to achieve their personal interests, and firom 
using their voting power to ratify their own breaches of duty. °^
that consideration.”
It is alike to Table A in the UK.
See Sealy, L. S., the Directors as Trustee, C .i.J  (1967) p. 83; see also,/7ogg v. Cra/np/jorn 
[1967] Ch 254; Bamford v. Bamford [1968] 2 All ER 655.
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In the UK, if the director controls the voting at the GM because he holds a 
majority of the shares carrying voting rights,®' a resolution allowing him to retain the 
profit, which is passed as a result of votes cast or controlled by him, is void. He can 
stUl be held accountable to the company.®^  A director, according to the KCL, may vote
as he wishes in the GM and no restrictions apply to his right to vote as in the UK, 
where the directors are given the opportunity to ratify their own breaches of duty and 
pass any resolution they want.
7.4 Do General Meetings Matter to the Shareholders?
One might ask, do GMs matters to the body of shareholders if;
(1) Shareholders are not interested in attending and voting at GMs, the minority 
who do attend the meeting go along with the directors.
(2) Shareholders are not, in general, interested in using the powers granted to 
them by the company’s Articles of Association and the company law to hold 
the directors of their company to account.
(3) An individual shareholder cannot do anything because he typically has only 
a tiny part of the shares in any JSC, and is, therefore, not in a to exercise 
effective monitoring of the performance of the directors.
(4) Institutional shareholders, who are estimated to own between 65 per cent 
and 75 per cent of shares of quoted companies in the UK,®® are not interested
®' Cookv. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554.
^^Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] Ch 565, [1956] 2 All ER 518.
®® Final Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (January 1998) (Hampel Committee
Report) para 5.1 note 60 per cent is held by UK institutional, around 20 per cent by foreign owners 
and the remaining 20 per cent or so by private investors. The DTI also estimates that around 80 per 
cent lies in institutional investors: the Annual General Meeting and Shareholder communications 
(Consultative Document) (October 1999) para 20; see also Potter Julian, the Role of the Institutional
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in playing their role as the most powerful group in the GMs (as a number of 
studies prove)
As a result of this situation (the weakness of GMs), the boards of directors in 
many JSCs are effectively playing two roles; that of the GM and their original role/^
Therefore, the AGMs of many companies have become places where boards of 
directors make their work of the last year legal; at the sametime, the role of 
shareholders in the company becomes just a way of putting money into the company.
If having an effective GM is an impossible goal or difficult to achieve, one might 
ask why GMs need to be held every year?®® If most shareholders believe that directors
of JSCs have complete control over the voting process and do what they want why do 
JSCs not stop holding these seemingly impractical and valueless meetings that cost the 
companies too much money? Why is company law everywhere still enforcing JSCs to 
hold GMs? Finally, why not think of something better than holding GMs as provides in 
one of the DTI report that®’
There are two ways or responding to the ineffectiveness of the AGM in 
fulfilling its role in the governance of JSCs. The first is to extend to pics 
a right to dispense with the AGM; the second is to improve the
Shareholders' Committee, in Saieem Sheikh and William Rees (eds.). Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, (1995), p. 383.
®'' Mallin, Christine A., Investors' Voting Rights, in Kevin Keasey and Mike Wright (eds.), Corporate
Governance Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd Publishing, 
(1997), p. 146. In this article Mallin provides that "the result o f a survey on voting sent to top 250 
companies in the UK provide evidence o f a low level of voting with, on average, only 35% of shares 
being voted. In 90% of the companies, the voting level is at 52% or less. These result have 
implications for UK institutional investors, who own between 65% and 75% of UK equity, and have 
been the object of criticism for not exercising their votes more." These institutions have access to 
management in way any time that individual shareholders do not have, and they can if  they wish 
bring significant pressure on board o f directors. For more information see Mallin, Chris, Voting: The 
Role of Institutional investors in Corporate Governance, London: the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales Publishing, (1995), p. 1.
®® Butcher, supra note 3, p. 230.
®® Smerdon, supra note 58, p. 156; also see Butcher, supra note 3, p. 229.
®’ See the DTI Report in the Annual General Meeting and Shareholder communications (Consultative 
Document) (October 1999) para 23.
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legislative provisions relating to the AGM to enable it better to fulfil its 
role.
Arguably demanding the abandonment of GMs will not solve the problem of the 
effectiveness of GMs. It will create new problems and make the process of monitoring 
the affairs of the company quite complex.^^ This in turn should mean more losses and
damages for the shareholders and other interested groups. Therefore, the second way 
is preferable; to have effective meetings because a JSC without a GM would be like a 
democratic country without a parliament (impossible to imagine). The GM is one of 
the main two organs of a JSC and it has its ovm duties and responsibilities (see 2.4). 
Therefore, how can we re-achieve balance among the most important organs in the 
company, which are the board and general meeting?
Any solution for the brining about balance again between the main two organs in 
any company shall be through creating means for obliging the GM to perform their 
tasks again. Shareholders are the main players GMs. Thus, any attempt for re- 
achieving balance shall be ofl;en made through the body of shareholders first. That is 
the reason behind giving shareholders their fiiU entitlements in the company, as 
obstacles which hinder them firom practising their supervisory role shall also be 
removed as already mentioned in this study. If the shareholders are unhappy with the 
performance of the directors, the effective way to express their unhappiness and 
present their ideas to the board of directors and other shareholders is through the GM. 
Therefore, GMs in general have always had a fundamental role to play in JSCs. If 
GMs do not perform their role effectively that does not mean the solution is to 
abandon them.
98 Ibid, para 25.
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To have more effective meetings it is necessary to think about how to remove 
the obstacles that preclude shareholders from attending GMs and from having an 
effective role in the meeting (see 7,3.2). Therefore, if the main reasons are the large 
numbers, the geographic spread of shareholders or that they are too busy to attend the 
GM, company law should be amended to allow voting on resolutions by post, 
telephone or even electronic ballot. These methods may improve voting levels.
One of the suggestions presented by the DTI Report on the AGM and 
Shareholder Communications (Consultative Document) (October 1999) para 30 
provided that
It would be possible to go one stage further and envisage an interactive 
virtual meeting held in no location; directors’ presentations would be 
posted on an electronic company bulletin board accessible to shareholders’ 
interventions and the directors’ responses would also be posted on the 
bulletin board. Such meeting would probably have to remain open for 
several days. Such a procedure could potentially offer even wider 
shareholder access... it is suggested that this option should be open to pics 
with unanimous shareholder agreement, as an alternative to dispensing with 
the AGM altogether...
However, to make sure that those who cast vote by these methods are real 
shareholders, there should be some procedure and/or conditions in place before giving 
a shareholder the right to vote in this way. In these circumstances, ah the proposals for 
resolutions must be sent to shareholders in good time before the meeting. This is 
because, as already mentioned, shareholders are usuaUy lay people who do not have 
enough experience to understand the accounts of the company easily. They should, 
therefore, be given greater time to review the annual accounts and reports of the 
company (see 6.7). A real obligation must also be imposed on the board of directors 
of every JSC to give enough time to make disclosures of the annual accounts (see 5.3).
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Furthermore, to enhance the function of GMs in the JSCs, company law should 
impose more obligations on directors to improve the distributions of invitations to 
shareholders to attend the meetings, to give the shareholders the right to submit 
resolutions on the expense of the c o m p a n y ,an d  create a good atmosphere for 
auditors to work independently and provide real information that presents to the 
shareholders the true picture of their company (see 6.6)/°^ Also, the body of
shareholders should have the main role regarding the auditors, such as the appointment 
of auditors and the determination of their remuneration, the determination of the audit 
extent, and the provision of any other services to the company by the auditing firm.
Additionally, as provided above, a shareholder usually only has only a tiny part of 
the shares of the company that push him to thinking he is not in a position to exercise 
an effective role at GMs.'°^ Therefore, there should be an approach to have some kind
of communication between shareholders to encourage them to attend the meetings and 
make them realise that when they work together they will have the majority. This will 
enable them to monitor the performance of the board of directors and have a 
significant voting group, which could pose as a real threat to the board of directors.
Moreover, institutional shareholders should be prevented from ignoring a 
monitoring role. In other words, they should be encouraged to carry out their
®® Ihid., para 34..
Butcher, supra note 3, p. 234.
Ibid., p. 237.
Short, Helen and Keasey, Kevin, Institutional shareholders and Corporate Governance, in Kevin,
Keasey and Mike Wright (eds.). Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remunerations, 
London: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, (1996), p. 29.
Whittington, G., Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting, 23 Accounting 
and Business Re (1993) p. 313.
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responsibilities as shareholders to their companies.As provided above, institutional
shareholders in the UK for example, control more than 65 per cent of shares of quoted
companies. This amount of ownership gives them the potential to have an effective
role at GMs. As the Cadbury Committee Report states at Para. 6.9:
Institutional shareholders...are largely holding their shares on behalf of 
individuals, as members of pension funds, holders of insurance policies 
and the like. As a result, there is an important degree of common 
interest between individual and institutional shareholders. In particular 
both have the same stake in the standards of financial reporting and of 
governance in the companies in which they have invested
Studies have shown that when institutional shareholders play a more active role 
in corporate governance affairs the more returns the shareholders get fi'om their 
company. Therefore, if an individual shareholder, who only has a tiny part of the 
company’s shares is not in the position that allows him to exercise an effective role in 
the GM, the bodies that control huge numbers of shares should take their 
responsibility. Thus, there should be a compulsory rule in every company law or 
articles of association compelling these institutions to participate and vote in the GM 
and stop them fi'om using their powers selfishly.
GMs shall not be held, unless with the attendance of the majority of shareholders 
whom are not members in the board. Among the problems resulting fi'om the Kuwaiti 
law is that upon invitation for the meeting, when the required majority does not attend 
in the first meeting, another meeting shall be held. If the meeting lacks such a quorum
Short, supra not 102, p. 28; in this articles the authors provided that "there are several reasons why
institutions may adopt sueh a stance. First, i f  they intervene publicly, they are effectively drawing to 
the public attention the difficulties the company is facing. This is likely to be perceived as bad news 
by the market, resulting in a fall in share price and a reduction in the value of their investment. 
Second, if  they become involved in the management of such problem companies, they become privy to 
inside information and unable to trade in those shares, potentially compounding their losses. Finally, 
effective monitoring is costly in terms o f time and money, especially for institutional investors which 
hold divers portfolios.”
'®®See Sheridan, Thomas and Kendall, Nigel, Corporate Governance: An Action Plan fo r  Profitability
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it must be adjourned to another day and the second such meeting shall be valid 
regardless of the number of members present. This issue is very critical, as if we 
assume that the majority in the second meeting are from board members (most often 
from shareholders), the normal result would be that the GM looses the capacity or role 
it set for. Thus, for the purpose of re-achieving equilibrium, a reasonable majority shall 
be demanded in the invitation for the second meeting, as it shall be correct -whatever 
the number of attendees is.
Auditors shall also be entitled to perform a significant role in the GM for 
shareholders interests, as they represent the company, when they monitor board 
reports. They shall have a role in clarifying to shareholders and GMs what is going on 
in the company, such as operations which may not be identical to what is mentioned in 
the company’s reports. Shareholders shall also be entitled to ask auditors for 
clarifications about any matters that is considered vague for them.
Finally, for the sake of re-achieving equilibrium, the minority of shareholders 
shall be granted their entitlements, as they are entitled to participate in decisions 
affecting them and the company. They are also entitled to investigate in the company’s 
affairs by the ministry of Commerce in order to protect the company and its 
shareholders. If this minority sensed that the GM is managed by a method that does 
not achieve the company’s high interests. It must be indicated that the existence of 
such entitlements may be a reason in suppressing who may wishes to illegally 
manipulate the general meeting’s affairs. There must be a supervisory role for the MCI 
in order to make sure that the GM is managed correctly according to the constitution 
of the company and the company law.
and Business Success, London: Pitman Publishing, (1992), p. 23.
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7,5 Conclusion
It could be said that the GM is the highest authority in the company. It plans the 
policies of the company, monitors and audits the company’s directors and appoints the 
directors. Shareholders are the main players in the GM, and they have a number of 
rights in this meeting that enable them to carry out their role.
The position of shareholders entitles them to a number of pov^ers and 
responsibilities m and out of the GMs. They acquire this position, not because they 
own the company, but because they are the main providers of the company’s capital. 
They are also the owners of the company shares and, furthermore, they are residual 
risk-bearers. Consequently, they are the most appropriate organ to monitor the 
fulfilment of the directors of the company.
However, the rights which shareholders enjoy in the GM cannot be fully applied 
without first attending the meeting. Therefore, the right of attending is substantial and 
connected with other rights, such as voting. Shareholders should have a strong belief 
that their attendance is beneficial for them to protect their interests and to protect their 
company as whole. Therefore, the obstacles that prevent them fi'om attending should 
be removed, thus encouraging them to attend. The field should not be left for the 
board of directors to do whatever they please in the company without any real 
supervision.
Furthermore, the role of institutional shareholders in Kuwait is absent. They 
have a considerable weight that cannot be neglected in these kinds of companies. 
Institutional shareholders should be obligated by law to perform certain duties in the 
GM, such as communicate with other shareholders. Thus, it is believed that the KCL 
should handle this type of shareholder and impose them to play the role of
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shareholders.
Resolutions of the GM can only be made by votes and shareholders alone have 
this right. They, under any kind of circumstances, should not be deprived from 
practising this right. To make the votes of shareholders more effective and influential in 
decision-making, shareholders should have the right to arrange voting agreements.
Finally, it should be pointed out that so far this study has discussed in detail 
shareholders rights, such as the financial rights and other significant rights. These 
rights and authorities are important to maintain their interests in the company. If they 
are practiced in the right way, they may be called "preventive rights", as they can be 
considered as an adequate protector of the company's and shareholders' interests. The 
question that shall be posed in the next and final chapter is: If a mistake is made by the 
board of directors or third party, and this mistake or shortcoming harms the company 
and shareholders, what shall be required whether from the board or the GM to 
compensate for these harms? If the shortcoming is from the board's side, shall 
shareholder(s) perform the required role to compensate the harms caused to the 
company? What is the role of the law in order to protect the rights of shareholders 
minorities who do not possess the required majority to make their voice heard by the 
board and the GM?
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Chapter Eight 
Shareholders’ Remedies
8, Introduction
The shai'eholders in the GM are supreme in the company. Sh^eholders are the 
ones who contributed to the company’s capital. Therefore, they should have the major 
say in what is done with the capital that they invested in the company. However, the 
picture is not always as excellent as this for many reasons; including the fact that 
directors may be majority shareholders. They are, thus, in a position both to handle 
awkward questions from shareholders and are in a position to approve their own 
actions because they have the advantage of weighted voting.
The question that is addressed in this chapter is; if the minority shareholders have 
been treated badly by the board of directors who may be the majority shareholders, or 
if the directors who control the majority of shareholders are managing the company to 
achieve their personal interests, what remedy can the minority shareholders seek under 
the KCL?
As a general principle, each person sustaining damage as a result of a decision or 
erroneous act may proceed with a liability action. In the case of JSCs, the damage 
arising from the acts of the board of directors may harm the company and some or all 
of the shareholders, as well as third parties. However, a JSC, as a legal person, may 
file an action against the wrongdoers to recover the damages, and if it faüs to defend 
its rights, a shareholder or number of shareholders of the company have the right to 
resort to the courts and file an action in his, or in the company’s name, to force the 
board of directors to maintain the assets of the company or to obtain a fair indemnity
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against the damages sustained by him as a result of the error committed by the board.
In this final chapter, there is a focus on the means available for shareholders or 
the minority of shareholders, to repair or remedy the harm done to the company and 
shareholders (or some of them), because of the negligence of the board or because of 
the action of a third party. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to discuss what is 
required to be done about the damage and by whom. What are the rights and 
authorities for shareholders or the minority of shareholders to face these harms, in or 
outside the GM, according to the KCL? Is there a shortcoming in the law regarding 
this matter?
This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will be about the 
actions that may be brought by the company and shareholders. There are different 
types of action to defend the company and shareholders’ rights. These may be 
proceeded by the company itself or the shareholders against the board of directors or a 
third party. Examples include the company’s action, the derivative action and personal 
action and these will each be discussed in turn. The second part of this chapter will 
concentrate on the statutory remedies that exist for shareholders who do not want to 
proceed with a legal action to defend the company or their personal rights.
8.1 Liability Actions
This section will consider the liability actions that may be brought by the 
company itself or its shareholders to defend the interests of the company or their 
personal interests.
A question that may be asked before discussing the kinds of actions that may be 
brought by the company or shareholders and the statutory protection of shareholders
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under the company law, is: What is the distinction between the company’s rights of 
action and shareholders’ rights of action? The differences between the company’s 
right of action and an individual shareholder’s right of action lie in the purpose of the 
action and in the nature of the damages sought. An action belongs to the company 
either when the company or all of its shareholders have an interest in the action, and if 
its purpose is to maintain, reconstitute or augment company capital. On the other hand, 
an action will be a personal action if the company and the majority of shareholders do 
not have an interest in it, and if also the purpose of the action is to recover damages 
relates to the personal right of the shareholder in the company. Thus, he sues to 
protect his personal rights.
However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, there are a number of 
obstacles in the path of a shareholder who wants to proceed with an action against the 
wrongdoing directors or officers, whether, as provided above, on his own behalf or on 
behalf of the company.^
8.1.1 Action of the Company
The company, as a legal person, like any other person is entitled to initiate an 
action against any person committing an actionable wrong causing damage to it, even 
If the wrongdoers are its directors, founders or officers.^ The action of the company is 
the action owned by the company as an artificial person.
The objective of this action is to indemnify the company against material damage
' Sealy, Problems of standing, Pleading and proof in Corporate Litigation, in Pettet, B. G. (ed.). 
Company in Change: Current Legal Problems, London: Sevens Publishing, (1987), p. 2.
’ Abou Zeid, Radwan, Commercial Companies in Kuwait Comparative Law, 1st edn, Cairo: Dar Al-
fker Al-Arabi Publishing ,(1978), p456; Mahmoud, Al sharkawi , Commercial Companies in 
Egyptian Law, Cairo: Dar AL-Nahdah Publishing (1986), p.226
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sustained by it, i.e. the artificial person itself. The aim is to protect the shareholders 
represented by the company and eliminate the damage sustained by them. In this 
action, damages are general and sustained by the company and all of its 
shareholders^and it is insufficient to believe that the damage has extended only to the
company’s shareholders.'^
The damages that may be sustained by the company can take several forms these 
include a decrease of its capital due to gross negligence of the board, misuse of 
powers, or the conclusion of loss-making transactions, thus harming the financial 
adequacy of the company and the shareholders at that time.^ The damage extends to 
each shareholder, whose shares lose part of their value, in addition to the losses 
incurred by the company.
Pursuant to the KCL all commercial partnerships and companies (except joint 
ventures),® constitute legal personalities with the result that when the contracting
parties enter into legal agreements on behalf of the company, they are not considered
as separate persons exercising rights and bearing obligations, but as part of one entity.
Also, KCL leaves no doubt about when legal personality takes effect when it provides
in Article 74 that:
The decree of incorporation of a JSC shall be published in the 
official Gazette, and the company shall become a legal person as 
fi'om the date of issue thereof.
However, such a legal personality (the company) and its directors cannot be 
pleaded agaiust by a third party unless all the registration formalities have been
® Younes, All, Commercial Companies, Egypt: Dar-Ai-feker Al-Araby Publishing, (1991), p.429.
“ Ibid, p. 429.
® Abou Zied, Radwan, Shareholding Companies in Public Sector, Eygpt: Dar Al-fker Al-Arabi 
publishing, (1983), p. 219.
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satisfied otherwise any action that may be brought by the company will be rejected/
As the JSC is an artificial person, it cannot by itself proceed with an action.
Therefore, who can represent the company and start the company action? Who in this
action is the proper plaintiff in this action to redress an alleged wrong to the company
by anyone, whether directors, shareholders or outsiders? Who has the direct right to
proceed on this action? It is established that this action is initiated by the company’s
representative i.e. the chairman of the board of directors, being its representative
before third parties, including the judiciary. This conforms with the provision of
Article 147 of KCL that provides:
The chairman of directors of the company shall (also) be its 
president. He shall represent the company in dealings with third 
parties and his signature in such dealings shall be deemed that of 
the board of directors. He shall carry the resolutions of the board 
into effect and the company with its recommendations.
Hence, the board of directors and, specifically, the chairman is the party with 
jurisdiction to initiate such an action in order to protect the company’s rights.^
Therefore, if an actionable wrong has been done to the company, then the company, as 
an independent person, has the right to file an action through its representative. One of 
the authorities granted to the boards due to distribution of authorities m JSCs, is the 
representation of the company before the courts in order to defend the company’s
® See Article 2 of the KCL.
’ Article 10 of the KCL provides that “ The directors of the company shall comply with the formalities
for its registration prescribed by the provisions o f the Commercial Register Law, and, as against a 
third party, the company may not contend that it exists but ifom the date on which those formalities 
are completed. Failure to complete them shall cause any action brought by the company to be 
rejected.
One the other hand, a third party may maintain that the company exists though the formalities for its 
registration have not been completed.”
* The Egyptian Company law no. 159/1981 in article 85/3 is clearer than KCL when provides “ the 
chairman of the board represent the company before the judicature...”
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rights in case it was exposed to any harms. If the board of directors fails to perform 
their duties, the authority shall be transferred to shareholders in the GM.
In the UK, the company as an artificial person may initiate an action against 
anybody committing a wrong to it, even against its directors if they violate their duties 
towards the company, exceed their limits of their authority, or violate the provisions of 
the law or the company’s Articles of Association. Therefore, the company itself is the 
proper plaintiff to initiate the action of the company. This is mentioned in one of the 
most famous cases in this subject on the UK: Foss v Harbottle. In this case Foss and 
Turton were minority shareholders in a company in which Harbottle and others were 
directors and shareholders. The directors sold a plot of land to the company at an 
inflated price.^ Foss claimed that the directors had defi'auded the company. The
directors replied that they were entitled to decide what price the company should pay 
for its acquisitions. Foss and other minority shareholders sued the directors. It was 
held that it was not for Foss and his fellow minority shareholders to raise an action 
against the directors for fi'aud or for making the company lose money on a costly 
bargain. The court also held that the proper plaintiff was the company itself, as it was 
the company as a whole that was being defi'auded or mismanaged, and because the 
plaintiff (Foss and Turton) were not the company. If the company had suffered, it was 
for the company to start an action.
From the statement of Lord Davey in it is also noticed that
there are three principles:
® At the time of the case the present rules on fiduciary duties of directors were undeveloped and there 
was little judicial control over companies.
10 [1902] AC 83.
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1. If a wrong is done to the company as a person separate from its shareholders then 
the only body which may sue for redress is the company itself;
2. The court will not interfere in the internal administration of the companies 
performing within their powers;
3. A shareholder cannot sue to rectify a mere informality or irregularity if the act 
when done regularly would be within the powers of the company and if the 
intention of the majority of shareholders is clear. “
Moreover, it is usual that the articles of associations of JSCs grant the board of 
directors the right to initiate action on behalf of the company.
It could be noticed that the above cases and discussion took no account of the 
fact that, sometimes, directors are the perpetrators of wrongdoing or fraud. In other 
words, the position described above is acceptable if the defendant or the wrongdoer is 
somebody outside of the board of directors. If the defendants include all or the 
majority of the board of directors, it is surely unreasonable that the board could sue 
itself on behalf of the company. So, a question may be asked: What if the board
adopts a resolution not to proceed with the action?
KCL provides that the company itself, the shareholders and third parties may
" In Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, CA, Jenkins LJ referred to the rule in v
Harbottle as applying only where a wrong had been done to the company as a separate person and 
said that it had two elements: “First, the proper plaintiff in an action in respect o f a wrong alleged to 
be done to a company or association of persons is prima facie the company or the association of 
persons itself. Secondly, where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on 
the company or association and on all its members by a simple majority of the member, no individual 
member of the company is allowed to maintain an action in respect o f that matter for the simple 
reason that, if  a mere majority of the members of the company or association is in favour of what has 
been done, then cadit quaestio.”
See Table A, art 70 of the UK CA 1985; and article 21(1) of the Kuwaiti pro forma of article of
association of a JSC Appendix B that provides “The chairman of the board o f directors shall represent 
the company before the judiciary and shall implement the directors’ resolution.”
Tamma, Alsharamiri, Commercial Companies Law o f Kuwait, 3®** edn, Kuwait: Author Publishing, 
(1999), p. 443.
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hold the board of directors to account even after a vote of the GM to absolve the
board of responsibility if the board committed one of the types of conduct mentioned
in Article 148 of the KCL. Article 148 provides:
The chairman and members of the board of directors shall be 
accountable to the company, the shareholders, and third parties, 
for any fraudulent act, abuse of powers, violation of law or the 
articles of the company, or error of management and a vote of the 
general assembly to absolve the board of responsibility shall not 
prevent an action for liability from being brought.
Therefore, the company as an artificial person, may initiate the action against its 
board of directors if they commit fraud, misuse their authority, violate the law, the 
provisions of the company’s articles of association, or commit a gross error in 
management. It is understood from this article that KCL gives the company, as an 
independent person, the right to sue whoever damages its interests. As a company 
does not have a physical existence, it must act through other people. When the 
company wants to sue, it practises this right through its representative i.e. the board of 
directors.
Does the company, by its GM under the KCL, have the right to proceed with the 
action on behalf of the company and against the board of directors if the board has 
refused to proceed with the action? According to the above article, the board of 
directors is accountable to the company. That means the company through its GM, 
has the right to proceed with an action of the company against the board of directors. 
Therefore, the GM can proceed with the action of the company against that board. 
The GM, in this case, may dismiss the board of directors and elect another board to 
proceed with the action. If the wrongdoers only include some of the directors, then 
the action against them is conducted in the name of the company by the other
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directors.
However, the majority in the GM may ratify an act by as long as the purpose of 
this ratifying resolution is passed bona fide in the interest of the company. In 
MacDougall v Gardiner the Mellish LJ provides that/^
In my opinion, if the thing complained of is a thing which in 
substance the majority of the company are entitled to do, or if 
something has been done irregularly which the majority of the 
company are entitled to do regularly, or if something has been 
done illegally which the majority of the company are entitled to do 
legally, there can be no use in having litigation about it, the 
ultimate end of which is only that a meeting has to be called, and 
then ultimately the majority get its wishes. Is it not better that the 
rule should be adhered to that if it is a thmg which the majority 
are the master of, the majority in substance shall be entitled to 
have their wül followed?
The exercise of power of the majority to ratify the actions of the board depends 
on whether it was exercised bona fide in the interest of the company as a whole. If 
the wrongdoing directors held the majority of the votes in the GM, then the directors’ 
action cannot be ratified. Therefore, the court will allow minority shareholders to 
bring an action on the basis that the majority had acted with the purpose of benefiting
See Article 160/5 of the Egyptian Company Law; Like in the Saudi Arabian Company Law article
77 that provides “the company may institute an action in liability against its directors for wrongful 
acts that cause prejudice to the body o f shareholders. The resolution to institute this action shall be 
made by the regular GM, which shall appoint a person (or persons) to pursue the case on behalf o f the 
company...”; see also A wad. All, Commercial Companies, Cairo: Dar Al-nahda Ai-arabia Publishing, 
(1961), p. 203-4.
(1875) 1 ChD 13 at 25.
In Parke v Daily News Ltd  [1962] Ch 927 a company sold a major part of its business and proposed
to distribute part of the proceeds of the sale to its employees as compensation for loss of employment. 
A minority shareholders successfully objected on the basis that the employees had no legal right to 
such compensation. The court held that the directors’ proposal was not inspired by the best interest of 
the company, therefore, that the voluntary payments were ultra vires the company and the majority in 
GM could not ratify the proposal.
See Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554.
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themselves or the directors at the minority’s expense/^ Nevertheless, there are a
number of exceptions that permit a shareholder or minority shareholders to start an 
action on behalf of their company and these will be discussed in the next section.
It should be noted that the liability of the board of directors is a joint one if all 
members collectively create liability. However, if the act of creating a liability is
committed by only one director, the company shall have no other option but to have 
recourse against that member of the board. If he indemnifies the company, then it shall 
not be entitled to have recourse against the remaining directors, as provided in Article 
149 of KCL that:
(1) The liability referred to in the preceding article may be 
personal, i.e. attach to an individual member or collective, i.e. 
attach to the whole board as a body. In the latter case all the 
members shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages, 
unless some of them had objected to the resolution which resulted 
in the liability and the objection had been entered in the minutes 
(of the meeting).
(2) The period of limitation on the action for liability (referred to 
in the preceding article), shall be five years from the date of the 
meeting of the general assembly at which the board of directors 
rendered an account of its management.
According to this article, the directors’ liability shall be assumed by all directors 
if the wrongful act arises, for example, fi’om a resolution adopted by a unanimous vote. 
But with respect to resolutions adopted by a majority vote, dissenting directors shall 
not be liable if they have expressly recorded their objection in the minutes of the 
meeting. Absence fi’om the meeting at which such resolution is adopted, shall not 
constitute cause for relief fi’om liability, unless it is approved that the absentee was not
See for example Menier v H ooper’s Telegraph Works (1874) LR 9 Ch App 350,
See article 199 of the KCL and article 169 of the Egyptian Company Law; see also Carriage Co­
operative Supply Association  (1884) 27 Ch D 322.
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aware of the resolution. The limitation period for the action that may be brought 
against the board of directors is five years, starting from the date of the GM where the 
board of directors rendered the accounts of its management.
8.1.2 Derivative Action
A derivative action is commenced by a shareholder or the minority of 
shareholders in the name of the company to redress a wrong done to the company. 
This type of action has no support fi’om the board of directors or the majority of 
shareholders. Therefore, a derivative action is not duly authorised by the proper 
organs of the company. The derivative action as described in Smith v CrofF^ is:
... a form of pleading originally introduced on the ground of 
necessity alone in order to prevent a wrong going without redress.
The derivative action is an exceptional procedural instrument for enabling the 
court to do justice to shareholders of a company controlled by the wrongdoing 
directors or shareholders.^^ It could be said that a shareholder or the minority of 
shareholders who want to bring this action are seeking to escape fi’om the principle of 
majority rule.^^
Some people may raise a question about the legal basis of this action. It is within 
the framework of protecting the public savings of the shareholders who invest their 
savings in the shares of JSCs. The legislators have surrounded this type of company 
with a special protection by noting the company’s action if it sustains damage. The
[1988] Ch 114, 185; see Shareholders Remedies: A Considtative Document, DTI November 1998, 
URN 98/994.
As Lawton L.J. provided in Nurcomhe v Nurcomhe [1985] 1 W.L.R. 370 at 376.
Hollington, Robin, Minority Shareholders’ Rights, London: Sweet & Maxwell Publishing, (1994),
p. 11.
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GMs would have the right to decide whether to initiate such an in its sole capacity as 
the artificial person (company). If it deputises the board to take over the company’s 
affairs, the GM solely has the right to question on the damages sustained by the 
company as a result of their violation of the company law or the company’s articles of 
association, or if they commit errors or misuse the funds of the company.
A company, as an artificial person, may initiate an action against any body. As 
provided above, a company is the proper plaintiff to bring an action to recover 
damages. Thus, a third party cannot be allowed to bring an action in relation to 
wrongs done to another and, if a third party (such as a shareholder) is allowed to, this 
could lead to multiple actions against a single defendant in relation to a single wrong.^^
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the company is an artificial person acting through its 
board, the board shall be the party representing the company in bringing the action. 
This is acceptable if the defendants are of the directors of the company or even some 
of the board’s members. But, if the defendants include the majority or all of the 
members of the board of directors, then it is illogical that the board will sue itself As 
previously mentioned, it is left to the GM of the company to dismiss the present board 
and appoint a new one to initiate the action.
However, this not always easy, '^^especially if such a board has control over the 
GM or if the majority shareholders are the directors of the company.^^ Therefore, a 
GM may be unable to perform its function, i.e. protecting the company’s funds. As in
This principle mentioned in many cases for example in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd  v Newman
Industries Ltd (No2) [1982] Ch 204, 210 provided that "... the elementary principle that A cannot, as 
a general rule, bring an action against B to recover damages or secure other relief on behalf o f C for 
an injury done by B to C.”
Tamma, supra note 13, p.444.
25 Stamp, Mark, Minority Shareholders; Another Nail in the Coffin, 9 Co Law (1988) p. 135.
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the case of Cook v DeeksF^ the board of directors (who hold the majority votes in the
GM) sought to ratify their action that breached their fiduciary duty toward the
company. Lord Buckmaster LC opined:
Even supposing it be not ultra vires of the company to make a 
present to its directors, it appears quite certain that directors 
holding a majority of votes would not be permitted to make a 
present to themselves. This would be to allow a majority to 
oppress the minority.
Consequently, the action of the company could be restricted or stopped by the 
board of directors or by the majority in the GM who are actually controlled by the 
board. As a result, a company would be unable to proceed with the company action to 
protect the company capital and shareholders interests. This situation compelled many 
legislative bodies to admit the right of a shareholder to initiate the company’s action if 
the GM fails to do so.^ ^
If the shareholders have the right to start the action on behalf of the company, 
who is responsible for the costs of the derivative action? The cost of the action is one 
of the greatest obstacles to the shareholder action. In Wallersteiner v. Moir (No2) 
[1975] 1 All ER 849, the Court of Appeal held that in a minority shareholder’s action, 
the court could order that the company indemnify the plaintiff (a shareholder) against 
the costs of the action. This is rational because a shareholder as plaintiff has sued on 
behalf of the company, and the benefit of the action, if successful, will accrue to the 
company and only indirectly to the shareholders who proceed the action.^^
[1916] 1 AC 554 at 564.
”  For example, see article 245 and 246 of France Company Law 1966 that give shareholders the right
to start derivative action; see Sugarman, David, Reconceptualising Company Law-Reflections on the 
Law Commission’s Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies, in Rider, Barry A K., (ed)., The 
Corporate Dimension, Bristol: Jordans Publishing, (1998), p. 210.
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8.1.2.1 What is the stance of KCL towards the derivative action?
Do shareholders under the KCL have the right to bring this action on behalf of 
the company? Some countries, such as Egypt, give this right to the shareholders of a 
JSC^ ,^ in addition, Saudi Company Law provides in article 78:
Every shareholder shall have the right to institute the action in 
liability against directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful 
act committed by them is of a nature to cause him personal 
prejudice. However, the shareholder may institute such action 
only of the company’s right to institute it is still valid and after 
notifying the company of his intention to do so..
Unfortunately, this is another issue that the KCL is not clear about. The Kuwaiti 
legislator has not taken a stance on whether to allow or reject the right of derivative 
action. But, from the provision of Article 148 of the KCL that provides that the 
chairman and members of the board of directors are accountable to the shareholders, it 
could be concluded that the shareholder might initiate derivative action, as declared by 
Dr. Alshammiri.^^
However, in light of the wording of article 148, it cannot be asserted that the 
Kuwaiti legislator specifically permits derivative action in the article. The article is also 
ambiguous regarding the rights of shareholders’ to bring an action because of its 
expansive scope. If it is accepted that Article 148 refers to the right of a shareholder 
to bring an action against the board of directors, one might ask what kind of action 
personal action or derivative action? This is difficult to establish from the wording of 
the article. Therefore, it is unclear whether a shareholder or a minority of shareholders
Tamma, supra note 13, p.444.
See Egyptian Company Law no 159/1981 article 102/3, Syrian Company Law article 196/2, 
Lebanon Company Law article 168, Jordanian Company Law article 188.
See Aziz, Al-akaii, Commercial Companies: Jordan Law, Aman: Maktabat Dar Althkafah 
Publishing, (1995), p. 377-8.
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have the absolute right to sue the board of directors on behalf of the company by 
bringing a derivative action.
The Kuwaiti legislator should have realised that the board of any company has 
many ways and means of preventing the GM from taking the decision to initiate action 
against it. Therefore, any shareholder should clearly and explicitly be allowed to 
initiate a derivative action if the GM of the company fails to assume its responsibilities.
The right of derivative action should at least be indicated in article 131.5 of the 
KCL, which determines the rights of shareholders in a JSC.^  ^ It provides that each 
shareholder of a JSC must have the power to apply to the court for the annulment of 
any resolution issued by the GM or the board in violation of the law, public order, or 
the memorandum or articles of association of the company. This article omits the
shareholder’s right to initiate an action on behalf of the company if the GM fails to 
initiate it.
If the shareholders under KCL do not have a clear right of derivative action 
agamst the board of directors, do they have the right of this action against the founders 
of the company who were in control of the company before the election of the first 
board of directors? In fact, nothing in KCL no. 15/1960 gives such a right to 
shareholders against the founders of their company. As a result of this lack in KCL, 
many offences have been committed by the founders of JSCs against these companies 
and the investors m these companies such as shareholders. For example, the 
Committee that was established by the Kuwaiti Cabinet after the Kuwaiti Stock Market
Tamma, supra note 13, p. 445; see also Radwan, supra note 2, p. 459.
Ibid.
Article 131/5 of the KCL provides that “ A member shall in particular enjoy the following rights;
(5) to apply to the court for adjudging null any resolution of the GM or the board of directors which 
infringes law or the public policy or is ultra vires the article of the company or its memorandum of
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crash in 1982 found that the founders of some companies carried out the companies’ 
activities and disposal of capital of their companies before the completion of the official 
establishment of these companies. Despite the fact that founders are not allowed, 
under the KCL, to dispose of their shares in the first three years after the completion of 
the establishment of the company, some also sold their (see 4.1.3.2). Therefore, the 
founders of any company must be responsible for all illegal or ultra vires actions and, if 
they have the power to prevent the action of the company against them, every 
shareholder should have the right to bring a derivative action against the founders to 
protect the company assets.
If the company is being wound up, the liquidator, as a general rule, has the 
statutory power to litigate in the name of the company as provided in Article 175 of 
KCL:
The liquidators shall be provided with an account of the 
management of the company fi'om the date on which the GM 
approved the last balance sheet up to the commencement of the 
liquidation; and they shall submit to the court (any matter dealt 
with by this account) which in their opinion should be submitted 
to the court.
Thus, if the company has gone into liquidation, there is no need for a derivative 
action to be brought by a shareholder because the liquidator will have taken control of 
the company’s business affairs. If there is reasonable cause for the company to bring 
action against wrongdoers (such as directors), the liquidator can do this in the name of 
the company.
The question here is, if the liquidator is unwilling to bring an action in the 
company’s name, does any shareholder under KCL have the right to bring an action? 
Unfortunately, this right has only been given to the GM, who can contest the accounts
association.
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of the liquidators and go to the court. Therefore, if the GM is controlled by the board 
of directors, as in many JSCs, an ordinary shareholder will be deprived to use his rights 
to go to court to protect the assets of the company. '^  ^In the UK, for example, if the
liquidator is unwilling or refuses to bring an action in the name of the company, any 
shareholder of the company may apply to the court to order the liquidator to do so. 
Alternatively, shareholders may get an order allowing them to bring an action in the 
name of the company.^^
The shareholder’s right to bring a derivative action has several advantages; first, 
it forces the founders and the board of directors of any company to protect the rights 
and funds of the company, and to work purely in the interests of the company, 
especially when they know that they could be sued any time. It would mininiise the 
control of the majority in the GM, especially when the GM is controlled by the board 
of directors. If so, the GM of shareholders wiU be able to take deterrent decisions 
against the action of the company. Therefore, the KCL needs to be modified with a 
clear article giving the shareholders this right on behalf of the company, if the board 
and the GM fail to bring an action. Third, it is important to mention in this context 
that, when the board is controlling the GM, the shareholders must seek a mechanism or 
means to rectify such errors as well as protect the rights of the company and, 
consequently, their rights.
In the UK, a company is a separate legal person and, therefore, the proper
Article 177 of the KCL provides that “The auditors shall make a report on the accounts tendered by
the liquidators. This report shall be submitted to the GM in an ordinary meeting to be approved by 
the GM together with the liquidators’ release.
If the GM contests the accounts, the dispute shall be referred to the court.
The power of the court to order the liquidator to sue is granted by the Insolvent Act 1986, ss. 112
(1), 167 (3) and 168 (5) the latter section provides that “ If any person is aggrieved by an action or 
decision of the liquidator, that person may apply to the court; and the court may confirm, reverse or 
modify the act or decision complained of, and make such order in the case as it thinks just.” ; see also
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plaintiff to defend its rights. However, this rule is subject to a number of exceptions in 
which an individual shareholder or minority shareholders may bring a derivative action. 
This action is brought instead of an action in the name of the company.
As an exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, a derivative action may be 
brought by a shareholder or by minority shareholders in the UK for the following 
reasons. First, where the wrong is a fraud by the majority of the shareholders (who are 
often also commonly the directors) on the minority and where the wrongdoers are in 
control of the company’s GM. The minority shareholders, in this case, are not only 
defending their interests in the company, but also first the right and interests of the 
company. For example, say the wrongdoers control the majority of votes in the GM 
and will not permit an action to be brought in the name of the company. If the 
wronged minority shareholders are not able bring an action, in such a case, their 
objections would never reach the court.^^ In Daniels v Daniels^^ the minority
shareholders were allowed to bring an action where the directors had approved the sale 
of company land to one of them at a price alleged to be well below its market value. 
The directors refused to bring an action, stating that fraud had not been alleged. 
Templeman J provides:
If minority shareholders can sue if there is fraud, I see no reason
why they cannot sue where the action of the majority and
Fargro Ltd  v Godfroy [1986] 1 WLR 1134, 1136.
In Cook V Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 a shareholder brought an action to compel the directors to
account to the company for the profits made out o f the construction contract which they took in their 
own names. See also as example of fraud Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254, in this case the directors 
have authority to allot shares, and use that authority to allot shares to new members, who when voting 
with the directors in their capacity as shareholders, are able to outvote the previous majority and turn 
it into a minority; see J.H. Farrar and others, Farrar's Company Law, London: Butterworths 
Publishing, 4‘^  edn (1998), p. 436.
[1978] Ch. 406.
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directors, though without fraud, confers some benefit on those 
directors and majority shareholders themselves/^
Second, where the act is illegal or ultra vires, an individual shareholder may 
obtain an injunction to restrain the company proceeding with the illegal or ultra vires 
act. An illegal transaction or act cannot be ratified, and a shareholder can compel the 
company not to undertake it. If the illegal transaction is already being carried out, the 
shareholder can stop any further process of the illegal transaction. Section 35(2) gives 
statutory effect to the right of a minority shareholder to bring proceedings to restrain 
the doing of an ultra vires act.^ ®
The third reason for a derivative action is when a company has acted on a 
resolution which has not been properly passed. This may happen when there is a 
matter that could not be validly sanctioned by a simple majority but only by a special 
majority, and where this special resolution has not been obtained. Thus, in Bailli v 
Oriental Co. Lt(t^, a shareholder was able to bring a derivative action when the
company tried to pass a special resolution without giving adequate notice. Also, a 
company would be restrained from acting on an ordinary resolution when the 
company’s articles of association required that the matter in question be authorised by 
a special resolution.
See Sealy, L S., Cases and Materials in Company Law, 5^  ^ edn, London: Butterworths Publishing, 
(1992), p. 480.
S. 35 (2) o f the UK CA 1985 provides that “A member of a company may bring proceedings to
restrain the doing of an act which but for subsection (1) would be beyond the company’s capacity; but 
no such proceedings shall lie in respect of an act to be done in fulfillment of a legal obligation arising 
from a previous act o f the company.”; see Parke v the Daily News Ltd & Ors [1962] 2 All ER 929. 
% 9 1 5 ] 1 Ch. 503.
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Fourth, where the personal rights of shareholders, such as, the right to vote or 
the right to attend meetings has been violated/^ Here, a shareholder may sue in his 
own name to restrict an act which is an infringement of his individual rights/^
8.1.2.2 The Limit of Derivative Action
As mentioned at the beginning that shareholders’ right to start a derivative action 
in the name of the company is an exceptional right, which cannot be practiced unless 
within the narrowest limits. As granting this right without remarkable constrains shall 
affect the company’s reputation. Therefore, conditions must be set on practicing this 
right, and this practice shall be made in the narrowest limits as mentioned.
However, it may be said that, the intervention of the shareholder in filing the 
action on behalf of the company may limit the board’s authority, and confound the 
expectations of such a board. Furthermore, it would motivate the management not to 
neglect the maintenance of the company’s rights. It would also encourage the minority 
of shareholders to monitor the company’s management actions, while limiting the
Pender v Liishington (1877) 6 Ch D 70; see also Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co. (1889) 42 Ch D 
636.
The law Commission published a report on shareholder remedies which made a number of
recommendations for legislative and procedural change. See Law Commission Consultation Paper No 
142, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper (London: the Stationery Office, 1996), The DTI 
support the majority of the recommendations and summarised these recommendations in one o f its 
consultative papers. The report provided regarding the derivative action: there should be a new 
derivative procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible criteria for determining whether a 
shareholder can pursue the action. Also, about the availability o f the new derivative action it provide; 
the new procedure should only be available members if  the cause of action arises as a result of an 
actual or threatened act or omission involving (a) negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust 
by a director or shadow director of the company, or (b) a director putting himself in a position where 
his personal interests conflict with his duties to the company. The claimant of the action should give 
a notice at least 28 days before the commencement of proceedings, and this notice should determine 
the grounds of the proposed action. Moreover, a shareholder is able to start the action if; (1) the 
applicant of the action in a good faith want to protect the interest of the company and the court has the 
power to refuse the action if  the action not in the interests of the company; (2) the claim is capable of  
being pursued as a derivative action; (3) the company has failed to prosecute the claim diligently; for 
more information see Shareholders Remedies: A Consultative Document, DTI November 1998, URN 
98/994,
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control of the majority over the company’s destiny/^ Therefore, the existence of the
rights of derivative action is vital for the body of shareholders. However, some people 
might think that giving the shareholders this right could cause some difficulties. 
Granting the shareholder this right may be a reason for concern and instability to the 
company’s management. The possibility of multiple actions may lead to the rendering 
of contradictory judgments. It may also damage the reputation of the company. This 
would cause some people to demand that the right to bring such an action be confined 
to the GM of the company.
However, such criticism may be refuted by noting that the lack of this right of 
shareholders may cause alot of damage to the company and, consequently, the 
shareholders, especially if the board of directors frilly control the GM of the company. 
There may be concern that shareholders could misuse this right and thus cause damage 
to the company’s image. The legislator may impose a number of conditions on this 
right in order to guarantee that nobody can misuse this right.
1. The person that wants to bring the action must be a proper person to bring 
this action to the court. Therefore, he must be a shareholder in the
44company.
2. A particular person might not be a proper person if his conduct is tainted in 
some way under the rules of justice. For example, a shareholder will not be 
allowed to bring the action if he participated in the wrong doing or if 
motivated by completely personal interests which are not to the benefit of
Alumani, Asyed M., Protection o f Minority Shareholders in Holding Companies, (1986), p. 134. 
According to the Canada Business Corporation Act, there are a number of Conditions that must be
existed and the court must be satisfied that these conditions exist as provides in Ss. 238 and 239 (1) 
reasonable notice has been given to the board of directors (2) the complainant is acting in good faith; 
and (3) it appears to be in the interests of the eompany that the aetion be brought or defended.
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the company/^
3. The law should always provide that this right is an exceptional right and a 
shareholder cannot take advantage of it until the board of directors and the 
GM have refused or failed to bring the action on behalf of the company.
4. Any shareholder who intends to start this action on behalf of the company 
must be doing so, for the benefit of the company and not for some other 
purpose.'^^
5. A shareholder should only be allowed to bring the action for the benefit of 
the company only if another satisfactory remedy is not available.'^^
6. The shareholder who wants to bring the derivative action must first inform 
the GM about his intention to bring an action in the name of the company. 
This condition may compel the board or the GM to remedy wrongs done to 
the company, or to bring the action on behalf of the company instead of 
letting a shareholder bring a derivative action that may affect the company’s 
reputation.
7. Company law may specify exceptional cases where a shareholder may bring 
such an action, as in the UK.
8. The court should always have the power to dismiss any derivative action
brought by a shareholder which, in the opinion of the court, has no realistic
prospect of success at full trial.
9.Finally,among the means which contribute to not resorting to filing an action
v Duckett (CA 1994) [1995] 1 BCLC 243.
French law stipulates, under articles 245 and 246, that a shareholder who wishes to practice the
company’s action in his name should produce evidence that such action is being practised for the 
company’s interest rather than his personal interest, and that it aims at indemnifying the company for 
the damages sustained by it.
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in the name of the company by one of the shareholders is the particularly 
significant resolutions of GMs, which affect shareholders’ rights (especially the 
minority) shall not be issued unless by a special majority, as the ordinary 
majority is not sufficient, which may be available easily for board members. 
Hence, they can decide what they may wish easily. Therefore, the following 
matters should be carried out by special resolution and article and 
memorandum of association cannot provide to the opposite.
(a) Alteration of the objects of the company;
(b) Alteration of the article of association;
(c) Changing of the company’s name;
(d) Reducing or increasing the company capital;
(e) Restricting the liability of the board of directors;
(f) Any resolution about wounding up the company;
(g) Any resolution about merging or reconstructing the company.
8.1.3 The Personal Action
Obviously if a shareholder can point to the violation of some of his personal 
rights then he need not to be concerned with the rule of Foss v Harbottle at all"^  ^this is
because the wrong is done to him and not to the company, and this wrong damages his 
personal right in the company. In other words, if the board, some of its members, or 
an employee commit an act that causes direct damage to one or more shareholders, any 
party sustaining damage may sue the board of directors.
See Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243 at 250.
Wedderburn, K.W., The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, C.L.J (1957) p .194; Wedderburn, K.W., 
Shareholders, Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Horbottle, C .L J  (1958) p. 93; see also Sealy, Cases and
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A shareholder would initiate the personal action in his name, claiming indemnity 
for the damage incurred personally by him. Such a right is already established under 
the provision of article 148.2 of KCL. The action is based on the grounds of omissive 
responsibility.'^  ^ Therefore, shareholders have the right to bring this action when their
rights have been breached and where they have suffered direct damage. Because of the
importance of this right, KCL provides in Article 133(4) that:
The shareholders’ GM may not;
(4) Restrict the shareholder’s to bring an action for damages, in
accordance with law, against all or some of the members of the
board of directors in respect of such damage as he may sustain.
Also the KCL in Article 131 provides that:
A shareholder shall in particular enjoy the following rights:
(5) to apply to the court for adjudging null any resolution of the 
GM or the board of directors which infringes law or the public 
policy or is ultra vires the articles of the company or its 
memorandum of association.
A shareholder has the right to bring a personal action in three situations. First, a 
wrong must have been committed by one or all directors or founders against a 
shareholder. Second, this wrong must have caused damage or deprived a shareholder 
of his personal rights. Third, the damage sustained by a shareholder was a direct result 
of the defective actions of the directors, or founders of the company.^®
A shareholder’s right to initiate such an action does not lapse even if he sells his 
shares after initiating the action, as long as the damage incurred by him happened prior 
to selling out his shares.
As this is an individual or personal action, it is deemed to constitute a pure right
Materials in Company Law, edn, London: Butterworths, (1996), p. 517.
Radwan, Fayiz, Commercial co mpanies, Amansora: Maktabt Aljala’a Publishing, (1994), p. 550.
Sameha A1 Kalyoubi, Commercial Companies. Egypt: Dar Alnadah Publishing, (1993), p. 476.
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of the individual shareholder. Thus, he may not be deprived of his right to initiate it, 
whether by a provision in the company’s articles of association or under a resolution by 
the GM. Moreover, initiating the action may not be conditional on the GM’s 
permission. In addition, the approving of the company’s balance sheet during the GM 
should not affect the personal rights that stem from the law or the company’s articles 
of association, or those derived from his position as a member of the company. This is 
because he claims indemnity for the damage incurred personally, rather than 
representing the company in this action.
8.2 Statutory Protection Shareholders
When the subject of the company’s theory was examined in the second chapter, 
it was explained that, according to aU theories, a company issues its decisions by the 
approval of the majority in its GM. Thus, the opinion of the majority consists in fact of 
many shares which entitle its owner to many voices. Those who possess the biggest 
number of votes enjoy the loudest voice in the company. This problem does not 
emerge if the majority dominating the company acts in a way that most benefits the 
company and shareholders.
The question that is posed here is: What are the rights and means in which the 
majority can resort to in the GM or outside it, to cease any exploitation from the 
majority to achieve personal interests, especially if the board is dominating this 
majority? If the minority of shareholders are granted some of the rights they may have 
a significant role in protecting the company and its shareholders. Some of the 
authorities that shall be granted to this minority are; requesting to hold the EGM to
Tamma, stipra note 13, p. 450.
296
discuss specific subjects, the right of the majority to resort to court to cancel any 
decision that changes the company's objectives, or impose new commitments on 
shareholders, asking the concerned bodies in the MCI to conduct an investigation in 
the company's transactions and the right of the minority to liquidate the company, as 
well as other rights.
The first part of this chapter was concerned with the right of a shareholder to
bring an action on behalf of his company or in his personal name. The second part
deals with statutory remedies that are available to the shareholders if they do not want
to bring a legal action. The KCL contains a limited number of articles concentrating
on the statutory protection of shareholders’ rights. An attempt will be made to identify
these articles to decide whether they are enough to provide the statutory protection
demanded by the body of shareholders. Article 136 of KCL provides that:
Within thirty days from the date on which a resolution is passed in 
accordance with the preceding article^ ,^ (any) number of the
shareholders who did not consent to that resolution, holding 
shares to a total value of not less than 15% of the subscribed 
capital, may, if the resolution is to their detriment, make 
opposition to it before the court. The court may confirm, qualify 
or cancel the resolution, or (order) postponement of its carrying 
out untü a suitable arrangement for purchasing the shares of the 
dissentient member -  provided that no expense whatsoever 
towards such purchase shall be charged to the company -  or any 
other suitable settlement is made.
As for the minority shareholder’s right to object to the resolutions of the EGM, 
Article 136 of KCL establishes that right if the objections constitute at least 15 per cent 
of the company’s capital provided, they have voted against the resolutions in question 
at the meeting and prove that the same prejudice their rights. The objections must be
The preceding article is 135 that provides “ the memorandum of association o f a JSC and its articles
of association may be altered by a resolution of its EGM, as provided in the article 158. Also, as 
provided in the said article, the EGM may decide to sell or otherwise dispose of the whole undertaking 
of the company or to amalgamate with any other company or body.”
297
submitted to the court within 30 days of issue of the meeting resolution, and the court 
may uphold, modify, overrule or defer implementation of the resolution pending an 
appropriate settlement of the dispute by buying the objectors’ shares or in any other 
appropriate manner/^ Likewise, minority shareholders who control not less than one
tenth '^  ^ of the capital of the company may request the GM to meet and discuss any
proposals or decisions made by them/^
Shareholders who hold not less than one-quarter of the company shares may 
demand that the directors convene an extraordinary meeting. This meeting must be 
held within one month of the date of receipt of the application (see 7.1.2).^^
Minority shareholders may inform the relevant government authority in the MCI 
about the violations of company law or the company contract by the board of directors 
or managers of the company. This authority may ask the auditor of the company to 
inspect the company’s accounts and all its transactions if it discovers that the board of
”  Almelhera, Ahmed, Privatisation and Protection of Investors in Kuwait: Reality and Ambition, 13 
A..L.Q  (1998)p .l84 .
Article 154 (2) of the KCL provides that “the board of directors, however, may call a meeting of the
assembly whenever it thinks fit, and shall do so whenever requested by a number of shareholders 
holding not less than one-tenth of the capital.”
Article 157 (6) of the KCL provides that “The agenda of the annual meeting of the general
assembly shall include the following items: (6) discussing any other proposal the board of directors 
may enter on the agenda to be decided (by the GM). A proposal may also be submitted during the 
meeting of the GM by a number of shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of the total number of 
shares.”.
Article 159 of the KCL provides that “(1) The EGM shall be convened pursuant to convocation by
the directors or pursuant to a written application addressed to the board by a number of shareholders 
who hold not less than one-quarter of the company’s shares. (2) In the latter case, the directors shall 
convene the EGM to transact business within one month of the date of receipt o f the application.”
One of many example that prove that even the rights that have been given to minority shareholders 
by KCL are not applied in many cases easily. In one of the Kuwaiti close shareholding companies 
(Alsahel For Development and Investment) one of its shareholders who hold more the quarter of its 
capital demanded the board o f directors to call a GM according to the article 159 of the KCL. The 
board here must within one month make a call the shareholders to attend a GM. However, the board 
of this company refused to make such a call until the Ministry of Commerce interfered after few 
months and compelled the company to hold its GM. This incident and many other incidents give us a 
bad impression about the application of the articles that provide the rights of minority shareholders;
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directors or employees of the company breached the law or the constitution of the 
company. As provided in Article 178 of KCL:
(1) The Government department concerned may exercise control 
over a joint stock company to insure that the provisions of the law 
and the Articles of association have been observed; the said 
department may at any time require the auditor of the company to 
examine its accounts and all its business.
(2) If it is established that a violation of the provisions hereof has 
been committed or some of the company directors or promoters 
have acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company, 
or if all or some of the shareholders or the violation is such as may 
have an adverse effect on the national economy, the government 
department concerned shall submit a report to that effect to the 
GM, and may convene the GM to discuss its report, and report 
the said violation to the competent authorities.
Therefore, according to this Article, the government department concerned in 
the MCI has the power to investigate the affairs of the company if these affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of the company or the interests of the shareholders.
Besides this, it is unacceptable for the GM to impose new conditions or reduce 
the shareholders’ rights beyond those imposed or given to them in the company law or 
the constitution of the company (see 7.1).^  ^ All shareholders of JSCs may also, at any
time, go to the concerned government authority in the MCI and review the documents 
of their company, and they can obtain an original copy of the document (see 5.3.5).^^
These are the rights of minority shareholders under KCL, and may be used to 
protect their interests in the company and prevent or nullify an ultra vires act of a 
promoter, the directors or a majority in the GM.
for more information see Alwatan Dealy Newspaper, Kuwait, Issue no. 8193/2639, on December 
1998.
”  Article 133 of the KCL.
58 Ibid,, Article 179.
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The role of the GM regarding the minority of shareholders issue is criticized for 
its weakness, as the KCL has not given this issue adequate concern and care, bearing in 
mind that the majority that always dominates the company and manages it for its own 
interest is often representing -  at the same time- the board members, as they are these 
members are main shareholders in the company. The KCL is also criticized for other 
matters and needs to be amended to take into consideration that the minority shall have 
a role in the GM, in order to protect their interests and the companies’, if its managed 
for personal purposes. This requires addition of many rights that are not available in 
the present law in Kuwait.
With regard to the statutory protection of shareholders under the KCL, a number 
of issues can be raised. First, do minority shareholders have the right to present a 
petition to the court to wind up the company? Does a shareholder have the right to 
present a petition for relief to the court which could order the company to be wound 
up on the grounds that the business affairs of the company are being, or have been, 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the company, the 
shareholders, or part of them? In fact, courts, according to the KCL, do not have the 
legal authority to accept such a petition because shareholders of JSCs do not have the 
right to go to the court to wind up the company, except where a company loses three- 
quarters of its c ap i ta l . In  this event and in this event alone, if the directors fail to
convene an EGM to wind up the company, any shareholder may petition to the court 
for a decree to wind up the company (see 7.1.2). The right to present a petition to the 
court on the grounds of an unfairly prejudicial act is an essential right every 
shareholder must enjoy, and the courts should be given the power to enable them to
Article 171.
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play thek appropriate role. The court alone has the power to accept or refuse the 
petition. Moreover, to demand the protection of the court, there should be no 
minimum number of shareholders needed to petition to the court.
Also, as provided above, the MCI, by its concerned department, has the power 
to hold an investigation into a company’s business affairs. It could be said that the 
system of investigation that is provided in the KCL is defective and shareholders will 
get nothing from it for a number of reasons. First, the Ministry in this investigation 
depends on the auditors of the company to carry out the investigation and provide an 
end report to the Ministry. This is unjust for shareholders because these auditors may 
themselves need to be investigated. They may be controlled by the board of directors 
as in many companies, as in the report the Kuwaiti Cabinet provided after the Stock 
Market crash.^  ^ If a company has good auditors there may be no need for an
investigation by the Ministry because all of the facts about the company’s affairs will be 
in the reports of such auditors. Therefore, the Ministry, which must have their 
independent professional investigators carrying out the investigation to obtain the end 
report, has the facts. Second, how will the Ministry behave when the concerned 
authority, depending on the report of the auditors, discovers that the board of 
directors, founders or managers of the company breached the law or the constitution of 
the company and it is proved that they have been guilty of fraud towards the company 
and its shareholders. What measures will be taken by the Ministry? What are the 
punishments that may be imposed on the wrongdoers and what are the remedies given 
to the victims? Unfortunately, as described above, Article 178(2) of the KCL provides 
that the Government Department concerned in the MCI should demand a GM to be
See the the report of the committee that established by the Kuwaiti Cabinet on 13/03/1983 by 
Cabinet resolution no. 10 meeting 11/1983 to inspect the affairs of number of companies.
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called to discuss the report. Therefore, the company itself will determine what shall be 
done regarding the report. Thus, if the GM is already controlled by the directors or the 
majority shareholders, nothing will happen regarding the breaches of law and the 
constitution of the company, and the wrongdoers will be safe from any punishment. 
The KCL in Article 178 is, in fact, giving a gift to the directors because, at the end of 
the investigation, according to this article, the MCI must transfer the report of the 
investigation to the GM, and if the board controls the GM, they would issue a 
resolution to ratify their wrongful actions. The law should not give this gift to the 
wrongdoers.
The question that must be asked here is: What is the advantage of the system of 
the investigation in the KCL? The system of investigation under the KCL should be 
reformed. Minority shareholders should have a clear right to demand that the Ministry 
appoint an independent investigator to examine the company’s affairs. The Ministry 
should have its own investigators and there should be no need to ask the auditors to 
conduct the investigation into the company’s affairs. The powers of the investigators 
must be enough to enable them to carry out their duties. Therefore, they must have the 
right to demand that the officers of the company produce every book and document 
they have. They should have the right to interview personally any or every person in 
the company. The Ministry should have, under the KCL, the right to present a petition 
for relief to the court which could order the company to be wound up on the basis of 
results from the investigation.
If there is a fear that shareholders may misuse this right and the reputation of the 
company is at stake, the Ministry should be entitled to impose a number of conditions 
before accepting the demand of shareholders to hold an investigation. First, the 
minority shareholders must comprise one-tenth of the shareholders. Second, the
302
shareholders must support their application for investigation of the affairs of the 
company with evidence to prove that they have good cause for the demand and to no 
illegal purpose.
In the UK the statutory protection of minority shareholders is quite 
comprehensive in comparison with the shareholders situation in the KCL. In the UK 
the minority may always petition the court to wind up the company on the grounds that 
the conduct of the majority is imjust.^  ^However, sometimes it is not in the minority’s
interest for the company to be wound up. Therefore, they have the right to petition the
court for an injunction under Section 459 of the CA for relief against the company.
This section provides that:
A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an 
order under this part on the ground that the company’s affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of some part of the members (including 
at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of 
the company (including an act or omission on its behalQ is or 
would be so prejudicial.
Any shareholder may petition the court on the ground that; (1) the affairs of the 
company are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of its members generally or of some part of its members; (2) any actual or 
proposed act or omission of the company is or would be so prejudicial.^^
In order to present a petition under the UK CA, a person must have the locus 
standi prescribed in S. 459(2) of the Act. S. 459(1), as noted above, provides that a 
member of a company may petition, then S. 459(2) provides:
S. 122(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that “A company may be wound up by the court if-(g)
The court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should wound up.”
Roberts, Pauline and Poole, Jill, Shareholder Remedies-EfFicient Litigation and the Unfair Prejudice
Remedy, J.B.L (1999) p. 40; Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd  [1986] Ch. 65% wrvdi Re Ciimana Ltd 
[1986] BCLC 430.
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The provisions of this part apply to a person who is not a member 
of the company but to whom shares in the company have been 
transferred or transmitted by operation of law, as those provisions 
apply to a member of the company; and references to a member or 
members are to be construed accordingly/^
Therefore, a person is qualified to present a petition when he is a subscriber to 
the memorandum or entered as a member in the company’s register of members. 
However, S. 459(2) expands the locus standi As a result, where a person to whom 
shares have been legally transferred by a proper method of transfer, but the company 
or the directors have refused to enter his name in the register of the company, he has 
locus standi to present a petition.
If the court is satisfied that the petition is well founded, it may issue such order 
as it thinks appropriate.^"  ^The court may also make an order;
1. Regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future;
2. Requiring the company to do, or to refrain from doing, any act;
3. Authorising civil proceedings to be brought in the company’s name or on behalf of 
the company by such persons and on such terms as the court may direct;
4. Providing for the purchase of any shares and, if appropriate, any consequent 
reduction in the company’s capital.
Point no. 3 is quite interesting because it gives a shareholder or minority 
shareholders the right to start an action against the wrongdoers on behalf of the 
company, (even where the conduct in question is not one of the exceptions to Foss v 
Harbottle) although, if he wants to bring such an action he needs the authorisation of
A member of a company is defined in S. 22 of the UK CA to be a subscriber to the memorandum of
association, and every other person become a member when he or she agrees to become a member of 
the company and whose name is entered in its register of members; see Prentice, D., Protection of 
minority shareholders, 25 Current Legal Problems (1972) p. 130.
S. 461(1) of the UK CA 1985.
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the court/®
Also, in the UK, the Secretary of State is authorised under CA 1985 to 
investigate the affairs of the companies for various reasons as provided in S. 432(2) of 
the UK CA/^ This section provides that the Secretary of the State for Trade and
Industry is authorised to appoint an investigator in the following instances;
1. When the Secretary of State is convinced that the company’s affairs are 
being handled in such a manner so as to defraud its creditors or other persons;
2. When there is concern that the company was established for an illegal 
purpose or that its acts are oppressive or harmful; or
3. When the managers of the company or its initiators have been found guilty of 
fraudulent management of the company’s affairs;
4. When the company members have not been given the information which 
they are entitled to receive in relation to the company’s affairs.
The inspectors who are in charge of the investigation of the company’s affairs 
have wide powers. They have the right to interview directors and employees and 
anyone else connected with the company. All these people are required to provide all 
information and documents they have.®^  The inspectors can require that interviewees
be put on oath,®^and, if interviewees refuse to comply with the inspectors’ orders, this
may result in the matter being reported to the court. The court may then listen to any
Ibid., S. 461(2).
Ryan, Christopher, Company Directors: Liabilities, Rights and Duties, 3^  ^ edn, Bicester: CCH
Editions Limited Publishing, (1990), p. 273; May son, Stephen W and May^on French Ryan on 
Company Law, 15* edn, London: Blackstone Publishing, (1998-99), p. 564.
Instone, Ralph, Inspectors, Investigation and Their Aftermath, J.B.L (1978) p. 121.
S. 434 (1) and (2) of the UK CA 1985.
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evidence and has the power to punish an obstructive interviewee for contempt of 
court. Furthermore, the UK CA allows the investigators to search the company’s 
premises to find and seize documents and evidence that pertain to the investigation.^^ 
The investigators are authorised to examine the company under investigation as well as 
affaii’s of its associated companies.
When the Secretary of the State has received a report fi'om the inspectors 
confirming the existence of illegal conduct, he can use this report as evidence in any 
petition to the courts to have the company wound up under the lA 1986 S. 124A.^  ^
He may also bring civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings against directors 
and/or officers of the company, depending on the report of the investigator and if he 
considers that it is in the public interest to do so. These proceedings are brought in the 
name of the company.
The report can be used to obtain a remedy for the company’ shareholders in 
respect of the unfairly prejudicial conduct. "^  ^ Therefore, shareholders are given some
protection and assurance that the company’s affaires will be properly controlled 
because of the possibility of a comprehensive investigation by the Secretary of State, 
and the fact that real actions may be taken against the wrongdoers to recover damages.
There are other sections protecting minorities within companies in the UK. The 
holders of not less than ten per cent of the paid up capital carrying a right to vote in the
Ibid., S. 434 (3).
Ibid., S. 447.
Such as holding, fellow subsidiary, or subsidiary companies see S. 433.
About the function o f investigators Buckley L.J. in Re Perga/nonprm  Ffc/[1970] 3 All E.R. 535
said that “is an inquisitorial function. His duty is to investigate the affairs of the company and to 
report on them to the Board of Trade. It is not a judicial fimction.”
S. 438 of the UK CA 1985.
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GM may at any time force the directors, by a signed requisition, to call an 
extraordinary GM/^ The directors then have just 21 days to convene the extraordinary 
GM/®
The right of a class of shareholders can only be altered if the shareholders of the 
class itself agree to it/^ However, the holders of not less than 15 per cent of any shares 
influenced by a variation of class rights may apply to the court to have the variation 
cancelled/® If they wish to do this, they must, first, not have voted in favour of the
variation, and second, they must apply to the court within 21 days of the passing of the 
class resolution or the granting of consent.
If some of the shareholders of a company themselves wish to move a resolution 
at an annual meeting, or circulate to shareholders a statement relating to any proposed 
resolution or business to be dealt with at any GM, they can do so. The holders of not 
less than 5 per cent of the company’s paid up capital, or 100 shareholders who have 
paid an average of £100 on their shares, may compel a company to give notice of a 
resolution to be moved at a meeting and circulate statements to shareholders.^^
Also, shareholders may object to any alteration of the objectives of their 
company. Thus, the UK CA provides that 15 per cent of the shareholders, or holding 
15 per cent of any class of shares, may apply to the court within 21 days of the passing 
of a special resolution altering the objects of the company. The objectors must not
S. 460.
Ibid., S. 368.
8.368(4).
"m W ., S. 125.
Ibid., S. 127 
’fb id ., S. 376
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include anyone who previously voted in the favour of the alteration/^
The holders of at least 10 per cent of the issued shares of the company, or 200 
shareholders whatever their shareholding, may apply to the Secretary of State to 
appoint inspectors to investigate the company’s affairs®^  the company’s ownership/^ 
The minority shareholders may require a liquidator to acquire their shares on a 
reconstruction of the company/^ In a take-over bid, the dissenting shareholders may
compel the company to acquire their shares if the company has not chosen to do so/"^
The holders of not less than 5 per cent of the issued share capital or 5 per cent of the 
members (if no share capital) or fifty shareholders can apply to the court to cancel a 
resolution for re-registering a JSC as a private company/^
Minority shareholders have the right to demand a poll/®
8,3 Penalty of the Wrongdoers as a Remedy
It could be said that the law cannot be followed and respected without a number 
of penalties that may be imposed upon persons who abuse the law. Such penalties can 
be considered as a remedy for shareholders by forcing the directors, founders, 
managers and others to respect the rights of shareholders and other interest groups in 
the company. These penalties may also prevent, or at least reduce, the offences against 
companies and other interested parties in the company. Amongst all the articles of the
JW ., S. 5.
Ibid., S. 431.
Ibid., S. 442.
S. 11 of the lA.
S. 429 of the UK CA 1985. 
Ibid., S. 54.
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KCL, there is only one which imposes limited penalties upon any person who violates
specific articles. This Article is 184 (bis) of KCL which provides that:
Any person who violates the provision of article 85, 106, 109, the 
last paragraph of article 77 and the last paragraph of article 104, 
shall be punished with a fine not less that 10 dinars nor more than 
200 dinars; the court may decree the impounding of the shares 
which were the subject of the violation; any interested person may 
claim damage, (if appropriate) fi'om the defaulter.®^
KCL provides in this article that any person breaching one of the articles 
mentioned (Articles 85, 106, 109 and last paragraphs of 77andl04) will be penalized. 
The penalty will be a fine of not less than 10 Kuwaiti dinars®® and not more than 200
dinar and the court may impound the shares of the wrongdoer. The question that must 
be asked here is: what about the other articles of company law, is it acceptable that 
they are breached? It could be said that, the penalty under the current law is too 
lenient and does not match the gross mistakes which the company and its shareholders 
suffer. In the UK, for example, the Companies Act 1985 contains approximately 202 
separate criminal offences punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. Examples 
include;
1. Directors exercising company’s power of allotment without the authority 
required by S. 80 (1) are liable to a fine.
2. Each of the directors knowingly or willfiilly authorising or permitting non- 
compliance with S. 142 (requirement to convene a company meeting to 
consider serious loss of capital) is liable to a fine.
3. A director who makes a statutory declaration under S. 155 with particulars of
Ibid., S. 373.
Article 77 and 85 o f the KCL concentrate on subscriptions in JSC, 106 and 109 impose restrictions
on the process of transferring the shares of JSCs and finally article 104 about the shareholders’ 
responsibility to pay the calls.
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financial assistance to be given for acquisition of shares without reasonable 
grounds for the opinion expressed in it is liable to imprisonment and/or a 
fine.''
4. Every director who knowingly or recklessly is a party to approving defective 
accounts is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine.'^
5. The company and any person (include directors) who fails to send annual 
accounts, the directors’ report and the auditors’ report to those entitled to 
them is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine.'^
6. The company and every officer who fails to supply a copy of accounts and 
reports to shareholders on his demand is guilty of an offence and liable to a 
fine.'^
7. Any director or shadow director who fails to declare an interest in a proposed 
contract with the company is liable to a fine.'^
8. The company and every officer (include directors) who fails to make 
directors’ service contracts open to inspection, or fails to notify the registrar 
within 14 days where they are kept, or refuses to allow the inspection required 
under S. 318(7) is liable to a fine.'"^
9. Directors who fail to notify an interest in company shares; or who make false 
statements in purported notification are guilty of an offence and liable to
One Kuwaiti Dinar equals £2. 
S e e s . 156 (7) of the UK CA. 
Ibid., S. 233 (5).
Ibid., S. 238 (5).
Ibid., S. 239 (3).
'^Ubid., S. 317(7).
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imprisonment or a fine, or both.'^
10. Every director or secretary who fails to file an annual return and who cannot 
show that he took all reasonable steps to avoid commission of the offence is 
liable to a fine.'^
11. Every director who failed to take all reasonable steps to convene meeting 
requested by a resigning auditor is guilty of an offense and liable to a fine.'^
12. Any person who fails to give the Secretary of State information or gives 
false information about his interests in shares is liable to imprisonment or a 
fine, or both."
The purpose of these criminal offences punishable by fine, imprisonment or both 
is not just to punish the wrongdoers, but also to deter other fi*om committing such 
crimes or wrongs that may affect the company and its shareholders interests. These 
aims cannot be achieved under the current KCL because this law, in terms of the 
punishments that may be imposed on the persons who breach the laws and 
constitutions of companies is too weak. Therefore, a number of suggestions were 
introduced in a new chapter ten," which regulates the penalties imposed in the event of
a breach of the provisions of commercial company law, thereby canceling Article 184 
(bis) concerning penalties. The suggested amendments are designed to strike a balance
^Ubid., S. 318(8).
Ibid, S. 324 (7).
^U bid, S. 363.
Ibid, S. 392A (5).
Ibid., S. 444 (3); related laws such as the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, the
Business Name Act 1986, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the financial services 
Act 1986 also impose criminal penalties.
Produced by the Kuwait National Assembly and government of Kuwait to put forward number of
suggestions for amending the Company Law which are now under consideration by the assembly’s 
financial and legislative Committee.
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between the contravention and the punishments as the penalties under the current law 
are too lenient and do not match the gross mistakes which the company and its 
shareholders suffer, and the new provisions, therefore, attempt to eliminate such a 
mismatch.
In this proposed new article, the offender committing one of the actions 
determined in the article will be liable to a penalty of imprisonment for a period not less 
than three years, and to a fine not less than 5,000 Kuwaiti dinars and not more than 
20,000 dinars, or by one of these two penalties. This proposed article incriminates;
1. Any one who mentions intentionally in publication the issue of shares, false 
data, or contradiction to the company law.
2. Whoever intentionally makes a false report and creates a false picture about 
the real financial situation of the company such as directors, auditors, managers 
and liquidators.
3. Whoever overstates the value of any contribution in kind.
4. Whoever distributes profits or interests contrary to the provisions of the 
company law or the constitution of the company and the financial situation of the 
company.
5. Whoever manages the company (e.s directors and liquidators) to achieve his 
personal interests directly or indirectly.
6. Every director, manager, auditor, officer of the company who discloses a 
secret, known by reason of his work.
7. Whoever is employed to inspect the affairs of the company and intentionally 
advertises false data that affect the result of investigation.
8. Whoever distributes false information or misleading information about the 
financial situation of a company registered in the Kuwait Stock Market.
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9. Whoever publishes hidden information about companies registered on the
stock market to gain personal profit/"
Eventually, one might ask, do the minority shareholders’ have enough protection 
under the KCL from unfair prejudicial acts? Minority shareholders do not have 
minimum rights to help them protect their interests in the company against the board of 
directors or the majority of shareholders.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the channels or instruments available for a shareholder 
or minority shareholders to remedy the harm done to the company, shareholders or 
both caused by an act or negligence of the board of directors or a third party. Usually, 
those vyho cause harm to the company and its shareholders control the company and 
the GM and can therefore, prevent any action by the company to remedy the harm. In 
this situation, every shareholder should have a number of means that enable him to 
remedy the harm done. Thus, if the minority shareholders feel that the actions of 
directors or majority shareholders cause damage to the interests of the company, they 
should be able to raise an action to protect their interests by protecting the interest of 
their company. In addition, because the 'way to the court may be long and expensive, 
they should have other means such as asking the MCI or DTI to investigate the 
company’s affairs or present a petition to the court to wind up the company.
It is clear that the KCL has failed to provide protection for shareholders 
regarding this significant matter. According to the KCL, shareholders have no right to
See proposed article no. 246 of the proposal which is now under consideration by the assembly’s
Financial and Legislative Committee in the Kuwait National Assembly. This proposal suggests 
adding a new article to the KCL
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sue in the name of the company. Minority shareholders do not have protection against 
the behaviour of the majority of shareholders and they have no right to litigation. They 
can neither request liquidation of the company, nor ask the MCI to investigate the 
affairs of the company by an independent investigator.
Therefore, the KCL fails to address many of the issues relating to shareholders’ 
rights, and especially the topic of shareholders’ remedies. Therefore, there is a real 
need for passing a new Company Law that mentions all of the shareholders’ rights. If 
there is concern that shareholders may misuse these rights and thus cause damage to 
the company’s image, the legislator may impose a number of conditions on this right to 
guarantee that nobody can misuse. First, to practice these rights he must be a 
shareholder in the company. Second, a shareholder will not be allowed to bring an 
action (or a demand) to investigate the affairs of the company if he participated in the 
wrong or if motivated by completely personal motives which are not to the benefit of 
the company. Third, the Company Law should always provide that these rights are 
exceptional rights. Therefore, a shareholder cannot take advantage of it, until the 
board of directors and the GM have refused or failed to bring the action on behalf of 
the company. Fourth, practicing these rights by shareholders should always be for the 
benefit of the company and not for some other purpose. In addition, the court or the 
MCI (DTI in the UK) will not allow the derivative action or investigation to be 
brought if there is another satisfactory remedy. Moreover, the shareholder who wants 
to bring the derivative action, present a petition or demand an investigation must first 
inform the GM about his intention. This condition may compel the board or the GM to 
remedy wrongs done to the company to protect the company’s reputation. Finally, the 
court and the MCI may always have the power to dismiss or refuse any derivative
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action or demand of investigation brought by a shareholder which, in the opinion of the 
court or MCI, has no realistic prospect of success at full trial.
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Conclusion
This study addressed the issue of Shareholders’ rights in the JSCs in accordance 
with the KCL No. 15 of 1960. In Kuwait, there has not been a single study conducted 
on this topic despite its importance. This was the main reason behind the selection of 
this topic as the body of this study.
Shareholders are the owners of the company’s shares and as such, they provide 
the capital of the company. Shareholders bear losses whenever a company’s project 
fails, each according to his shares in the total capital of the company. They are also 
the last to be financially compensated when companies are liquidated. Therefore, 
they are one of the main two organs in any JSC and, because of their position, they 
possess numerous authorities enabling them to participate in administrating and 
monitoring those running the Company.
In general, in this study, an attempt was made to define the rights that those 
shareholders should enjoy with consistent reference to articles contained in the KCL. 
Company laws in other countries were touched on, particularly the UK Companies 
Act 1985, with the aim of finding solutions to existing problems in the KCL and to fill 
the apparent discrepancies in the issues pertaining to shareholders rights as contained 
in the KCL, compared to those other laws.
In this conclusion the most important points that appeared in this study will be 
discussed. Recommendations will also be made in relation to the shareholders' rights 
in JSCs as related to the KCL.
The theory of the company was discussed in Chapter Two. This was important 
in order to understand the position of the shareholder in this type of company. 
Contractual theory, states that the shareholder company is nothing but a contractual
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agreement between several persons and that those persons are the actual owners of the 
company. This contract, like any other private contract, is in no way related to the 
State other than in an organisational sense. According to Institutional Theory, the 
company is an establishment initiated by a state decree in which the role of the 
shareholders is limited to producing the capital of the company.
It is not easy to come to a conclusion on the matter of contractual and 
institutional theories, and determine whether a company is a contract or an institution. 
Nevertheless, it is quite true that the establishing and running of JSCs is no longer 
considered as a purely private affair fieely organised by private parties. Thus, the 
legislatures almost everywhere in the world impose several significant restrictions 
upon the process of incorporating and running companies. Companies in general, and 
especially JSCs, have a very strong influence on the economy of every country. They 
also affect the lives of ordinary people who use their products and services; they 
affect the environment, and many other things, which force the countries by their 
Company Acts to interfere in commercial life in order to protect their economy and 
also to protect public savings. Consequently, the legislature of Kuwait in Company 
Law No. 15/1960 has given the MCI in Kuwait a major role in the process of 
incorporation.
The notion of contract does not totally disappear. But, at the same time, a JSC 
is not purely a private contract. It is a fact that a company is created by a number of 
contracts between a number of persons. However, these contracts are not like other 
private contracts between private parties. Thus, the rules of private law are not totally 
abandoned to adopt public law. Because, the operation of subscription still appears 
directly or indirectly as a contract. For example, see Article 78 of KCL, S. 14(1) of 
the UK Companies Act 1985, and Art. 1832 of French Civil Law.
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In discussing company’s ownership it was explained that when the company is 
established legally and formal legal decree of its establishment is issued, it becomes a 
legal entity. This legal entity (the company) owns all of the Company’s assets. 
Therefore, during the existence of the Company, Shareholders do not own the 
Company’s assets. However, they do own the Company’s shares which give them 
numerous rights. The ownership of the assets of the Company does not get 
transferred to the Shareholders except when the Company is dissolved and all debts 
are settled. Only then will the Company’s assets become the property of the 
Shareholders, pro rata the number of Company’s Shares that he is holding.
It was clarified in Chapter Two that many groups have an interest in these types 
of companies such as members of the board, creditors, bondholders, company 
employees, company customers and shareholders. The rights of every interested 
group should be protected since the JSCs are not just making profits for the 
shareholders alone. However, this study is about the rights of shareholders and, 
therefore, it concentrated on their rights. It stressed the distinguished position 
shareholders enjoy in these companies, as compared to other beneficiaries. For this 
reason, company’s regulations grant them (as opposed to the board) several rights and 
authorities.
It was also made clear in this chapter that JSCs are not managed is the interests 
of shareholders alone. There are many groups in every JSC, and every group has 
interest that must be protected. However, because the study is about the shareholders 
rights it concentrates on their rights.
The distribution of power and authority in shareholder companies between the 
board and the shareholders was discussed in this chapter. Each possesses a number of 
different authorities which create, even theoretically, some sort of balance of power
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between the two sides. It was stressed that this balance of power will fulfil the goals 
of the company.
Chapter Three concentrated upon the definition and description of shares and 
the shareholder. A person becomes a shareholder in a JSC when he owns a share, and 
because of this ownership he enjoys a number of rights and powers within the 
company. The KCL was criticised for not including any definition of shares, despite 
the importance of such a definition. The KCL was also found to be lacking in the 
issue of the preference shares. The KCL only recognises one type of share; the 
ordinary shares. Companies in Kuwait do not issue anything but ordinary shares, a 
fault that needs to be reprimanded. A company should be granted the rights to issue 
preference shares if it desires to do so and give preference shareholders special 
privileges that ordinary shareholders do not enjoy. The issuance of this type of share 
does not jeopardize the principle of equity among shareholders of the same type of 
shares. In other words, equity should prevail among owners of ordinar y shares. The 
same should be true for shareholders of the preference shares.
The rest of the study concentrated on the rights of the shareholder in a direct 
way. It should be clear that making profits for the body of shareholders is not the 
only aim of the JSCs. Any company is in fact a web of contracts. Therefore, there are 
a number of interested groups, and every group has rights and interests to be 
achaeived. Shareholders, as one of these interested groups, also have interests and 
rights in the company. Their first right is the financial right. This right is one of the 
main reasons that drive them to participate in these kinds of companies. Also, this 
right is or should be considered as an encouragement for shareholders to pay more 
attention in the company’s affairs.
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Chapter Four began with the right of shareholders to dispose of theii* shares in 
any disposition way (selling, gift, present or giving up). It was emphasised that this is 
one of the basic rights that shareholders cannot be deprived of. It is also one of the 
main reasons why people invest in these types of companies.
It was mentioned in this study that the company laws for a number of reasons, 
impose some restrictions on the rights of shareholders to dispose of their shares. 
These restrictions must be designed in the interest of the company and its 
shareholders and the legislator must not super impose his restrictions to the extent of 
depriving shareholders of this right. It could be said that the KCL has gone too far in 
imposing restrictions on this right.
Also reviewed was the right of existing Shareholders to subscribe in new Shares 
that are being offered during the company’s existence. It was made clear that these 
new shares should be offered first to existing Shareholders and not to the public in 
order to preserve the existing balance of power within the companies. Article 131/6 of 
the KCL has given this right candidly to Shai'eholders. However, as indicated earlier, 
the KCL Article 111 has given companies the privilege to impose restrictions on this 
right. This means that the board, especially if it monopolises the Company’s GM (as 
is the case in many companies) will have the authority to impose any restrictions. It 
can therefore, deprive the company’s shareholders from priority in subscribing to new 
Shares offered. This is one of the problems in the Kuwaiti law that should be evaded. 
Shareholders should not be deprived of this right unless they voluntarily relinquish it.
One of the most important financial rights that encourage investors to engage in 
the JSCs is the right of Shareholders to an annual profit. In Chapter Four, “Profit” 
was defined and the KCL was criticised for not having a clear definition of the word 
despite its importance. Also tackled was the issue of determining profit’s due dates
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and when the shareholder can claim his profit. Profits become the right of the 
shareholder as soon as it is declared in the resolution issued by the GM of the 
company. However, the KCL is found to be at fault when giving the board the 
authority to determine the date for the distribution of the annual profits. This means 
that distribution of profit can be delayed for some time. Profits should be distributed 
as soon as they are advertised and Boards should have no authority on this matter.
The issue of reserves was handled in this chapter. It discussed types reserves, 
means of creating reserves and the importance of preserving reserves as means to 
maintain the company’s independence (especially avoiding the need of a banks to 
finance a project). Despite the importance of reserves, this should have no reflection 
on the rights of shareholders to receive their profits. Shareholders should be informed 
in any fiscal year if the annual profit is being derived fi*om the company’s reserves. 
The KCL was criticised for allowing Companies to pay annual profit to Shareholders 
these fi*om reserves without obligating companies to inform their Shareholders 
directly of the sources of their profits. The Shareholders should become aware of the 
financial situation of the Company.
This Chapter also focused on the issue of distributing unreal or alleged profits. 
This is the case when the Board decides to distribute annual profit without having any 
real profits made by the company during the past fiscal year. These amounts are 
drawn firom the Capital of the company. It was clear ified that the Kuwaiti Company’s 
law does not mention this crime. This is a fault that needs rectifying. The lack of an 
article that incriminates the alleged profits has forced many Boards to distribute 
profits fi*om the capital without them actually knowing that they are alleged profits. 
There is a crucial need to impose new provisions to be added to the company law.
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incriminating this act and demanding that those who accepted alleged profits return 
them.
The final issue addressed in Chapter Four was the issue of shareholders’ rights 
to the Company assets at the time of dissolving the company. The Company being a 
legal entity owns its own assets, when the company is dissolved, the ownership of 
these assets is transferred to the shareholders. These assets are not to be distributed 
among shareholders until all debts are settled. Each Shareholder receives a 
percentage of the assets related to the Shares he is holding.
Chapter Five was about the rights of shareholders to know what goes on in the 
company. Having studied and reviewed the KCL, it is clear that there is an apparent 
lack in this area. Despite the fact that the KCL mentions the shareholders’ right to 
information in several articles, this is still insufficient to ensure that the Shareholders 
will receive the true picture of the company’s situation. Therefore, this matter should 
be remedied. It is not possible to expect Shareholders to play their role as supervisors 
to the board of directors’ administrative work if they do not have enough information 
on the company’s position.
In order to ensure that shareholders are playing a vital role, they should be 
granted a candid right to be informed of all the company’s documents and reports, not 
just for one fiscal year but for three fiscal years. This is necessary to enable 
shareholders to make comparisons on the Company’s performance over these years. 
They will then be able to find out for themselves whether the company is actually 
developing or deteriorating.
This chapter also looked at all types of annual reports. Each report was 
examined separately and it was suggested that the Kuwaiti legislature be more
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inclusive and simplified. These reports should be presented in a simpler way so that 
they can be comprehended and understood by a regular shareholder with no 
experience in this field also, in order for these reports to be beneficial, the KCL along 
with the Board of Directors should distribute these reports at least two months before 
the session of the GM. This will allow Shareholders ample time to study these reports 
and to understand its contents of figures, graphics and plans.
Moreover, if the bulk of the shareholders do not have enough experience to 
understand these reports, why not allow shareholders, especially big ones, to be 
accompanied by experts at meetings. Experts could help them understand these 
reports and assist them in making the right decision when the company’s position 
clearly understood.
This chapter pointed out the information that should be available in the agenda 
of the meeting of the Shareholders. The agenda for the GM should include all the 
projects for resolutions to be discussed in the meeting. Shareholders should be made 
aware of these proposed resolutions and should have enough time to study them and 
prepare questions to the board of directors. It is felt that the KCL should mention 
these points clearly to obligate the Board of Directors to reveal all the decisions they 
intend to take in their GMs.
There is plenty of information relating to members of the board and company 
management that needs to be made available. The place for this information is the 
private report of shareholders on company members of the board. To make sure they 
are in compliance with the law, the directors should reveal to Shareholders any 
awards and/or bonuses that they might have received as members of the board.
All personal interests of the board of directors should be disclosed. For 
example, contracts which tie the company to any one or number of its members has to
323
be disclosed; thus ensuring that these contracts were not made on accounts of the 
company or for achieving any personal gains, for the members of the board of 
directors. The Kuwaiti legislature should be commended for preventing board 
members from acquiring any direct or indirect gains except upon receiving the 
approval of the GM for the company. Unfortunately, this prevention does not include 
relatives of board members. Any board member wishing to engage in a contract with 
the company for personal gain can do so in the name of one of his relatives. This is 
one of the loopholes in the company law that can cause damage to the company’s 
interest and that of the shareholders. In order to remedy this, this prevention of 
receiving any contract or interest from the company needs to be extended to include at 
least first and second relatives of the board members.
The reality about companies in Kuwait and previous incidents prove the 
necessity of a new law obligating Board members to reveal all they gain in terms of 
rewards, privileges and contracts that may have been attained at the cost of the 
company and the company’s shareholders.
There is also a need for the MCI to play a supervisory role to reveal these 
wrongdoings and to keep shareholders informed. This would be in addition to its 
authentic role of providing information on all companies in the commercial area and 
opening its offices for Shareholders and Investors who are in search of facts about 
some companies.
Chapter Six was devoted to a discussion about the role of auditors towards 
company shareholders. The chapter pointed out the importance of the role played by 
these individuals in commercial companies, especially JSCs and with regard to the 
interest of Shareholders of these companies. As mentioned in the KCL, The auditors
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ai*e, in fact agents of the shareholders. Since they play an important role in this kind 
of company in the interests of the body of shareholders, their existence can be seen as 
one of the shareholders’ rights.
It is known that, at the end of every fiscal year, many reports are presented 
indicating the financial condition of the company and its commercial activities during 
the last fiscal year. These reports are prepared under the supervision of the Board of 
Directors and are not published until endorsed by the Board. In reality, these reports 
do not have real value. This is due to the fact that these reports are prepared by the
Û
board on the activities conducted by the board and this lessens its credibility. It 
cannot be foreseen that the board will prepare reports indicating discrepancies in 
management or point out to personal gains attained on the accounts of the company 
and the shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to have an independent figure to 
present reports on the company and the company’s stand. The role of this report is to 
actually assert or refute the information addressed in the company’s reports. In other 
words, the reports prepared by the Board of Directors do not enjoy credibility unless 
they are endorsed by the company’s auditors.
This important role of auditors cannot be carried out without the existence of 
several points. First, the auditor should be utterly independent from the board of 
directors. This means that they should be free from any influence or authority from 
the board of directors that may affect the integrity of their reports. Second, the 
individual who wishes to be appointed as an auditor should possess the proper 
academic credentials and experience. These might include, possessing the suitable 
accounting degrees, practical experience in the field and membership of the proper 
syndicate or society for this profession, which usually obligates its members to work 
within a recognized professional code of conduct. Third, the auditor should be given
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all the authorities and power within the company to enable him to fulfill his role of 
monitoring the company’s situation and affairs. He should be given the right to 
review all records, documents, deals and contracts for the company. The auditor 
should be granted the right to call upon the GM at any time if he sees a need for it to 
protect the company and the shareholders. This is a matter that was not mentioned in 
the KCL despite the fact that these are the only individuals, besides the board 
members, who are aware of the actual situation of the company. Finally, auditors are 
proxies (as provided in the KCL) of the shareholders this means that the shareholders 
have the right to question these proxies regarding their work and for any information 
they may gather from the company. The proxy should not under any condition refrain 
from answering any inquiries from the shareholders.. They should not stall in their 
answers for the questions directed to them by the shareholders.
Chapter Seven emphasized the right of shareholders whether ordinary or 
extraordinary during the GMs of companies. It was made clear that these meeting are 
nothing but a higher authority in the company that supposedly plans the policies of the 
company, monitors and audits the company’s directors and appoints them to the board 
of directors and renews or terminate their appointment as they see fit.
The KCL was criticised for stating that in order for any shareholder to be able to 
include items of discussion on the meeting agenda, he needs to be holding at least 10 
percent of the company’s capital. This percentage is available only to a small number 
of shareholders and they are usually board members. Therefore, it would be much 
better if the Kuwaiti legislature would change that percentage to 5 percent of the total 
capital of the company. This would include larger numbers of shareholders to 
participate in the GM.
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The right of shareholders to attend the meetings of the GMs was then discussed. 
It was clarified that the rights which shareholders enjoy within these GMs cannot be 
fully applied without their attendance at these meetings. Therefore, any shareholder, 
regardless of the number of shares he is holding should have the right to attend the 
meetings. The shareholder has the right to attend even if the value of his shares has 
not been fully paid up.
In Chapter Seven, there was stress on the importance of practising the right to 
attend meetings by shareholders, not only to practice their rights but also to monitor 
the work of the board of directors and to participate in the planning of the public 
policies of the companies. Attending these meetings is the golden opportunity for 
shareholders to face the members of the boards of directors and question them. 
However, the vast majority of shareholders are not enthusiastic to attend these 
meetings, and this leaves the field open for the board of directors to do whatever they 
please in the company without any real supervision from the shareholders. The 
reasons that prevent shareholders from attending these meetings should be studied. If 
the reason that prevents shareholders from attending these meetings rests in the 
excessive numbers, the board should prepare an appropriate setting large enough to 
accommodate each shareholder and facilitate their attendance. If the reason for not 
attending is the location of the meeting place, i,e., the distance from home causing 
additional transportation costs, then other means of participation should be included 
such as participation by registered mailing or by internet. However, measures should 
be put in place to ensure the proper organisation of this type of participation and to 
avoid any misuse.
Some shareholders may have a strong belief that their attendance would not be 
usefijl and are, therefore, not motivated to attend these meetings. It could be because
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they only own a negligible number of shares in comparison with the big shareholders. 
This, in fact, is the main reason that makes shareholders lose interest in attending 
these meetings. To overcome this matter means must be established to encourage 
small shareholders who, if united, will form an accountable force, able to 
communicate among themselves. Therefore, companies should provide shareholders 
with information on other shareholders whenever this information is requested. 
Communication should be facilitated by publishing names and addresses of 
shareholders, and the number of shares each holds.
The institutional shareholders have huge numbers of shares in JSCs, which 
enables them to play an important role in the administration and supervision of the 
board of directors of such shareholding companies. They, therefore, have an 
important role and carry weight that cannot be ignored in these companies. The 
questions pose that themselves in this study are: What is the role of the institutional 
shareholders in Kuwait? What is the nature of the relationship with other types of 
normal shareholders? Is there any communication between the two types of 
shareholders ? Unfortunately, the KCL does not mention institutional shareholder in 
any of its articles. Therefore, it does not place any special obligations towards the 
company and shareholders.
The KCL gave each shareholder the right to attend the GM of the company 
through his proxy. This is an important matter as not every shareholder can attend all 
the GMs for all the companies in which he is a shareholder. However, a weak point in 
the KCL is that a board member can attend the GM as a proxy for an unlimited 
number of shareholders, even for all the shareholders. The primary role of these 
meetings is to monitor and audit the members of the board and it is not logical for 
board members to represent or attend as proxies for the shareholders in these
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meetings. How would the board member question himself if he is the proxy for all 
the shareholders? Therefore, it is thought that board members should be prevented 
from acting as proxies for one or several of the shareholders.
An important right that shareholders enjoy in the GM is the right to question 
and to discuss matters with the members of the board. According to this right board 
directors are obliged to answer any inquiries in an obvious and understandable way; 
along with supporting evidence. The importance of this right stems from the 
ambiguity of the reports issued by the company. The meeting of the GM is the 
opportunity for shareholders to address the directors and auditors may be present to 
clarify the ambiguity of these reports for shareholders. The Kuwaiti legislature in the 
KCL did not mention this right clearly in any of its articles. It is suggested that this 
right should have an article by itself and that this right should not be restricted, even if 
the meetings of the GM go into prolonged sessions. For the process of asking 
questions, shareholders may be allowed to prepare their questions on the company's 
stand prior to the meeting of the general assembly and these inquiries could be sent to 
the company. The company's directors should arrange these questions, omit similar 
and then show them to the board members and auditors in an organised way during 
the GM's session.
Another right that needs special attention, is the right of shareholders to vote in 
the GM. Decisions can only be made by voting and this right is acquired as soon as 
they hold a share of the company. Under no circumstances, should they be deprived 
from practicing this right. One of the issues ignored in the KCL is the right of 
shareholders to arrange voting agreements among themselves pertaining to their 
method of voting in the GM. These agreements are very important and make the 
votes of the shareholders more effective and influential in decision making for the
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company and in the interest of the shareholder. These agreements push shareholders 
to cooperate among themselves to defend their rights. With the absence of this 
cooperation, the role of shareholders in these companies disintegrates. As mentioned 
earlier in this study that each shareholder alone cannot possess an active role in the 
GM, especially in the large JSCs, unless he cooperates with the other shareholders. 
Therefore, these agreements cannot be ignored by the Kuwaiti legislature and should 
instead be organised to achieve the interest of the companies and the shareholders. 
This organization should be handled legally and additional articles should be included 
in the Company law.
This study also looked at the rights of the shareholders to vote if they have a 
personal interest in the voting matter. It has already been established that the voting 
right is an authentic right that can not be withheld from the shareholder. However, if 
the shareholder attains a respected number of votes in the GM of the company and the 
same shareholder has personal interest in the issue of the vote he will no doubt give 
precedence to his personal interest over the interest of the remaining shareholders in 
the company. Therefore, in an attempt to protect the remaining shareholders, 
organisational methods should be applied to regulate this issue. The KCL does not 
include any article to this effect which gave an opportunity to those who own the 
majority of votes in the GM of the company to issue decisions in their direct personal 
interest. A legal article that regulates this important matter is recommended.
Chapter Eight focused on the shareholders’ remedies according to the KCL. 
After studying the shareholders’ remedies in the KCL and comparing them with other 
laws such as the UK CA, the KCL was found to be obviously lacking. According to 
the Kuwaiti law the shareholders have no right to sue in the name of the company 
even if the company, through the board of directors failed to take the necessary action
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and sue in defence of its interest. The KCL should candidly give any shareholder or a 
group of shareholders the right to litigate in the name of the company and in defence 
of its interest; if the company through members of the board have failed to do so..
The KCL fails to provide the minority of shareholders with protection against 
the behavior of the majority of shareholders, even the directors who usually control 
the proceedings of the GMs. According to the KCL, the minority of shareholders do 
not enjoy their rights. If the minority of shareholders are deprived of their rights, as a 
minority they have no right to litigation to request the liquidation of the company. 
Nor can they request the Ministry of Commerce to investigate fairly through 
independent investigators who have the rights and the authorities to conduct any 
procedure to secure the truth and give justice to the minority of shareholders.
Therefore, if they find out that their rights have been violated, it is the right of 
the minority of shareholders to litigate and request the liquidation of the company. 
Ultimately, the matter should rest in the hand of the legal system and if strong 
justifications exist for these demands of liquidation the matter should be decided by 
the court alone. The minority of the shareholders should always have the right to 
request the MCI to conduct an investigation. The MCI should consider their request 
and it should always have independent investigators separated from the auditors of the 
company. These investigators should have all the authorities to reach the truth. If the 
MCI determines that there are some discrepancies or mistakes in the company it 
should have the right to litigate and request liquidation of the company.
Moreover, the role of the courts in Kuwait in the case of protecting the 
shareholders is absent. A shareholder should always have the right to go to the court 
to defend the interests of his company and also his personal interest in it. The court 
should have the power to restrict or forbid the carrying out of any proposed act, make
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an order requiring the company not to make any specified, alteration to the 
memorandum or articles of association, require the purchase of the shares of the 
dissenting shareholders by other shareholders or by the company and it should also 
have the power to wind up the company if it just to do so.
On studying the subject of shareholders rights according to KCL it can be 
concluded that the shareholders in JSCs of Kuwait do not enjoy all of their rights. 
These rights can enable them to carry out their supervisory roles on the activities of 
the Boards of directors which, in turn, helps them protect their interests in the 
companies in which they have shares. Despite many adjustments to the KCL since 
1960, this law is still underdeveloped and inadequate. It has failed to address many of 
the issues relating to shareholders equities. There is a need for the passing of a new 
Company Law, contemporary and suited to the new world order in which we are 
living today.
It is hoped that the following point would be considered in the passing of a new
law;
1. Shareholders should be granted all the rights that are not included in the 
present KCL no. 15/1960. These rights should be given in accordance with the real 
role and position of shareholders. One may ask what these shareholders’ rights should 
be? There are a number of rights that must exist in any company law and these rights 
are; the right to remain in the company as a shareholder who presented a part of the 
company's capital, the right to dispose of his share at any time and by any means of 
disposition, the right to reject the increase of his commitments in the company, the 
right to acquire profits, the right to participate in the company’s management, the
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right to hold a responsibility according to the capital paid by him, the right to receive 
the deed proving his rights in the company, the right to have access to information 
that enable him to read specific documents, data and reports sent to him, or be put 
under his disposition at certain appointments and occasions, the right to attend and 
vote in the GMs, the right to demand abrogation or dissolution of the company, if 
there is a legal reason for that. Shareholders are also entitled to file suits before the 
judge in the name of the company to defend its interests or in his own name, to defend 
his ovm interests in the company.
2. It is not enough that shareholders simply receive their rights. Proper methods 
should be implemented to encourage these shareholders to practice these equities. A 
law should be passed to encourage the cooperation between shareholders to enhance 
the influence of practicing these rights in the company.
3. There is a direct, basic and inseparable relation between the board of directors 
and shareholders. Directors, by the powers they have within the company, can 
impede the continuity of the rights granted to shareholders. Any new Law should 
consider the matter of directors and, therefore, the issue of directors’ powers and 
responsibilities should receive constant attention;
(i) Restrictions should be imposed on the vast authorities given to the 
board of directors of the JSCs and they should be obliged to reveal all 
their private interests in the companies in their annual reports;
(ii) Any new law should impose on the board of directors that all 
reports be more detailed and simplified so that they can be understood 
by the regular shareholders. This opportunity should be given to any 
shareholder at any time to attain the information required to assist him 
in playing a more vital role.
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(iii) Moreover, it is the right of shareholders to have their companies 
administered by qualified members. Any new law should request that 
shareholders wishing to elect themselves as members of the board of 
the company must have the specific qualifications that would help him 
to carry out his role in handling the company. This is a matter not 
mentioned in the KCL.
(iv) Any new law should include what is known as Shadow Director.
This is not mentioned presently in the KCL. Duties and obligations 
should be imposed on the individual playing the role of "Shadow 
Director" to protect the interest of the company and the Shareholders.
(v) Punishments, whether fines or imprisomnent, should be imposed 
on board members and company auditors when they violate the 
company law or Articles of Association of the company in which they 
work. The present law only includes modest penalties. The presence of 
punishments will assist in preventing the directors, managers and 
auditors from exceeding their limits and harming the interest of the 
shareholders.
4. The relationship between auditors and shareholders also cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, company auditors should be independent and given all the authorities and 
the privileges that they need to fulfill their supervisory role on the activities of the 
company and its administration.
5. Any new Law must test all powers and authority, as addressed in this study, 
upon the MCI, with a particular emphasis on the department supervising the 
shareholding companies. Hence, the companies may be directly protected. Such a 
department should be entitled to intervene at any time it deems appropriate.
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Moreover, each shareholder should be entitled to resort to this department for 
information or to request intervention to protect the company's interest. He should be 
able to request independent auditors to audit the Company's accounts. Also, the 
department should also be entitled to protect the accounts and request dissolution or 
liquidation of the Company, if necessary, to protect the shareholders' interests.
6. Among the important recommendations of this study, is conducting a study 
through which it can assist in being acknowledged of the distribution of shares in 
Kuwait, meaning determining where the shareholding company’s shares are 
concentrated. Is it in the hand of the company’s board members, the ordinary or 
institutional shareholders. As this study shall require time, as well as complete team.
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